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The forward march of biobanking creates the need for an alternative approach 
to biobank governance. Biobanking encourages medical advancement by making the 
conduct of health-related research more efficient, by minimising physical harms to 
participants, and by facilitating personalised medicine and greater understandings of 
disease. Nonetheless, its characteristics that distinguish it from general health-related 
research often give rise to many ethical and social issues. For example, multiple and 
unexpected uses of biobank resources can render conventional informed consent 
inadequate for safeguarding participants and maintaining public trust and confidence. 
Also, because the size of a biobank cohort is normally large, biobanking usually 
requires considerable management resources and this can mean that biobanks can 
likely be financially dependent upon for-profit entities. This dependency can cause 
concern among participants and publics about commercial exploitation. These issues 
suggest that a new approach to biobank governance is required to address them. 
Indeed, their complexity and the sheer longevity of biobanking itself also suggest that 
it is relatively feasible and coherent to address them by focusing on a relationship 
between participants and biobankers. This involves many aspects of interaction and 
reflects an element of continuity, which is crucial to biobanking success, as opposed 
to one-off measures. Consequently, with the aim of addressing issues that arise from 
biobanking, this thesis offers an analysis of the participant-biobanker relationship that 
can deal with these issues. Such a relationship constitutes an authentic research 
relationship in biobanking (“ARR”). 
Based on this premise, the main research question of my thesis is to ask: What 
form of research relationship is appropriate for effective and ethical biobanking 
practices? Three sub-questions are raised to solve this top-level research question. 
They start with a normative question of why the ARR proposed in this thesis is 
desirable for biobanking. The next sub-question asks what this ARR should look like 
from a conceptual perspective. For a practical respect on my proposals, the last  
sub-question concerns the ways in which the ARR can be fostered in practice.  
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To address these research questions, my thesis first establishes the main 
characteristics of the proposed ARR as the fundamental notion thereof. These main 
characteristics are used to answer the first sub-question. For the second sub-question, 
the thesis suggests that the ARR should be based on the concept of partnership, as 
opposed to solidarity, mainly because partnership can exhibit the main characteristics 
of the ARR – as argued – and can also be prescribed in a governance manner. The 
thesis then uses partnership as a basis for proposing the key features of the ARR, which 
are deemed to be a conceptual framework for the ARR. To answer the last  
sub-question, the thesis uses this conceptual framework to propose a partnership model 
for biobank governance that can be used to develop the ARR in practice. 
My original contribution is to propose a novel approach to an ARR, and this 
ARR is based on the concept of partnership. In other words, my thesis argues that the 
pursuit of the ARR, which looks like a partnership relationship, is an important 
element of biobanking success. In this respect, my thesis is about a sociologically 
informed role for partnership in biobank governance. It also provides a nuanced 
epistemological grounding for a participant-biobanker relationship in both conceptual 
and practical ways. From a philosophical perspective, my thesis proposes an ethical 
framework for biobank governance that perceives partnership as a virtuous trait for 
biobankers and provides rules for acquiring this trait through biobanking practices. 
Notably, it is argued that this partnership is not – nor need it be – the legal paradigm 
of partnership, which fundamentally refers to for-profit business association. While 
law might have a role to play in facilitating the development of the ARR, it cannot 





Medical advances are generally made through health-related research. 
Recently, there is a trend towards facilitating this research by establishing biobanks: 
collections of tissue samples and/or information that serve as resources for research. 
One substantial benefit of biobanks is that their resources can be used in multiple 
research studies and so they help researchers avoid the need for participant recruitment 
in every research study, thus enabling researchers to conduct research studies more 
conveniently and efficiently. Moreover, biobank resources are usually so rich that they 
allow research studies on diseases or treatments that cannot be made if the amount and 
variety of research resources are not sufficient, like multifactorial diseases and 
personalised treatments.  
Notwithstanding, some issues could arise from using biobanks as research 
resources, and these issues possibly make participation in biobanks unappealing to 
some potential participants, who would otherwise be crucial contributors by providing 
biobanks with tissue samples and information as research resources. One example 
arises from the fact that uses of biobank resources in research studies are in the future 
and sometimes unforeseeable. This means that, when being recruited in biobanks, 
participants cannot know exactly how their samples and information are to be used. 
As a result, they cannot know whether such uses will cause any harms to them. Such 
uses might, for example, disclose their health condition that can cause emotional injury 
to them or their families. This disclosure might even expose them to discrimination 
and stigmatisation. In this respect, they cannot realise all risks involved when giving 
consent to participation in biobanks. Occurrence of such harms without their 
anticipation might render participation in biobank unacceptable to them and might 
even lead them to withdraw from any biobanks in which they have previously agreed 
to participate. This implication could undermine the viability of biobanks or even 
discourage biobanking practices in the long run. 
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Given the complexity of the issues arising from biobanking practices and the 
long-term nature of biobanks, it can be difficult to simply suggest one or more one-off 
measures as solution to these issues. Rather, it is argued in this thesis that it is 
preferable, feasible and coherent to address them by focusing on the nature of a 
relationship between participants and biobankers. This is because it involves many 
aspects of interaction and reflects an element of continuity, which is crucial to biobank 
success. Thus, with the aim to address the issues arising from biobanking, this thesis 
argues for a participant-biobanker relationship that can appropriately deal with these 
issues and such a relationship is considered as an authentic research relationship in 
biobanking (“ARR”). In other words, the thesis proposes one approach to an ARR so 
as to render participation in biobanks more appealing to participants and publics as 
well as to encourage and facilitate biobanking practices. As a result of my research, 
my thesis suggests that an ARR should look like a partnership relationship. The thesis 
justifies why an ARR should be based on partnership and how so? It then suggests 
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Introduction and Fundamental Notion of the ARR 
This thesis is interested in pursuing a participant-biobanker relationship that 
can be considered authentic. As for the reason behind this interest, there has been a 
trend towards establishing research biobanks to facilitate health-related research. 
When compared with conventional research conduct, biobanking is proving to be 
relatively beneficial to making medical advances by making research conduct more 
convenient and efficient, as well as allowing researchers to acquire more in-depth 
knowledge on medical science. Despite these advantages, my literature review 
suggests that many characteristics of biobanking also raise many issues and challenges 
that can render biobanking unattractive to participants or weaken their relationship 
with biobankers, thereby undermining biobanking together with its benefits. 
Accordingly, with the aim of encouraging biobanking, this thesis seeks to argue for a 
participant-biobanker relationship that can deal effectively with those issues and 
challenges. Such a relationship is considered here to be an authentic research 
relationship in biobanking (“an ARR”). The contribution of my thesis is therefore to 
provide one approach to an authentic research relationship (“the ARR”) and, as 
explained in the following chapter, it should look like a partnership relationship. Note 
that, with the expression ‘one approach’, this thesis is based on the assumption that 
there are many types of relationship that can be considered ‘authentic’ for biobanking, 
and it merely proposes one of them, which is based on the concept of partnership. This 
implies that there may be other types of relationship that can also be considered 
authentic in a biobanking context.  
This chapter is primarily aimed at explaining the context of this thesis as well 
as establishing some basic notions regarding the ARR that are per se part of the 
proposals of this thesis and are necessary for understanding other proposals developed 
in subsequent chapters. In so doing, its structure can be illustrated as follows. The first 
section outlines the background problems of this thesis by illustrating how the 
2 
 
distinctive characteristics of biobanking raise many issues and challenges in 
biobanking practice. It then justifies why this thesis ultimately focuses on proposing a 
participant-biobanker relationship, as opposed to suggesting one or more one-off 
measures for biobank governance. The second section explains the principal research 
question of this thesis together with three sub-questions that need to be addressed to 
answer this principal question. This section also explains how this thesis is structured 
and the research methods used in this thesis. The third section clarifies the contribution 
of this thesis by highlighting some aspects of this contribution in order to define the 
scope thereof. The fourth section establishes the fundamental notion of the ARR by 
proposing two main characteristics of it. The last section summarises the contents of 
this chapter and draws a tentative conclusion regarding the contribution of this thesis. 
Three words should first be defined here. First, as far as an ARR is concerned, 
the term 'authentic' is used in an instrumental manner: an ARR is not claimed to be 
genuine, in a literal sense, for a participant-biobanker relationship in general; instead, 
this term is used to make a reference to a participant-biobanker relationship that is 
capable of tackling issues and challenges arising in biobanking practice. Second, as 
further explained in Sub-section 1.3.1 below, a biobank refers to a collection of tissue 
samples and/or data related to tissue samples that is organised or held with an intention 
to use for health-related research. Finally, in this thesis, biobankers mean all persons 
who work as part of biobanks. In this respect, they are those involved in organising 
and/or conducting biobanking activities in certain biobanks, regardless of their 
professions. They include nurses who collect tissue samples and data from 
participants, persons who have a role in communicating with participants about 
biobanking, lawyers who are tasked with tackling legal issues arising from biobanking 
activities, and principal investigators who facilitate biobanking activities in general. In 
this sense, biobankers here exclude participants, funders who merely provide financial 




1.1   Background Problems 
The need for medical advances has prompted efforts to make the process of 
health-related research more efficient and be better positioned to investigate 
complicated diseases and develop innovative treatments. In recent decades, these 
efforts have resulted in the establishment of biobanks: organised collections of 
biological tissue samples and data, which serve as research resources for multiple 
research studies.1 Undeniably, the benefits of biobanking are noticeable. Particularly 
as researchers can use research resources in biobanks, they do not need to recruit 
participants for every research study. As a result, their administrative burdens and need 
for management resources significantly decrease, making their research more 
convenient and efficient. Indeed, the risk of an insufficient cohort is also substantially 
reduced. Moreover, biobanks usually contain various types of research resources, 
including tissue samples and a variety of information related to the samples. Some 
biobanks, such as national and population-based ones, even have large participant 
cohorts. These characteristics offer many advantages to research conduct. For 
example, they allow the risks associated with common genetic variations to be 
generalised and quantified, enabling researchers to understand genetic influence on 
common multifactorial or complex diseases. Also, these characteristics make it 
possible to innovate personalised treatments, whereby medical treatment is tailored to 
individual patients. Other than the benefits to researchers, biobanking is also claimed 
to entail minimal risks of physical or emotional harm to participants.2 Given all these 
                                               
1 J Kaye et al, "From an Idea to a Project" in J Kaye, SM Gibbons, C Heeney, M Parker and 
A Smart (eds), Governing Biobank: Understanding the Interplay between Law and Practice, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) 3-29, at 14-15. 
2 LM Beskow et al, "Informed Consent for Population-Based Research Involving Genetics" 
(2001) 286 JAMA 18 2315-2321; S Eriksson and G Helgesson, "Potential Harms, 
Anonymization, and the Right to Withdraw Consent to Biobank Research" (2005) 13 
European Journal of Human Genetics 9 1071-1076; UK Biobank, Information Leaflet, 
(2010) 11. Notably, this claim is not widely accepted. See TK Baumann, "Proxy Consent and 
a National DNA Databank: An Unethical and Discriminatory Combination" (2001) 68 Iowa 
Law Review 2 667-701. 
4 
 
benefits, it is understandable why many countries have recently established their own 
national biobanks, including Estonia,3 Taiwan,4 Sweden,5 Denmark6 and the UK.7  
Biobanking Issues 
Nevertheless, biobanking presents a number of issues in practice. According 
to my literature review, these issues essentially result from the distinctive 
characteristics of biobanking and they might render biobanking unappealing to 
potential participants due to, inter alia, nullifying many conventional safeguards for 
research participants or making participants feel uneasy about biobanking. These 
issues will now be briefly explained according to the characteristics of biobanking.  
For issues regarding participant safeguards, the foremost characteristic is 
multiple and unforeseen uses of biobank resources, which intrinsically nullify the 
conventional safeguard of informed consent.8 In particular, as biobank resources can 
be used multiple times in the future and these uses are sometimes unexpected, there is 
not sufficient information available to prospective participants for them to know 
exactly how their samples and information will be used after recruitment. In this 
respect, they cannot be sufficiently informed in a conventional sense. Consequently, 
they might not know whether or not future uses will be in accordance with their 
expectations and biobanking goals. More importantly, they might also be unable to 
realise or anticipate any harm resulting from those uses, thus preventing them from 
assessing the risks and benefits of their participation properly. This is especially the 
case when genetic materials are involved, as genetic research can have far-reaching 
implications.9 It can therefore be said that this characteristic of biobanking renders 
                                               
3 University of Tartu, "Estonian Genome Center" available at http://www.geenivaramu.ee/en 
(accessed 15 July 2016) 
4 Taiwan Biobank, available at http://www.twbiobank.org.tw/ (accessed 15 July 2016) 
5 Biobanking and Molecular Resource Infrastructure of Sweden, available at 
http://bbmri.se/en/ (accessed 15 July 2016) 
6 Danmarks Nationale Biobank, available at http://nationalbiobank.dk/ (accessed 15 July 
2016) 
7 UK Biobank, available at http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/ (accessed 10 July 2016) 
8 H Widdows and S Cordell, "The Ethics of Biobanking: Key Issues and Controversies" 
(2011) 19 Health Care Analysis 3 207-219; KJ Maschke, "Alternative Consent Approaches 
for Biobank Research" (2006) 7 The Lancet Oncology 3 193-194. 
9 Council for Responsible Genetics, Genetic Discrimination: A Position Paper Presented by 
the Council for Responsible Genetics, (January 2001) 5.  
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informed consent ineffective in terms of safeguarding participants from harm resulting 
from their participation in biobanking. 
The next characteristic is the variety of research resources. Biobanks usually 
contain tissue samples and many types of related data other than health information, 
including medical histories, genotypes, lifestyles and behaviours. These data are 
collected by asking participants questions, performing measurements on them and/or 
acquiring information collected from other existing databases. While this 
characteristic makes biobanking distinctively beneficial to health-related research, as 
explained above, it may render anonymisation unable to safeguard participants from 
harm to their confidentiality and privacy since a concealed identity might be uncovered 
by researchers using certain genetic information.10 This exposes participants to risks 
of discrimination and stigmatisation.11 As an example, if it is revealed to participants’ 
insurance companies that they are part of a cohort with a high chance of suffering heart 
disease, they might have to pay a higher premiums although they are actually healthy 
and do not eventually contract the disease. Indeed, provided that genetic material or 
information is involved, this implication might also affect other people who are 
genetically related to them, such as their families or genetic communities. One can 
therefore say that the richness of biobank resources might render anonymisation 
unable to protect biobank participants’ identity from unauthorised disclosure. 
Other than issues regarding these participant safeguards, biobanking might 
raise other issues that implicitly cause participants to feel uneasy about biobanking. 
These issues mainly stem from the size of biobank cohorts, which are normally large. 
Particularly, in practice, this characteristic increases the cost and the administrative 
burden of biobanking activities. On the one hand, this increase usually causes 
                                               
10 Z Lin et al, "Genomic Research and Human Subject Privacy" (2004) 305 Science 5681 
183-183. 
11 R Ashcroft, "Should Genetic Information Be Disclosed to Insurers? No" (2007) 334 BMJ 
7605 1197-1197; C Heeney et al, "Assessing the Privacy Risks of Data Sharing in 
Genomics" (2011) 14 Public Health Genomics 1 17-25. However, some authors say that this 
concern might be exaggerated. See HT Greely, "The Uneasy Ethical and Legal 
Underpinnings of Large-Scale Genomic Biobanks" (2007) 8 Annual Review of Genomics 
and Human Genetics 1 343-364, at 350; MA Hall and SS Rich, "Laws Restricting Health 
Insurers' Use of Genetic Information: Impact on Genetic Discrimination" (2000) 66 
American Journal of Human Genetics 1 293-307. 
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biobanking to rely upon financial support from the private sector,12 thereby allowing 
for-profit companies to become influential in biobanking. Indeed, this probably makes 
biobanking prone to the accusation of commercial exploitation, which is opposed to 
participants’ altruism and can provoke public disapproval. This probability is 
supported by extensive literature13 and empirical studies14 revealing concerns about 
commercial involvement in biobanking. On the other hand, the aforesaid increase in 
cost and administrative burden makes it difficult for biobankers to implement some 
measures that help make participants feel content with biobanking. An example of such 
measures is the provision of individual feedback: while many empirical studies suggest 
that individual feedback is generally desirable,15 it might be unfeasible for large-scale 
biobanks to provide feedback, especially when it involves careful and complicated 
analysis. One can therefore say that the large cohort size of biobanks might indirectly 
render biobanking unattractive to participants. Indeed, this might also be the case for 
small-scale biobanks that do not have limited resources. 
It can be concluded from the explanations above that, while many 
characteristics of biobanking are distinctively beneficial to health-related research, 
                                               
12 This is supported by a survey revealing that funding shortage is a main concern for 
biobanking. See RJ Cadigan et al, "Neglected Ethical Issues in Biobank Management: 
Results from a U.S. Study" (2013) 9 Springer-Verlag available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4228790/ (accessed on 14 July 2016). 
13 M Anderlik, "Commercial Biobanks and Genetic Research: Ethical and Legal Issues" 
(2003) 3 American Journal of Pharmacogenomics 3 203-215; D Budimir et al, "Ethical 
Aspects of Human Biobanks: A Systematic Review" (2011) 52 Croatian Medical Journal  
3 262-279. 
14 G Haddow et al, "Tackling Community Concerns about Commercialisation and Genetic 
Research: A Modest Interdisciplinary Proposal" (2007) 64 Social Science & Medicine 2  
272-282; Wellcome Trust and MRC, Public Perceptions of the Collection of Human 
Biological Samples, (October 2000) 130, at 63-64; Biobank UK: A Question of Trust:  
A Consultation Exploring and Addressing Questions of Public Trust (March 2002) 46, at  
20-21; SB Trinidad et al, "Genomic Research and Wide Data Sharing: Views of Prospective 
Participants" (2010) 12 Genetics in Medicine 8 486-495. 
15 J Murphy et al, "Public Expectations for Return of Results from Large-cohort Genetic 
Research" (2008) 8 The American Journal of Bioethics 11 36-43; AA Lemke et al, "Biobank 
Participation and Returning Research Results: Perspectives from a Deliberative Engagement 
in South Side Chicago" (2012) 158A American Journal of Medical Genetics Part A 5  
1029-1037; D Wendler and E Emanuel, "The Debate over Research on Stored Biological 
Samples: What Do Sources Think?" (2002) 162 Archives of Internal Medicine 13  
1457-1462; NL Allen et al, "Biobank Participants’ Preferences for Disclosure of Genetic 
Research Results: Perspectives from the OurGenes, OurHealth, OurCommunity Project" 
(2014) 89 Mayo Clinic Proceedings 6 738-746.  
7 
 
they might raise many issues that make biobanking unappealing to participants. To 
encourage biobanking, these issues need to be properly addressed in order to make 
biobanking more acceptable to participants. In so doing, however, there are many 
practical challenges to be overcome. 
Practical Challenges  
The first one is the inevitable trade-offs between different values and 
interests. This is particularly the case for commercial involvement in biobanking and 
possibilities of re-identification: as explained above, while the richness of biobank 
resources allows scientifically-valid and ground breaking research studies, the large 
size of biobank cohorts might heighten the risk of commercial exploitation, and the 
variety of information about participants might allow their identity to be disclosed 
despite anonymisation. Indeed, even if complete anonymisation is possible, it will 
prevent the provision of individual feedback, which is considered generally desirable 
and might be clinically beneficial to participants. Given these trade-offs, it can be said 
that direct solutions to these biobanking issues might not be feasible in practice. 
Particularly, while a decrease in the range of biobank resources and the prohibition of 
commercial involvement might address those two issues, those measures could reduce 
the intrinsic value of biobanking and make it practically unviable, respectively. One 
can, therefore, say that the attempts to address these biobanking issues can create 
tension between biobanks’ and participants’ interests – i.e. the capabilities of biobank 
resources versus the potential harms to participants’ privacy and other personal 
interests, and the sufficiency of financial support versus participants’ unease about 
commercial exploitation.16  
Another practical challenge stems from the longevity of biobanking, because 
this characteristic renders many one-off measures inappropriate for addressing 
biobanking issues. An obvious example is the issue regarding consent procedure in 
biobanking. Particularly, as explained above, multiple and unexpected uses of biobank 
                                               
16 Note that other trade-offs in biobanking are also pointed out in the academic literature, 
such as degrees of privacy versus facilitation of research and individual control of samples 
versus consideration of community risks and benefits. See KC O’Doherty and MM Burgess, 
"Engaging the Public on Biobanks: Outcomes of the BC Biobank Deliberation" (2009) 12 
Public Health Genomics 4 203-215, at 203. 
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resources make informed consent impractical for safeguarding participants. As a 
result, alternative approaches to consent have been proposed to replace this 
conventional one,17 such as tiered consent,18 implied consent19 and broad consent.20 
My literature review suggests that the latter approach seems to be preferable and has 
become the mainstream choice in practice, as it has generally been adopted in many 
biobank initiatives.21 While these alternatives are, in practice, more suitable for 
handling unexpected uses of biobank resources when compared to informed consent, 
it is still questionable whether they provide participants with sufficient safeguards 
against any harm caused by future uses, since participants do not know how biobank 
resources will actually be used, let alone the probable dynamics of and uncertainty in 
biobanking caused by changes in policies and the direction of biobanking activities, if 
any. One can therefore doubt whether these one-off consent approaches can be 
solutions to this biobanking issue. This also implies that they are unable to deal 
properly with the longevity of biobanking, and so they might not be able to make 
biobanking attractive to participants.  
Appropriate Solutions? 
These practical challenges indicate that it is not straightforward to address the 
aforementioned issues in biobanking. To make biobanking attractive to participants, 
one solution to these issues might be to consistently engage them in making decisions 
                                               
17 AL McGuire and LM Beskow, "Informed Consent in Genomics and Genetic Research" 
(2010) 11 Annual Review of Genomics and Human Genetics 361-381. 
18 AL McGuire and RA Gibbs, "No Longer De-Identified" (2006) 312 Science 5772  
370-371; MA Rothstein, "Tiered Disclosure Options Promote the Autonomy and Well-Being 
of Research Subjects" (2006) 6 The American Journal of Bioethics 6 20-21. 
19 P Furness, "Consent to Using Human Tissue: Implied Consent Should Suffice" (2003) 327 
BMJ 7418 759-760; JWW Coebergh et al, "One-time General Consent for Research on 
Biological Samples: Opt Out System for Patients is Optimal and Endorsed in Many 
Countries" (2006) 332 BMJ 7542 665-667; L Johnsson et al, "Opt-out from Biobanks Better 
Respects Patients’ Autonomy" (2008) 337 BMJ a1580-a1580. 
20 D Wendler, "One-time General Consent for Research on Biological Samples" (2006) 332 
BMJ 7540 544-547; MG Hansson et al, "Should Donors Be Allowed to Give Broad Consent 
to Future Biobank Research?" (2006) 7 The Lancet Oncology 3 266-269. 
21 German Ethics Council, Human Biobanks for Research: Opinion, (2010) 57, at 18; 
Icelandic Biobanks Act (No. 110/2000), art 7; Estonian Human Genes Research Act 2000,  
s 12; Norwegian Health Research Act 2008, s 14; Norwegian Institute of Public Health, 
Protocol: The Norwegian Mother and Child Cohort Study, (June 2002) 63. Both UK 
Biobank and ALSPAC use broad consent to recruit their participants. See ch 4 and 5 below. 
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about biobanking. In principle, this solution is arguably promising because it has the 
element of continuity, which can deal with the longevity of biobanking, and it might 
enable participants to know about and deal with any possible harm to them, including 
possible disclosure of their identity, and/or commercial involvement in biobanking. 
Examples of this engagement that are usually proposed in the academic literature, are 
dynamic consent and ongoing participant involvement. Nevertheless, when 
considering these examples in more detail, one can say that they raise additional 
practical issues that can undermine biobanking practices, as explained below. 
Dynamic consent allows participants to decide whether their samples and 
information will be used in certain research studies throughout biobanking endeavours. 
In this respect, they can directly control every use of biobank resources at an individual 
level.22 While this approach can deal well with unexpected uses of biobank resources, 
as well as the long-term nature of biobanks, it is probably undesirable in practice. One 
reason is that it can impose substantial administrative and financial burdens on 
biobankers. Moreover, even though some proposals for dynamic consent that use 
either opt-outs23 or an information technology interface24 could avoid these burdens to 
some extent, it remains doubtful whether participants really prefer dynamic consent as 
some empirical studies indicate that some people consider the complicated information 
in consent material cumbersome, and some feel unqualified to make decisions about 
the uses of biobank resources,25 let alone their actual capabilities for doing so.26  
Furthermore, this consent approach might also raise the practical issue of insufficient 
cohorts, since participants can decide not to participate in certain studies. This issue 
                                               
22 J Kaye et al, "From Patients to Partners: Participant-Centric Initiatives in Biomedical 
Research" (2012) 13 Nature Reviews: Genetics 5 371-376; J Kaye et al, "Dynamic Consent: 
A Patient Interface for Twenty-First Century Research Networks" (2015) 23 European 
Journal of Human Genetics 2 141-146. 
23 J Kaye, "Abandoning Informed Consent the Case of Genetic Research in Population 
Collections" in R Tutton and O Corrigan (eds), Genetic Databases: Socio-ethical Issues in 
the Collection and Use of DNA, (London: Routledge, 2004) 117-138. 
24 See note 22 above. 
25 CM Simon et al, "Active Choice but Not Too Active: Public Perspectives on Biobank 
Consent Models" (2011) 13 Genetic Medicine 9 821-831; AL McGuire et al, "DNA Data 
Sharing: Research Participants' Perspectives" (2008) 10 Genetics in Medicine 1 46-53. 
26 KS Steinsbekk et al, "Broad Consent versus Dynamic Consent in Biobank Research: Is 




can significantly discourage biobanking practices, especially when the reasons behind 
those decisions might be based on conscience – not reasonable grounds. It can 
therefore be said that the use of dynamic consent can raise additional practical issues 
that might hinder biobanking. Note that there are some academic controversies about 
whether participants should have control over biobanking at all, as explained below.27 
As regards ongoing participant involvement, participants are continuously 
involved in biobank management by, inter alia, being appointed to working groups or 
committees dealing with biobank governance. In some circumstances, participants’ 
communities are involved in organising biobanks as well.28 Accordingly, participants 
are allowed to know about and deal with biobanking issues directly by collaborating 
with biobankers or influencing decisions about biobanking activities at a collective 
level. Nonetheless, there might be some other issues that arise with such involvement 
in practice. On the one hand, it is questionable whether involvement procedures 
employed are meaningful or just tokenistic, as participant involvement can be executed 
in many forms – ranging from merely being informed about biobanking activities to 
having actual control over biobanking.29 Thus, it is possible for participants to be 
involved in biobanking but not actually able to help address any biobanking issues. On 
the other hand, this involvement usually leads certain participants to represent other 
participants or a whole cohort, thereby causing the interests of some participants to be 
overlooked.30 It can therefore be said that there may be some practical issues arising 
from measures employed to involve participants in biobanking.  
Given these two examples, the conclusion drawn here is that measures for 
engaging participants in biobanking could raise additional issues in practice. That is, 
to the extent that these measures might provide some solutions, they only do so for 
other practical issues that this thesis is concerned about. One might therefore ask 
whether they really can be appropriate solutions to biobanking issues. 
                                               
27 See 6.4.1 in ch 6 below. 
28 AA Lemke et al, "Community Engagement in Biobanking: Experiences from the 
eMERGE Network" (2010) 6 Genomics, Society, and Policy 3 35-52. 
29 See 2.2.3 (b) in ch 2 below. 
30 See 6.3.1 in ch 6 below. 
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Focus on Research Relationships 
All the explanations above reveal the complexity of the issues arising in 
biobanking: those issues involve trade-offs between different values and interests; 
some measures for addressing them might raise additional issues in practice. These 
explanations also suggest that one or more one-off measures might not be the best 
solution to these biobanking issues. A relatively holistic solution is therefore required 
to maintain the viability and acceptability of biobanking.  
Nonetheless, one might question whether this requirement is really necessary, 
as many empirical studies indicate a high level of trust in a biobanking context.31 
Despite such evidence, the answer to this question is arguably positive32 since it is still 
vital to ensure the ethicality of biobanking practices. This is especially the case when 
considering many circumstantial factors that might potentially hamper biobanking, 
such as public mistrust in science33 and the erosion of trust caused by the supposed 
untrustworthiness of professional actors.34 These factors also include some scandals 
that could diminish the public’s trust in health-related research, such as the unexpected 
commercial uses of research results in the Greenberg case, the unauthorised removal 
and retention of human tissues in the Alder Hey case, the suspicious exploitation of the 
Icelandic people’s genetic make-up35 and the introduction of an opt-out model into the 
sharing of sensitive health information with commercial companies in the care.data 
                                               
31 AK Rahm et al, "Biobanking for Research: A Survey of Patient Population Attitudes and 
Understanding" (2013) 4 Journal of Community Genetics 4 445-450; W Lipworth et al, 
"Tissue Donation to Biobanks: A Review of Sociological Studies" (2011) 33 Sociology of 
Health & Illness 5 792-811. 
32 Some authors argue for securing participants’ trust in a biobanking context. See M Levitt 
and S Weldon, "A Well Placed Trust?: Public Perceptions of the Governance of DNA 
Databases" (2005) 15 Critical Public Health 4 311-321; LM Beskow and E Dean, "Informed 
Consent for Biorepositories: Assessing Prospective Participants' Understanding and 
Opinions" (2008) 17 Cancer Epidemiol Biomarkers Prev 6 1440-1451; 
33 UK House of Lords, "Science and Technology - Third Report" (March 2000) available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldselect/ldsctech/38/3801.htm (accessed 
25 April 2012); B Wynne, "Public Engagement as a Means of Restoring Public Trust in 
Science--Hitting the Notes, But Missing the Music?" (2006) 9 Community Genetics 3  
211-220. 
34 O O'Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), at 3. 




initiative.36 Accordingly, an appropriate solution to biobanking issues is still essential. 
Otherwise, biobanking might not only directly erode participants’ and the public’s trust 
and confidence in biobanks, but also eventually hinder research practices as a whole, 
with implications for medical advances in the long run. 
When considering the aforesaid complexity of biobanking issues together 
with the sheer longevity of biobanking, it is reasonable to suggest that it is a viable 
proposition to address these issues by focusing on a participant-biobanker relationship, 
as opposed to proposing certain one-off measures. One reason is that this method 
intrinsically reflects the element of continuity, which is crucial to biobanking success. 
Indeed, this element could deal well with the aforesaid inadequacy of participant 
safeguards stemming from one-off consent approaches. Furthermore, focusing on a 
relationship generally allows many aspects of interaction to be taken into consideration 
and could thereby provide ways to properly address any complicated issues or 
challenges. In this circumstance, one might say that this focusing can properly deal 
with the dynamics and uncertainty in biobanking, as well as the aforementioned  
trade-offs, by allowing different values and interests to be considered and providing 
contextually appropriate solutions. Given these reasons, it can be said that the focus 
on a participant-biobanker relationship may provide a more systemic and coherent 
solution here, since it may be able to deal with many issues and challenges arising in 
biobanking practice. 
This thesis therefore aims to pursue a participant-biobanker relationship 
that can handle these issues and challenges, in order to make biobanking 
appealing to participants as well as to encourage biobanking practices. Notably, 
such a relationship is considered as an authentic relationship between biobankers and 
participants, or an ARR, in this thesis and, as emphasised below, this relationship is 
the core contribution of this thesis. 
                                               
36 Department of Health, "Review of Health and Care Data Security and Consent" (6 July 
2016) available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/review-of-health-and-care-data-
security-and-consent (accessed 15 July 2016); National Data Guardian for Health and Care, 
Review of Data Security, Consent and Opt-Outs, (June 2016) 58; T-P van Staa et al, "Big 
Health Data: The Need to Earn Public Trust" (2016) 354 BMJ available at 
http://www.bmj.com/content/354/bmj.i3636 (accessed on 19 July 2016). 
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1.2   Research Questions and Methodology 
From the previous sub-sub-section, it can be seen that this thesis pursues an 
ARR, i.e. a participant-biobanker relationship that can address issues and challenges 
arising in biobanking practice. As the distinctive characteristics of biobanking are 
beneficial to research conduct but these same characteristics render biobanking less 
appealing to participants, there seem to be two different values that need to be 
underlined when pursuing this relationship: one is the ethical acceptability of 
biobanking to participants, which makes biobanking attractive to them, and the other 
is the effectiveness of biobanking, which allows biobanking to fully benefit health-
related research. Based on this premise, my principal research question asks: What 
form of research relationship is appropriate for ethical and effective biobanking 
practices? To address this top-level question, three sub-questions need to be dealt 
with. 
1.2.1   Three Sub-questions 
The first sub-question concerns why the ARR proposed here is desirable 
for biobanking. This sub-question aims to provide a normative basis for the ARR. In 
so doing, this thesis first takes into account the issues and challenges in biobanking 
outlined in the previous section and then lays down the broad and basic criteria of the 
ARR. These criteria are considered to be the main characteristics that the ARR is 
expected to have. It can therefore be said that the ARR is normatively justified by 
illustrating how the background problems of this thesis are translated into the main 
characteristics of the ARR. The second sub-question concerns what the ARR 
should look like from a conceptual perspective. This sub-question aims to provide 
more details about the ARR that can be applicable in practice, by proposing the key 
features that conceptually characterise it. To do so, this thesis seeks for a concept in 
the field of social science that complies with the main characteristics of the ARR, so 
as to use the concept to underlie the ARR. As suggested in the title of this thesis, such 
a concept is partnership. Based on this, the thesis then develops a conceptual 
framework for the ARR by proposing four key features thereof. For a practical aspect 
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of my proposals, the last sub-question concerns how the ARR can be developed in 
biobanking practice. This sub-question suggests how to develop the ARR in practice 
by devising a partnership model for biobank governance that can incorporate the 
ARR’s key features into biobanking activities. This model consists of four key 
attributes, and each key attribute requires biobankers to implement certain measures 
and mechanisms in biobank governance so as to manifest that key attribute.  
Based on all these research questions, the main proposals of this thesis can be 
explained with the aid of a diagram, as shown in Box 1.1 below. 
Box 1.1:   The main proposals of the thesis 
 
Two points should be noted here. The first point concerns the relation 
between these proposals. In particular, the main characteristics of the ARR, which are 
used to normatively justify it, stem from the background problems of this thesis and 
they are basic criteria for seeking the concept underlying the ARR. Then, this concept 
becomes a basis for developing the conceptual framework of the ARR, which consists 
of the key features of the ARR. This framework is eventually used as a guide when 
proposing the partnership model for biobank governance, and thereby this model 
basically entails biobanking activities that can reflect the ARR’s key features. Based 
on this relation, it is worth emphasising that the main characteristics of the ARR differ 
ARR
Fundamental Notion
(the main characteristics of the ARR)
Partnership Model
(the key attributes of the model)
Conceptual Framework
(the key features of the ARR)




from its key features, in that the former stem from the issues and challenges arising in 
biobanking while the latter are established by translating the former into relatively 
specific criteria that can be applied to biobanking practices.  
On the second point, the aim of the proposed model is in particular to foster 
the ARR, which is expected to deliver ethical and effective biobanking practices. This 
aim is different from those of other models for biobank governance that have been 
proposed in other academic literature. For example, Campbell proposes a model that 
has the aim of safeguarding trust and altruism in biobanking.37 Prainsack and Buyx’s 
model aims to incorporate solidarity into biobanking.38 Winickoff suggests a 
shareholder model for engaging participants in managing UK Biobank.39 Notably, 
regarding the relationship between the proposed model and these examples, it can be 
said that the former serves as an alternative to the latter since the former has different 
basic notions, as suggested in the explanations below.40  
1.2.2   Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis has six chapters. Chapter 1 illustrates the problems behind this 
thesis, how they inform the top-level research question of this thesis, and what  
sub-questions need to be addressed to answer this question, as is evident above. This 
chapter also defines the scope of the contribution of this thesis, and devises the main 
characteristics of the ARR, which are used to answer the first sub-question. Chapter 2 
deals with the second sub-question by first examining the concepts of solidarity and 
partnership, and then justifying why partnership is selected to underlie the ARR. This 
chapter eventually proposes the ARR’s key features as its conceptual framework. 
Chapter 3 answers the last sub-question by devising a partnership model that 
biobankers can use to foster the ARR in biobanking practice. In doing so, this chapter 
outlines the key attributes of this model and explains what practical measures are 
                                               
37 AV Campbell, "The Ethical Challenges of Genetic Databases: Safeguarding Altruism and 
Trust" (2007) 18 King's Law Journal 2 227-245. 
38 B Prainsack and A Buyx, "A Solidarity-Based Approach to the Governance of Research 
Biobanks" (2013) 21 Medical Law Review 1 71-91. 
39 DE Winickoff, "Partnership in U.K. Biobank: A Third Way for Genomic Property?" 
(2007) 35 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 3 440-456. 
40 See 2.2.3 c) in ch 2 and 6.4.1 in ch 6 below. 
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required to implement these key attributes. It also illustrates how these key attributes 
and practical measures can reflect the key features of the ARR. In Chapters 4 and 5, 
the partnership model proposed in Chapter 3 is tested against two biobank initiatives, 
namely UK Biobank and ALSPAC, respectively, in order to demonstrate how the 
model can be put into practice. The last chapter clarifies the extent of the contribution 
of this thesis by first summarising its core proposals as well as the lessons learnt from 
the aforesaid testing. Next, it describes the types of literature to which this thesis 
contributes. It then highlights the limitations of the contribution. Finally, it explains 
how the proposals of this thesis deal with issues that commonly arise in a biobanking 
context, such as the provision of individual feedback, financial incentives and 
commercial involvement in biobanking.  
1.2.3   Research Methods 
All the discussions in this thesis are based on documentary research. There 
are three main categories of materials involved in these discussions. The first category 
is the academic literature, which encompasses many fields of study. For example, 
articles and books regarding legal, ethical and social controversies over biobanking 
practices were reviewed to determine biobanking issues that need to be addressed as 
well as to acknowledge existing arguments on certain biobanking issues. The literature 
on sociology was also examined to acquire basic knowledge about many concepts that 
might be used to underlie the ARR, such as partnership, solidarity and participation. 
The second category is reports on the results of empirical studies, which are used to 
support many of the arguments and proposals in this thesis. It is, however, worth 
emphasising that I have not conducted my own empirical study, while doing research 
for this thesis. The last category is materials illustrating activities of certain biobanks, 
which are used to identify and analyse activities that have been practically performed 
in those biobanks, such as reports on annual reviews of biobanking activities, 
participant newsletters and biobank websites. These materials are particularly crucial 
when testing the proposed partnership model against practical biobank initiatives in 
Chapters 4 and 5. Note that almost all of the materials in the latter category are publicly 
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accessible, i.e. they are readily available on biobank websites. Only one internal 
document is used in this thesis, the communication plans of UK Biobank.41  
1.3   Scope of the Contribution 
It can be seen from the previous discussions that this thesis attempts to pursue 
an ARR, a participant-biobanker relationship that can deal with issues and challenges 
arising in biobanking practice (as explained in Section 1.1). The reason is that this 
relationship is deemed to be able to encourage and facilitate biobanking by delivering 
ethical and effective biobanking practices. In doing so, this thesis first establishes the 
main characteristics of the proposed ARR as a fundamental notion of what this ARR 
is expected to achieve. These main characteristics are then used to suggest the key 
features of the ARR, which are considered as its conceptual framework. Finally, the 
thesis proposes a partnership model that can be used to foster the ARR in practice by 
incorporating the ARR’s key features into biobanking activities.42 It can therefore be 
said that the contribution of this thesis is an approach to an ARR; and to make this 
contribution, the thesis proposes the main characteristics of the ARR, its conceptual 
framework and a model for developing the ARR in practice. As explained below, this 
contribution can be categorised in the area of applied ethics in a biobanking context.43  
Before suggesting the fundamental notion of the ARR – which can be used to 
address the first sub-question of this thesis – it is necessary to discuss some aspects of 
the contribution of this thesis in order to further clarify the scope of this contribution. 
Thus, this section deals with three issues, namely the meaning of a biobank in this 
thesis, the level of relationship that the ARR involves and the ethicality of this 
contribution. These issues are addressed separately in three sub-sections, as follows. 
                                               
41 This document was provided by a UK Biobank staff member who produced it, with his 
knowledge that it would be used in this thesis. 
42 The proposals of this thesis are concluded in the form of a diagram in Chapter 6 (Box 6.1) 
below. 
43 See 6.2.1 in ch 6 below. 
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1.3.1   Meaning of a Biobank 
As there are many types of biobanks, it is important to clarify the types of 
biobanks to which the proposals of this thesis are applied. To do so, this sub-section 
first reviews the literature and regulatory instruments that offer definitions of the term 
biobank, and then it gives the definition of a biobank that will be used in this thesis.  
My literature review suggests that two parameters have usually been used to 
classify biobanks: purposes of biobanking and types of biobank resources. The former 
can be broadly categorised into medical purposes (e.g. pathology, organ transplants 
and reproductive technology) and non-medical purposes (e.g. insurance premiums, 
criminal intelligence and employment).44 The medical purposes can be either for 
research or non-research. Biobank resources can be categorised into two main types. 
One is tissue samples, which encompass any human tissues that consist of or include 
human cells. The other is data related to tissue samples, e.g. family and medical 
history, lifestyle and phenotype. Two points should be noted here. First, while tissue 
samples contain genetic information within their DNA, they are not treated as data in 
law.45 Nevertheless, genetic sequences are considered as data.46 Second, other 
characteristics of biobanking are also mentioned in some definitions of a biobank. An 
example is the length of preservation: in the Icelandic Biobanks Act, a biobank is 
defined as ‘a collection of biological samples which are permanently preserved’;47 in 
contrast, under the Swedish biobank law, biobanks can preserve biological samples for 
                                               
44 SMC Gibbons, "Regulating Biobanks: A Twelve-point Typological Tool" (2009) 17 
Medical Law Review 3 313-346. 
45 UK Human Tissue Act 2004, s 45(5); Estonian Human Genes Research Act 2000, s 2(2); 
Swedish Biobanks in Medical Care Act (2002:297), s 2; Norwegian Health Research Act 
2008, s 4(b). 
46 Estonian Human Genes Research Act 2000, s 2(9); Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural 
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679 (accessed 16 
July 2016). 
47 Icelandic Biobanks Act (No. 110/2000), art 3(5). 
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either an indefinite or a limited period.48 Indeed, the origins of tissue samples in 
Swedish biobanks need to be traceable to individuals.49 
As regards the meaning of a biobank in this thesis, it can be inferred from the 
discussions above that this thesis focuses only on biobanks for health-related research. 
That includes biobanks that were originally established for other purposes but later 
used for research purposes. It can therefore be said that, as long as biobanks currently 
serve as resources for health-related research, they fall within the scope of this thesis. 
As regards types of biobank resources, this thesis does not differentiate between 
physical and informational resources. This is because the thesis basically deals with 
interactions between participants and biobankers, and so types of biobank resources 
do not matter here. Indeed, this absence of differentiation renders the proposals of this 
thesis more widely applicable in that it does not limit their application to biobanks that 
only have certain types of biobank resources. It can be concluded from this sub-section 
that the term ‘biobank’ in this thesis refers to a collection of tissue samples and/or data 
related to tissue samples that is organised or held with an intention to use for  
health-related research. 
1.3.2   Level of Relationship 
Given that the proposed ARR concerns a participant-biobanker relationship 
and, in practice, participants can interact with biobankers as either collectives or 
individuals, a question arises as to whether the ARR involves a meso- or micro-level 
of relationship. This question is important as it helps to clarify what forms of 
interaction between participants and biobankers are of interest to this thesis, as well as 
what measures can be suggested in the proposed partnership model. For example, to 
receive input about biobanking from participants, this question will indicate whether 
biobankers can merely receive input from participants who represent participant 
collectives, or they need to receive input from every cohort participant. Another 
example concerns participants’ control over uses of biobank resources: when focusing 
on a micro-level of relationship, biobankers might be required to allow all participants 
                                               




to make decisions on the uses through, inter alia, dynamic consent, whereby each 
participant can decide whether his/her own sample and information will be used in 
certain research studies; by contrast, a focus on a meso level of relationship might lead 
biobankers to either involve some participants in making decisions about such uses on 
behalf of a whole participant cohort, or adopt Winickoff’s shareholder model, where 
the decisions made by participants at general meetings represent those of all cohort 
participants.50 
The answer to this question is that the ARR involves a micro-level of 
relationship, i.e. biobankers’ relationship with individual participants. The reason is 
that the ARR aims to make biobanking ethically acceptable to participants, who are of 
course vital contributors to biobanking, and so it is necessary to give weight to the 
interests of every participant. By contrast, a focus on a meso-level of relationship 
usually results in the interests of some participants being neglected, thereby possibly 
undermining the ethical acceptability of biobanking to these participants. For this 
reason, the ARR should therefore focus on biobankers’ interaction with individual 
participants, as opposed to participant collectives or other parties in biobanking such 
as members of the public and participants’ communities. While this answer is 
justifiable in principle, some might raise the practical issues of how to take into 
account the interests of every participant in certain biobanks and how to address 
conflicts between these interests. In this thesis, these practical issues are to be 
discussed and addressed when proposing the partnership model in Chapter 3. In short, 
the model addresses these issues by only requiring biobankers to give all participants 
opportunities to give their input about biobanking, not to receive input from all of 
them; in case of conflicts between their input, biobankers need to provide sufficient 
justifications for not acting on certain input.51 Notably, the focus on a micro-level of 
relationship also imposes some limitations on the contribution of this thesis and 
addresses the issue of representation in a biobanking context. This will be explained 
further in the last chapter of this thesis.52 
                                               
50 DE Winickoff, see note 39 above. 
51 See 3.2.1 b) (Disregard for Participants’ Input) in ch 3 below. 
52 See 6.3 in ch 6 below. 
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1.3.3   Ethicality of the Proposals 
Since the proposed ARR stems from an attempt to deliver ethical (and 
effective) biobanking practices, the contribution of this thesis arguably contains the 
element of ethicality.53 Thus, it can generally be said that the proposals of this thesis 
can be considered to be an ethical framework for biobank governance. A question 
subsequently arises as to what approach to ethical reasoning these proposals employ.  
In general, there are three main moral theories of modern philosophy in the 
field of bioethics.54 The first theory is consequentialist. This theory bases the morality 
of certain actions on the consequences of those actions. When applying this theory, all 
the consequences of possible actions are compared, and moral actions are actions that 
would result in better consequences than the other ones.55 The second theory is 
deontological ethics, where the means and features of actions are major considerations 
in terms of morality. This theory uses moral rules, obligations or duties to determine 
the morality or rightness of certain actions. This morality might also be explained in 
terms of prohibitions or constraints.56 The last relevant school of thought is virtue 
ethics. Unlike the other two theories, this moral theory determines morality by mainly 
considering the character traits or virtues of actors – e.g. courage, justice, honesty and 
temperance. It seeks to answer the question of how persons should be, as opposed to 
that of what persons should do.57 Based on this classification, this sub-section takes 
into account the research questions of this thesis together with these three moral 
theories, and then determines which theories will be used to ethically justify the 
proposals of this thesis. 
                                               
53 The term ‘ethical’ here has a broad meaning in that it refers to the state of being correct, 
right or acceptable according to those of certain professions or groups. In this respect, it is 
not limited to ethics, a system of philosophical principles or moral values that influence how 
people make decisions and deal with certain issues. 
54 M Talbot, Bioethics: An Introduction, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012),  
at 32. 
55 Note that, among consequentialists, the ways in which this moral theory is applied are 
different. See JF Childress, "Methods in Bioethics" in B Steinbock (ed) The Oxford 
Handbook of Bioethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 15-45, at 17-20. 
56 D McNaughton and P Rawling, "Deontology" in D Copp (ed) The Oxford Handbook of 
Ethical Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 424-458. 
57 AV Campbell, Bioethics: The Basics, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), at 32. 
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Given the explanations about the three sub-questions that need to be dealt 
with to address the main research question,58 it can be said that two of these three moral 
theories will be adopted as approaches to ethical reasoning in this thesis. One is 
deontological ethics, which bases the rightness of certain actions on rules or features 
of actions when making moral decisions about those actions. This stems from the third 
sub-question, which concerns how to develop the ARR in practice. Particularly, this 
sub-question seeks to propose measures that biobankers need to implement in biobank 
governance. As these measures aim to develop the ARR, which in turn encourages 
biobanking by enhancing the ethical acceptability (and effectiveness) of biobanking, 
they can be taken as rules for biobankers who need to make their biobanking ethical. 
It can therefore be said that the proposals of this thesis consider the features of actions 
to be a source of ethicality. The other moral theory is virtue ethics, where morality is 
based on the character traits of actors. This moral theory is applied when addressing 
the second sub-question, which aims to propose the concept underlying the ARR. As 
the practical aspect of the ARR involves biobankers’ interactions with participants, 
this proposed concept intrinsically characterises these interactions, and thus it can be 
considered to define the character of biobankers. In this respect, the ethicality of the 
proposals of this thesis stems from the character traits of actors as well.  
Given these explanations, it is therefore arguable that the proposals of this 
thesis use deontological ethics and virtue ethics as their approaches to ethical 
reasoning. Notably, this aspect of these proposals is to be explained further in the last 
chapter of this thesis.59 This is because the content of these proposals in the following 
chapters is required to explain it properly. 
To summarise, this section has explained that the contribution of this thesis is 
one approach to an ARR, a participant-biobanker relationship that can deal with the 
issues and challenges arising in biobanking practice; and this contribution is applied 
only to biobanks for health-related research, no matter what types of resources they 
contain. The proposed ARR involves a micro-level of relationship, i.e. a biobankers’ 
                                               
58 See 1.2.1 above. 
59 In Chapter 6, the explanations on this matter include the questions of how these two moral 
theories are related to each other from the perspective of this thesis and why consequentialist 
is ruled out. See 6.2.1 in ch 6 below. 
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relationship with individual participants. Also, this thesis uses deontological ethics and 
virtue ethics as methods for justifying its proposals ethically. Two additional points 
can be noted here. First, this thesis focuses on proposing a novel approach to an ARR. 
Even though this ARR is expected to address issues that commonly arise in 
biobanking, such as commercial involvement in biobanking and the provision of 
individual feedback, the thesis does not seek to solve these issues directly. 
Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that these issues are important and can potentially 
affect a participant-biobank relationship. Thus, they are to be addressed in the last 
chapter of this thesis, which demonstrates how the proposals of this thesis deal with 
them.60 Second, while this thesis focuses on a micro-level of participant-biobanker 
relationship, its contribution basically address the questions of what biobanking 
activities in biobank governance should look like and how biobankers should behave 
towards participants. It can therefore be said that this thesis deals with a  
micro-and-meso-level of a management approach to biobank governance. In other 
words, this focus is directed at a micro-level of interaction but does not necessarily 
involve only face-to-face interactions.  
1.4   Main Characteristics of the ARR 
As this thesis aims to address the issues and challenges arising in biobanking 
practice by proposing one approach to an ARR, it is necessary to establish the 
fundamental notion of the proposed ARR so as to provide the main criteria for the 
ARR, which can be used to develop a conceptual framework for the ARR and a 
partnership model for fostering it in the following chapters. Also, this notion inherently 
paints a broad picture of what the contribution of this thesis will look like. Thus, this 
section provides such a notion by proposing main characteristics that the ARR should 
have. Given the background problems of this thesis, one can say that there are two 
major challenges. One is that the distinctive characteristics of biobanking raise many 
issues and challenges in biobanking practice. The other is that, as suggested by the 
principal research question of this thesis, there are two values that need to be promoted 
                                               
60 See 6.4 in ch 6 below. 
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in biobanking, i.e. the ethical acceptability of biobanking to participants and the 
effectiveness of biobanking;61 and as explained below, these two values might conflict 
with each other. To deal with these two major challenges, it is suggested that the ARR 
should have two main characteristics: (1) the ability to deal with the distinctive 
characteristics of biobanking and (2) the ability to strike a balance between 
participants’ and biobanks’ interests. The details of these main characteristics are 
explained in the next two sub-sections, as follows. 
1.4.1   Ability to Deal with Biobanking 
The first main characteristic of the ARR stems from the fact that the 
distinctive characteristics of biobanking raise many practical and ethical issues and 
challenges, which can make biobanking unappealing to participants. Consequently, the 
ARR must be able to help participants and biobankers to address these issues and 
challenges. For example, as explained above, multiple and unexpected uses of biobank 
resources render the conventional safeguard of informed consent ineffective for 
protecting participants from harm resulting from these uses. Thus, the ARR might need 
either to offer additional safeguards for participants or to enable them to handle such 
harms directly. As another example, the long-term nature of biobanks results in the 
practical challenge of maintaining the viability of biobanking, due to the dynamics and 
uncertainty of a participant-biobanker relationship. The ARR should therefore be able 
to handle this challenge by, inter alia, enabling participants to anticipate any changes 
in biobanking activities or allowing them to negotiate changes that do not conform to 
their expectations. Notably, while Section 1.1 demonstrates many other characteristics 
of biobanking that result in issues and challenges in biobanking practice, this sub-
section merely focuses on these two characteristics since they cannot be dealt with by 
the other main characteristic of the ARR. 
                                               
61 See 1.2 (first paragraph) above. 
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1.4.2   Ability to Balance Participants’ and Biobanks’ Interests 
The other main characteristic of the ARR is the ability to strike a balance 
between participants’ and biobanks’ interests. This main characteristic is based on the 
aforesaid attempt to support two key values that this thesis aims to enhance, namely 
the ethical acceptability of biobanking to participants and the effectiveness of 
biobanking. With the aims of describing and justifying this main characteristic, this 
sub-section first explains the meanings of participants’ and biobanks’ interests in this 
context. Next, it illustrates the possible conflicts between these two interests. 
Ultimately, it explains why the ARR should be able to strike a balance between these 
two interests and how. 
a)  Participants’ and Biobanks’ Interests  
By defining the term ‘interests’ as benefits or advantages for somebody or 
something, participants’ interests refer to benefits or advantages that individuals have 
as biobank participants, as opposed to those of biobanks or participant collectives.62 
They can be equated with individuals’ interests in a participant-biobanker relationship. 
The list of what these interests are is non-exhaustive, but it is worth citing those usually 
mentioned in many ethical guidelines: health, well-being, confidentiality, privacy, 
right to self-determination and dignity.63 In general, these interests are promoted and 
protected when engaging in ethical conduct. As an example, according to the moral 
theory of principlism,64 there are four basic principles that underlie the character 
of ethical actions, i.e. respect for individual autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence 
and justice.65 These principles basically encourage measures that can promote 
                                               
62 See 1.3.2 above. 
63 World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki, (2013) 8, art 9; The National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
The Belmont Report, (18 April 1979) 697; European Clinical Trials Directive 2001/20/EC. 
64 This is one of the moral theories that underpin ethical conduct in the area of bioethics. This 
theory is also called ‘pluralistic principlism’. See JF Childress, see note 55 above. Note that 
other moral theories are to be dealt with in the last chapter of this thesis. See Sub-section 
6.2.1 in ch 6 below.  
65 TL Beauchamp and JF Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th ed (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013); R Gillon, Philosophical Medical Ethics, (Wiltshire: Antony 
Rowe, 1994); The Belmont Report, see note 63 above; RJ Levine, Ethics and Regulation of 
Clinical Research, (London: Yale University Press, 1986). 
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participants’ interests. For example, based on the principle of respect for autonomy, 
biobankers need to obtain consent from participants at recruitment and allow them to 
withdraw their consent at any time without giving any reason. Also, participants should 
be given opportunities to be involved in biobank management, as well as access to 
information about biobanking activities, so that they are capable of making decisions 
about biobanking. Conceptually, all these measures enable participants to safeguard 
their own interests. Regarding the principle of non-maleficence, biobankers are 
required to protect participants’ identity by anonymisation in order to safeguard them 
against any harm to their privacy or confidentiality. Given these explanations, it can 
be said that the promotion of participants’ interests can intrinsically indicate the 
enhancement of ethicality. That is, promoting the interests of biobank participants can 
make biobanking more ethically acceptable to them. 
For biobanks’ interests, since biobanks generally have the goal of advancing 
medical science, medical advances are in biobanks’ interest. Indeed, because this goal 
is conceptually shared by all parties in biobanking – including every individual 
participant – medical advances amount to a collective interest in a relationship between 
participants and biobankers. This implies that medical advances can also be considered 
as being in participants’ interest. There are a number of ways to promote biobanks’ 
interests, such as maintaining the viability of biobanking, increasing the availability of 
biobank resources, and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of biobanking.  
Two points should be noted here. First, biobankers’ interests are not taken 
into account here since biobankers are considered as constituents of biobanks. In this 
respect, they share the same interests with biobanks and have an instrumental role in 
promoting biobanks’ interests in practice. Second, it can be concluded from the 
explanations in this sub-sub-section that the promotion of participants’ interests can 
make biobanking more ethically acceptable to participants, and the promotion of 
biobanks’ interests involves improving the effectiveness and efficiency of biobanking. 
Based on this conclusion, the two values that the ARR is expected to enhance, i.e. the 
ethical acceptability of biobanking to participants and the effectiveness of biobanking, 
can be equated with participants’ and biobanks’ interests, respectively. It can therefore 
be said that the ARR should be able to promote both of these two interests. 
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b)  Conflict between Two Interests 
Given the nature of participants’ and biobanks’ interests, it might be said that 
there is a constant risk that these two interests might come into conflict. Particularly 
in health-related research, the interests of research participants have always been 
important. The reason is that research participants are exposed to various threats to 
their interests – including physical discomfort, emotional injury, discrimination and 
stigmatisation – for the benefit of others.66 As a result, health-related research may be 
accused of exploiting research participants by seeing them as a means to another end, 
i.e. making medical advances. To allow research to proceed and dismiss this 
accusation, many safeguards have been introduced to protect and promote their 
interests, such as risk-benefit assessments, informed consent and anonymisation. 
These safeguards are therefore crucial to justifying the conduct of health-related 
research on research participants, whether healthy or ill. However, the promotion of 
their interests might conflict with medical advances, since these safeguards might 
discourage research practices by, inter alia, introducing additional costs and 
administrative burdens. This might also be the case for biobanking: as explained 
above, biobanking has many characteristics that facilitate health-related research but 
might undermine many safeguards for biobank participants; for example, multiple and 
unforeseen uses of biobank resources may boost the efficiency of research conduct, 
but this characteristic may prevent participants from understanding and assessing all 
the risks and benefits of their participation.67 Thus, it can be said that, while both 
participants’ and biobanks’ interests are crucial here, these two interests might conflict 
with each other. 
Furthermore, there appear to be many arguments that are in favour of 
biobanks’ interests overriding those of biobank participants, especially in the context 
of public-oriented initiatives. For example, Chadwick and Berg argue for solidarity in 
the context of genetic research, and then they ask for a rethink about measures to 
                                               
66 D Evancs and M Evans, A Decent Proposal: Ethical Review of Clinical Research, (West 
Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 1996); See also note 11 above. 
67 See 1.1 above. 
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emphasise individuals’ rights, such as consent and the right of withdrawal.68 Likewise, 
Prainsack and Buyx propose a solidarity-based model for the governance of publicly 
funded biobanks, whereby participants agree to accept certain costs for the benefit of 
biobanking and thus biobankers should, inter alia, embrace broad consent instead of 
informed consent, refrain from unnecessary re-contacting, and adopt an actual-harm 
compensation strategy as opposed to a risk-prevention one.69 One reason behind these 
arguments is that, while the benefits of biobanking are arguably immense, the risks to 
biobank participants are fairly low when compared to conventional health-related 
research because biobanking involves negligible levels of direct physical harm to 
biobank participants.70 For some authors, the same reasoning is also applied to the 
harm resulting from accidental identification.71 It is also argued that the risk to 
confidentiality and the potential for genetic discrimination are controversial and 
unclear.72 Some even argue for ‘a duty to facilitate research progress and to provide 
knowledge that could be crucial to the health of others’.73 Note that these arguments 
are normally based on the concept of solidarity, which generally refers to a state where 
individuals exhibit beneficial behaviour towards others who share the same social 
connectedness with them.74  
Despite these arguments, it is arguable here that participants’ interests still 
need to be given importance to in biobanking, especially when accentuating a 
participant-biobanker relationship. Particularly, given the long-term nature of 
biobanks, a healthy relationship with participants is crucial for maintaining the 
viability of biobanking since it can help to guarantee their ongoing disposition, 
commitment and contribution to biobanking. One way to build such a relationship is 
to promote their interests in order to make biobanking ethically acceptable and 
appealing to them. This also prevents abusing the well-evidenced trust that harm to 
                                               
68 R Chadwick and K Berg, "Solidarity and Equity: New Ethical Frameworks for Genetic 
Databases" (2001) 2 Nature Reviews: Genetics 4 318-321. 
69 B Prainsack and A Buyx, Solidarity: Reflections on an Emerging Concept in Bioethics, 
(November 2011) 111; B Prainsack and A Buyx, see note 38 above. 
70 S Eriksson and G Helgesson, see note 2 above. 
71 B Prainsack and A Buyx, see note 69 above, at para 6.22 
72 KE Ormond et al, "Assessing the Understanding of Biobank Participants" (2009) 149A 
American Journal of Medical Genetics Part A 2 188-198, at 195. See also note 11 above. 
73 R Chadwick and K Berg, see note 68 above, at 320. 
74 See 2.1.2 in ch 2 below. 
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participants’ interests is sufficiently prevented in biobanking.75 For these reasons, it 
can therefore be argued that the proposed ARR needs to promote participants’ interests 
as well. This argument is supported by some authors76 as well as the fact that the 
aforementioned authors who favour biobanks’ interests do not entirely neglect the 
interests of participants. Particularly, Chadwick and Berg say, as a caveat, that 
participants still need to be sufficiently safeguarded against discrimination.77 
Prainsack and Buyx suggest providing participants with information about the 
biobanks in which they participate (e.g. biobanking goals, funding and governance 
structures), in addition to risks and potential benefits.78  
It can therefore be concluded from the discussions above that there might be 
a tension between participants’ and biobanks’ interests in biobanking, and thus it is 
questionable which interests should be prioritised by the ARR. 
c)  Balance between Two Interests 
The conclusion drawn at this stage is that, while it is important to promote 
both participants’ and biobanks’ interests in biobanking, they might conflict with each 
other. With the aim of encouraging biobanking, it is arguably promising to seek a 
balance between these two interests. Such a balance is not only the best way to promote 
biobanking in the short and the long run, but it might also be able to deal with the 
aforesaid trade-offs between different values and interests.79 It can thus be said that 
this balance should be a main characteristic that the ARR needs to have.  
Nonetheless, the strict criteria for this balance cannot be defined here as they 
should be circumstantial in practice. This is supported by many empirical studies 
revealing discrepancies in the preferences regarding biobanking activities, such as the 
                                               
75 W Lipworth et al, "An Empirical Reappraisal of Public Trust in Biobanking Research: 
Rethinking Restrictive Consent Requirements" (2009) 17 Journal of Law and Medicine  
119-132. 
76 C Lenk et al, Biobanks and Tissue Research: The Public, the Patient and the Regulation, 
(London: Springer, 2011), at 30. 
77 R Chadwick and K Berg, see note 68 above. 
78 B Prainsack and A Buyx, see note 69 above, at para 6.23. 
79 See 1.1 above. 
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consent procedure80 and the provision of individual feedback.81 In this respect, it is 
uncertain as to the ways in which participants’ interests can be promoted or balanced 
with biobanks’ interests in practice and, consequently, the consideration of this balance 
should be on a case-by-case basis. As is evident in the following chapters, this thesis 
does not lay down any strict criteria regarding the evidence for the ARR or when the 
ARR already exists; rather, it merely suggests ways in which biobankers can develop 
the ARR through biobanking activities. However, one certain thing that can be inferred 
from this explanation is that the ARR needs to involve allowing participants to provide 
their input in order to know what their interests actually are in certain circumstances. 
This will be reflected in the last chapter of this thesis, which suggests that 
communication should be a crucial mechanism when fostering the ARR in practice.82 
To summarise, this section has established that, to address the issues and 
challenges arising in biobanking practice, the ARR should have two main 
characteristics. First, it needs to be able to deal with the distinctive characteristics of 
biobanking that result in practical and ethical issues and challenges, such as the 
longevity of biobanking and unexpected uses of biobank resources. Second, the ARR 
should be able to strike a balance between participants’ and biobanks’ interests. The 
reason is that this balance is arguably appropriate for encouraging biobanking, given 
that both of these two interests are crucial for biobanking but they might conflict with 
each other. These main characteristics of the ARR are to be used as a guideline for 
proposing a conceptual framework for the ARR in Chapter 2. Indeed, they can also be 
used to address the first sub-question, which concerns normative justification for the 
ARR. In particular, the reason why the ARR is desirable for biobanking is that it is 
designed to deal with the distinctive characteristics of biobanking, which potentially 
make biobanking unappealing to participants. Also, the ARR can properly enhance the 
ethical acceptability of biobanking to participants as well as the effectiveness of 
biobanking, as it requires participants’ interests to be balanced with those of biobanks. 
                                               
80 CM Simon et al, see note 25 above.  
81 J Murphy et al, "Public Expectations for Return of Results from Large-cohort Genetic 
Research" (2008) 8 The American Journal of Bioethics 11 36-43; NL Allen et al, "Biobank 
Participants’ Preferences for Disclosure of Genetic Research Results: Perspectives From the 
OurGenes, OurHealth, OurCommunity Project" (2014) 89 Mayo Clinic Proceedings 6  
738-746.  
82 See 6.1.2 b) (Communication with Participants) in ch 6 below. 
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One can therefore say here that the ARR is desirable because it is designed to solve 
the background problems of this thesis and to create a situation where the 
attractiveness of biobanking to participants is in harmony with its benefits to  
health-related research. Notably, the ARR’s capability to promote participants’ 
interests reflects the element of ethicality in the ARR, and this element will be echoed 
within the other proposals relating to the ARR (i.e. its conceptual framework and the 
partnership model for fostering it), as further emphasised below.83 
1.5   Tentative Conclusion of the Thesis 
As the conclusion of this chapter, the central problem of this thesis is that the 
distinctive characteristics of biobanking render some conventional safeguards for 
research participants ineffective and can also cause participants unease by 
necessitating commercial involvement in biobanking and hindering some desirable 
measures. These become practical and ethical issues and challenges in biobanking, 
which can make biobanking unappealing to participants. With the aim of encouraging 
biobanking, this thesis proposes an approach to an ARR, i.e. a participant-biobanker 
relationship that can deal with these issues and challenges. The proposed ARR aims to 
enhance the ethical acceptability of biobanking to participants and the effectiveness of 
biobanking. This suggests that the ARR contains the element of ethicality. It involves 
a micro-level of participant-biobanker relationship and it is only applied to biobanks 
for health-related research. This premise brings up the principal research question of 
this thesis: What form of relationship is appropriate for effective and ethical 
biobanking practices? Three sub-questions need to be addressed to answer this 
principal question: (1) Why is the proposed ARR desirable for biobanking? (2) 
Conceptually, what should this ARR look like? (3) How can the ARR be developed in 
practice? This chapter has already addressed the first sub-question by outlining the 
main characteristics of the proposed ARR and explaining how they can deal with the 
background problems of this thesis.  
                                               




It can be said that this chapter has outlined what the context of this thesis topic 
is and how it leads to the research questions of this thesis. It also highlights the 
contribution of this thesis and provides a broad picture thereof by explaining the scope 
of this contribution and the fundamental notion of the ARR. 
The following chapters deal with the second and third sub-questions. As a 
rough picture of my proposals, Chapter 2 outlines the conceptual framework of the 
ARR, which is based on the ARR’s main characteristics (proposed in this chapter). In 
so doing, it first establishes that the concept of partnership should be used to underlie 
the ARR mainly because it allows the ARR to give importance to the interests of 
individual participants, unlike solidarity, which focuses more on collective interests. 
By using common partnership attributes explained in the academic literature, Chapter 
2 outlines five key features of the ARR, namely respectfulness, cooperation with 
negotiability, support, continuity in relationship and collectiveness in goals. These key 
features become the conceptual framework of the ARR. This framework answers the 
second sub-question of this thesis, which concerns what conceptually the ARR should 
look like. In the light of this framework, Chapter 3 addresses the last sub-question of 
how to develop the ARR in practice by proposing a partnership model for biobank 
governance that can be used to foster the ARR through biobanking activities. This 
model has four key attributes, i.e. emphasis on collective goals, collaboration, 
reciprocation and control sharing; and it can incorporate the key features of the ARR 
into a participant-biobank relationship. In Chapters 4 and 5, the proposed model is 
tested against two biobanks, namely UK Biobank and ALSPAC, respectively, in order 




Conceptual Framework of the ARR 
Chapter 1 concluded that an authentic research relationship in biobanking 
(“an ARR”) generally refers to a participant-biobanker relationship that can deal with 
the practical and ethical issues and challenges created by the distinctive characteristics 
of biobanking. With the aim to encourage and facilitate biobanking, this thesis pursues 
one approach to an ARR (“the ARR”). The ARR is expected to enhance both the 
ethical acceptability of biobanking to participants and the effectiveness of biobanking. 
As its fundamental notion, it should have two main characteristics. First, it should be 
able to deal with the distinctive characteristics of biobanking, such as multiple and 
unexpected uses of biobank resources and the longevity of biobanking. Second, it 
should also be able to strike a balance between participants’ and biobanks’ interests. 
These main characteristics are considered to be the fundamental notion of the ARR 
proposed in this thesis. The first chapter also established that the ARR is only applied 
to biobanks for health-related research and it focuses on a micro-level relationship 
– i.e. it involves biobankers’ interactions with individual participants but these 
interactions are not necessarily face-to-face. Given the explanations about the ARR in 
Chapter 1, a question subsequently arises as to what the ARR should look like from a 
conceptual perspective.  
This chapter addresses this question by proposing the key features of the ARR 
as its conceptual framework. Two steps are taken to do so. First, this chapter seeks the 
underlying concept of the ARR. Such a concept must satisfy two criteria: first, it is 
applicable to biobank governance because it is to be used as a basis for governing 
biobanks; second, it reflects the two main characteristics of the ARR. In this chapter, 
two concepts, namely partnership and solidarity, are examined because they are both 
considered to be desirable in biobanking according to the extensive literature in this 
area. This examination is conducted in the first two sections, each of which deals with 
one concept. In these sections, the literature explaining these two concepts is reviewed 
and their working notions for this thesis are proposed. To refine the understanding of 
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them, the same procedures are also applied to other related concepts that also feature 
heavily in the literature, such as collaboration and participation, and the relationships 
between all these concepts are also described. The first step ends with justifying why 
partnership should be used for underlying the ARR. In a second step, the common 
attributes of partnership are translated into key features that the ARR should have. This 
will be done in the last section. 
Two points need to be made here. First, the working definitions and attributes 
of all the concepts proposed in this chapter are extracted from the academic literature, 
and they serve as the basis for analysis in subsequent discussions in this thesis. In this 
respect, this chapter does not intend to make any original contributions to these 
concepts; rather, these working definitions and attributes aim to illustrate the kinds of 
insights that each concept can bring according to the academic literature, so as to avoid 
confusion that might arise from multiple, overlapping definitions. Second, the main 
characteristics and key features of the ARR, proposed in Chapters 1 and 2, 
respectively, are different. In particular, the former are merely broad criteria that the 
ARR is expected to fulfil after considering the background problems of this thesis, 
while the latter amount to the conceptual framework of the ARR, which results from 
the translation of partnership attributes into features that the ARR should have in order 
to exhibit the former. Indeed, the latter are to be used to inform the partnership model 
for biobank governance proposed in the following chapter (“the Model”), as well as 
discussions and explanations regarding the ARR later in this thesis. 
As for a tentative conclusion to this chapter, partnership is considered 
appropriate to underlie the ARR, rather than solidarity. The main reason is that 
partnership can be utilised in a governance manner and can better echo the two main 
characteristics that the ARR is expected to have. In contrast, this is not the case for 
solidarity. Thus, although solidarity can be deemed promising for a relationship 
between participants and biobankers, it is considered to be merely the aspirational 
concept of the ARR. With the expression ‘aspirational concept’, it is possible for the 
ARR to develop solidarity, but this is not necessarily the case. Based on the premise 
that partnership and solidarity are the underlying and aspirational concepts of the ARR, 
respectively, the ARR should have five key features: (i) respectfulness, (ii) cooperation 
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with negotiability, (iii) support, (iv) continuity in relationship and (v) collectiveness in 
goals. These key features basically stem from the common attributes of partnership 
that are translated in a way that befits a participant-biobanker relationship, and they 
might also encourage solidarity in biobanking. They are considered to be the 
conceptual framework of the ARR, which becomes an important basis for proposing 
the Model. Notably, it is this cumulative account (i.e. the argument for partnership as 
an underlying concept and that for those key features as a conceptual framework for 
the ARR) that is an original contribution concerning the conceptual aspect of the ARR. 
In this respect, the engagement with different concepts is per se not original, because 
it mainly aims to propose the working notions of those concepts for this thesis. 
2.1   Solidarity 
Solidarity has increasingly been embraced by many authors when attempting 
to move away from individualism and autonomy. Extensive literature attempts to apply 
this concept to a situation where individualism and autonomy might not be suitable or 
where collective benefits are at stake, including genetic research1 and public health.2 
This is also the case for biobanking: many authors say that the introduction of 
solidarity to biobanking is advantageous in that it generally helps reinforce the trend 
towards collective benefits.3 It is therefore intriguing to first explore this concept by 
examining the literature on it, and then answer the question of whether it is appropriate 
for this concept to underlie the ARR. Notably, the literature examined is in the field of 
                                               
1 BM Knoppers and R Chadwick, "Human Genetic Research: Emerging Trends in Ethics" 
(2005) 6 Nature Reviews. Genetics 75-79; R Hoedemaekers et al, "Solidarity and Justice as 
Guiding Principles in Genomic Research" (2007) 21 Bioethics 6 342-350. 
2 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Ethical Challenges in Bioscience and Health Policy for the 
New UK Parliament, (July 2015) 3; M Krishnamurthy, "Political Solidarity, Justice and 
Public Health" (2013) 6 Public Health Ethics 2 129-141; A Dawson and B Jennings,  
"The Place of Solidarity in Public Health Ethics" (2012) 34 Public Health Ethics 5 65-79. 
3 B Prainsack and A Buyx, Solidarity: Reflections on an Emerging Concept in Bioethics, 
(November 2011) 111; R Chadwick and K Berg, "Solidarity and Equity: New Ethical 
Frameworks for Genetic Databases" (2001) 2 Nature Reviews: Genetics 4 318-321;  
H Machado and S Silva, "Public Participation in Genetic Databases: Crossing the 
Boundaries between Biobanks and Forensic DNA Databases through the Principle of 
Solidarity" (2015) 41 Journal of Medical Ethics 10 820-824. 
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the social sciences, and this examination focuses on literature that explicitly defines 
and explains this concept.  
As for the structure of this section, four issues are to be dealt with in four 
different sub-sections. The first sub-section reviews the academic literature on 
solidarity and discusses definitional issues of this concept. The second sub-section 
explains the fundamental nature of solidarity, which eventually becomes the working 
notion of this concept for this thesis. The third sub-section then illustrates how 
solidarity might be applied to a biobanking context. The last sub-section addresses the 
question of whether the ARR should be based on solidarity. As implied from the thesis 
topic, solidarity is not the underlying concept of the ARR; rather, it is considered as 
the aspirational concept thereof because it is still appealing to biobanking. The main 
aim of this section is therefore to explain why solidarity should not be used to underlie 
the ARR, despite some authors arguing for solidarity in biobanking. 
2.1.1   Definitional Issue 
It is worth first noting that solidarity has been used either to explain social 
facts or as an ethical value. The former approach is adopted by many authors, such as 
Lindenburg and Durkheim, who use solidarity to explain social phenomena4 and social 
bonds between people in society,5 respectively. By contrast, some consider solidarity 
to be an ethical value. For example, Harmon explores this concept and argues for using 
it as a value that allows community and interconnectedness to be used to inform 
solutions to social or legal problems and to underpin derivative legal rules for 
evaluating legal and quasi-legal instruments.6 Benatar also argues that solidarity is the 
most important value that needs to be promoted for improving global health,  
                                               
4 S Lindenberg, "The Microfoundations of Solidarity: a Framing Approach" in P Doreian and 
T Fararo (eds), The Problem of Solidarity: Theories and Models, (Pennsylvania: Gordon and 
Breach Publishers, 1998) 61-112, at 62-64. 
5 A Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, 
Durkheim and Max Weber, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), at 117. 
6 SHE Harmon, "Solidarity: A (New) Ethic for Global Health Policy" (2006) 14 Health Care 
Analysis 4 215-236. 
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well-being and meaningful development.7 However, my impression is that these two 
approaches seem to be two sides of the same coin: there is still a single notion of 
solidarity, which involves connectedness between people and a disposition to benefit 
others, but this notion can be used either for explaining social phenomena or as a value 
to be promoted. Since this section aims to investigate the basic nature of this concept, 
these two approaches are not treated separately here.  
My review of the extensive literature on solidarity reveals some discrepancies 
in the definitions of this concept. Nonetheless, it can be said that this concept does not 
suffer a definitional problem since its common nature can be identified from those 
definitions. Particularly, these discrepancies simply result from differences in the 
contexts to which solidarity is applied or in the aspects in which certain authors are 
interested, not in the basic nature of this concept. For instance, the application of 
solidarity in the context of biofuels involves protecting vulnerable people and sharing 
benefits fairly with them, since development in biofuels usually impose unjust burdens 
on them.8 By contrast, Jaeggi considers solidarity to be one type of cooperation, as he 
compares it with compassion and altruism, which normally involve a one-sided 
dependency.9 Despite this difference, these definitions echo the common nature of 
solidarity, which involves a willingness to be of benefit to others, as is explained in 
more detail below. It is therefore arguable that solidarity has its fundamental nature 
but, in practice, it has been variously defined depending on how it is used or which 
aspects of it are considered. This argument implies that its working notion for this 
thesis should be based on its fundamental nature, rather than on the definitions 
proposed by different authors.  
                                               
7 SR Benatar, "Bioethics and Society: A View from South Africa" in MP Neves and M Lima 
(eds), Bioética ou bioéticas na evolução das sociedades, (Coimbra: Gráfica de Coimbra, 
2005) 377-380. 
8 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Biofuels: Ethical Issues, (April 2011) 187, at para 4.14-15. 
9 R Jaeggi, "Solidarity and Indifference" in RT Meulen, W Arts and R Muffels (eds), 




2.1.2   Fundamental Nature 
To understand solidarity and settle on its working notion for this thesis, its 
descriptions in the academic literature were reviewed. This literature review indicates 
that there are three main aspects of solidarity that are usually used to define this 
concept, i.e. solidaristic bases, expression and attitudes. This sub-section therefore 
explains the fundamental nature of solidarity by outlining these three aspects. Some 
points should be noted here. First, in the academic literature, these aspects of solidarity 
are also used to compare solidarity with other related concepts, such as communality, 
compassion and loyalty.10 Second, the literature reviewed does not always use all three 
aspects to describe this concept. Finally, it is worth emphasising again that the 
explanation of solidarity in this sub-section stems from analysing the descriptions of 
this concept provided in the academic literature. In this respect, it does not attempt to 
make any sociological contribution to this concept; rather, it only aims to provide a 
working notion of solidarity for this thesis. 
a)  Solidaristic Bases 
The first aspect is solidaristic bases. Some literature refers to this aspect as 
solidaristic property11 or sources.12 My literature review indicates that solidaristic 
bases are social conditions of connectedness that can inform and develop a solidaristic 
relationship, such as collective purposes, shared interests, common sets of values and 
interdependence between people. With the term ‘connectedness’, these conditions can 
connect individuals with others, and thereby form a solidaristic relationship between 
them. My analysis classifies these social conditions into two categories: social bonds 
and collectiveness between individuals. The former refer to interpersonal relations that 
can bring about solidarity, regardless of whether or not individuals have any social 
conditions in common. These relations might be in the form of either interdependence 
                                               
10 Ibid. 
11 R Ashcroft et al, "Solidarity, Society and the Welfare State in the United Kingdom" (2000) 
8 Health Care Analysis 4 377-394. 
12 J Hawdon et al, "Crime as a Source of Solidarity: A Research Note Testing Durkheim's 
Assertion" (2010) 31 Deviant Behavior 8 679-703; J Goldberg, "Trauma as a Potential 
Source of Solidarity" (2013) 28 Tikkun Winter 2013 38-42; KP Rippe, "Diminishing 
Solidarity" (1998) 1 Ethical Theory & Moral Practice 3 355-373. 
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between people or other interpersonal relationships, such as ties within a family or a 
village.13 Durkheim’s organic solidarity, the solidarity in society with complex 
division of labour and substantial variation,14 is a classic example of the solidarity 
based on interdependence between individuals. 
The other category of solidaristic bases is collectiveness between individuals, 
which refers to a situation where individuals share some conditions with others. 
According to my literature review, this form of solidaristic bases is embraced by many 
socialist theories – e.g. the classic Marxist and the Leninist concepts of solidarity, 
where the recognition of sameness between people is the foundation of solidarity.15 It 
is also adopted by many authors; for example, Bayertz considers the actual common 
ground between people to be a factual aspect of solidarity.16 There are various types 
of this collectiveness. A classic example is the collectiveness in conscience explained 
in Durkheim’s mechanical solidarity, which refers to social integration where all 
members share common sentiments and beliefs.17 Another example is the state of 
being faced with the same situation, such as missing a flight because of a delayed 
departure, surviving colon cancer18 and suffering from a large-scale natural disaster.19 
The state of sharing a common interest,20 goal, set of values,21 or occupation22 is also 
in this category. It can therefore be concluded from these examples that collectiveness 
in certain areas of life can form social conditions of connectedness that may culminate 
in solidarity. It is worth noting that this category plays an important role in a 
                                               
13 KP Rippe, ibid, 356-357. 
14 A Giddens, see note 5 above; S Lukes, Émile Durkheim: His Life and Work, (Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1973). 
15 S Stjernø, Solidarity in Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 58-59. 
16 K Bayertz, "Four Uses of "Solidarity"" in K Bayertz (ed) Solidarity: Philosophical Studies 
in Contemporary Culture, (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999) 3-28, at 3. 
17 A Giddens, see note 5 above. 
18 B Prainsack and A Buyx, see note 3 above, at para 5.8. 
19 TE Drabek, Human System Responses to Disaster: An Inventory of Sociological Findings, 
(London: Springer-Verlag, 1986), at 179-182. 
20 R Ashcroft et al, see note 11 above, at 378; J Feinberg, Doing & Deserving: Essays in the 
Theory of Responsibility, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), at 234. 
21 D Gunson, "Solidarity and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights" 
(2009) 34 The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 3 241-260, at 245. 
22 R Chadwick, "Euroscreen 2: Towards Community Policy on Insurance, 




biobanking context, since all parties in biobanking basically share the same goal, 
which is to advance medical science, as explained in 2.1.3 below. 
A key finding from my literature review is that solidarity is based on social 
conditions of connectedness between individuals, and these conditions can be either 
collectiveness in some areas of life or some social bonds between them. This finding 
can help in understanding this concept, in that it suggests what social conditions are 
necessary for developing a solidaristic relationship and also how solidarity, which is 
to be used here as the aspirational concept of the ARR, can be encouraged in a 
biobanking context. Indeed, it also helps to explain the relationship between solidarity 
and partnership in the following section.23 Note that the definitions of solidarity 
proposed by some authors do not explicitly mention solidaristic bases. For example, 
Prainsack and Buyx define solidarity as ‘shared practices reflecting a collective 
commitment to carry ‘costs’ (financial, social, emotional, or otherwise) to assist 
others’, but they explain that solidaristic expression stems from the recognition of 
sameness or similarity between individuals.24 
b)  Solidaristic Expression 
The next aspect of solidarity is solidaristic expression, which refers to the 
ways in which individuals show their solidarity through their behaviours. According 
to my literature review, many authors say that this form of expression usually shows a 
willingness to be of benefit to others. For example, Bayertz describes solidarity as acts 
that at least show a disposition to help others.25 As explained by Knoppers and 
Chadwick, some bioethicists believe that, in the context of genetic research, solidarity 
may be expressed as ‘a willingness to share information for the benefit of others’.26 
Indeed, this willingness might be passively expressed by way of sacrificing benefits or 
accepting burdens for the benefits of others. An example is Prainsack and Buyx’s 
definition of solidarity, which involves a willingness to accept cost – whether financial, 
                                               
23 See 2.2.3 c) below. 
24 A Buyx and B Prainsack, "Lifestyle-related Diseases and Individual Responsibility 
Through the Prism of Solidarity" (2012) 7 Clinical Ethics 79-85, at 80. 
25 K Bayertz, "Staat und Solidarität" in K Bayertz (ed) Politik und Ethik, (Stuttgart: Reclam, 
1996) 305-330, at 308, quoted in B Prainsack and A Buyx, see note 3 above, at para 3.7. 
26 BM Knoppers and R Chadwick, see note 1 above, at 76. 
41 
 
social, emotional or otherwise.27 Given these examples, it can be said that the display 
of a willingness to be of benefit to others is a typical characteristic of solidaristic 
expression. This implicitly suggests that there are no specific forms of solidaristic 
expression in practice. As is evident in the vast literature, solidarity encompasses many 
forms of action or activity, such as engagement,28 blood donation to soldiers,29 
transfusion30 and cooperation.31 It can be concluded here that solidaristic expression 
generally shows a willingness to be of benefit to others and can be found in various 
forms of action. This conclusion suggests that participants and biobankers can express 
their solidarity through biobanking activities if those activities can show a willingness 
to be of benefit to other parties in biobanking, as further explained in 2.1.3 below. 
c)  Solidaristic Attitudes 
The last aspect is solidaristic attitudes, i.e. psychological processes inside 
solidaristic individuals’ minds. My literature review suggests that solidaristic attitudes 
are explained in two patterns. First, solidaristic individuals accept or recognise social 
connectedness that amounts to solidaristic bases. For example, Prainsack and Buyx32 
as well as Jaeggi33 explain that solidarity only emerges among people who recognise 
their connectedness to others, i.e. the sameness and any connections that link their and 
others’ situations together, respectively. Similarly, some authors say that feelings of 
connectedness with others are an ingredient for solidarity.34 Likewise, Bayertz 
explains that people will express their solidarity with others in particular groups to 
                                               
27 B Prainsack and A Buyx, "A Solidarity-Based Approach to the Governance of Research 
Biobanks" (2013) 21 Medical Law Review 1 71-91, at 75. 
28 C Calhoun, "Imagining Solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and the 
Public Sphere" (2002) 14 Public Culture 1 147-171. 
29 C Waldby and R Mitchell, Tissue Economies: Blood, Organs, and Cell Lines in Late 
Capitalism, (London: Duke University Press, 2006). 
30 P Rabinow, French DNA: Trouble in Purgatory, (London: University of Chicago Press, 
1999), at 84. 
31 A Wildt, "Solidarity: Its History and Contemporary Definition" in K Bayertz (ed) 
Solidarity: Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, (London, Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1999) 209-220, at 216. 
32 B Prainsack and A Buyx, see note 3 above, at para 5.8. 
33 R Jaeggi, see note 9 above, at 291. 
34 KP Rippe, see note 12 above, at 358; SE Komter, Social Solidarity and the Gift, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 115. 
42 
 
which they believe they belong.35 For the second pattern, solidaristic individuals have 
feelings of a mutual obligation to benefit others. This pattern is mentioned by Bayertz, 
who explains that solidarity involves an obligation to help others as a normative level 
of mutual attachment between individuals, and feelings of such an obligation are an 
emotional dimension of solidarity that emerges from common ground.36 Given these 
explanations, it can therefore be said that solidarity has a psychological element and 
this element plays a role in fostering a solidaristic relationship.37 Note that this aspect 
of solidarity is to be used below for justifying why this concept cannot be used to 
underlie the ARR: in brief, this element suggests that it is difficult to prescribe 
solidarity and confirm its existence in practice, and thus it is arguably not applicable 
to biobank governance.38  
To summarise, there are three aspects of solidarity that have been widely used 
in the academic literature to define this concept. The first aspect is solidaristic bases, 
i.e. social conditions that constitute connectedness between solidaristic individuals. 
Solidaristic bases can be classified into two categories: collectiveness in certain 
aspects of life and social bonds between individuals. The second aspect is solidaristic 
expression. This expression has no specific form, but generally it shows a willingness 
to be of benefit to others. The last aspect is solidaristic attitudes, which refer to either 
the recognition/acceptance of solidaristic bases or feelings of a mutual obligation to 
benefit others in the same group. As these explanations can reflect the fundamental 
nature of solidarity, they are considered as the working notion of this concept for this 
thesis. As is evident in the following sub-sections, these explanations are to be used to 
describe how solidarity can be present in a biobanking context and then to address the 
question of whether solidarity can be used for underlying the ARR. Notably, the 
literature reviewed does not specifically explain how these three aspects interact with 
one another, and so it is difficult to draw any conclusions about the relationship 
between them.  
                                               
35 K Bayertz, Solidarity, (Dordecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 
at 4, cited in D Gunson, see note 21 above, at 245. 
36 K Bayertz, see note 16 above, at 3. 
37 Mayhew and Wildt are among authors who give a detailed description of solidaristic 
attitudes. See SE Komter, see note 34 above; A Wildt, see note 31 above, at 216-217. 
38 See 2.1.4 a) below. 
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2.1.3   Solidarity and Biobanking 
Based on this working notion of solidary, it can be said that solidarity may 
exist in biobanking, since all three aspects of solidarity can be applied to a biobanking 
context. Particularly for solidaristic bases, every research biobank normally has the 
goal of advancing medical science, and thereby all participants and biobankers can be 
assumed to share this goal. Thus, collectiveness in biobanking goal is one solidaristic 
basis that exists in any research biobanks. Moreover, biobanking intrinsically reflects 
interdependence between individuals: biobankers need participants’ samples and 
information as biobank resources, while participants have to rely on biobankers’ skills 
and management to make their samples and information beneficial to research studies. 
Accordingly, the social bond of interdependence between individuals is another 
solidaristic basis found in any research biobanks. Some biobanks might also involve 
other social connectedness that constitutes additional solidaristic bases, such as a 
similarity in diseases from which participants are suffering and a sameness in 
participants’ nationality.  
As for solidaristic attitudes, whilst it is admittedly very difficult in practice to 
know precisely the actual thoughts of both parties in biobanking, it can be assumed 
from the acts of joining biobanking and recruiting participants that, in general, both 
participants and biobankers at least recognise and accept the collectiveness in their 
goals to advance medical science and the aforesaid interdependence. For some authors, 
such acts might also stem from feelings of a mutual obligation to promote the health 
of others.39 Regarding solidaristic expression, there are a number of biobanking 
activities that can be used to express solidarity, because they can demonstrate a 
willingness to benefit other parties in biobanking. For example, participants may 
express their solidarity by providing additional samples and information, or helpful 
input about biobanking. Biobankers may show their solidarity by, inter alia, accepting 
the burdens created by communication about biobanking activities or reciprocating 
participants’ contributions with feedback of incidental findings. All these activities 
can, to some extent, reflect the willingness of participants and biobankers to be of 
                                               
39 R Chadwick and K Berg, see note 3 above. 
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benefit to each other. Indeed, they also allow these two parties to help each other in 
managing and facilitating biobanking.  
Given these explanations, it can therefore be argued that solidarity can exist 
or be embodied in a biobanking context. There are two notable points here. First, this 
argument merely means that solidarity is possible in a biobanking context. The ways 
in which this concept is beneficial to biobanking are to be described in the following 
sub-section. Second, the aforesaid explanations are based on the premise that the 
contribution of this thesis focuses on a research relationship between participants and 
biobankers.40 In this respect, members of the public and communities are not involved 
here because these parties are beyond the scope of this contribution. Accordingly, 
collective interests in a solidaristic relationship here refer to the interests of biobanks, 
not those of the public or communities. This point will be revisited when explaining 
the limitations on the proposals of this thesis in the last chapter.41 
2.1.4   Solidarity and the ARR 
A subsequent question arises as to whether solidarity can be a concept that 
underlies the ARR. To address this question, it must be evident that solidarity can 
satisfy two criteria: as explained in the introduction above, (1) it needs to be applicable 
to biobank governance and (2) it should be able to reflect the two main characteristics 
of the ARR, established in Chapter 1, i.e. the ability to tackle the distinctive 
characteristics of biobanking and to achieve a balance between participants’ and 
biobanks’ interests. Given the working notion of solidarity above, the answer to this 
question is arguably negative, because this concept cannot meet both of these criteria, 
as explained below. 
a)  Inapplicability to Biobank Governance 
For the first criterion, it can be said that solidarity cannot be applied to 
biobank governance mainly because, based on the explanations of solidaristic attitudes 
                                               
40 See 1.3.2 in ch 1 above. 
41 See 6.3 in ch 6 below. 
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given above,42 solidarity has a psychological element and this element renders this 
concept incapable of being used in a governance manner for two reasons. First, the 
occurrence of solidarity is uncertain. Particularly, as explained above, solidarity 
depends on individuals accepting, recognising, feeling solidaristic bases, or having 
feelings of a mutual obligation to benefit others. Based on this explanation, one might 
say that the perception of individuals is crucial for developing a solidaristic 
relationship.43 This suggests the possibility that, although there are solidaristic bases, 
individuals may not have solidaristic attitudes or become solidaristic. It can therefore 
be said that the presence of solidaristic bases does not always result in solidarity. This 
is supported by Jaeggi, who considers the psychological aspect of solidarity to be a 
practical difficulty in forming solidaristic bonds.44 Second, it might be very difficult, 
or even impossible, to confirm the existence of solidarity in practice, because it is not 
feasible to know precisely whether certain behaviours are actually informed by 
solidaristic motivations. Behaviours of consideration might mainly, or purely, result 
from other motivations in this respect.  
Given this explanation, it can therefore be said that it is in practice difficult 
to arrange solidarity as well as confirm its existence, and thereby this concept is not 
suitable as a governance instrument nor a goal to be pursued. Accordingly, solidarity 
is arguably not applicable to biobank governance and, thereby this concept cannot 
satisfy the first criterion for the underlying concept of the ARR, which is established 
in the introduction of this chapter. 
Nonetheless, this argument might be countered by some scholars who explain 
that solidarity can be based on a legal relationship by citing solidarity within the 
welfare state as an example.45 To rebut this counter-argument, it seems that any legal 
arrangements for social welfare and acts conforming to them are considered 
solidaristic simply because solidarity conceptually underlies them. Such arrangements 
and acts might per se not be solidaristic in this respect. As for a reason, people 
                                               
42 See 2.1.2 c) above. 
43 This is supported by Gunson, who explains that solidarity might be based on the 
perception of some commonality. D Gunson, see note 21 above. 
44 R Jaeggi, see note 9 above, at 301. 
45 B Prainsack and A Buyx, see note 3 above, at para 5.13. 
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performing those acts might not actually have solidaristic attitudes: they do so only 
because those arrangements are legally binding. Thus, their acts might not really stem 
from their own recognition of solidaristic bases nor their feelings of a mutual 
obligation to benefit others. One can therefore argue that, although those arrangements 
may be based on solidarity, those actors may not actually be solidaristic. This rebuttal 
is supported by many authors who are sceptical about solidarity within the welfare 
states by citing the coercive character of those arrangements.46 In reality, it would 
indeed be difficult to assert that every person in the welfare states pays high taxes with 
the primary aim of helping people living on a pension, although this taxation is 
undoubtedly based on solidarity. My impression is that while the notions behind 
certain arrangements are solidaristic, these arrangements themselves do not 
necessarily constitute solidarity in practice. One might also say that, in this case, 
solidarity is only used to justify arrangements that target the public good, but it is not 
always the result of such arrangements.47  
b)  Silence about Participants’ Interests 
For the second criterion regarding the two main characteristics of the ARR, it 
is arguable that solidarity cannot reflect one of them, namely the ability to strike a 
balance between participants’ and biobanks’ interests. This is because, essentially, 
solidarity tends to accentuate collective benefits: its explanations usually stress why 
and how individuals commit themselves to collectives, but they are silent about the 
role of individuals’ interests in a solidaristic relationship. Even though solidaristic 
expression might practically promote individuals’ interests, the extent to which these 
interests are given importance to is unclear from a conceptual perspective. 
Accordingly, it is questionable whether, in a biobanking context, solidarity can be used 
to promote participants’ interests when using this concept to underlie the ARR. As an 
                                               
46 K Bayertz, see note 16 above, at 22-25; Rt Meulen et al, "Solidarity, Health and Social 
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47 
 
example, biobankers sharing useful information with participants could be considered 
solidaristic if this sharing evidently stems from their recognition of connectedness with 
participants and their willingness to benefit participants. However, this consideration 
does not require the evidence that this sharing is actually beneficial to those 
participants. Thus, it is doubtful whether solidarity can be used conceptually to strike 
a balance between participants’ and biobanks’ interests.  
The conclusion here is that solidarity cannot meet the two main criteria for 
the underlying concept of the ARR, established in the introduction of this chapter, i.e. 
(1) the applicability to biobank governance and (2) the ability to reflect the two main 
characteristics of the ARR. For the former, it is difficult to arrange solidarity as well 
as confirm its existence, and thus it cannot be used comprehensively in a governance 
manner. For the latter, since solidarity does not provide a clear enough account of how 
to promote participants’ interests, it is unclear whether this concept can reflect one 
main characteristic of the ARR, namely the ability to balance participants’ and 
biobanks’ interests. Given this explanation, it is therefore arguable solidarity cannot 
be used to underlie the ARR. 
Solidarity as an Aspirational Concept 
Although solidarity should not be used to underlie the ARR, it is still desirable 
in biobanking. The reason is that, based on the explanation of how this concept can 
exist in a biobanking context (in Sub-section 2.1.3), it can be beneficial to a 
relationship between participants and biobankers when considering every aspect of it. 
Particularly for solidaristic bases, since solidarity is based on social connectedness 
between individuals that is voluntarily established, solidarity – where it exists – helps 
to emphasise and encourage a genuine relationship between participants and 
biobankers. Regarding solidaristic attitudes, feelings of a mutual obligation to benefit 
others, which is one pattern of solidaristic attitudes, probably lead participants and 
biobankers to have a positive disposition towards, and commit themselves to, 
biobanking and each other. This can be favourable to both a participant-biobanker 
relationship and biobanking activities. As for solidaristic expression, solidarity can 
lead participants and biobankers to perform many biobanking activities that can 
improve a relationship between them and might also facilitate biobanking, such as 
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contributing more biobank resources, providing helpful input about biobank 
governance and reciprocating participants’ contributions with individual feedback. 
Given all these benefits, it can be said that solidarity can strengthen a participant-
biobanker relationship, and it can also lead these two parties to dedicate themselves to 
biobanking. One can therefore argue that this concept is promising for biobanking.  
Based on this argument, although solidarity cannot be the underlying concept 
of the ARR, it should be considered to be the aspirational concept of it when proposing 
its key features. With the expression ‘aspirational concept’, the ARR attempts to 
encourage solidarity by providing the best chance for solidarity, but it does not 
necessarily foster a solidaristic relationship in biobanking. In other words, solidarity 
is not a goal to be achieved by design, albeit that it might emerge during the course of 
cultivating the ARR. This attempt is similar, in terms of methodology, to some forms 
of arrangements that are considered by some authors to be social engineering towards 
certain normative values. One example is the system of voluntary blood donation, 
which Titmuss believes to be intrinsic to fostering altruistic attitudes in individuals and 
thereby can be used to institutionalise altruism.48 Another example is organisational 
mechanisms (and cultural contexts), which – according to Healy – can be used to forge 
altruism because they can help provide reasons and opportunities to give to others.49 
Indeed, this attempt is also similar to many legal regimes (e.g. criminal law) that 
theoretically target certain consequences, although these might not actually be 
achieved in practice (e.g. deterrence).  
It is, however, worth emphasising again that the ARR proposed in this thesis 
is based on partnership, not solidarity. One can therefore say that this thesis proposes 
a partnership relationship between participants and biobankers that might develop a 
solidaristic relationship in biobanking. In this respect, it is not the case that any attempt 
to build this partnership can always mandate the existence of, and a role for, solidarity 
in biobanking. 
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2.1.5   Conclusion on Solidarity 
Solidarity is used either to describe social phenomena or as an ethical value 
to be promoted, particularly when collective benefits are an important consideration. 
Although this concept has been variously defined by different authors, it has its own 
fundamental nature, which can be outlined in three aspects: solidaristic bases, 
expression and attitudes. The former refer to social conditions of connectedness 
between individuals, and these conditions can be either certain social bonds or 
collectiveness in certain aspects of life between individuals. Solidaristic expression 
refers to individuals’ behaviours that reflect their solidarity. There is no specific form 
of this expression but it must show a willingness to be of benefit to others. Solidaristic 
attitudes refer to the psychological processes inside solidaristic individuals’ minds. 
These attitudes have been explained in two ways: (i) the recognition or acceptance of 
solidaristic bases and (ii) feelings of a mutual obligation to benefit others. All these 
explanations are to be used as the working notion of solidarity for the discussions 
that follow in this thesis. Note again that these explanations result from my analysis 
of the academic literature on solidarity, and thereby they are not intended to make any 
contributions to the sociological literature on this concept.  
Based on this working notion of solidarity, although it is possible for 
solidarity to be embodied in biobanking, it is arguably impractical to use this concept 
as the underlying concept of the ARR for two main reasons. First, solidarity involves 
a psychological element, and thereby it is difficult to prescribe this concept and to 
assure the existence thereof in practice. This makes this concept not feasible to be used 
as a governance instrument or a goal to be attained. Second, solidarity is silent about 
the role of individuals’ interests in a solidaristic relationship. In this respect, it is 
unclear how this concept can strike a balance between participants’ and biobanks’ 
interests, the former of which amount to individuals’ interests in the ARR. As the 
ability to strike this balance is one of the two main characteristics of the ARR, as 
established in Chapter 1, one can therefore question whether this concept can really 
reflect both of the ARR’s main characteristics. For these two reasons, it can be argued 
that solidarity should not be used to underlie the ARR. Despite this argument, it is still 
evident that solidarity is promising for biobanking: it can strengthen a relationship 
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between participants and biobankers and also lead these two parties to dedicate 
themselves to biobanking. Accordingly, it is suggested that solidarity should be seen 
as the aspirational concept of the ARR.  
The conclusion here is that solidarity is not to be used as the underlying 
concept of the ARR, but instead as the aspirational concept of it. In this respect, 
solidarity is neither a basis nor a benchmark for the development of the ARR in 
practice. As will be shown below, this thesis instead uses partnership to inform the key 
features of the ARR. Notably, the context of the discussion here is different from those 
in other literature that argues for introducing solidarity into biobanking.50 In particular, 
this thesis focuses on the ARR, which basically involves a relationship between 
participants and biobankers,51 and thereby its discussion excludes other parties that 
might engage in biobanking, such as members of the public, participants’ communities 
and family members. This is the reason why collective interests in the ARR amount to 
biobanks’ interests. By comparison, other literature does not have such exclusion and 
thus it usually takes the interests of the public or communities as collective interests in 
biobanking. This exclusion will be further emphasised below because it imposes a 
limitation on the contribution of this thesis.52 
2.2   Partnership 
Partnership generally refers to a state where two or more parties work together 
to achieve their shared goals within a special relationship.53 By the term ‘special 
relationship’, a group of individuals working together does not of itself constitute a 
partnership, unless those individuals additionally have certain responsibilities and 
attitudes towards one another. This concept seems to be promising for this thesis, 
because it involves a strong interpersonal relationship between individuals and thus it 
might be used to underlie the ARR, which aims to deal with, inter alia, the longevity 
                                               
50 See note 3 above. 
51 See 1.3.2 in ch 1 above. 
52 See 6.3 in ch 6 below. 
53 Tunnard and Ryan argue that partnership is not about equality of power, but rather 
involves working together to fulfil common goals. J Tunnard and M Ryan, "What Does the 
Children Act Mean for Family Members?" (1991) 5 Children & Society 1 67-75, at 67. 
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of biobanking. Moreover, partnership involves cooperation between individuals and 
an aim to achieve collective goals, and thereby it seems to be applicable to biobanking, 
where participants and biobankers work together to pursue the shared goal of 
advancing medical science. It is therefore interesting to examine this concept to find 
out whether it can really be the underlying concept of the ARR.  
To do so, this section first explores the definitions and common attributes of 
partnership provided in the academic literature that explicitly define and describe this 
concept, in order to propose its working notion for this thesis. This section then 
examines its relationships to other related concepts – like collaboration, participation 
and solidarity – so as to refine its working notion. This section eventually justifies why 
it becomes focal in this thesis. It is note-worthy that the term partnership in this thesis 
refers to the general notion of partnership, which is widely used in the social-science 
field. It encompasses, but is not limited to, the legal paradigm of partnership in this 
respect.54 
2.2.1   Definitional Issue 
My literature review suggests that there are two difficulties when using the 
definitions of partnership provided in the academic literature as a working notion of 
this concept for this thesis.  
First, it is difficult to decide on a common definition of partnership from the 
academic literature. The reason is that this concept basically involves many aspects of 
relationship and thereby its definitions proposed in the literature are fairly diverse, 
depending upon what aspect of relationship is focused on. For example, some authors 
define it from the aspect of control power. Arnstein, in her typology of participation, 
describes partnership as one form of participation that allows power to be redistributed 
through negotiation with power holders.55 In a social-work context, Miley defines 
                                               
54 Partnership is defined in Partnership Act 1890 as ‘the relationship which subsists between 
persons carrying on a business in common with a view of profit.’ See Partnership Act 1890, 
s 1. 
55 SR Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation" (1969) 35 Journal of the American 
Institute of Planners 4 216-224. 
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partnership as a ‘collaborative process whereby the social worker and client work as 
equals’.56 By contrast, other authors focus on other aspects of relationship. Macaulay 
et al define partnership as ‘a mutually respectful relationship based on sharing 
responsibilities, costs, and benefits’.57 In social care settings, Carnwell and Carson 
perceive partnership to be ‘a shared commitment, where all partners have a right and 
an obligation to participate and will be affected equally by the benefits and 
disadvantages arising from the partnership’.58 Given the range of these definitions, it 
is arguably difficult to find parameters that the academic literature commonly uses to 
define this concept, let alone the content of its definitions. 
Second, even if a common definition of partnership is possible, it might not 
be applicable in practice. This is because this concept fundamentally involves ongoing 
interaction between equal parties. It basically has the elements of continuity, 
cooperation and negotiability in this respect. As a result, the characteristics of a 
partnership relationship can in certain circumstances be influenced and changed by 
involved parties as well as by other contributory factors, rendering this relationship 
dynamic in nature. This is supported by Carnwell and Carson, who explain that 
partnerships (in health and social care settings) are significantly informed by social 
policy – which changes quickly – and thereby they can change across time and place.59 
Thus, it can be said that, in practice, the definition of partnership can change over time.  
Given these two difficulties, it is arguably inappropriate to use the definitions 
of this concept provided in the academic literature to propose its working notion for 
this thesis, which should be able to reflect its true nature. Otherwise, this working 
notion would be neither sufficiently inclusive nor practically applicable. Accordingly, 
this section instead proposes a working notion of partnership by considering 
partnership attributes that are commonly explained in the academic literature. In other 
                                               
56 A Scheyett and MJ Diehl, "Walking Our Talk in Social Work Education: Partnering with 
Consumers of Mental Health Services" (2004) 23 Social Work Education 4 435-450, at 436. 
57 AC Macaulay et al, "Participatory Research Maximises Community and Lay Involvement" 
(1999) 319 BMJ 7212 778-774, at 775. 
58 R Carnwell and A Carson, "The Concepts of Partnership and Collaboration" in R Carnwell 
and J Buchanan (eds), Effective Practice in Health Social Care and Criminal Justice, 2nd ed, 
(Berkshire: Open University Press, 2009) , at 7. 
59 Ibid, at 6. 
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words, the working notion of partnership to be used herein stems from an amalgam of 
attributes commonly found in academic accounts of this concept, rather than an 
attempt to offer a definitive definition of this concept. 
2.2.2   Working Attributes 
With the aim of settling on a working notion of partnership for this thesis, this 
sub-section reviews the academic literature that illustrates the common attributes of 
partnership, and then suggests partnership attributes that are suitable for a relationship 
between participants and biobankers. These attributes will become the working notion 
of partnership for this thesis.  
Two points need to be clarified here. First, as suggested above, my literature 
review focuses on partnership in a general sense, i.e. partnership that is generally used 
in the field of the social sciences. In this respect, the term partnership here is not limited 
to legal partnership, which refers to business associations established for generating 
profits.60 Nor is it limited to partnership in Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation, 
which focuses on redistributing decision-making power.61 The reason is that the ARR, 
by considering its main characteristics, is not merely about profitability or equality of 
control in a biobanking context, although either of these two factors might be involved 
in practice. Second, a partnership between professionals and non-professionals is of 
interest here, as opposed to a partnership among professionals, since this partnership 
is analogous to the ARR, which is based on a relationship between participants  
(non-professionals) and biobankers (professionals). Still, this sub-section discusses 
both forms of partnership so as to underline the differences between them. Note that 
these differences will inform one key feature of the ARR, as further emphasised below. 
Among the literature that explains partnership attributes, two approaches are 
worthy of consideration here: Bidmead and Cowley’s and Carnwell and Carson’s 
explanations of partnership attributes, as summarised in Table 1 below. The reason for 
highlighting these two approaches is that they both result from an attempt to propose 
                                               
60 Partnership Act 1890, s 1. 
61 SR Arnstein, see note 55 above. 
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partnership attributes in a general context, and this was done by reviewing other 
literature on partnership.62 Indeed, they also cover different aspects of partnership 
relationship, ranging from ethical attributes (e.g. trust and respect) to procedural ones, 
such as negotiation, participation and communication. These two approaches are 
therefore arguably robust, and thus they should be used to propose a working notion 
of partnership for this thesis.  
Table 1:   Summary of two approaches to defining partnership attributes 
Bidmead and Cowley63 Carnwell and Carson64 
 a genuine and trusting 
relationship 
 sharing and respect for the 
other’s expertise 
 working together with negotiation 
of goals, plans and boundaries 
 reciprocity 
 empathy 
 honest and open communication 
and listening 
 information giving 
 participation and involvement 
 praise and encouragement 
 support and advocacy 
 enabling choice and equity 
 trust and confidence in 
accountability 
 respect for specialist expertise 
 joint working and teamwork 
 agreement about objectives and 
common goals 
 members of partnerships have the 
same vested interests 
 reciprocity 
 empathy 
 transparent lines of communication 
within and between partner 
agencies 
 appropriate governance structures 
 blurring of professional boundaries 
As for the question of which approach is more suitable for the ARR, Bidmead 
and Cowley’s approach is embraced here since, as suggested above, it basically 
                                               
62 Bidmead and Cowley perform a concept analysis of partnership by reviewing the literature 
explaining this concept in different contexts, e.g. health visiting, paediatric care and general 
nursing. See C Bidmead and S Cowley, "A Concept Analysis of Partnership with Clients" 
(2005) 78 Community Practitioner 6 203-208. Carnwell and Carson propose partnership 
attributes by reviewing the definitions of partnership provided in dictionaries, websites and 
other academic literature. See R Carnwell and A Carson, see note 58 above. 
63 C Bidmead and S Cowley, ibid, at 206. 
64 R Carnwell and A Carson, see note 58 above, at 11. 
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concerns a partnership between professionals and non-professionals. In this respect, 
this partnership is analogous to the ARR, which involves a relationship between 
biobankers and participants. By contrast, Carnwell and Carson’s approach is about 
partnership in any context and thus it encompasses a partnership among professionals, 
which has fewer defining attributes (as further explained below). Accordingly, the 
former approach is taken as a working notion of this concept for this thesis. 
For the content of these two approaches, one can generally say that they are 
essentially similar. Nonetheless, differences between them are evident and should be 
noted here, since these differences help suggest what should be incorporated into a 
conceptual framework for the ARR. As italicised in the table, Bidmead and Cowley’s 
approach has some partnership attributes that are additional to Carnwell and Carson’s 
approach, such as encouragement, support and equity. Although my literature review 
does not clearly reveal the reasons behind these differences, it might be inferred from 
the nature of these additional attributes that these differences are based on an attempt 
to achieve equality in the capabilities of partners. Particularly when a partnership 
consists of professional and non-professional partners, there are likely to be 
discrepancies between partners in their capability to handle certain matters. Thus, there 
should be some measures in place for dealing with these discrepancies properly, and 
these additional attributes can be deemed to be such measures. In other words, 
provided that such discrepancies exist in a partnership, partners are generally required 
to support and encourage each other. This requirement could therefore be considered 
important in a partnership between professionals and non-professionals. As seen 
below, this requirement is translated into one key feature of the ARR, i.e. support, as 
the ARR involves a partnership relationship between participants (non-professionals) 
and biobankers (professionals).65 
To facilitate the following discussion, Bidmead and Cowley’s partnership 
attributes can be classified into two categories: attributes of values and procedures. 
The former concerns important values that reside in a partnership relationship, 
including a genuine and trusting relationship, respect for others’ expertise, reciprocity, 
empathy, encouragement and equity. The latter concerns the processes or measures 
                                               
65 See 2.3.1 below. 
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that are normally implemented in a partnership, such as participation, involvement, 
working together via negotiation, honest and open communication and information 
giving. This categorisation is useful for this thesis in that it highlights two broad 
aspects of partnership that need to be considered when building a partnership in 
practice. As evident in Sub-section 2.2.3 below, this is particularly helpful when 
explaining how partnership differs from other related concepts that involve only one 
of these categories, such as empowerment and participation. 
2.2.3   Other Related Concepts 
To further the understanding of partnership, this sub-section delineates its 
relationships to other related concepts that need to be clarified or clearly distinguished 
from it. These concepts are as follows: (1) collaboration, which is generally similar to, 
or even used interchangeably with, partnership, (2) empowerment, which can have 
more than one meaning, (3) participation, which is variously defined in different 
literature, and (4) solidarity, which has been increasingly suggested in the literature on 
biobanking. In doing so, this sub-section first examines the meanings of these concepts 
that are explained in the academic literature, then assigns their working notions for this 
thesis, and finally explains their relationships to partnership.  
As for the structure of this sub-section, these four concepts are dealt with 
separately in three different sub-sub-sections, according to their roles in this thesis. 
Particularly, the first sub-sub-section explains collaboration, which is to become a key 
attribute of the Model, as outlined further in Chapter 3. The next sub-sub-section deals 
with participation and empowerment, which will be used to explain and justify many 
practical measures proposed in the Model. The last sub-sub-section compares 
solidarity with partnership, in order to confirm whether partnership is more suitable to 
underlie the ARR than solidarity. 
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a)  Collaboration 
In general, collaboration refers to the act of working together to do something. 
Nonetheless, the act of helping the enemy during war is also defined as collaboration,66 
but this meaning is arguably not applicable to this thesis since the focus here is on 
biobanking – which involves mutual co-operation and contributions to medical 
science, not rival relationship and a goal to occupy another party’s territory. My 
literature review reveals that the forms of collaboration vary depending upon how this 
concept is put into practice. For example, Himmelman considers the acts of 
exchanging information, altering activities, sharing resources and enhancing others’ 
capacity, to be instances of collaboration.67 Mailick and Jordan also include the act of 
sharing responsibility for outcomes within the meaning of collaboration.68 
Involvement in discussions and decision-making processes might also amount to 
collaboration in some circumstances.69 These examples indicate that collaboration 
encompasses various types of action, and thereby it is arguably difficult to define this 
concept strictly without considering the context of application. This is supported by 
many authors: Henneman et al explain that the definition of collaboration is vague or 
highly variable;70 D'Amour et al explain in detail how the conceptualisation of 
collaborative processes is influenced by environmental factors.71  The act of ‘working 
together’ is therefore, albeit vague, suitable to be used as the working notion of 
collaboration for this thesis. 
                                               
66 AS Hornby, Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 8th ed (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010); An Encyclopedia Britannica Company, "Merriam-Webster Dictionary: 
Collaborate" (2013) available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/collaboration 
(accessed 29 January 2014). 
67 AT Himmelman, "On the Theory and Practice of Transformational Collaboration: From 
Social Service to Social Justice" in C Huxham (ed) Creating Collaborative Advantage, 
(London: Sage Publications, 1996) 19-43. 
68 M Mailick and P Jordan, "A Multimodel Approach to Collaborative Practice in Health 
Settings" (1977) 2 Social Work Health Care 445-454, cited in EA Henneman et al, 
"Collaboration: A Concept Analysis" (1995) 21 Journal of Advanced Nursing 1 103-109,  
at 104.  
69 National Health & Medical Research Council, Statement on Consumer and Community 
Participation in Health and Medical Research, (December 2001) 45, at 18. 
70 EA Henneman et al, see note 68 above, at 103. 
71 D D'Amour et al, "The Conceptual Basis for Interprofessional Collaboration: Core 
Concepts and Theoretical Frameworks" (2005) 19 Suppl 1 Journal of Interprofessional Care 
116-131, at 127-128. 
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Collaboration and Partnership 
According to my literature review, the difference between collaboration and 
partnership is unclear mainly because, as implied above, these two concepts have been 
variously defined and explained according to contexts and goals of application. Indeed, 
the relationship between them is differently described as well. For instance, some 
consider partnership to be an attribute of collaboration72 while others consider the 
opposite.73 Indeed, it is also said that collaboration and partnership are often used 
interchangeably,74 and the former is frequently equated with the latter.75  
Nevertheless, in the light of their working notions assigned in this thesis, the 
working distinction between them for this thesis can be explained, as follows. In this 
thesis, collaboration merely refers to the act of working together, while partnership has 
a wide range of attributes and its attributes can be classified into the attributes of values 
and procedures. Based on these working notions, it can be said that, for this thesis, 
collaboration merely refers to certain actions, while partnership encompasses not only 
actions and activities but also values to be promoted, such as empathy, a trusting 
relationship, honesty and respectfulness. Accordingly, from the perspective of this 
thesis, a focus only on action can be used to distinguish collaboration from partnership. 
Notably, this distinction is supported by Carnwell and Carson, who – with the aim of 
distinguishing between these two concepts – state that collaboration is about ‘what we 
do’, but partnership is about ‘who we are’.76  
Based on the working notions of and the working distinction between 
collaboration and partnership explained above, it is arguable that collaboration is 
related to partnership, in that the former is used to develop the latter. In other words, 
individuals need to collaborate with each other to foster a partnership relationship 
between them. This argument is supported by many authors who offer similar 
                                               
72 B Hudson et al, The Integration of Localised and Collaborative Purchasing: A Review of 
the Literature and a Framework for Analysis, (Leeds: Nuffield Institute for Health, 1998), 
cited in R Carnwell and J Buchanan, Effective Practice in Health, Social Care and Criminal 
Justice., 2nd ed (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2009), at 15. 
73 See note 77 and 78 below. 
74 R Carnwell and A Carson, see note 58 above, at 3. 
75 EA Henneman et al, see note 68 above, at 104. 
76 R Carnwell and A Carson, see note 58 above, at 10-11. 
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explanations of this matter. Cahil, for example, illustrates that there is a hierarchical 
relationship between collaboration and partnership, and the former must be achieved 
to develop the latter.77 Likewise, Apostolakis describes collaboration as a mechanism 
for developing strategy for multi-organisational partnerships.78  
The conclusion regarding collaboration for this thesis is as follows: this 
concept refers to the act of working together with others; it only has a procedural 
aspect, unlike partnership – which also involves the aspect of values; as regards its 
relationship to partnership, this thesis considers it to be a measure for developing a 
partnership relationship. It is worth emphasising that this conclusion might not agree 
with the literature that offers different explanations of collaboration.79  
b)  Participation and Empowerment 
As explained above, this thesis uses participation and empowerment as 
concepts that justify some practical measures proposed in the Model. It is therefore 
necessary to explore these two concepts, to find the relationships between them as well 
as their relationships to partnership. In doing so, this sub-sub-section first explores 
their meanings that are explained in the academic literature, and then proposes their 
working notions for this thesis. Finally, based on these working notions, the 
relationships between participation, empowerment and partnership are outlined.  
Participation or Involvement 
Participation generally refers to the act of taking part in something. A 
question subsequently arises as to what the term ‘taking part’ exactly means. My 
literature review suggests that participation does not actually have particular forms of 
action. Indeed, its definition normally varies depending upon what purposes it is 
expected to serve in certain circumstances. As explained by Brager et al, there are 
many of such purposes, including being a means to educate citizens and increase their 
                                               
77 J Cahill, "Patient Participation: A Concept Analysis" (1996) 24 Journal of Advanced 
Nursing 3 561-571, at 567. 
78 C Apostolakis, "Citywide and Local Strategic Partnerships in Urban Regeneration: Can 
Collaboration Take Things Forward?" (2004) 24 Politics 2 103-112. 
79 Some authors explain that collaboration involves some values, such as trust and respect. 
See B Hudson et al, see note 72 above. 
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competence; a mechanism for ensuring sensitivity and accountability of services to 
consumers; a vehicle for influencing decisions that affect the lives of citizens; and an 
avenue for transferring political power.80 Undoubtedly, its definitions proposed in the 
academic literature are diverse. For example, Brager et al refer to participation as ‘the 
means by which people who are not elected or appointed officials of agencies and of 
government influence decisions about [programmes] and policies that affect their 
lives’.81 Richardson defines this concept as the ways in which ordinary citizens can or 
do take part in decision-making processes.82 For Armitage, citizen participation is a 
process whereby citizens act in response to public concerns, voice their opinions about 
decisions that affect them, and take responsibility for changes to their community.83 
Westergaard refers to participation as a collective effort to increase and exercise 
control over resources and institutions.84 It can be inferred from these examples that 
participation can take various forms of action and its definition is contextually diverse. 
It is therefore difficult to assign an exact meaning to it. 
Moreover, a question might arise as to whether or not participation 
necessarily involves perceptible action. In other words, when people participate in 
something, do they need to be actively involved in it by performing certain perceptible 
actions, such as voicing their opinions or making decisions, as opposed to 
imperceptible ones, e.g. receiving information or realising something? My literature 
review suggests that it is difficult to answer this question due to discrepancy in the 
definitions of participation provided in the academic literature. Particularly for some 
authors, this concept only refers to the act of receiving information that leads to, inter 
alia, sensitisation, an increase in receptivity, an increase in an ability to get involved,85 
                                               
80 G Brager et al, Community Organizing, 2nd ed (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1987), at 62. 
81 Ibid, at 63. 
82 A Richardson, Participation (Concepts in Social Policy 1), (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1983), at 8. 
83 A Armitage, Social Welfare in Canada : Ideals and Realities, 2nd ed (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1988), cited in GM Mathbor, Effective Community Participation in 
Coastal Development, (Chicago: Lyceum Books, 2008), at 8. 
84 KB Westergaard, An Economic and Social Analysis of a Village in Bangladesh, 
(Bangladesh: Rural Development Academy, 1986).  
85 UJ Lele, The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa, (London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1975). 
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an increase in knowledge86 or an active concern.87 In this sense, participation does not 
require perceptible action. This is, however, not the case for some authors who equate 
this concept with an increase in control over objects of participation, as illustrated 
below. Given this discrepancy, one can say that participation can range from the act of 
being informed about objects of participation, to the act of having control over them. 
It can therefore be concluded, as the working notion of participation for this thesis, 
that this concept refers to the act of taking part in something that might involve the 
act of receiving information about it.  
It can be inferred from this working notion that participation here does not 
necessarily involve control over objects of participation. Admittedly, this does not 
agree with the literature that considers such control to be central to the nature of this 
concept. For example, the World Bank Participation Sourcebook, which defines 
participation as ‘a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over 
development initiatives, and the decisions and resources which affect them’.88 Another 
example is Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation, a classic typology of 
participation, where the act of taking part without actual control over decisions is 
considered to be either non-participation or tokenistic participation.89 To recognise this 
disagreement, participation in this thesis is classified into three types, as follows: mere 
‘participation’ includes the act of being informed about objects of participation; ‘active 
participation’ calls for active or perceptible action related to objects of participation; 
and ‘meaningful participation’ requires participants to have some control over objects 
of participation. It is worth emphasising here that this classification is aimed at coining 
the working terms of participation used in this thesis, not making any theoretical 
contribution or constructing any argument about this concept.  
Notably, in general, the expression ‘participation in biobanking/biobanks’ 
specifically refers to the act of joining a biobank, which involves the acts of giving 
consent and providing a biobank with tissue samples and information, and the word 
‘participant’ is usually used to refer to a person who performs such acts. In this respect, 
                                               
86 G Brager et al, see note 80 above, at 62. 
87 A Richardson, see note 82 above, at 9. 
88 World Bank, The World Bank Participation Sourcebook, (1996) 259, at xi. 
89 SR Arnstein, see note 55 above. 
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the meaning of the term ‘participation’ in this context is different from the concept of 
participation explained above: from a conceptual perspective, the former amounts to 
the act of following the processes which people normally take part as ordinary 
procedure, while the latter refers to the act of taking part in the processes that are not 
deemed ordinary procedure. This difference is also highlighted by Rifkin et al, who 
explain in a healthcare context that ‘the mere receiving of services does not constitute 
participation’.90 As this thesis revolves around biobanking practices, this explanation 
implies that there is likely to be some confusion between the former and the latter when 
the word ‘participation’ is used in this thesis. To avoid such confusion, afterwards, this 
thesis uses the term ‘involvement’ to refer to the concept of participation, which 
is explained in this sub-sub-section, and uses the term ‘participation’ to refer to the act 
of joining a biobank. This is also applied to the aforesaid classification: the terms 
‘active involvement’ and ‘meaningful involvement’ are used for recognising the 
disagreement as to the meanings of participation explained by different authors. 
Empowerment 
It can be argued that the meanings of empowerment vary according to 
individuals’ perceptions and contexts of application.91 They are even ambiguous in 
some circumstances.92 This is evident from some of its definitions proposed in the 
academic literature. Adam, for example, defines empowerment as ‘the means, by 
which individuals, groups and/or communities become able to take control of their 
circumstances and achieve their own goals, thereby being able to work towards helping 
themselves and others to maximise the quality of their lives’.93 For Fawcett et al, 
empowering physically-disabled people refers to ‘the process of gaining some control 
                                               
90 SB Rifkin et al, "Primary Health Care: On Measuring Participation" (1988) 26 Social 
Science & Medicine 9 931-940, at 933. 
91 CC Ellis-Stoll and S Popkess-Vawter, "A Concept Analysis on the Process of 
Empowerment" (1998) 21 Advances in Nursing Science 2 62-68, at 62; B Humphries, 
"Contradictions in the Culture of Empowerment" in B Humphries (ed) Critical Perspectives 
on Empowerment, (Birmingham: Venture Press, 1996) 1-16; CH Gibson, "A Concept 
Analysis of Empowerment" (1991) 16 Journal of Advanced Nursing 3 354-361, at 355. 
92 T Gilbert, "Empowerment: Issues, Tensions and Conflicts" in M Todd and T Gilbert (eds), 
Learning Disabilities: Practice Issues in Health Settings, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1995) 83-102, at 84-85. 
93 R Adams, Social Work and Empowerment, 3rd ed (Hampshire: Macmillan Distribution, 
2003), at 8. 
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over events, outcomes, and resources of importance to an individual or group’,94 while 
community empowerment is defined as ‘the process of gaining influence over 
conditions that matter to people who share neighbourhoods, workplaces, experiences, 
or concerns’.95 In poverty-reduction initiatives, the World Bank sees this concept as 
‘the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate 
with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives’.96 
These definitions suggest that the meaning of empowerment depends on the context 
of application, which – according to these examples – involves whom is to be 
empowered and what is to be achieved as a result of empowerment. One can therefore 
say that the definitions of empowerment are contextually diverse. 
However, the theme underlying the definitions of empowerment can be 
identified: they all refer to processes by which people/entities gain either additional 
control over, or extra capability to control, matters that affect them. This theme is 
similar to Rappaport’s definition of empowerment, where empowerment is the process 
by which people, organisations and communities gain mastery over their own lives.97 
Two elements can be extracted from this theme. The first element is the enhancement 
of control or of capability to control. Those empowered either might not originally 
have any or sufficient control or capability to control, such as elderly people (less 
capability to live by themselves),98 physically disabled people (less capacity to 
work),99 and ethnic minorities (less ability to decide about their lives).100 Second, those 
empowered are directly affected by matters of interest. For this element, the context 
must be taken into consideration. For example, provided that a poverty reduction 
                                               
94 SB Fawcett et al, "A Contextual-behavioral Model of Empowerment: Case Studies 
involving People with Disabilities" (1994) 22 American Journal of Community Psychology 
471-496, at 472. 
95 SB Fawcett et al, "Using Empowerment Theory in Collaborative Partnerships for 
Community Health and Development" (1995) 23 American Journal of Community 
Psychology 5 677-697, at 679. 
96 World Bank, Empowerment and Poverty Reduction: A Sourcebook, (May 2002) 272, at vi. 
97 J Rappaport, "Studies in Empowerment - Introduction to the Issue" (1984) 3 Prevention in 
Human Services 2 1-7, cited in CH Gibson, see note 91 above, at 355. 
98 P Lloyd, "The Empowerment of Elderly People" (1991) 5 Journal of Aging Studies 2  
125-135. 
99 SB Fawcett et al, see note 94 above. 
100 MS Chen, Jr., "Informal Care and the Empowerment of Minority Communities: 
Comparisons between the USA and the UK" (1999) 4 Ethnicity & Health 3 139-151. 
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programme aims to provide individuals with opportunities to improve their economic 
status, empowerment should involve an increase in their capabilities to, inter alia, 
negotiate with financial institutions. However, information-sharing among financial 
institutions is not considered to be empowerment because, although such sharing can 
enhance those institutions’ capability to tackle poverty, those institutions themselves 
are not directly affected by it. It can be concluded from the academic literature that 
empowerment generally refers to processes or measures for enhancing one’s control 
over or one’s capability to control matters affecting them.  
In this thesis, however, this concept focuses only on the enhancement of 
capability to control, not control itself, since the thesis deals with the aspect of control 
in a participant-biobanker relationship separately.101 Thus, to avoid any confusion, an 
increase in control needs to be differentiated from an increase in capability to control. 
As an example in a biobanking context, participant involvement in management boards 
is considered as empowerment here only because participants have access to 
information about biobanking activities, which enables them to deal with biobanking 
by giving meaningful input about biobanking. The reason is not that they have some 
degree of control over decisions about biobanking. Thus, the term ‘empowerment’ in 
this thesis refers to processes or measures that allow ones to enhance their 
capability to control matters affecting them. In a biobanking context, it amounts to 
measures that allow biobank participants to improve their capability to deal with 
biobanking, such as giving input about biobank governance and providing samples and 
information properly. In practice, it mainly involves information and knowledge 
sharing, because this sharing basically increases such capability. Notably, it can be 
assumed that any biobanking issues affect participants, because participants can be 
considered to be part of biobanking and thereby those issues inherently affect them. 
Relationships Between Three Concepts 
Before describing the relationships between involvement, empowerment and 
partnership, their working notions for this thesis are first noted: partnership refers to 
the state of having a relationship between professionals and non-professionals, and its 
                                               
101 See 3.4 in ch 3 below. 
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attributes are based on Bidmead and Cowley’s explanation of partnership attributes, 
which is concluded in Table 1 above; involvement (or participation) refers to the act 
of taking part in something, ranging from merely the act of receiving of information 
to the act of having control over objects of participation; empowerment refers to 
processes or measures for increasing ones’ capability to control matters affecting them.  
Based on these working notions, one can say that, in general, the nature of 
partnership is different from that of the other two concepts. This is because partnership 
refers to a state or relationship and so it involves the aspect of values; by contrast, 
empowerment and participation are only about measures or processes.102 This 
difference implies that merely implementation of certain measures cannot build a 
partnership if certain values – e.g. trust, openness and equity – are not concurrently 
encouraged. Other than the nature of these three concepts, when considering the 
content of their working notions in more detail, the relationships between them can be 
demonstrated in a Venn diagram (see Figure 1 below) and described as follows: 
Figure 1:   Venn diagram illustrating the relationship between partnership, 
empowerment and involvement 
 
 
                                               
102 In practice, empowerment and participation can be used to enhance certain values, such as 
autonomy and equity, respectively. However, the working notions of these two concepts for 








For involvement [1-4], this concept is a basis for both partnership and 
empowerment, as two or more parties need to take part in performing empowerment 
or forming a partnership. On the other hand [2, 3, 4], involvement may result in 
empowerment and/or partnership. As an example, people who take part in certain 
projects may acquire knowledge or information that renders them capable of dealing 
with problems they need to handle. Alternatively, these people might become part of 
those projects, establish open and honest communication with project organisers, and 
even help to pursue the goals of those projects, thereby making them become partners 
with project organisers. Notwithstanding [1], involvement does not always result in 
partnership and empowerment as it might lead to mere awareness of something. For 
example, healthy people might be involved in disease prevention programmes in order 
to receive information about disease which they are interested in but are not suffering 
from. As a result, their involvement merely leads them to being aware of it, not 
enhancing their capability to deal with disease that they are suffering from or building 
a partnership between them and programme organisers. 
As for the empowerment circle, although it is said that empowerment and 
involvement are closely related and indivisible,103 these two concepts are in fact 
arguably distinguishable here: based on their working notions explained above, 
empowerment accentuates the consequences of measures (i.e. an increase in capability 
to control) while involvement focuses on the methods involved in measures (i.e. the 
act of taking part). As for the relationships between empowerment and partnership, [2] 
empowerment does not always result in a partnership relationship. As an example, the 
sharing of knowledge about financial management might only aim to increase ones’ 
capability to deal with their financial problems. This sharing can be considered to be 
empowerment, but it might not build a partnership since it might not develop any 
special relationships. On the other hand [3], empowerment and partnership can be 
concurrent. For example, in a case where people engage in a pollution-reduction 
project and can voice their opinions on the strategy of this project, the sharing of 
information about environmental science not only helps them to deal with 
environmental problems they face, but also enables them to collaborate properly with 
                                               
103 A Sidorenko, Empowerment & Participation in Policy Action on Ageing, (2006) 9, at 2. 
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organisers of this project by, inter alia, making useful contributions to this project. In 
this case, the sharing of information can be deemed to be both empowerment and a 
means to exhibit or build a partnership. 
When considering the partnership circle [4], the key question is whether it is 
possible for a partnership to be developed without empowerment. From a conceptual 
perspective, the answer to this question can be positive: non-professionals and 
professionals might work together to form a partnership, and they both have capability 
to control the issues they are responsible for. A possible example is where a service 
provider forms a partnership with clients with the aim of improving the quality of its 
services, and they both agree to deal single-handedly with particular aspects of those 
services by using their own skills and resources. In this case, they do not both need to 
be empowered to achieve this aim. In practice, however, it is questionable whether this 
form of partnership actually exists because it might be difficult to find a partnership 
that does not involve any empowerment at all. Particularly, the sharing of information 
or expertise is conceptually a common attribute of partnership. Also, from a practical 
perspective, this sharing is usually used to help other partners to pursue the goals of 
partnerships. Moreover, in reality, individuals/entities are unlikely to team up with 
others to do something if they are already capable of dealing with it by themselves. It 
can therefore be concluded that partnership is normally intertwined with 
empowerment, but a partnership without empowerment is – albeit theoretically 
possible – rarely existent in reality. 
There are some limitations to the above description of the relationships 
between these three concepts. First, this description is not applicable if any of these 
three concepts is defined differently from their working notions for this thesis. For 
example, provided that involvement is considered to require control, this description 
– where involvement also includes the act of being educated – is not applicable. 
Second, this description is only applied to a situation where two or more parties are 
involved and these parties consist of at least one non-professional and one 
professional. The reason is that, in this description, partnership is between 
professionals and non-professionals. Thus, this description might not be suitable for 
situations that do not involve such parties. An example is a situation where ‘have-nots’ 
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empower themselves by gaining financial knowledge and skills: this situation does not 
have any involvement and thus this description, whereby empowerment stems from 
involvement, is not applicable. Finally, this description does not concern the aspect of 
values because, here, empowerment and involvement merely have the aspect of 
procedure. As can be seen above, when considering partnership, this description 
focuses only on its procedural attributes, such as working together, information sharing 
and negotiation. 
To summarise, the relationships between involvement, empowerment and 
partnership can be concluded, based on their working notions for this thesis, as follows. 
Involvement is a basic concept or precursor to the other two concepts. Empowerment 
and partnership are interrelated. In particular, partnership can lead to empowerment 
since it involves the sharing of information or expertise. On the other hand, 
empowerment can be considered as a means to develop a partnership relationship 
because all partners should have sufficient capability to pursue the goals of 
partnerships. Notably, as empowerment can be considered inseparable from 
partnership in practice, this concept is inherently essential for partnership-building 
processes. This is echoed in the Model, as explained and emphasised in the following 
chapters. Particularly, according to Chapter 3, almost all of the key attributes of the 
Model require implementing measures that result in empowering biobank participants. 
These measures involve communicating general knowledge about biobanking and 
information about biobanking activities to biobank participants, so as to enhance their 
capability to exercise their right of withdrawal,104 negotiate policies on tangible 
reciprocation105 and provide useful input about biobank governance.106 As emphasised 
in Chapter 6, these measures are considered crucial for the Model.107 
c)  Solidarity 
The previous section has already explored the concept of solidarity by 
discussing its definitional issues, outlining its fundamental nature and explaining its 
                                               
104 See 3.1.1 b) (Changes to Participants’ Goals) in ch 3 below. 
105 See 3.3.1 b) (Negotiation over Policies) in ch 3 below. 
106 See 3.2.1 b) (Insufficiency of Capability) in ch 3 below. 
107 See 6.1.2 b) (Communication with Participants) in ch 6 below. 
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applicability to biobanking. That section eventually argues that solidarity cannot be 
used to underlie the ARR because it cannot be used in a governance manner and cannot 
exhibit one of the ARR’s main characteristics. However, because this concept is 
deemed desirable for biobanking, it is considered to be the aspirational concept of the 
ARR. In other words, the ARR does not aim to achieve solidarity in biobanking, but a 
solidaristic relationship might emerge during the course of fostering the ARR.  
With the aim of finding the underlying concept of the ARR, it is useful to 
understand how partnership is conceptually related to solidarity, in order to know 
whether and how partnership is more suitable to underlie the ARR when compared 
with solidarity. This sub-sub-section therefore examines the relationship between 
these two concepts by examining the similarities and differences between them. 
Notably, this sub-sub-section only performs a comparison between partnership and 
solidarity. In this respect, the question of whether partnership can be considered as the 
underlying concept of the ARR will be answered in the following sub-section. 
Similarities 
There are many similarities between solidarity and partnership. First, both 
concepts refer to certain forms of connectedness between individuals. Second, the 
natures of solidarity and partnership both have various aspects of relationship other 
than the aspect of procedure: partnership requires some values to be encouraged, such 
as equity, empathy and a trusting relationship; solidarity theoretically stems from 
social connectedness and requires individuals to have certain attitudes. One can 
therefore say that partnership and solidarity both involve psychological and social 
aspects, and thus the mere presence of certain processes or actions cannot prove their 
existence. Participant involvement alone, for example, can verify neither a partnership 
nor a solidaristic relationship in biobanking, unless it is also evident that this 
involvement allows participants to help biobankers pursue biobanking goals or is 
based on a willingness to be of benefit to biobanking, respectively. The last similarity 
concerns the content of these two concepts, which can be separated into four points: 
(1) both concepts involve two or more people voluntarily joining together; (2) these 
people have a disposition to be of benefit to each other; (3) they share similar internal 
motivations that stem from certain forms of connectedness; and (4) they express their 
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motivations through perceptible behaviours, whether active (e.g. assisting others) or 
passive (e.g. accepting burdens). Given these similarities, one can therefore say that 
partnership and solidarity largely share the same features. 
Differences 
Despite these similarities, there are three differences between these two 
concepts. First, they have different functions. Partnership basically concerns 
interactions between individuals that express or develop a partnership relationship 
between them, and thereby its attributes focus on suggesting how to treat those with 
whom one is in partnership or want to build a partnership, respectively. By contrast, 
solidarity is basically used to justify and explain the interactions between solidaristic 
individuals. Thus, its explanation rather focuses on describing why individuals become 
solidaristic (solidaristic bases and attitudes) and how they express their solidarity 
(solidaristic expression).108 
Second, these two concepts give importance to individuals’ interests 
differently. When building a partnership, individuals’ interests remain an important 
consideration. This is evident from many partnership attributes that enable individuals’ 
interests to be acknowledged, respected and even influential in a partnership 
relationship, such as open communication, listening and openness to negotiation. In 
contrast, solidarity is usually silent about the importance of individuals’ interests, since 
it is normally used to explain a situation where collective interests are paramount.109 
Indeed, it is sometimes used to justify limiting individuals’ interests, e.g. Prainsack 
and Buyx’s solidarity-based model for biobank governance, where a risk-prevention 
strategy can be replaced with an actual-harm compensation one as participants 
presumably agree to accept some costs for the benefit of biobanking.110  
The last difference is that a partnership can be intentionally established, while 
this is not the case for solidarity. Particularly, it is arguably difficult to prescribe 
solidarity in practice. As already illustrated above, according to the psychological 
                                               
108 See 2.1.2 above. 
109 See 2.1.4 b) above. 
110 See 1.4.2 b) in ch 1 and 2.1.2 b) above. 
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aspect of solidarity (i.e. solidaristic attitudes), individuals need to accept, recognise or 
feel something so as to become solidaristic, and thereby the occurrence of solidarity 
essentially depends on individuals’ perception. One can therefore say that, despite the 
presence of solidaristic bases, it is uncertain whether a solidaristic relationship is to be 
developed afterwards, let alone the difficulty in confirming the existence of solidarity 
in practice.111 By contrast, in partnership, partners basically share the same goals and 
have an inherent willingness and intention to develop a partnership relationship with 
others.112 Also, a partnership can be built or expressed through certain arrangements. 
Accordingly, partnership does not raise theoretical doubts about whether partners 
recognise their connectedness with others, whether they really want to be of benefit to 
each other, or whether a partnership actually exists. It can therefore be said that, unlike 
solidarity, a partnership can be built intentionally.  
The relationship between solidarity and partnership can be concluded as 
follows: it can be argued that solidarity is essentially similar to partnership, since they 
both refer to connectedness between individuals and involve various aspects of 
relationship, not only a procedural aspect. Furthermore, both of them concern a 
situation where two or more people share similar internal motivations and have a 
disposition to be of benefit to each other. The crucial difference between these two 
concepts is that a partnership can be built intentionally, while solidarity cannot, since 
the occurrence of solidarity relies on individuals’ perception. Moreover, it is arguable 
that partnership emphasises individuals’ interests relatively and also better suggests 
ways to promote these interests. By contrast, solidarity is fundamentally silent about 
the importance of individuals’ interests, and it accentuates justifying and explaining a 
social phenomenon where individuals have dispositions and commitments to 
collectives. Note that the similarities and differences between these two concepts will 
be used in the following sub-section, which discusses why partnership (rather than 
solidarity) should be used to govern biobanking and to underlie the ARR. 
                                               
111 See 2.1.4 a) above. 
112 Common characteristics of partnership include voluntariness and common purposes. 
Theoretically, individuals cannot be coerced to enter into partnerships. 
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2.2.4   Partnership and the ARR 
This sub-section addresses the questions of whether and why partnership 
should be used to underlie the ARR. Given all the above explanations about 
partnership, the answers to these questions are arguably positive. The main reason is 
that partnership does not suffer the two issues that prevent solidarity from being used 
to underlie the ARR, i.e. the inapplicability to biobank governance and the silence 
about participants’ interests.113 For the former, unlike solidarity, a partnership can be 
built intentionally through making certain arrangements, as explained above.114 
Indeed, its existence can be confirmed by the presence of measures that are 
implemented for exhibiting or developing a partnership relationship, thereby allowing 
its use to be recognised and benchmarked. One can therefore say that it can be used as 
a governance instrument, and so it is arguably applicable to biobank governance.  For 
the latter issue, as illustrated above, partnership gives importance to individuals’ 
interests better than solidarity does.115 Indeed, since a partnership is normally built to 
achieve the goals shared by certain persons, it can also lead individuals to assist others 
and/or contribute towards collectives. Accordingly, one can say that partnership can 
be used to balance individuals’ with collectives’ interests, making it possible for this 
concept to strike a balance between participants’ and biobanks’ interests.116 Given that 
partnership can resolve these two issues, one can say that partnership is more suitable 
to underlie the ARR than solidarity. 
In addition, partnership is, per se, promising for biobanking. In general, 
partnership attributes suggest how to treat individuals properly, and so they can be 
used to advise how to behave towards participants in order to strengthen a relationship 
between participants and biobankers. Indeed, many of its attributes can deal well with 
the distinctive characteristics of biobanking. For example, reciprocity can be used to 
respect participants’ contributions to biobanking and can help encourage their ongoing 
commitment to biobanking, thereby corresponding to the longevity of biobanking. 
                                               
113 See 2.1.4 above. 
114 See 2.2.3 c) above. 
115 See 2.2.3 c) above. 
116 See 1.4.2 in ch 1 above. 
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Also, honest and open communication can enhance the transparency and 
accountability of biobanking, which can cope with multiple and unexpected uses of 
biobank resources. Given all these reasons, it can therefore be said that partnership can 
satisfy both of the main criteria for the underlying concept of the ARR.117 Furthermore, 
a partnership might build solidarity, which is an aspirational concept here.118 
Particularly, a partnership can be used to establish solidaristic bases by leading 
individuals to share the same goals. This is applicable to a biobanking context, where 
all parties normally share the same goal of advancing medical science. Accordingly, a 
solidaristic relationship might be fostered when building a partnership in biobanking, 
thereby allowing a participant-biobanker relationship to be additionally strengthened 
by the occurrence of solidarity.119 Given all the explanations in this sub-section, it can 
therefore be argued that partnership should be used as a basis for the ARR. 
2.2.5   Conclusion on Partnership 
To summarise, this section does not propose the working notion of 
partnership for this thesis by using its generic definition extracted from the academic 
literature. Instead, Bidmead and Cowley’s explanation about its attributes is adopted 
as its working notion here because this explanation is generally applied to a partnership 
between professionals and non-professionals, making it suitable for the ARR – which 
involves a relationship between biobankers and participants. This section then 
proposes the working notions of other related concepts and explains the relationships 
of these concepts to partnership, all of which can be concluded as follows: 
Collaboration, the act of working together, can be used for developing a partnership 
relationship. Involvement refers to the act of taking part, which ranges from the act of 
receiving information to the act of having control over something. It is a basis for a 
partnership relationship, since a partnership involves two or more parties working 
together. Empowerment, the measures for increasing ones’ capability to control the 
matters affecting them, is interrelated to partnership since both concepts can be used 
                                               
117 See the introduction of this chapter above. 
118 See 2.1.4 (Solidarity as an Aspirational Concept) above. 
119 See 2.1.3 above. 
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to achieve each other. Solidarity is essentially similar to partnership. It does however 
differ from partnership, in that it can be neither intentionally prescribed nor proven in 
practice and it does not clearly demonstrate how important individuals’ interests are 
when they are balanced against collective interests.  
After considering the nature of partnership and its relationship to solidarity, 
this section has argued that partnership should be used as the concept underlying the 
ARR. The main reason is that it does not raise the issues that solidarity does if being 
used to underlie the ARR – that is, partnership is applicable to biobank governance 
and it can be used to balance participants’ interests with biobanks’ ones. This renders 
it relatively suitable to underlie the ARR when compared with solidarity. Moreover, 
when considering partnership itself, its attributes are arguably beneficial to 
biobanking, and it can indirectly encourage the occurrence of solidarity, which is 
desirable in biobanking. For these reasons, this thesis therefore adopts partnership as 
the underlying concept of the ARR. This means that this concept is to be used as a 
basis for both the conceptual framework of the ARR and the Model.  
It is worth noting again that the working notions of all concepts and the 
relationships between them, explained in this chapter, are not intended to make any 
original contribution or to construct theoretical argument concerning them. Rather, 
these explanations are only provided for use as working bases for the following 
discussions in this thesis. 
2.3   Conceptual Framework of the ARR  
The previous two sections establish that partnership should be used to 
underlie the ARR because it is applicable to biobank governance and can also reflect 
both of the main characteristics of the ARR, proposed in Chapter 1, namely the ability 
to deal with the distinctive characteristics of biobanking and the ability to strike a 
balance between participants’ and biobanks’ interests. Also, solidarity is merely the 
aspirational concept of the ARR, whereby a solidaristic relationship might be fostered 
when developing the ARR but this is not necessarily the case.  
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Based on this premise, this section outlines the conceptual framework of the 
ARR, which is fundamentally based on partnership but aspires to solidarity. In doing 
so, its first sub-section takes into account partnership attributes proposed by Bidmead 
and Cowley, and translates them into key features of a partnership relationship in 
biobanking (“a PRB”). Then, the following sub-section explains how these key 
features can reflect the two main characteristics of the ARR, in order to justify why 
these key features should be considered as the conceptual framework of the ARR. Note 
that, as explained at the end of this section, this conceptual framework can also be used 
to answer the second sub-question of this thesis concerning what the ARR should look 
like from a conceptual perspective, as well as to demonstrate how virtue ethics is 
adopted as an approach to ethical reasoning in this thesis.  
2.3.1   Partnership in Biobanking 
When considering Bidmead and Cowley’s partnership attributes together 
with biobanking practices, a PRB should have five key features as follows. The first 
one is respectfulness, whereby biobankers treat participants with due respect. This 
key feature is embraced as the psychological aspect of a PRB because it is echoed in 
many partnership attributes, such as respect for others’ expertise, equity, and honest 
and open communication. The second key feature is cooperation with negotiability, 
which requires biobankers to work together with participants as well as to allow them 
to influence biobanking activities or the direction of biobanking. This key feature 
amounts to the procedural aspect of a PRB, which encompasses the partnership 
attributes of collaboration, negotiation and involvement. It is noteworthy that, since 
these first two key features are partnership attributes that are commonly found in 
partnership initiatives, it can be said that they incorporate the fundamental attitudes 
and procedures that normally exist in a partnership relationship into a relationship 
between participants and biobankers. In this respect, they help reflect the basic nature 
of partnership in a biobanking context.  
The third key feature is support, whereby biobankers need to help 
participants to make contributions towards biobanking via empowerment, advocacy 
and encouragement, amongst others. In practice, this key feature normally involves the 
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sharing of general knowledge about biobanking and information about biobanks, the 
latter includes background information about biobanks and updates on biobanking 
activities. This key feature is important here, since the ARR is based on a relationship 
between participants and biobankers, and support is a partnership attribute that is 
particularly necessary in a partnership between non-professionals and professionals.120 
The fourth key feature is continuity in relationship, which requires biobankers to 
maintain their relationship with participants. This key feature is echoed in some 
partnership attributes that can be used to continue the relationship between partners, 
such as reciprocation and ongoing communication.  
The last key feature is collectiveness in goals, whereby participants and 
biobankers need to share the same biobanking goals throughout biobanking 
endeavours. Collectiveness in goals can be considered as a fundamental attribute of a 
partnership relationship, and thereby this key feature incorporates another common 
attribute of partnership into a participant-biobanker relationship. Indeed, this key 
feature is applicable to biobanking, as all parties in biobanking generally share the 
same goal, which is to advance medical science. This suggests that collective goals 
here generally refer to medical advances. In practice, they might be specific to a certain 
disease and/or cohort population, and they might also include non-research goals, such 
as profitability and benefit sharing. Furthermore, this key feature can indirectly 
encourage solidarity, the aspirational concept of the ARR, in biobanking: as explained 
above, collectiveness in goals is a partnership attribute that can establish solidaristic 
bases, and so it allows a partnership to foster a solidaristic relationship.121 Given these 
explanations, it can be said that this collectiveness not only underlines partnership but 
also expresses an attempt to encourage solidarity in biobanking, and thereby it should 
be another key feature of a PRB.  
To summarise, a PRB should have five key features: (i) respectfulness, (ii) 
cooperation with negotiability, (iii) support, (iv) continuity in relationship, and (v) 
collectiveness in goals. These key features stem from partnership attributes that are 
translated to suit a participant-biobanker relationship and to encourage the occurrence 
                                               
120 See 2.2.2 (the second last paragraph) above. 
121 See 2.2.4 (last paragraph) above. 
77 
 
of solidarity in biobanking. In the following sub-section, they are to be tested against 
the main characteristics of the ARR, in order to answer the question of whether they 
really can be taken as the conceptual framework of the ARR. It is noteworthy that these 
key features might not be clearly differentiated from each other in practice. For 
example, the collaboration with negotiability and the support could be considered as 
ways to respect participants. Also, the respectfulness could in practice maintain the 
continuity of a relationship between participants and biobankers. Still, this lack of clear 
differentiation does not raise any theoretical issues. The reason is that this sub-section 
is not intended to categorise the key features of a PRB precisely. Rather, it merely 
offers them as conceptual criteria for what a partnership between participants and 
biobankers should look like, as well as working bases for the following discussions. 
2.3.2   From Partnership to the ARR 
The previous sub-section suggests how the concept of partnership can be 
incorporated into a participant-biobanker relationship by proposing the key features of 
a PRB. A subsequent question arises as to whether these key features can be used as a 
conceptual framework for the ARR. The answer to this question not only underlines 
the aforesaid argument for partnership as the underlying concept of the ARR, but also 
resolves the second sub-question of this thesis concerning what the ARR should look 
like from a conceptual perspective. To address this question, this sub-section explains 
whether and how the key features of a PRB can reflect the two main characteristics of 
the ARR, proposed in Chapter 1, i.e. the ability to deal with the distinctive 
characteristics of biobanking and the ability to strike a balance between participants’ 
and biobanks’ interests. These two main characteristics are dealt with separately in two 
different sub-sub-sections, as follows.  
a)  Ability to Deal with Biobanking 
It is arguable that the key features of a PRB can address many issues and 
challenges resulting from the distinctive characteristics of biobanking, especially the 
longevity of biobanking and unexpected uses of biobank resources. Particularly, the 
key feature of continuity in relationship, which involves reciprocation and ongoing 
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communication, can handle these two distinctive characteristics of biobanking. For 
example, participants might be provided with individual feedback in order to 
encourage their continuing commitment to biobanking. Also, regular communication 
might be established to keep them up-to-date with biobanking activities, so that they 
can know how their samples and information are actually used. Also, the key feature 
of cooperation with negotiability enables biobankers and participants to cope with 
unwelcome changes and unanticipated harm to participants, both of which may occur 
as a result of those two distinctive characteristics of biobanking. Moreover, the key 
feature of collectiveness in goals can deal with unexpected uses of biobank resources 
and any dynamics in biobanking, by highlighting the commitment that biobanking 
activities will conform to participants’ expectations. In addition, the key feature of 
respectfulness can generally maintain the good quality of a participant-biobank 
relationship from a psychological perspective, and so it helps maintain the continuity 
and viability of biobanking. Given these explanations, it can therefore be said that the 
key features of a PRB can deal with the distinctive characteristics of biobanking, and 
thereby they can arguably reflect one main characteristic of the ARR. 
b)  Ability to Strike a Balance between Interests 
It is also arguable that the key features of a PRB can be used to balance 
participants’ interests with biobanks’ ones. According to the key features of 
respectfulness and cooperation with negotiability, biobankers are required to treat 
participants respectfully as well as to allow them to engage in and influence 
biobanking. This implies that their interests and attitudes are given due importance and 
consideration. Indeed, this also prevents them from being treated as a mere means to 
another end. One can therefore say that these two key features allow participants’ 
interests to be promoted in a participant-biobanker relationship. On the other hand, 
biobanks’ interests are also promoted, especially through the key feature of 
collectiveness in goals. Particularly, this key feature emphasises the connectedness 
between participants and biobankers. This emphasis helps reaffirm the commitment of 
both parties to biobanking and, as explained above, encourage the occurrence of 
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solidarity in biobanking.122 Consequently, this key feature not only strengthens a 
participant-biobanker relationship, but also allows a positive disposition and helpful 
contributions towards biobanking, thus promoting biobanks’ interests. Indeed, one can 
also say that this key feature inherently promotes participants’ interests: biobanks’ 
interests normally include medical advances, which are in participants’ interest too.123 
These explanations indicate that the key features of a PRB can be used to 
promote participants’ and biobanks’ interests differently, and thereby they allow these 
two interests to be variously and flexibly promoted. Accordingly, it is possible to use 
these key features to strike a balance between these two interests. One can therefore 
say that these key features have the ability to strike such a balance, which is another 
main characteristic of the ARR. 
It is notable that the PRB’s key feature of support can promote both of these 
two interests. In particular, this key feature can further participants’ interests, in that it 
renders participants capable of dealing with biobanking by allowing them to, inter alia, 
understand biobanking, keep up-to-date with biobanking progress and be aware of 
possible harm to them. On the other hand, it also indirectly promotes biobanks’ 
interests, in that it enables participants to help improve biobanking by allowing them 
to properly collaborate with or provide useful input for biobankers. For example, the 
sharing of knowledge and information about biobanking activities with participants 
allows them to have a good understanding of biobanking and to realise possible harm 
to their interests. As a result, they can protect themselves from such harm as well as 
suggest how to prevent it and make biobanking attract more participation. Given this 
explanation, it can therefore be said that the key feature of support can promote both 
participants’ and biobanks’ interests. 
To summarise this sub-section, it can be said that the key features of a PRB, 
proposed in the previous sub-section, can exhibit the two main characteristics of the 
ARR since they can deal with some distinctive characteristics of biobanking and can 
also be used to balance participants’ interests with biobanks’ ones. It is therefore 
arguable that these key features, which are based on partnership, can be considered as 
                                               
122 See 2.2.4 (last paragraph) above. 
123 See 1.4.2 a) in ch 1 above. 
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the conceptual framework of the ARR. As mentioned above, this argument reinforces 
the above argument that partnership should be used to underlie the ARR.124 
Furthermore, it also answers the second sub-question of this thesis, regarding what the 
ARR should conceptually look like: the ARR should look like a partnership 
relationship and it should have these five key features as its conceptual framework. It 
is noteworthy that, in terms of ethicality, this argument also suggests that this thesis 
uses the moral theory of virtue ethics, which determines morality by considering the 
character traits of actors, to justify its proposals ethically.125 Particularly, as the ARR 
involves biobankers’ interactions with participants in practice, this argument implies 
that biobankers should treat participants in the same ways that partners do towards 
each other. Partnership can therefore be considered to underlie the desirable character 
of biobankers. This means that this thesis perceives partnership as a virtue that 
biobankers need to have for fostering the ARR. In other words, partnership is used to 
define the character trait of virtuous biobankers. Accordingly, the ethicality of the 
proposals of this thesis is arguably based on the character traits of actors.126 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the concepts of solidarity and partnership in order 
to find the underlying concept of the ARR, which needs to (1) be applicable to biobank 
governance and (2) echo the two main characteristics of the ARR, outlined in Chapter 
1. Other related concepts – i.e. collaboration, participation and empowerment – have 
also been explored to refine the understanding of partnership as well as propose their 
working notions for this thesis.  
As a result of this exploration, this chapter first argues that solidarity cannot 
be used to underlie the ARR. However, since solidarity is arguably desirable in 
biobanking, it should be considered as the aspirational concept of the ARR. This 
chapter then argues for using partnership as the concept that underlies the ARR. One 
                                               
124 See 2.2.4 above. 
125 See 1.3.3 in ch 1 above. 
126 Notably, this aspect of the proposals of this thesis will be explained further in the last 
chapter. See 6.2.1 in ch 6 below. 
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reason is that partnership can be used in a governance manner and thus it is arguably 
applicable to biobank governance. Moreover, it can reflect the two main characteristics 
of the ARR: it acknowledges the importance of both individuals’ and collectives’ 
interests, and so it can be used to balance participants’ with biobanks’ interests; it also 
has many attributes that can deal with the distinctive characteristics of biobanking. 
These reasons suggest that partnership is more suitable to underlie the ARR, especially 
when compared with solidarity. Other than these two reasons, partnership might also 
encourage solidarity, which can further strengthen a participant-biobanker relationship 
and encourage participants to dedicate themselves to biobanking. Given all these 
reasons, one can say that partnership can be used to introduce the main characteristics 
of the ARR into a participant-biobanker relationship as well as to encourage the 
occurrence of solidarity in biobanking. It is therefore arguable that this concept should 
be used as the underlying concept of the ARR. 
Based on this argument, this chapter then translates common attributes of 
partnership into the key features of a PRB that befit a participant-biobanker 
relationship. These key features are respectfulness, cooperation with negotiability, 
support, continuity in relationship and collectiveness in goals. Finally, with the aim of 
explaining why these key features should be considered as the conceptual framework 
of the ARR, this chapter demonstrates that they can exhibit both of the main 
characteristics of the ARR, as follows. First, almost all of them can deal with the 
longevity of biobanking and unexpected uses of biobank resources. Second, they can 
be used to strike a balance between participants’ and biobanks’ interests, because they 
can promote either of these two interests: on the one hand, the key features of 
respectfulness and cooperation with negotiability allow participants’ interests to be 
given due importance and consideration; on the other hand, the key feature of 
collectiveness in goals essentially promotes biobanks’ interests by reaffirming the 
commitment to biobanking and encouraging solidarity in biobanking. Given these 
explanations, it can be concluded that the ARR should have these five key features as 
its conceptual framework. These key features are considered to be conceptual criteria 
that need to be satisfied when developing the ARR in practice. In this respect, they 
will be used to underpin the Model in the next chapter. 
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Two important arguments in this chapter can be summarised as follows: first, 
partnership should be the underlying concept of the ARR, and solidarity should only 
be an aspirational concept when developing the ARR; second, the ARR should have 
five key features, namely respectfulness, cooperation with negotiability, support, 
continuity in relationship, and collectiveness in goals. These two arguments answer 
the second sub-question of this thesis, regarding what the ARR should look like from 
a conceptual perspective: the ARR should look like a partnership relationship and it 
should have those five key features as its conceptual framework. Also, as far as 
ethicality is concerned, these arguments suggest that partnership should be considered 
to be the character trait of virtuous biobankers. In the following chapter, this 
conceptual framework will be used as a working basis when proposing the Model, 
which suggests how the ARR can be fostered in biobanking practice. The Model 
consists of four key attributes, i.e. emphasis on collective goals, collaboration, 
reciprocation and control sharing. To apply these key attributes in practice, biobankers 
need to implement certain practical measures. These key attributes and measures can 





Chapter 3  
Partnership Model for Developing the ARR 
By considering a participant-biobanker relationship that can deal with the 
practical and ethical issues and challenges created by biobanking as an authentic 
research relationship in biobanking (“an ARR”), this thesis pursues one approach to 
an ARR (“the ARR”), one which can enhance both the ethical acceptability of 
biobanking to participants and the effectiveness of biobanking. The previous chapter 
concluded that partnership is the underlying concept of the ARR, while solidarity is 
merely taken as the aspirational concept thereof. Based on this premise, that chapter 
establishes the conceptual framework for the ARR by suggesting that the ARR should 
have five key features, namely: (1) respectfulness, (2) cooperation with negotiability, 
(3) support, (4) continuity in relationship and (5) collectiveness in goals. With the aim 
to suggest ways to foster the ARR, this chapter addresses the last sub-question of this 
thesis, regarding how to develop the ARR in practice. In doing so, it proposes a 
partnership model for biobank governance that can reflect all of the ARR’s key 
features (“the Model”).  
This chapter explains the Model by proposing the key attributes that biobank 
governance needs to embody. Each key attribute is explained separately in four 
different sections, each of which has three main sub-sections. In each case, the first 
sub-section explains the general meaning and characteristics of a key attribute in a 
biobanking context. The second sub-section outlines the practical application of that 
key attribute. To do so, it first proposes practical measures as essential requirements 
for applying that key attribute, and then suggests some mechanisms for implementing 
those measures. Note that the latter are considered to be exemplars of how to put the 
former into practice and so, unlike the former, they are actually not the proposals of 
this thesis. Finally, the last sub-section justifies that key attribute by showing how it 
can reflect the key features of the ARR, proposed in the previous chapter. The 
measures and mechanisms for applying that key attribute may also be specifically 
justified in the same fashion, if they additionally reflect other ARR’s key features. 
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Two points need to be noted here. First, this chapter mainly aims to propose 
the Model. In this respect, it does not deal with controversial issues that might arise 
from these proposals, such as participants’ control, the provision of individual 
feedback and commercial involvement. These issues will be addressed in Chapter 6. 
Second, in an attempt to make the proposals of this thesis practically applicable in a 
range of biobanking settings, the Model intentionally does not lay down overly 
stringent requirements so as to make its practical application somewhat flexible. 
As an interim conclusion, the Model consists of four key attributes, namely: 
(i) emphasis on collective goals, (ii) collaboration, (iii) reciprocation and (iv) control 
sharing. It is arguable that the Model can be used to foster the ARR in practice because 
its key attributes, as well as the measures and mechanisms proposed for applying them, 
can reflect all the key features of the ARR, outlined in the previous chapter. It is worth 
emphasising that the Model is primarily aimed at suggesting the ways in which the 
ARR can be developed in practice. In this respect, the more biobank governance 
conforms to the Model, the more likely the ARR is to be fostered in that governance. 
This does not mean that biobanks whose governance does not conform to the Model 
can be judged ineffective, unacceptable or unsuccessful. Rather, such non-conformity 
merely tentatively suggests that the participant-biobanker relationship in those 
biobanks is unlikely to be fully beneficial to biobanking or that their biobanking 
activities might not be effective and ethically acceptable to participants. 
3.1   Key Attribute 1: Emphasis on Collective Goals 
Emphasising collective goals as a key attribute of the Model conceptually 
requires participants and biobankers to share the same biobanking goals. Also, this 
goal sharing must be consistent throughout biobanking endeavours, and thus 
continuity is an important element here. Accordingly, this key attribute basically 
reflects the ARR’s key features of collectiveness in goals and continuity in 
relationship. As for the question of what biobanking goals are of consideration, 
biobanks have diverse purposes – whether research or non-research ones. Research 
biobanks generally have the goal to advance medical science. In practice, their goals 
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may differ or vary depending upon, inter alia, types of biomaterials they collect, 
participant cohort, forms of knowledge they pursue and/or degree of commercial 
involvement. Some research biobanks, for example, focus on a particular disease in a 
certain population, while others function otherwise and collect various types of tissue 
samples and information for epidemiological purposes. Given this diversity, this key 
attribute requires the sharing of biobanking goals that are specific to certain biobanks, 
as opposed to merely the general goal to advance medical science. The main reason is 
that, based on the underlying concept of partnership, participants as partners  
should – or at least should be allowed to – know exactly how their tissue samples and 
information will be used. 
Nonetheless, when applying this key attribute, factual evidence on the sharing 
of specific biobanking goals is not required. This is based on the assumption that 
participants might not have a comprehensive understanding of biobanking goals. More 
importantly, it may also not be feasible in practice to gather such evidence as this 
evidence requires careful assessment of participants’ understanding, which may be too 
resource-consuming. One might therefore say that the requirement for such evidence 
is likely to make the Model impractical and thereby this requirement is not enforced 
here: to apply this key attribute, biobankers do not have to prove that all participants 
fully understand and actually share biobanking goals at this level of specificity. 
Instead, this specificity level is used as a standard for the quality of the measures used 
to apply this key attribute. For example, the information on biobanking goals that is 
communicated to participants needs to include details that are specific to biobanks in 
which they participate. It can therefore be concluded that this specificity is not required 
when determining the extent to which participants actually understand and share 
biobanking goals; rather, this specificity needs to be applied to the practical application 
of this key attribute – i.e. it is used to determine the adequacy of the information about 
biobanking goals that biobankers offer to participants. 
3.1.1   Practical Application 
To put this key attribute into practice, biobankers need to implement measures 
that emphasise biobanking the goals shared with participants, i.e. collective goals. 
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These measures stem from two major issues in biobanking practice. The first one 
concerns participants’ understanding of biobanking goals, which is highlighted in the 
academic literature.1  Admittedly, misunderstandings of biobanking goals seem 
unlikely, since uses of biobank resources are generally unanticipated and so 
biobanking goals do not usually involve detailed and complicated information.2 These 
misunderstandings are, however, possible in practice, especially given that participants 
do not usually have any professional expertise in this area.3 Thus, this issue should not 
be overlooked, especially for the ARR, where collectiveness in goals is one of its key 
features. As for the second issue, biobanking activities might not conform to the goals 
shared with participants. This might result from errors in managing biobanks or the 
dynamics of biobank governance, such as changes to management boards. Some 
extrinsic factors may also result in this non-conformity. One example is incremental 
commercial involvement, whereby biobankers might be enticed to incline more 
towards profitability – as opposed to healthcare necessity – and this might result in 
uses of biobank resources that are undesirable and not in accordance with the goals 
shared with participants. 
These two issues may result in uses of biobank resources that go beyond 
participants’ expectations, thereby eroding their relationship with and trust in 
biobankers. More importantly, since both issues might involve the discrepancy 
between participants’ and biobankers’ actual biobanking goals, they might preclude 
the ARR’s key feature of collectiveness in goals. Given these implications, one can 
                                               
1 LM Beskow et al, "Informed Consent for Biobanking: Consensus-Based Guidelines for 
Adequate Comprehension" (2015) 17 Genetics in Medicine 3 226-233; AK Rahm et al, 
"Biobanking for Research: A Survey of Patient Population Attitudes and Understanding" 
(2013) 4 Journal of Community Genetics 4 445-450. 
2 KE Ormond et al, "Assessing the Understanding of Biobank Participants" (2009) 149A 
American Journal of Medical Genetics Part A 2 188-198; CA McCarty et al, "Informed 
Consent and Subject Motivation to Participate in a Large, Population-Based Genomics 
Study: The Marshfield Clinic Personalized Medicine Research Project" (2007) 10 Public 
Health Genomics 1 2-9. 
3 M Dixon-Woods et al, "Beyond “Misunderstanding”: Written Information and Decisions 
about Taking Part In a Genetic Epidemiology Study" (2007) 65 Social Science & Medicine 
11 2212-2222; G Moutel et al, "Bio-Libraries and DNA Storage: Assessment of Patient 
Perception of Information" (2001) 20 Medicine and Law 2 193-204; V Toccaceli et al, 
"Research Understanding, Attitude and Awareness towards Biobanking: A Survey among 
Italian Twin Participants to a Genetic Epidemiological Study" (2009) 10 BMC Medical 
Ethics 1 1-8. 
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therefore say that these two issues might undermine a participant-biobanker 
relationship as well as the viability of biobanking. To avoid such setbacks, this key 
attribute proposes two measures that aim to tackle these issues by way of reinforcing 
the ARR’s key feature of collectiveness in goals. These two measures are (a) the 
clarification of biobanking goals and (b) the reinforcement of collectiveness in 
biobanking goals. The former focuses on the recruitment stage, while the latter 
emphasises following stages of biobanking. The details of these two measures are 
explained separately in two sub-sub-sections, as follows:  
a)  Clarification of Biobanking Goals 
For the first measure, this key attribute requires biobankers to clarify 
their biobanking goals. This clarification emphasises collectiveness in biobanking 
goals by attempting to achieve genuineness in this collectiveness at an early stage of 
biobanking. In particular, as this measure essentially makes biobanking goals clear 
when participants are recruited, it assists participants in having an accurate 
understanding of biobanking goals and thereby enables them to verify whether they 
actually share the same goals with biobankers before participating. Given this 
explanation, this measure can address the above issue concerning misunderstanding of 
biobanking goals. Indeed, a proper understanding of biobanking goals can inherently 
enhance participants’ capability to deal with biobanking. They can, for example, give 
meaningful consent and provide useful input on the direction of biobanking. In this 
respect, this measure could be seen as empowerment, which echoes the ARR’s key 
feature of support. In addition, this measure can help participants to have a better 
understanding of the implications of their participation, thereby allowing them to avoid 
misguided participation and foreseeable harm as well as promoting their exercising of 
autonomy. Thus, it is arguable that this measure can improve a participant-biobanker 
relationship. It is notable that the focus of this measure is on the recruitment stage. In 
contrast, the other measure, proposed below, serves to accentuate collective goals 




For the practice of this clarification, the focus should generally be on good 
communication with participants during recruitment. Given the aim of making 
biobanking goals clear to participants, the quality of communication should be an 
important consideration – that is, communication with participants should be 
sufficiently effective for delivering an accurate understanding of biobanking goals. To 
have such communication, many factors need to be taken into account. The foremost 
one is the characteristics of participants, including age, education level and cognitive 
ability. For example, information about biobanks should be presented differently to 
adult and young participants. The nature of information is another factor to be 
considered: sensitive or potentially confusing information – e.g. policies on individual 
feedback, commercial involvement and the fact that research biobanks do not provide 
medical treatment4 – needs to be carefully explained and sufficiently justified. Biobank 
design can also inform this communication. An example is a consent approach, which 
intrinsically indicates the amount of information to be communicated and the level of 
understanding to be achieved.5 It can be argued from these factors that the ways to 
implement this measure are contextual. One can therefore say that, without considering 
the contributory factors, merely to offer a deluge of detailed technical information 
about biobanking cannot amount to the implementation of this measure. 
Three points are noteworthy here. First, the implementation of this measure 
should in practice focus on the methods of communication, rather than the 
consequences thereof. Particularly, this implementation does not call for evidence of 
a sufficient level of participants’ understanding, which is arguably impractical to 
gather given the probable non-activeness of participants and the need for excessive 
resources to carefully assess participants’ understanding of biobanking goals. Rather, 
                                               
4 FG Miller and S Joffe, "Evaluating the Therapeutic Misconception" (2006) 16 Kennedy 
Institute of Ethics Journal 4 353-366; AA Lemke et al, "Biobank Participation and Returning 
Research Results: Perspectives from a Deliberative Engagement in South Side Chicago" 
(2012) 158A American Journal of Medical Genetics Part A 5 1029-1037; CA McCarty et al, 
see note 2 above; KE Ormond et al, see note 2 above. 
5 In the model proposed, the consent procedure has a role in sharing control over biobanking 
with participants at an individual level, according to the Model’s key attribute of control 
sharing. See Section 3.4 below. 
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it suggests looking for evidence demonstrating biobankers’ attempts to facilitate such 
understanding. An example is the fact that biobankers involve prospective participants 
in preparing recruitment materials. Another example is recruitment documents having 
content that is easily comprehensible to cohort participants by design. On the second 
point, when determining the extent of information to be communicated, the aforesaid 
level of specificity is applied – that is, this communication should allow participants 
to access the information about biobanking that is sufficiently specific to certain 
biobanks. For the last point, the information provided for participants needs not be 
only about the purposes of biobanks. It might include information concerning other 
aspects of biobanking that can help them to understand biobanking goals, such as types 
of research studies using biobank resources and researchers who have access to 
biobank resources. Indeed, it is necessary for biobankers to notify participants of any 
commercialisation that might be involved in biobanking, such as possible patenting 
and access to biobank resources by for-profit companies, since this indicates a 
commercial aspect of biobanking goals.6 
Re-contacting 
In some circumstances, collectiveness in biobanking goals between 
participants and biobankers does not exist in the first place, or become non-existent. 
This might result from the fact that participants are originally recruited to biobanks for 
different purposes, such as a criminal investigation or organ donation, or there are 
changes to biobanking goals originally agreed with participants. As an example of the 
latter, a long-standing biobank did not have the goal of commercialising its resources 
when recruiting participants but, afterwards, it comes to need and involve this 
commercialisation. In these circumstances, the suggestion of re-contacting is added: 
biobankers should re-contact participants and also explain current biobanking goals to 
them. The reason behind this suggestion is simply that such re-contacting allows 
biobankers to make current biobanking goals clear to participants. Furthermore, this 
re-contacting is of practical benefit to biobanking, in that it intrinsically enables 
                                               
6 The notification of commercial involvement in biobanking is considered to be one of the 




biobankers to obtain consent as well as more samples and information from 
participants if needed. Conceptually, this re-contacting can reflect the ARR’s key 
feature of respectfulness. Particularly, it involves respectful gestures towards 
participants by valuing their autonomy through individual contact and not exploiting 
their original intent. This re-contacting could indeed amount to allowing them to agree 
to become partners in current biobanks. For these reasons, this re-contacting should 
therefore be done in these circumstances. This also implies that, if those participants 
cannot be re-contacted, they should not be recruited to current biobanks. 
It can be concluded from this sub-sub-section that this key attribute requires 
biobankers to recognise the importance of participants’ understanding of biobanking 
goals, rather than ensuring that participants achieve a certain level of understanding of 
biobanking goals. To satisfy this requirement, biobankers need to clarify biobanking 
goals. In practice, they should establish communication that effectively allow 
participants to have an accurate understanding of biobanking goals. There are no 
criteria for what such communication should look like as this needs to be contextual. 
Alternatively, this requirement might be fulfilled with evidence of biobankers’ 
attempts to make information about biobanking goals easily comprehensible, such as 
involving prospective participants in preparing recruitment documents and 
differentiating between the content of recruitment leaflets for adult and young cohorts. 
In a case where collectiveness in biobanking goals does not exist to begin with or 
becomes non-existent, biobankers should re-contact participants. Notably, as this 
clarification involves the provision of information during the recruitment stage, one 
can say that this measure is complementary to the consent procedure.  
b)  Reinforcement of Collectiveness in Goals 
For the second measure, this key attribute requires biobankers to 
reinforce collectiveness in biobanking goals by establishing mechanisms for 
continuously encouraging participants and biobankers to share the same 
biobanking goals. The reason for this measure is that biobankers’ or participants’ 
goals might deviate from the goals already agreed, and thereby there must be 
mechanisms in place to discourage such deviation in order to maintain collectiveness 
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in biobanking goals throughout biobanking endeavours. Given this reason, this 
measure conceptually emphasises collectiveness in goals as well as continuity of this 
collectiveness, and so it arguably reinforces the ARR’s key features of collectiveness 
in goals and continuity in relationship. Moreover, this measure can address the issue 
regarding non-conformity of biobanking activities to collective goals, which is 
explained at the beginning of this sub-section: in this case, biobankers’ goals, reflected 
through non-conforming biobanking activities, are considered to deviate from the 
goals shared with participants; and this measure, which aims to discourage such 
deviation, could be implemented to hinder those activities. Indeed, one can also say 
that this measure could help develop trusting relationships with participants by 
encouraging the uses of biobank resources that accord with their expectations.  
It can be inferred from the above explanation that this reinforcement measure 
requires biobankers’ goals (or biobanking activities) and participants’ goals to be 
constantly monitored, and if any of these goals deviate from collective goals, there 
must be some mechanisms in place for identifying and hindering such deviation 
(unless new consent is sought). In practice, however, it is arguably not feasible for 
biobankers to constantly monitor participants’ goals. This is because such a monitoring 
task requires the continuous examination and careful assessment of participants’ 
thoughts and thereby can be considered excessively burdensome and resource 
consuming, let alone the possibility of non-active participants.7 The focus of this 
measure should therefore be on biobankers’ goals, which can be assumed to be 
reflected in biobanking activities. Accordingly, this reinforcement measure needs to 
have two crucial elements. The first one is ongoing oversight of biobanking 
activities. This oversight basically allows biobankers’ goals to be regularly identified 
from biobanking activities and, as suggested below, this identification allows any 
deviations from collective goals to be detected. The second element is the capability 
to discourage deviations from collective goals. This element basically plays a role 
in maintaining collectiveness in biobanking goals. To give examples of how to 
implement this measure, this sub-sub-section suggests mechanisms for resisting the 
                                               
7 Non-active participants here refer to participants that are not actively involved in biobank 
governance, such as those who are apathetic or unwilling to interact with biobankers other 
than providing their samples and information. 
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changes to participants’ and biobankers’ goals that deviate from collective goals. The 
details of these suggested mechanisms are as follows. 
Changes to Participants’ Goals 
The first suggestion is for a situation where participants themselves change 
their original goals, which have already been agreed with biobankers. Here, 
biobankers’ goals, reflected in biobanking activities, are perceived as collective goals, 
while participants’ goals are considered to deviate from collective goals. Accordingly, 
changes to participants’ goals need to be recognised and resisted in order to maintain 
collectiveness in biobanking goals. Conceptual consideration aside, it is, however, not 
feasible in practice for biobankers to constantly monitor participants’ thoughts and 
recognise such changes, as explained above. Such changes should therefore be dealt 
with by participants themselves. As a result, the task of reinforcing collectiveness in 
biobanking goals in this situation should be entrusted to participants, with the proviso 
that biobankers have an ongoing responsibility to keep them suitably informed.  
Based on this premise, there should be two mechanisms, which stem from the 
aforesaid two crucial elements: (1) communication about biobanking progress 
(“CBP”) and (2) the right to withdraw consent. CBP provides participants with 
information about biobanking activities and thereby allows them to recognise 
biobankers’ goals, which are collective goals here, through such information. In this 
respect, CBP enables them to determine whether or not they still have the same goals 
as biobankers. Provided that the answer is negative, they can prevent deviation of their 
goals from collective goals by withdrawing their consent. Other than reinforcing 
collectiveness in goals in this model, these suggested mechanisms are also of practical 
benefit in general. Particularly, as CBP facilitates the exercising of the right of 
withdrawal by enabling participants to know whether and/or when to withdraw their 
consent, these mechanisms arguably promote this right as well as empowering them 
by enhancing their capability to exercise this right. Indeed, these mechanisms can be 
used in a case where their goals do not actually change but they perceive that 
biobankers’ goals are deviating from the goals they originally agreed.  
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Three points can be noted here. First, these mechanisms are basically for 
active participants: they require participants to actively maintain collectiveness in 
biobanking goals through a self-checking method. This is based on the presumption 
that they will become active if their biobanking goals change. Second, the fact that 
participants might not be able to withdraw their contributions from research that has 
already used their samples and information does not undermine these mechanisms,8 
because they are based on the assumption that their biobanking goals change after 
previous uses. That is, previous uses are justifiable because they conform to 
participants’ original goals or collective goals. Finally, these two mechanisms together 
inherently allow participants to have some control over biobanking at an individual 
level, as further illustrated in the fourth key attribute of control sharing below.9  
Changes to Biobankers’ Goals 
The second suggestion aims to deal with a situation where biobanking 
activities are not in accordance with the goals shared with participants. In assuming 
that biobanking activities are generally a reflection of biobankers’ goals, this situation 
equates to the deviation of biobankers’ actual goals from collective goals. 
Accordingly, with the aim of reinforcing collectiveness in biobanking goals, there 
should be mechanisms in place for recognising and hindering biobanking activities 
that do not conform to participants’ goals so as to discourage the changes to 
biobankers’ goals that deviate from collective goals. It is noteworthy that, in contrast 
to the aforesaid suggestion, where biobankers’ goals are taken as collective goals, 
participants’ goals are perceived as collective goals in this situation because they are 
goals that are originally agreed between participants and biobankers. 
As for the question of who should have a role in implementing these 
mechanisms, one straightforward answer might be participants, since they are partners, 
who know well about collective goals and indeed share those goals. However, when 
                                               
8 Normally, it is not feasible to retrieve or destroy participants’ information that has already 
been used in research studies or released as part of research results. See T Caulfield et al, 
"Research Ethics Recommendations for Whole-Genome Research: Consensus Statement" 
(2008) 6 PLoS Biology 3 0430-0435, at 0432; UK Biobank, UK Biobank Ethics and 
Governance Framework Version 3.0, (October 2007) 20, at 8. 
9 See 3.4.1 a) (Right of Withdrawal) below. 
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considering the nature of this role and the characteristics of participants, this answer is 
not entirely sensible for many reasons. First, this role normally requires specialised 
knowledge of this area, not merely personal experience and reflection.10 Thus, 
participants, who are usually not experts, are unlikely to have adequate capability for 
this role. Second, as the identification of non-conforming activities involves ongoing 
oversight of biobanking activities, this role calls for a certain level of dedication to 
biobank governance. When considering that participants are not always active, it is 
doubtful whether they will have a sufficient level of such dedication. Finally, this role 
basically requires the ability to hinder or inhibit non-conforming activities. Given that 
the ARR is limited to biobankers’ relationship with individual participants,11 it is not 
feasible in practice for each participant to have such ability, let alone dealing with 
practical challenges of doing so. These reasons suggest that participants are probably 
unable to assume this role properly in practice and, consequently, they should not 
single-handedly take on this role.  
This model therefore suggests establishing an oversight body, a fully or  
semi-professional entity that is assigned to monitor biobanking activities and 
encourage the conformity of those activities to collective goals.12 This mechanism not 
only avoids the above issues, but also conceptually helps participants to inhibit 
biobanking activities that go against their goals or beyond their expectations. To adopt 
this suggestion, this body should interact with both biobankers and participants. The 
details of these two interactions are explained separately, as follows:    
For interactions with biobankers, the oversight body should (1) have access 
to information about biobankers’ activities and (2) be able to hinder or inhibit activities 
that do not conform to participants’ goals. These interactions are based on the two 
aforesaid crucial elements, namely the ongoing oversight of biobanking activities and 
the discouragement of any deviation from collective goals, respectively. There are no 
criteria for what this discouragement should look like so as not to limit the 
                                               
10 Note that the model proposed here is not based on the Information Deficit Model, but it 
recognises the reality that specific knowledge and understanding are required to deal with 
biobanking practices. 
11 See 1.3.2 in ch 1 above and 6.3 in ch 6 below. 
12 More detail about this oversight body will be explained in the last chapter of this thesis. 
See 6.1.2 b) (Establishment of an Oversight Body) in ch 6 below. 
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implementation of this measure to certain forms of governance structure. In this 
respect, discouragement mechanisms might either directly enable the oversight body 
to hinder non-conforming activities or involve other entities in doing so; these may 
range from simple practical sanctions to complicated legal mechanisms. Still, the 
effectiveness of discouragement mechanisms is an important consideration – that is, 
they should be able to hinder, or even impede, activities that the oversight body 
considers not to be in conformity with participants’ goals. One practical example is 
financial sanctions by funders:13 although these sanctions might not per se be 
considered powerful, they can amount to discouragement mechanisms if it is evident 
in practice that funders can use funding to effectively hinder activities that are 
considered not to conform to participants’ goals. 
As for interactions with participants, two tasks should be fulfilled by the 
oversight body. First, the body should know participants’ biobanking goals so that they 
can know what collective goals actually are. This task helps to make the body eligible 
to reinforce collectiveness in biobanking goals. In practice, the body can simply derive 
participants’ goals from their consent to biobanking. It might also adopt other 
mechanisms if their consent does not suffice, such as communication and focus groups. 
Notably, the body does not necessarily know precisely what biobanking goal each 
participant actually has, due to the impracticality of doing so. Given the likelihood of 
non-active participants, it is possible that the body will take participants’ consent as 
their overall goals and establish a communication channel that enables them to voice 
their thoughts about biobanking. For the second task, the body should make 
information about its interactions with biobankers (explained above) accessible to 
participants, because they (as partners) share collective goals and so should be allowed 
to know whether collective goals are being pursued. In practice, this task can be 
fulfilled by establishing communication with them. In the light of these two tasks, it 
can be concluded that the oversight body should generally establish mechanisms for 
understanding participants’ biobanking goals and informing them of its own activities. 
                                               
13 These sanctions are a common mechanism that is used for governing biobanks in the UK, 
and there is the view that funders should be involved in overseeing biobanking activities.  
See WW Lowrance, Access to Collections of Data and Materials for Health Research: A 
Report to the Medical Research Council and the Wellcome Trust, (March 2006) 36. 
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Note that these mechanisms can arguably reflect the ARR’s key features of 
respectfulness and support, since these mechanisms render the body’s activities 
transparent to participants and assist participants in dealing with biobanking by 
allowing them to know when to exercise their right of withdrawal, respectively. 
In summary, to implement the measure for reinforcing collectiveness in 
biobanking goals, there must be mechanisms for resisting the changes to participants’ 
and biobankers’ goals that deviate from collective goals. To deal with changes to 
participants’ goals, CBP and the right of withdrawal should be available for 
participants to verify this collectiveness and to inhibit the deviations from collective 
goals that are caused by themselves, respectively. As for changes to biobankers’ goals, 
an oversight body might be established to perform this resistance task by monitoring 
biobanking activities and hindering or inhibiting biobanking activities that do not 
conform to collective goals. In addition, the body should have mechanisms for 
realising collective goals through participants’ biobanking goals, and informing them 
of its own activities. Note that the mechanisms for dealing with changes to biobankers’ 
goals are similar to those suggested for applying the key attribute of reciprocation. The 
reason is that the Model uses the fact of biobankers committing themselves to the goals 
shared with participants to reciprocate participants’ contributions to biobanking.14 
3.1.2   Reflection on the ARR 
As explained at the beginning of this section, overall, this key attribute 
reflects the ARR’s key features of collectiveness in goals and continuity in 
relationship, since it requires participants and biobankers to share the same biobanking 
goals throughout biobanking endeavours. The other key features of the ARR are also 
reflected in the measures and mechanisms proposed for applying this key attribute. In 
particular, the ARR's key feature of respectfulness is echoed in both the clarification 
of biobanking goals, which recommends that biobankers respect participants’ 
autonomy by re-contacting them in the absence of collectiveness in biobanking goals, 
and the reinforcement of collectiveness in biobanking goals, where the oversight 
                                               
14 See 3.3.1 a) below. 
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body’s activities are made transparent to them. The ARR’s key feature of support can 
be exhibited through communication about biobanking goals and progress, as this 
communication inherently empowers participants by enhancing their capability to deal 
with certain biobanking activities, i.e. giving consent to biobanking and withdrawing 
their consent. The establishment of this oversight body can also assist participants in 
reinforcing collectiveness in biobanking goals and maintaining continuity of this 
collectiveness. It can therefore be concluded that this key attribute can help develop 
the ARR by reflecting almost all of the ARR’s key features, namely collectiveness in 
goals, continuity in relationship, support and respectfulness. 
3.1.3   Interim Conclusion 
The key attribute of emphasis on collective goals conceptually requires 
biobankers and participants to share the same biobanking goals. To apply this key 
attribute, biobankers need to implement two main measures. For the first measure, 
biobanking goals need to be clarified so as to encourage genuine collectiveness in 
biobanking goals. If this collectiveness does not exist or becomes ambiguous, 
biobankers should re-contact participants to initiate or verify it. For the second main 
measure, this collectiveness needs to be reinforced by hindering any deviations from 
collective goals. To implement this measure, there must be mechanisms that allow 
biobanking activities to be continuously monitored and hinder the changes to 
participants’ or biobankers’ goals that deviate from collective goals, e.g. the right of 
withdrawal, communication about biobanking progress and establishment of an 
oversight body that is assigned to monitor biobanking activities and resist such 
changes. Notably, the clarification measure focuses on the recruitment stage, while the 
reinforcement one emphasises subsequent stages of biobanking. Thus, these two 
measures can help maintain continuity of collectiveness in goals throughout the course 
of biobanking. In terms of the ARR, this key attribute helps develop the ARR by 
reflecting many of its key features: not only does this key attribute generally echo the 
ARR’s key features of collectiveness in goals and continuity in relationship, but its 
practical application also reflects those of respectfulness and support.  
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3.2   Key Attribute 2: Collaboration 
The term collaboration generally refers to the act of working together.15 
Collaboration in the Model, however, additionally encompasses respect for 
participants, because respectfulness is one of the ARR’s key features and participants 
are considered to be partners here, as explained in Chapter 2.16 Thus, this collaboration 
does not just refer to cooperation, which basically focuses on working together by 
fulfilling ones’ own responsibilities;17 rather, it also requires a psychological element 
of respectfulness. In this respect, this element renders this collaboration different from 
mere collaboration in a general sense. Notably, while collaboration generally involves 
bilateral commitment and action, this key attribute only focuses on those of biobankers 
since the Model basically concerns the ways in which biobankers should behave 
towards participants. In this respect, the Model is not arguing that collaboration in 
biobanking should be unilateral. Based on this premise, this second key attribute 
should have two elements: one is cooperation, or a state of working together, with 
participants; the other is respectful gestures towards them. These elements are to be 
used as bases for the practical application of this key attribute.  
3.2.1   Practical Application 
In the light of the aforesaid elements, one feasible way to cooperate with and 
also show respect to participants in biobanking, is to provide them with opportunities 
to meaningfully influence biobanking activities. Particularly, via the term 
‘opportunities’, all participants are not required to actively engage in biobanking. This 
recognises the reality that some participants are interested in actively engaging in 
biobanking, while others prefer to be inactive and thus do not want to take part in 
biobanking activities other than providing their samples and information. As for the 
term ‘meaningfully’, the call for meaningful influence incorporates an element of 
                                               
15 See 2.2.3 a) in ch 2 above. 
16 See 2.3 in ch 2 above. 
17 It is explained that cooperation refers to the state of individuals working together to 
achieve shared goals, while collaboration additionally involves respect for each individual’s 
contributions. See O Kozar, "Towards Better Group Work: Seeing the Difference between 
Cooperation and Collaboration" (2010) 2 English Teaching Forum 16-23. 
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genuineness into the aforesaid opportunities, thereby preventing such opportunities 
from being tokenistic in practice. Accordingly, the provision of these opportunities can 
be considered both practical for biobanking practice and respectful to participants, 
making it promising for a participant-biobanker relationship. Based on this premise, 
this sub-section therefore proposes two measures that are required to apply this key 
attribute: measures that (a) give participants opportunities to provide input about 
biobanking and (b) ensure the meaningfulness of their input.18 As for the structure of 
this sub-section, these two measures are dealt with separately in two different  
sub-sub-sections. 
a)  Opportunities to Provide Input 
For the first measure, this second key attribute requires biobankers to give 
participants opportunities to provide input about biobanking. The main reason is 
that this measure can reflect the ARR’s key features of (1) cooperation with 
negotiability and (2) respectfulness: it indicates biobankers’ willingness to cooperate 
with participants and, as further explained below, allows them to negotiate about 
biobanking; also, it intrinsically shows respect for their opinions and attitudes as well 
as their interests. In practice, biobankers need to implement mechanisms that allow all 
participants to voice their thoughts, including opinions and attitudes, about 
biobanking. They might, for example, establish some communication channels that 
enable participants to provide their input or feedback about biobanking activities, such 
as participant meetings with Q&A sessions and hotlines for general enquiries. 
Two points are noteworthy here. First, as the ARR concerns biobankers’ 
relationship with individual participants and every participant is deemed to be a partner 
in the Model,19 it is important to offer these opportunities to all participants, regardless 
of whether they choose to be active or not. Second, this measure accentuates 
opportunities to contribute, not actual input from participants. In this respect, it does 
                                               
18 The term ‘input’ in this chapter is limited to intangible contributions to biobanking, 
including opinions, attitudes and concerns about biobank governance. In contrast, the term 
‘contributions’ encompasses such input as well as other forms of contributions to 
biobanking, such as participants’ tissue samples and information. The latter term has a wider 
meaning in this respect. 
19 See 1.3.2 in ch 1 above and 6.3.1 in ch 6 below. 
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not require biobankers to seek input from every participant. As suggested above, this 
can address the likelihood of inactive participants. 
b)  Assurance of Meaningfulness 
For the second measure, biobankers are required to ensure the meaningfulness 
of participants’ input. To achieve this, they need to ensure that participants’ input 
actually has the possibility to influence biobanking activities. This does not mean 
that biobankers always have to put participants’ input into practice; rather, they must 
give participants a real chance to influence biobanking activities substantially. This 
requirement indicates that the genuineness of the aforesaid opportunities and the 
quality of participants’ input are main considerations here. Given these considerations, 
this measure is arguably crucial here because it can prevent those opportunities 
suffering from tokenism, which can arise in any participatory mechanisms20 and 
indeed could undermine a participant-biobanker relationship. Also, in terms of the 
ARR, the measure can help reinforce the ARR’s key features that are reflected in the 
previous measure, namely respectfulness and cooperation with negotiability, by 
making these key features more prominent and likely.  
To explain how to ensure this meaningfulness, this sub-sub-section separately 
deals with three forms of tokenism that could arise in biobanking, i.e. insignificance 
of the issues under consideration, insufficiency of participants’ capability to provide 
input, and disregard for participants’ input. For each possible form of tokenism, its 
nature is first delineated and then mechanisms for addressing it are suggested. 
Insignificance of Issues 
The first possible form of tokenism is that issues on which participants can 
provide input are not sufficiently significant, thereby preventing their input from 
influencing biobanking activities. Examples of such issues might be the theme colour 
of newsletters and the frequency of non-biobanking activities. Biobankers are thus 
required to give participants opportunities to provide input on sufficiently 
                                               
20 The term ‘tokenism’ here refers to the practice of making non-genuine attempts to achieve 
something or not doing something meaningfully. 
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significant issues. It is however difficult to define criteria for ‘sufficiently significant 
issues’, since the level of significance varies depending upon the aspects and contexts 
under consideration. As an example, the issue regarding monetary offers can be 
considered significant for the question of whether to have monetary offers as 
participation incentives, while this is unlikely to be so for the question of whether 
offers should be cash vouchers or cinema tickets. Thus, determination of this matter 
should be on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, one might say that, in general, the 
issues affecting the quality of a participant-biobanker relationship or the direction of 
biobanking activities can be considered significant, since they are influential in the 
management and viability of biobanking. Examples of these issues are policies on 
individual feedback, priorities in use of biobank resources and the degree of 
commercial involvement in biobanking. These characteristics should therefore be used 
as approximate guides to determine what issues should be considered sufficiently 
significant according to this second key attribute. 
Insufficiency of Capability 
The second possible form of tokenism is a situation where participants’ 
capability is not sufficient to give useful input about biobanking. As an example, 
participants may not have adequate knowledge about access to biobank resources and 
implications of this access, and so they are probably unable to voice useful opinions 
on priorities in it. As a result, their input might be unhelpful for biobanking and thereby 
not worthy of consideration. This can prevent their input from influencing biobanking 
activities and thus, in terms of the ARR, undermine the ARR’s key features of 
cooperation with negotiability and respectfulness. This insufficiency is likely to be the 
case, since participants are usually not professionals in this area and might not have 
access to knowledge about biobanking or much information about biobanking 
activities. Biobankers are therefore required to address this insufficiency by 
empowering participants.  
To fulfil this requirement, the suggestion is that biobankers should generally 
give participants access to such information and knowledge, because this access 
enables participants to enhance their capability to provide input about biobanking. 
Indeed, the level of this access should be sufficient in terms of both the amount and 
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type of information. It should be noted from this suggestion that the major concern 
here is the accessibility of such information and knowledge, as opposed to the extent 
to which participants actually access or absorb such information and knowledge. Also, 
no specific mechanisms are suggested – i.e. to address this possible form of tokenism, 
biobankers can use any mechanisms that allow participants to have sufficient access 
to such information and knowledge. In practice, biobankers might establish 
mechanisms for sharing such information and knowledge with participants. These 
mechanisms might be in the form of communication or participatory activities, such 
as issuing participant newsletters, arranging participant meetings, conducting 
workshops on certain issues, and responding to participants’ enquiries. Indeed, these 
mechanisms might be performed among participants. Biobankers might, for example, 
arrange meetings that enable cohort participants to share their experiences of  
data-collecting sessions with one another, so as to increase their capability to express 
their opinions about these sessions or recruitment procedures in general.  
It is noteworthy that mechanisms for addressing this possible form of 
tokenism can fundamentally exhibit the ARR’s key feature of support, in addition to 
the ARR’s key features of respectfulness and cooperation with negotiability. The 
reason is that these mechanisms intrinsically empower participants by enhancing their 
capability to deal with certain aspects of biobanking:21 the aforesaid access enables 
them to know about, inter alia, the nature of biobanking activities, actual problems 
with biobanking and possible solutions to these problems, all of which assist them in 
making useful contributions towards biobanking.  
Disregard for Participants’ Input 
The last possible form of tokenism is present when participants’ input is not 
given serious consideration. This prevents participants from having any real chance of 
influencing biobanking, thereby making their opportunities to provide input tokenistic. 
To address this possible form of tokenism, biobankers are required to take 
participants’ input into consideration seriously. To fulfil this requirement in 
practice, there should be mechanisms that can help to verify actual consideration of 
                                               
21 See 2.2.3 b) (Empowerment) in ch 2 above. 
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participants’ input, so as to assure participants that their input is not neglected by 
biobankers. These mechanisms may vary contextually depending upon, inter alia, the 
design of biobank governance and the availability of management resources. For 
example, participant representatives might be appointed to certain working groups or 
management committees and be assigned a role to observe how biobankers deal with 
participants’ feedback.22 As another example, after every meeting with participants, 
biobankers might be obliged to write a public report that documents participants’ 
feedback, discusses it and, if necessary, responds to it. In this case, biobankers should 
also be obliged to justify adequately why they put certain feedback into practice while 
ignoring other feedback. 
Three points are noteworthy here. First, the solution to this last possible form 
of tokenism merely accentuates actual consideration of participants’ input. In this 
respect, it is not necessary for biobankers to always put participants’ input into 
practice. This implies that this possible form of tokenism could be addressed even 
without any changes resulting from participants’ input. Second, the mechanisms for 
verifying biobankers’ consideration are especially important in a situation where input 
from certain participants is not put into practice or in conflict with that from other 
participants or other stakeholders in biobanking, such as members of the public and 
participants’ communities.23 This is because these mechanisms help demonstrate that 
the former input is not overlooked, thereby reinforcing the ARR’s key feature of 
respectfulness. In practice, biobankers might, for example, provide explanations or 
justifications for not acting upon that input. Finally, one might say that the requirement 
for giving participants’ input serious consideration implicitly introduces some extent 
of negotiability here, in the sense that it is possible for participants to trigger changes 
to certain biobank activities by voicing their attitudes or preferences about those 
activities. However, unlike negotiation in a general sense, this negotiation does not 
involve formal negotiation procedures and participants (as individuals) hold limited 
negotiation power in practice. 
                                               
22 However, if appointed participants provide any input on behalf of other participants as 
well, this appointment is prone to the issue of representation, which is not desirable for the 
ARR. See 6.3.1 in ch 6 below. 
23 See 6.3 (last paragraph) in ch 6 below. 
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To summarise this sub-section, the practical application of this key second 
attribute generally requires measures that (1) give participants opportunities to provide 
input on biobanking and (2) assure the meaningfulness of their input. The former, by 
conceding the research reality that participants are not always active, merely calls for 
mechanisms that allow all participants to provide input on biobanking, as opposed to 
receiving actual input from them. The latter aims to deal with any possible forms of 
tokenism, given that those mechanisms might be tokenistic, and so biobankers are 
required to ensure the following: first, the issues of participants’ consideration are 
sufficiently significant; second, participants are able to have sufficient capability to 
provide useful input; and finally, their input is given serious consideration. There are 
two notable points here. First, these measures are also employed in the key attribute of 
reciprocation, particularly when allowing participants to negotiate about policies on 
tangible reciprocation.24 Second, no specific collaborative mechanisms are required, 
since these mechanisms should vary contextually depending on many factors, such as 
the design of biobank governance, the availability of management resources and the 
activeness of participants. Thus, the Model is open to any innovative methods for 
applying this key attribute. Web-based applications,25 for example, might be used to 
receive participants’ input on individual feedback, and this input will be submitted to 
and eventually considered by management boards. 
3.2.2   Reflection on the ARR 
In general, the two measures required for applying the second key attribute of 
collaboration can arguably help develop the ARR. Particularly, the measure to give 
participants opportunities to provide their input about biobanking can indicate 
biobankers’ willingness to work with participants and, to some extent, allow them to 
negotiate about biobanking; also, as this measure allows participants to collaborate 
with biobankers and possibly influence biobanking, it can be seen to treat them with 
                                               
24 See 3.3.1 b) (Negotiation over Policies) below. 
25 It is suggested that some information technology interfaces should be applied to 
biobanking. See J Kaye et al, "From Patients to Partners: Participant-Centric Initiatives in 
Biomedical Research" (2012) 13 Nature Reviews: Genetics 5 371-376; J Kaye et al, 
"Dynamic Consent: A Patient Interface for Twenty-First Century Research Networks" 
(2015) 23 European Journal of Human Genetics 2 141-146. 
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due respect. Accordingly, this measure can arguably exhibit the ARR’s key features 
of cooperation with negotiability and respectfulness, respectively. Indeed, the measure 
for assuring the meaningfulness of participants’ input incorporates an element of 
genuineness into such opportunities, thereby additionally reinforcing these ARR’s key 
features. One can therefore say that, overall, these two measures can help foster the 
ARR. Furthermore, the mechanisms suggested for implementing these measures can 
per se reflect other key features of the ARR. One example is the sharing of information 
and knowledge, which is suggested to address the insufficiency of participants’ 
capability to give their input. This mechanism can reflect the ARR’s key feature of 
support in that it empowers participants to deal with biobanking activities by 
enhancing their capability, inter alia, to provide useful input about biobanking 
activities. It can be concluded from these explanations that this second key attribute 
can exhibit at least three key features of the ARR, i.e. respectfulness, support and 
cooperation with negotiability. 
3.2.3   Interim Conclusion 
To summarise, the second key attribute of collaboration in the Model refers 
to the act of working together that involves an element of respectfulness. The practical 
application of this collaboration involves two main measures, i.e. measures to (1) give 
participants opportunities to provide input and (2) assure the meaningfulness of their 
input by addressing any forms of tokenism that might arise in a biobanking context. 
These two measures generally reflect the ARR’s key features of cooperation with 
negotiability and respectfulness, because they enable participants to collaborate with 
biobankers and to have a real chance of influencing biobanking activities substantially. 
Also, the mechanisms suggested for implementing these two measures can reflect the 
ARR’s key feature of support. It is therefore arguable that this key attribute can help 
foster the ARR. In addition, this key attribute is arguably promising for biobanking 
practices. In particular, as this collaboration enables participants to make useful 
contributions towards biobanking, it could indirectly help improve some biobanking 
activities and even tackle some challenging issues arising from biobanking. This might 
also improve participants’ perception and acceptability of those biobanking activities. 
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Accordingly, one can say that this key attribute can be beneficial not only to a 
participant-biobanker relationship but also to biobanking practices themselves. 
Three points are notable here. First, the appointment of some participants to 
working groups or committees in biobank governance could enhance this 
collaboration, in that this would provide those participants with more opportunities to 
provide input and can inherently prevent biobankers from disregarding the input from 
appointed and other participants. However, in practice, this appointment is likely to 
lead those appointed to represent other participants, or even a whole participant cohort, 
and thus it is prone to the issue of representation, which does not comply with the ARR 
because the interests of some participants are disregarded.26 Thus, this appointment is 
not desirable for the Model in general. Second, the collaborative measures and 
mechanisms proposed for this key attribute might be employed when applying other 
key attributes of the Model. Particularly, an oversight body might use them to 
collaborate with participants so that it can learn about participants’ biobanking goals 
when reinforcing collectiveness in biobanking goals.27 Biobankers could use them to 
allow participants to negotiate about policies on tangible reciprocation.28 Finally, the 
collaborative measures might give participants some control over biobanking, because 
they give participants a real chance to influence biobanking activities by giving 
participants’ input serious consideration, as illustrated in the last key attribute of 
control sharing below.29 However, this key attribute accentuates a state of working 
together and revolves around participants’ input, and thus the aspect of control in 
biobanking is not discussed in this section. 
3.3   Key Attribute 3: Reciprocation 
For the third key attribute of reciprocation, biobankers are required to 
reciprocate participants’ contributions that result from their participation in 
biobanking. As the premise underlying this requirement, it is assumed that participants 
                                               
26 See 6.3.1 in ch 6 below. 
27 See 3.1.1 b) (Changes to Biobankers’ Goals) above. 
28 See 3.3.1 b) (Negotiation over Policies) below. 
29 See 3.4.1 a) (Meaningful Involvement) below. 
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have to bear additional burdens and expose themselves to many risks in order to make 
contributions to biobanking. Given that the ARR is intended to be ethically acceptable 
to them,30 they need to be properly compensated for these burdens and risks, and their 
contributions should also be sufficiently valued. One way to do so is to reciprocate 
their contributions. This is supported by many studies that reveal a preference for an 
opportunity for reciprocation.31 Thus, with the aim of fostering the ARR, biobankers 
should make participants feel satisfied with their participation by providing them with 
reciprocation. This rationale introduces this key attribute into the Model.  
In terms of methods, it is proposed that reciprocation in biobanking can be in 
either tangible or intangible form. Tangible reciprocation involves offers of tangible 
benefits to participants, such as monetary benefits and individual feedback (including 
individual research results, incidental findings and analysed health information). 
Intangible reciprocation refers to the commitment to do something obliquely beneficial 
to participants, namely the provision of participant safeguards and the pursuit of 
collective goals. These two forms of reciprocation will be explained further below. 
It is questionable whether intangible reciprocation is actually important here, 
since the benefits it offers can be considered barely perceptible in practice. The answer 
to this question is positive, mainly because tangible reciprocation cannot be used to 
foster the ARR in some circumstances. Particularly, tangible reciprocation might not 
be possible for some biobanks due to their design and/or characteristics. Biobanks that 
use complete anonymisation, for example, are unable to provide individual feedback. 
Indeed, even if individual feedback is possible, it might be undesirable for some 
participants and thereby cannot be used as reciprocation.32 In contrast, intangible 
reciprocation involves two activities that are commonly required to conduct ethical 
research and thereby can generally be used as reciprocation. In terms of the ARR, 
tangible reciprocation is prone to some issues that can undermine the ARR: as 
discussed below, the incentives it offers might be so financially strong that some 
                                               
30 See 1.2 (first paragraph) in ch 1 above. 
31 AA Lemke et al, see note 4 above; J Murphy et al, "Public Expectations for Return of 
Results from Large-cohort Genetic Research" (2008) 8 The American Journal of Bioethics 
11 36-43. 
32 See 6.4.2 a) in ch 6 below.  
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participants may be enticed to further their own personal ends, not the collective goal 
of medical advances,33 thereby hindering the ARR’s key feature of collectiveness in 
goals. In contrast, this is unlikely to be the case for intangible reciprocation, which 
merely involves making certain commitments, and thus it better helps to develop the 
ARR. It can therefore be said that, without intangible reciprocation, the ARR might 
not be fostered through reciprocation in some biobanking contexts and so intangible 
reciprocation is arguably crucial for this key attribute. 
3.3.1   Practical Application 
To explain the practical application of this third key attribute, intangible and 
tangible reciprocation are dealt with separately in two different sub-sub-sections. In 
these sub-sub-sections, the meanings of these two forms of reciprocation are first 
explained. Then, the ways to provide them are described by proposing measures 
required for doing so, and then mechanisms for implementing these measures are 
suggested as practical examples. 
a)  Intangible Reciprocation 
Conceptually, intangible reciprocation in the Model refers to reciprocation 
where biobankers are committed to conduct activities that can offer participants 
cognitive satisfaction in return for their participation, with the aim of showing them 
that their contributions to biobanking are valuable. Given this meaning, the ways to 
provide such reciprocation can be diverse, depending on, inter alia, participants’ goals 
of and expectations from participation. For example, sharing the benefits of research 
findings with third parties could be acceptable in some biobanks, but it might not 
please participants of other biobanks. Nonetheless, to make the Model generally 
applicable, two fundamental activities are suggested for this reciprocation, since they 
can be assumed to be desirable for participants in any biobanks: (1) the pursuit of 
collective goals, and (2) the provision of sufficient safeguards for participants. The 
reason is that these two activities can generally be considered to be ethical, or even 
                                               
33 See 6.4.4 a) in ch 6 below.  
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legal, responsibilities towards participants in biobanking. More importantly, they can 
also exhibit some key features of the ARR: the former can emphasise collectiveness 
in goals and the latter can be used to show participants due respect by demonstrating 
that their interests are important and taken into consideration. It is therefore arguable 
that these two activities can help to develop the ARR in general, and thus they should 
be used as intangible reciprocation in the Model. 
Based on this argument, in principle, biobankers need to give participants 
commitments to pursue collective goals and to provide sufficient safeguards for them, 
in order to intangibly reciprocate their contributions to biobanking. In practice, two 
main measures are required to make such commitments. The first measure is to 
encourage fulfilling these two commitments. This measure adds genuineness and 
firmness to these commitments. In practice, it can also prevent biobankers from being 
accused of paying lip service to those two activities. For the second measure, 
participants need to be informed of these commitments and the fulfilment 
thereof. This latter measure is specifically important for intangible reciprocation. In 
particular, as those two activities might not be perceived by participants in practice, 
those activities need to be clearly communicated to them in order to allow them to 
realise what biobankers commit to do and whether or not these commitments are 
actually fulfilled. This communication aims to make participants feel satisfied with 
their participation in this respect. One can therefore say that the second measure plays 
a role in making those two activities act as intangible reciprocation in the Model, and 
thereby this measure is considered crucial here.  
In practice, the mechanisms suggested for implementing these two measures 
may be similar to those suggested for reinforcing collectiveness in biobanking goals, 
which are explained in the first key attribute,34 since they all basically require the 
ongoing oversight of biobanking activities and the encouragement to conduct certain 
activities properly. Accordingly, the mechanisms suggested here can be explained 
again as follows: an oversight body should be established to monitor biobanking 
activities, and to encourage the pursuit of collective goals and the provision of 
sufficient safeguards for participants; this body should also have communication with 
                                               
34 See 3.1.1 b) (Changes to Biobankers’ Goals) above. 
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participants in order to know what collective goals actually are and whether they 
consider existing safeguards sufficient, as well as to inform them of its own overseeing 
activities; there should be mechanisms that allow participants to see those activities, 
such as communication about biobanking progress. It can be concluded from this 
explanation that the mechanisms proposed in the first key attribute can be adopted to 
encourage the fulfilment of the aforesaid commitments and to inform participants of 
such fulfilment. What is additionally required for intangible reciprocation here is 
merely to inform participants explicitly about those commitments. It is noteworthy that 
the involvement of an oversight body can arguably help to make this intangible 
reciprocation workable in practice, since this body consists of professionals in this 
area,35 and thus it can determine the sufficiency of participant safeguards properly.  
In summary, the Model intangibly reciprocates participants’ contributions to 
biobanking by making commitments to pursue collective goals and to provide 
safeguards for participants. Giving these two commitments involves measures for (1) 
encouraging the actual fulfilment of these commitments and (2) informing participants 
of these commitments and the fulfilment thereof. The mechanisms suggested for 
implementing these two measures are as follows: for the first measure, biobankers 
should establish an oversight body that (a) is assigned to encourage two activities, i.e. 
the pursuit of collective goals and the provision of participant safeguards and (b) can 
realise participants’ attitudes towards these two activities; as for the second measure, 
there should be the communication with participants that (i) explicitly informs them 
of these commitments and (ii) enables them to realise the fulfilment of these 
commitments. It is notable that this third key attribute requires encouraging the 
provision of safeguards for participants, and thus this requirement can inherently 
address risks resulting from their participation in biobanks. It is worth emphasising 
that this key attribute does not propose any criteria for the sufficiency of participant 
safeguards, because such criteria need to be contextual and thus the determination of 
this sufficiency should be on a case-by-case basis. 
                                               
35 See 6.1.2 b) (Establishment of an Oversight Body) in ch 6 below. 
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b)  Tangible Reciprocation  
Tangible reciprocation in the Model refers to offering tangible benefits to 
participants in return for their contributions to biobanking, with the aim of 
compensating participants for the burdens and risks resulting from their participation 
in biobanking as well as to showing them that their contributions are valuable to 
biobanking. These tangible benefits include individual research results, access to 
analysed health information and monetary offers. As explained above, tangible 
reciprocation might not be possible in some circumstances and could cause some 
issues that hinder the ARR, unlike intangible reciprocation.36 Accordingly, this third 
key attribute does not necessitate this reciprocation, in order to make this partnership 
model more widely applicable and able to foster the ARR effectively.  
Based on this premise, to provide tangible reciprocation, this key attribute 
merely requires measures for (1) clarifying policies on tangible reciprocation and (2) 
allowing participants to negotiate about these policies. These proposed measures 
attempt to avoid the aforesaid setbacks by introducing negotiability into this equation. 
That is, they render tangible reciprocation in certain biobank governance contextually 
flexible. Also, as further explained below, these two measures can help foster the ARR 
by additionally exhibiting the ARR’s key features of respectfulness, support and 
cooperation with negotiability. The details of these two measures are explained 
separately as follows. 
Clarification of Policies 
For the clarification measure, biobankers are required to clarify their policies 
on tangible reciprocation in order to enable participants to know and understand about 
this aspect of biobanking. In doing so, they need to have clear policies on whether 
and how this reciprocation is provided, and such policies – or any changes thereto 
– must be clearly notified and justified to participants. In practice, this measure 
might be implemented through communicative mechanisms that inform participants 
                                               
36 See 3.3 (third paragraph) above together with 6.4.2 a) and 6.4.4 a) in ch 6 below. 
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of current policies on this matter, including the actual extent of tangible reciprocation 
and justifications for this extent.  
As for the reasons behind these proposals, this measure is intended to assist 
participants in dealing with the negotiation over these policies, which will be proposed 
below. Furthermore, this measure is beneficial to a relationship with participants in 
practice: it promotes their autonomy since it allows them to make informed decisions 
on this matter by enabling them to appreciate, inter alia, biobanks’ actual capability to 
provide tangible reciprocation and the factors that might affect their preferences on 
this matter (such as the nature and implications of tangible reciprocation); also, this 
measure can handle issues about therapeutic misconception and misunderstandings,37 
which may undermine a relationship between participants and biobankers. Likewise, 
some authors support this measure by citing the benefit of transparency in research 
processes.38 In terms of the ARR, this measure can reflect the ARR’s key features of 
respectfulness and support, since it can be perceived as offering open communication 
and empowerment, respectively. It is notable that this measure is supported by some 
authors39 and adopted as guidelines.40  
Negotiation over Policies  
For the second measure, participants must be allowed the possibility of 
negotiating about policies on tangible reciprocation. As explained above, the reason 
behind this measure is that the availability of this reciprocation is uncertain and varies 
depending on many factors, e.g. the design and characteristics of biobanks. This 
availability might also be limited in practice by contextual factors, such as the financial 
vulnerability of participants or the insufficiency of management resources. Another 
crucial factor is participants’ actual desire for this form of reciprocation. These factors 
                                               
37 See note 4 above. 
38 E Clayton and L Ross, "Implications of Disclosing Individual Results of Clinical 
Research" (2006) 295 JAMA 1 37-38. 
39 V Ravitsky and BS Wilfond, "Disclosing Individual Genetic Results to Research 
Participants" (2006) 6 The American Journal of Bioethics 6 8-17; LM Beskow, "Considering 
the Nature of Individual Research Results" (2006) 6 The American Journal of Bioethics 6 
38-40. 
40 Medical Research Council, Human Tissue Series and Biological Samples for Use in 
Research: Operational and Ethical Guidelines, (April 2001) 11, at para 8.1. 
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indicate a need for contextualisation when considering whether to provide tangible 
reciprocation, and thereby an openness to negotiation is necessary to make policies on 
this matter feasible for and favourable to all parties in biobanking. Furthermore, this 
negotiation can deal with such practical challenges as possible changes to biobank 
governance and unpredictability in the uses of biobank resources, through the notions 
of mutual learning and reflexivity.41 Most importantly, this negotiation is also arguably 
promising for the Model since it directly reflects the ARR’s key features of 
cooperation with negotiability. It can therefore be concluded that room for negotiation 
over policies on tangible reciprocation is required. This inherently implies that the 
Model advocates neither a duty to disclose nor a right to access in particular.42  
In practice, biobankers are required to give participants’ opportunities to 
negotiate about policies on tangible reciprocation. This does not mean that formal 
negotiation processes are necessary; rather, biobankers should at least allow 
participants to voice their preferences on this matter and give their preferences serious 
consideration. This process allows negotiation in that it gives participants a real chance 
of influencing policies on tangible reciprocation, although these policies might not 
eventually change in accordance with their preferences. Given this process, measures 
for applying the key attribute of collaboration43 can be adopted here since those 
measures can be used to repeat this process. Particularly, the collaborative measures 
call for providing participants with opportunities to give input, and thus they can be 
used to allow participants to voice their preferences about tangible reciprocation. Also, 
those measures require biobankers to consider participants’ input seriously, and so they 
can be used to lead biobankers to do the same for these preferences. Moreover, as those 
measures ask biobankers to address the insufficiency of participants’ capability to 
provide input about biobanking, they inherently require biobankers to adequately 
                                               
41 The notion of reflexivity in a biobanking context is explained and discussed elsewhere. 
See G Laurie, "Reflexive Governance in Biobanking: on the Value of Policy Led 
Approaches and the Need to Recognise the Limits of Law" (2011) 130 Human Genetics 3 
347-356.   
42 There are a lot of discussions about the duty to disclose and the right to access. See  
SM Wolf et al, "Managing Incidental Findings and Research Results in Genomic Research 
Involving Biobanks and Archived Data Sets" (2012) 14 Genetics in Medicine 4 361-384;  
FA Miller et al, "Duty to Disclose What? Querying the Putative Obligation to Return 
Research Results to Participants" (2008) 34 Journal of Medical Ethics 3 210-213. 
43 See 3.2.1 above. 
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provide participants with the information that is useful for this negotiation. This not 
only reflects the ARR's key features of, inter alia, respectfulness and support, but also 
addresses the issue regarding an asymmetry of information during this negotiation, 
which might arise in practice. Based on this explanation, it can therefore be said that 
the mechanisms suggested for implementing the collaborative measures could also be 
employed here. For example, communication channels should be established to gather 
participants’ preferences for tangible reciprocation and biobankers should also be 
required to write reports that discuss and/or respond to those preferences.44 
To summarise, tangible reciprocation is possible but not required in the 
Model. If it is to be provided, two measures need to be implemented. First, policies on 
this matter need to be clear as well as clearly communicated and justified to 
participants. Second, biobankers need to allow participants to negotiate about these 
policies. The mechanisms for applying the key attribute of collaboration could be 
embraced to introduce negotiability into this aspect of biobanking. Two points are 
notable here. First, the clarification measure intrinsically enhances participants’ 
capability to deal with the negotiation measure by providing them with information 
about policies on tangible reciprocation, including the actual extent of tangible 
reciprocation in the biobanks in which they participate and the practical limitations 
imposed by the design and characteristics of those biobanks. Thus, it can be said that 
this measure complements the negotiation measure. Second, the Model neither 
suggests nor requires any particular approaches to tangible reciprocation. Rather, it 
merely requires biobankers to clarify their policies on this matter and provide 
participants with opportunities to negotiate about these policies. Accordingly, this key 
attribute might be fulfilled without any tangible reciprocation. 
                                               
44 Notably, this negotiation might be conducted via electronic communication, such as a 
web-based interface with a filter setting which allows participants to indicate what forms of 
reciprocation they prefer. See N Anderson et al, "Participant-Centric Initiatives: Tools to 
Facilitate Engagement in Research" (2012) 1 Applied & Translational Genomics 25-29. 
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3.3.2   Reflection on the ARR 
Given the practical application of reciprocation in the Model, it is arguable 
that this third key attribute can foster the ARR since it exhibits many key features of 
the ARR. In general, as this key attribute is used conceptually to value participants’ 
contributions to biobanking and compensate them for any burdens and risks resulting 
from their participation, it accords them respect and can consequently encourage 
ongoing involvement as well as further contributions. Thus, overall, this key attribute 
reflects the ARR’s key features of respectfulness and continuity in relationship. 
Particularly for intangible reciprocation, the commitments to pursue collective goals 
and to provide participant safeguards inherently show that biobankers share the same 
goals as participants and attach importance to participants’ interests. This echoes the 
ARR’s key features of collectiveness in goals and respectfulness, respectively. As 
regards tangible reciprocation, since this key attribute involves negotiation over 
policies on tangible reciprocation, it echoes the ARR’s key feature of cooperation with 
negotiability. Furthermore, the measure to clarify those policies can exhibit the ARR’s 
key features of respectfulness and support. This is because it allows those policies to 
be openly communicated and justified to participants, and it empowers them to deal 
with this aspect of biobanking (including the negotiation measure), respectively. Thus, 
it can be concluded from these explanations that this key attribute arguably helps to 
develop the ARR, since it can reflect all of the ARR’s key features. 
3.3.3   Interim Conclusion 
The key attribute of reciprocation requires biobankers to reciprocate 
participants’ contributions to biobanking. This reciprocation might be in either 
tangible or intangible form. The former is provided by making commitments to pursue 
collective goals and to provide participant safeguards. In practice, intangible 
reciprocation involves measures and mechanisms that are similar to those for applying 
the key attribute of emphasis on collective goals, as it similarly requires encouraging 
the performance of certain activities. Tangible reciprocation refers to offering 
participants tangible benefits, such as individual feedback and monetary offers. This 
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reciprocation is not required here and needs to be negotiable, since it might be 
impossible for some biobanks or unfavourable to the ARR. It might even be 
undesirable for some participants. Accordingly, the practical application of tangible 
reciprocation consists of measures to (1) clarify policies on this reciprocation and (2) 
provide opportunities to negotiate about these policies. In terms of the ARR, this key 
attribute generally reflects the ARR’s key features of respectfulness and continuity in 
relationship. Also, the measures for applying it additionally echo the other ARR’s key 
features, i.e. collectiveness in goals, cooperation with negotiability, and support. Thus, 
it is arguable that this key attribute can help develop the ARR. 
Three points should be noted here. First, this third key attribute also echoes 
other key attributes of the Model. Particularly, it requires encouraging biobankers to 
pursue collective goals, similarly to the reinforcement of collectiveness in biobanking 
goals in the key attribute of emphasis on collective goals. Also, this key attribute 
recommends that biobankers receive participants’ input on tangible reciprocation and 
take that input into consideration, similarly to the collaborative measures in the key 
attribute of collaboration. This explains why this key attribute uses similar mechanisms 
to those two key attributes. Second, extensive literature can be used to support this key 
attribute being incorporated into the Model. From a practical perspective, many 
partnership initiatives and proposals consider reciprocation to be an important 
attribute.45 Also, many authors argue for reciprocation in biobanking. For example, 
Levitt and Weldon argue that when donations are made to ‘large organisations, some 
multinational and profit-making, a free gift with no expectations of reciprocity seems 
less appropriate’.46 Also, after examining the public perception of biobanks in Europe, 
Gaskell et al conclude that ‘successful biobanking is a matter of creating reciprocity’ 
and, indeed, reciprocity can be in form of appreciation and personal benefits.47 Finally, 
this key attribute involves some controversial issues that have been raised in a 
biobanking context, such as the desirability of individual feedback and the implications 
                                               
45 See 2.2.2 (Table 1) in ch 2 above. 
46 M Levitt and S Weldon, "A Well Placed Trust?: Public Perceptions of the Governance of 
DNA Databases" (2005) 15 Critical Public Health 4 311-321, at 320. 
47 G Gaskell et al, Publics and Biobanks in Europe: Explaining Heterogeneity, (5 October 
2011) 16, at 12. 
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of financial incentives for participants’ decisions to participate. These issues will be 
explained and discussed in the last chapter of this thesis.48 
3.4   Key Attribute 4: Control Sharing 
Based on the notion that the term ‘control’ refers to power that someone has 
to make decisions about something, the fourth key attribute of the Model, namely 
control sharing, considers participants as equal co-contributors with biobankers, as 
opposed to leaders and followers. Thus, it requires biobankers to ensure that control 
over biobanking is appropriately shared with individual participants. For the reasons 
behind this key attribute, control sharing is a common attribute of partnership, where 
partners are generally equal in status, and the Model uses this sharing to exhibit the 
ARR’s key feature of respectfulness, as further explained below. However, this is not 
to say that control over biobanking must be shared equally between participants and 
biobankers; rather, it means that participants as equal co-contributors should be 
allowed to have some extent of control over biobanking. Notably, by requiring 
appropriate sharing of control over biobanking, this key attribute asks biobankers to 
take into account separately the aspect of control in biobank governance, and then only 
to ensure that, overall, control over biobanking is shared with participants in a 
contextually appropriate fashion. In this respect, this key attribute neither proposes nor 
directly suggests any particular forms of control-sharing mechanisms. Notably, the 
question of how to fulfil this requirement is addressed in 3.4.1 b) below. 
There are some points to be noted as the working notion of control for the 
Model.49 First, as the ARR accentuates biobankers’ relationship with individual 
participants,50 the explanations and proposals in this fourth key attribute involve 
control over biobanking when considering from the perspective of participant 
individuals. With the aim of showing respect for those individuals, this control 
                                               
48 See 6.4.2 and 6.4.4 in ch 6 below. 
49 It is noteworthy that this section does not make any theoretical contributions to the concept 
of control in a biobanking context. This paragraph only aims to establish the working notions 
of control for this thesis. 
50 See 1.3.2 in ch 1 above and 6.3.1 in ch 6 below. 
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basically allows participants to make decisions about biobanking at an individual level. 
It is opposed to control that participants collectively have over biobanking, as further 
emphasised below.51 In practice, this control allows participants to make decisions 
about biobanking activities that can be personalised, such as the uses of their own 
samples and information (through the consent procedure and the right of withdrawal) 
and the provision of individual feedback (if any). One can say that this control gives 
individual participants only slight influence on biobanking activities that cannot be 
personalised. Second, here, control over biobanking fundamentally stems from 
biobanking activities or certain mechanisms within biobank governance. In this 
respect, this key attribute does not involve control exercised through ownership over 
biobank resources. It is notable that the issue of ownership over biobank resources is 
dealt with in the last chapter of this thesis.52 Finally, some authors use the term power 
to refer to control, such as Foucault, who uses the term bio-power to refer to control 
over a population in a political sense.53 This thesis, however, avoids such a term 
because it might be confused with ‘power’ as used in the word ‘empowerment’, where 
‘power’ might also refer to the capability to deal with something. 
3.4.1   Practical Application 
To ensure appropriate sharing of control over biobanking, biobankers need 
to first take into consideration existing control-sharing mechanisms in 
biobanking, in order to gauge the overall level of control that participants currently 
have over biobanking. Then, they are required to determine whether or not such a level 
of control is contextually appropriate. If that is not the case, biobankers need to share 
more or less control over biobanking with participants in order to strike an 
appropriate balance of control between the two parties. These two tasks are 
considered to be two measures required for applying this key attribute. In the light of 
this requirement, this sub-section deals separately with these two measures in two 
different sub-sub-sections. The first one addresses the questions of what mechanisms 
                                               
51 See 3.4.1 a) (last paragraph) below. 
52 See 6.4.5 b) in ch 6 below. 




are taken into consideration and how to determine the level of control over biobanking 
that these mechanisms provide. The second sub-sub-section suggests how to determine 
whether control over biobanking is appropriately shared between participants and 
biobankers. 
a)  Control-sharing Mechanisms 
For the question of what mechanisms are to be considered, it is arguable that 
there is no definite answer to this question since there are diverse types of mechanisms 
that directly or indirectly give individual participants control over biobanking. 
Accordingly, biobankers are required to take into account any mechanisms that can 
give individual participants some control over biobanking. To determine the level of 
control that certain mechanisms provide, biobankers need to focus on the actual level 
of control that mechanisms under consideration allow individual participants to have. 
That is, biobankers are required to consider the extent of control over biobanking that 
individual participants will eventually have as a result of those mechanisms. In this 
respect, all factors that can increase or decrease the level of this control in practice are 
taken into account, such as the forms of those mechanisms, how they are implemented 
and the aspects of biobanking they involve. For example, biobankers can use the 
consent procedure to allow participants to have various levels of control over the uses 
of biobank resources by adopting different approaches to this procedure. Thus, the 
ways in which this procedure is implemented need to be taken into consideration when 
determining the level of control that it actually provides for participants.  
It can be concluded from the above explanations that, when determining the 
overall level of control that individual participants have in biobanking, biobankers are 
required to take into account all control-sharing mechanisms as well as any contextual 
factors affecting the level of control that these mechanisms actually provide. Given 
this conclusion, it is helpful to give some examples of control-sharing mechanisms 
here by discussing those that are commonly found in biobanking, namely the consent 
procedure, the right of withdrawal and meaningful involvement. One reason for this 
discussion is that it inherently outlines the nature and characteristics of the mechanisms 
to be considered as well as explains how to determine the level of control over 
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biobanking that participants are actually provided by those mechanisms. Indeed, it is 
also useful for the following sub-sub-section: these examples will be used when 
demonstrating how control over biobanking is appropriately shared in a relationship 
between participants and biobankers. As for the structure of this sub-sub-section, it 
deals with these three common control-sharing mechanisms by explaining how they 
give participants control over biobanking as well as how they provide different levels 
of this control. Note that these explanations will be used in the following  
sub-sub-section for delineating ways to determine the appropriateness of this control 
sharing. 
Consent Procedure 
The first example is the consent procedure, which is a fundamental 
requirement for any biobanking and based on the ethical principle of respect for 
autonomy. In the Model, this procedure is considered to give individual participants 
some control, particularly over uses of biobank resources, by allowing them to 
determine the scope of how their samples and information will be used. In a 
biobanking context, many approaches to consent have been developed, such as 
presumed consent, broad consent,54 tiered consent55 and dynamic consent.56 Some also 
propose alternative measures, such as authorisation,57 to replace the consent procedure. 
Indeed, these approaches allow participants to have different levels of the control over 
biobanking. This could be described as the spectrum of control. Particularly, at the 
high end of this spectrum is dynamic consent, where consent is required for every use 
of biobank resources, thereby giving participants the highest level of control. At the 
                                               
54 MG Hansson et al, "Should Donors Be Allowed to Give Broad Consent to Future Biobank 
Research?" (2006) 7 The Lancet Oncology 3 266-269; D Wendler, "One-time General 
Consent for Research on Biological Samples" (2006) 332 BMJ 7540 544-547. 
55 AL McGuire and RA Gibbs, "No Longer De-Identified" (2006) 312 Science 5772  
370-371; MA Rothstein, "Tiered Disclosure Options Promote the Autonomy and Well-Being 
of Research Subjects" (2006) 6 The American Journal of Bioethics 6 20-21. 
56 J Kaye, "Abandoning Informed Consent the Case of Genetic Research in Population 
Collections" in R Tutton and O Corrigan (eds), Genetic Databases: Socio-ethical Issues in 
the Collection and Use of DNA, (London: Routledge, 2004) 117-138; J Kaye et al, "Dynamic 
Consent: A Patient Interface for Twenty-First Century Research Networks", see note 25 
above. 
57 B Hofmann, "Broadening Consent—and Diluting Ethics?" (2009) 35 Journal of Medical 
Ethics 2 125-129. 
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other end is presumed consent, or an ‘opt-out’ approach, whereby consent is presumed 
and thus not required in practice when recruiting participants. Blanket consent, broad 
consent and categorical consent are along this spectrum from a low to a high level of 
control. In the Model, the consent procedure is therefore considered to provide 
participants with various levels of control over biobanking at an individual level. Note 
that the conventional ‘informed consent’ is not mentioned here since, in general, 
information about the uses of biobank resources is not sufficiently available to allow 
participants to become ‘informed’ in the conventional sense.58 
It is important to consider presumed consent. In general, this approach raises 
many ethical issues, including non-conformity to the principle of respect for 
autonomy.59  For the Model, this approach should arguably not be adopted since it 
does not help develop the ARR. Particularly, when using this approach, participants 
are not contacted or recruited directly in practice since their consent is presumed. This 
raises the question of whether they, as partners in the Model, are treated with sufficient 
respect. Indeed, those who are inactive might not even be aware of their recruitment. 
Furthermore, the lack of direct contact can raise the question of whether participants 
really share the same biobanking goals as biobankers, casting doubt on the genuineness 
of collectiveness in biobanking goals. One can therefore say that presumed consent 
does not reflect and might hinder the ARR’s key features of respectfulness and 
collectiveness in goals, respectively.  
Given all the explanations about the consent procedure, it can be concluded 
that the Model considers this procedure to be one of control-sharing mechanisms in 
biobanking and uses its approaches to determine the level of control that participants 
actually have over uses of biobank resources. This suggests that there are no consent 
approaches that are particularly preferred or suggested here but, as explained above, 
presumed consent is not desirable for the Model. 
                                               
58 J Kaye, see note 56 above; H Widdows and S Cordell, "The Ethics of Biobanking: Key 
Issues and Controversies" (2011) 19 Health Care Analysis 3 207-219, at 208. 
59 HT Greely, "Iceland's Plan for Genomic Research: Facts and Implications" (2000) 40 
Jurimetrics 153-191, at 179-181.  
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Right of Withdrawal 
The second example is the right to withdraw one’s consent, which biobank 
participants normally have as an ethical requirement. In terms of the ARR, this right 
can be used to express respectful gestures towards participants by allowing them to 
leave biobanks at will. For this key attribute, this right gives individual participants 
control over biobanking by, inter alia, allowing them to prevent their samples and 
information from being used by researchers or prevent their information in other 
databases from being accessed. Indeed, this right might also influence the direction of 
biobanking as it may reduce the availability of biobank resources, or might even 
undermine the viability of biobanking in the case of mass withdrawal. Notably, in 
some biobanks, this right also allows participants to prevent further communication 
with and/or further data collection from them.60 However, this right itself cannot be 
effectively exercised without CBP: CBP allows participants to know about biobanking 
activities, including how biobank resources are actually used,61 and thereby it assists 
them in determining whether and when to withdraw their consent. One can therefore 
say that this right cannot be considered to be an effective control-sharing mechanism 
unless biobank governance has proper CBP in place for participants.  
Other than complementing the right of withdrawal, CBP can also be used to 
regulate the level of control over biobanking that this right provides for participants.  
Particularly, this right itself can be perceived as an on-off switch that can prevent 
certain biobanking activities, such as uses of biobank resources. However, CBP can 
be used in practice to enable this right to provide gradations of control over biobanking 
by regulating the quality and quantity of CBP. For example, informing participants 
about all uses of biobank resources gives them a higher level of this control than 
providing them with annual reports that only give rough indications of these uses. It 
can therefore be said that CBP can make this right able to provide different levels of 
control over biobanking.62 In addition to CBP, biobankers might provide gradations of 
                                               
60 See 4.4.1 in ch 4 and 5.4.1 in ch 5 below. 
61 Notably, Kaye considers the communication about research studies using biobank 
resources to be a moral obligation when adopting broad consent. J Kaye, see note 56 above, 
at 31. 
62 Notably, the quality and quantity of CBP should be regulated cautiously since, as 
suggested above, CBP is also used for applying other key attributes of the Model. Otherwise, 
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control over biobanking through this right by offering various withdrawal options as 
well. An example is the withdrawal options offered in UK Biobank governance, 
whereby participants can (i) merely prevent UK Biobank from contacting them 
directly, (ii) forbid such contact as well as any access to their health records in other 
databases, or (iii) forbid such contact and access together with forbidding researchers 
from using their samples and information afterwards.63 In this case, participant 
individuals can be considered to have different levels of control over biobanking 
through their right of withdrawal.  
Given these explanations, one can therefore say that the right of withdrawal 
can be considered to be another control-sharing mechanism that can be used for 
balancing overall control that participants have over biobanking. It is noteworthy that 
biobank governance that adopts the Model does not raise any problems with regard to 
the effectiveness of this control-sharing mechanism since CBP is inherently required 
for applying the other key attributes of the Model. In particular, CBP is required to 
enable participants to reinforce collectiveness in biobanking goals, to empower them 
in order to facilitate meaningful collaboration, and to provide them with intangible 
reciprocation. It is therefore arguable that, for the Model, the right of withdrawal is 
always deemed legitimate as a control-sharing mechanism in biobanking. 
Meaningful Involvement 
The last example is meaningful involvement, which refers to the act of taking 
part that provides participants with some control over biobanking activities.64 For the 
Model, this involvement refers to the participatory mechanisms in biobanking that 
allow participants to influence biobanking activities. Based on this meaning, the focus 
of this involvement is on the actual possibilities of influencing biobanking activities 
                                               
such regulation might hinder the application of other key attributes and thereby discourage 
development of the ARR. For example, if CBP is excessively limited, participants might not 
be able to reinforce collectiveness in biobanking goals effectively or collaborate properly 
with biobankers. 
63 UK Biobank, UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework Version 3.0, (October 
2007) 20, at 9-10. 
64 As established above, ‘meaningful involvement’ in this thesis refers to involvement that 
gives participants some control over objects of involvement. See 2.2.3 b) (Participation or 
Involvement) in ch 2 above. 
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that participants are allowed. In this respect, any participatory mechanisms can be 
considered as this involvement if they give participants a genuine chance to influence 
biobanking activities. One illustrative example is the measures for applying the key 
attribute of collaboration, which were explained above: biobankers give participants 
opportunities to provide input about biobanking and that input is given serious 
consideration.65 As these collaborative measures enable participants to influence 
biobanking activities in practice, they can be equated with meaningful involvement 
here and thereby can be deemed to be a control-sharing mechanism according to this 
last key attribute. Notably, the fact that these collaborative measures can amount to a 
control-sharing mechanism, does not render the key attributes of collaboration and 
control sharing repetitive. Rather, these two key attributes perceive these measures 
from different perspectives, as explained in 3.4.3 below. 
For the level of control over biobanking that this involvement gives to 
participants, two types of biobanking activities can be dealt with separately. One is 
biobanking activities that can be personalised, such as the provision of individual 
feedback, where participants can decide whether to receive individual feedback.66 It 
can be said that participants can control these activities properly. The level of this 
control depends upon the extent to which participants are allowed to personalise these 
activities. As for biobanking activities that cannot be personalised, the level of control 
that participants have over these activities is basically low. Particularly, as the Model 
deals with biobankers’ relationship with individual participants,67 this involvement 
refers to a situation where biobankers allow each participant to engage in biobanking 
and have a real chance of influencing these activities. In practice, one possible way to 
allow this involvement is to enable every participant to voice input and to give this 
input serious consideration. As participants’ voices regarding biobanking activities 
that cannot be personalised can be diverse, some of those voices do inevitably not 
produce any changes to these activities. It is also possible that those voices cannot 
trigger any changes at all. Thus, it is arguably uncertain whether participants can 
                                               
65 See 3.2.1 above. 
66 Note that this example is used for explaining what biobank activities can be personalised. 
The questions of whether and why individual feedback should be provided are addressed in 
Sub-section 6.4.2 (Chapter 6) below. 
67 See 1.3.2 in ch 1 above. 
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influence these activities through this involvement. One can therefore say that, in 
practice, meaningful involvement gives individual participants little chance of 
influencing biobanking activities that cannot be personalised. 
It can be concluded that, in practice, meaningful involvement in the Model 
gives individual participants a good chance of influencing biobanking activities that 
can be personalised, but not those that cannot be personalised. It is worth mentioning 
other forms of participatory mechanisms that might be implemented in biobanking and 
can be considered to be meaningful involvement in the Model. One is the formal 
inclusion of participants on management boards with voting power in the decisions 
about biobanking activities. Another example is participant bodies that are established 
to collaborate with biobankers or to deal single-handedly with certain aspects of 
biobanking. Despite that these mechanisms give participants a real chance of changing 
biobanking activities, they are not considered to be control-sharing mechanisms from 
the perspective of the Model, which focuses a participant-biobanker relationship at a 
micro level. The reason is that these mechanisms do not basically give such a chance 
to every participant, only to those appointed to management boards or participant 
bodies. In this respect, they might be considered to give control over biobanking to 
participants at a collective level. Indeed, they might also lead some participants to 
represent others or even a whole participant cohort, thereby raising the issue of 
representation, which is undesirable for the ARR.68 Thus, these forms of participatory 
mechanisms are not taken into account when applying this fourth key attribute. 
To summarise this sub-sub-section, biobankers are required to take into 
account any mechanisms that give some control over biobanking to individual 
participants. To illustrate this requirement, this sub-sub-section gives three examples 
of control-sharing mechanisms that are commonly found in biobanking, i.e. the 
consent procedure, the right of withdrawal and meaningful involvement. It explains 
how these mechanisms give participants control over biobanking and then how they 
can provide different levels of this control. In short, the consent procedure allows 
participants to have control over the uses of their own samples and information, and 
the level of this control varies depending upon the approaches to consent that are used. 
                                               
68 See 6.3.1 (Representation) in ch 6 below. 
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It is however noted that presumed consent is not desirable for the Model as it might 
undermine the ARR. The right to withdrawal gives participants control over some 
biobanking activities, such as communication with them and future uses of their 
samples and information, and the level of this control can be regulated through the 
quality and quantity of CBP. Ultimately, meaningful involvement conceptually allows 
participants to have control over biobanking through participatory mechanisms. In 
practice, this involvement mainly allows participants to control biobanking activities 
that can be personalised, and the level of this control depends on the extent to which 
participants are allowed to personalise these activities. 
Two points can be inferred from these explanations. First, as control in the 
Model is based on the individual level of a participant-biobanker relationship, this 
control is unlikely to allow participants to directly or immediately cause changes to 
the biobanking activities that cannot be personalised, as suggested above. This control 
differs from the control based on the collective level of a participant-biobanker 
relationship, where it is more likely for participants to influence those biobanking 
activities. For the Model, it is therefore difficult in practice for participants to shape 
the general direction of biobanking activities, except for the unusual case of mass 
withdrawal. As emphasised further in the last chapter, this aspect of the Model can be 
considered to be a limitation on the proposals of this thesis.69 Second, since there are 
no stringent criteria for control-sharing mechanisms in the Model, this key attribute is 
open to any innovative mechanisms that can give individual participants some control 
over biobanking. One example is the automated Web-based platform in the Genomera 
project, which grants participants a certain level of control over biobanking by 
allowing them to initiate, design and operate health studies by themselves.70   
b)  Appropriate Control Sharing 
To suggest how to determine the appropriateness of certain control sharing, 
biobankers should determine whether that control sharing can conceptually 
accommodate respectful gestures to participants. A basis for this suggestion is the 
                                               
69 See 6.3.1 in ch 6 below. 




ARR’s key feature of respectfulness: as explained below, this fourth key attribute is 
basically intended to reflect this ARR’s key feature and thus control sharing in the 
Model should be able to reflect this key feature. That is, the appropriateness of control 
sharing here relates to respectfulness towards participants. However, it is admitted that 
this determination is challenging in practice. This is because it is difficult to define 
criteria for when control sharing can be considered to show respect for participants, 
due to differences in their perceptions and expectations on this matter. This reason is 
supported by many empirical studies demonstrating the variety in a preferred level of 
the control over uses of biobank resources71 as well as discrepancies in the preferences 
vis-à-vis consent approaches.72 Moreover, in practice, there are many circumstantial 
factors that can influence these preferences, such as financial sponsors of biobanks, 
participants’ experiences, their characteristics73 and the possibility of commercial 
involvement.74 There are also some factors that inherently limit the extent of this 
control sharing, such as management resources and the activeness of participants. 
Given these reasons, it is arguable that to determine the appropriateness of 
control sharing in certain biobank governance needs to be contextual. In other words, 
it is not feasible to define exact criteria for how control is shared appropriately with 
participants, and thus determination of this matter should be on a case-by-case basis. 
In practice, biobankers should consider a number of contextual factors, which are 
already suggested in the previous paragraph. It might also be helpful for this 
determination if biobankers also receive input from participants on, inter alia, their 
willingness to control and the level of control they prefer. In doing so, biobankers 
                                               
71 AL McGuire et al, "DNA Data Sharing: Research Participants' Perspectives" (2008) 10 
Genetics in Medicine 1 46-53; AT Ewing et al, "Demographic Differences in Willingness to 
Provide Broad and Narrow Consent for Biobank Research" (2015) 13 Biopreservation and 
Biobanking 2 98-106. 
72 CM Simon et al, "Active Choice but Not Too Active: Public Perspectives on Biobank 
Consent Models" (2011) 13 Genetic Medicine 9 821-831; F D’Abramo et al, "Research 
Participants’ Perceptions and Views on Consent for Biobank Research: A Review of 
Empirical Data and Ethical Analysis" (2015) 16 BioMed Central 60 available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4563851/ (accessed on 20 January 2016);  
J Murphy et al, "Public Perspectives on Informed Consent for Biobanking" (2009) 99 
American Journal of Public Health 12 2128-2134. 
73 JI Valle-Mansilla et al, "Patients’ Attitudes to Informed Consent for Genomic Research 
with Donated Samples" (2010) 28 Cancer Investigation 7 726-734. 
74 E Vermeulen et al, "Obtaining ‘Fresh’ Consent for Genetic Research with Biological 
Samples Archived 10 Years Ago" (2009) 45 European Journal of Cancer 7 1168-1174. 
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might establish communication with them to obtain their feedback on this matter. 
Collaborative measures proposed in the key attribute of collaboration could be used as 
an example of what this communication should look like. It is worth emphasising again 
that this last key attribute merely requires biobankers to ensure that control sharing is 
circumstantially appropriate and suggests how to do so, i.e. by taking into 
consideration all control-sharing mechanisms and determining whether control sharing 
can be used to show participants respect. In this way, it does not directly suggest the 
extent to which control over biobanking should be shared with participants nor what 
mechanisms need to be implemented to apply this key attribute. 
Examples 
As an example of this determination, broad consent is used to recruit 
participants to a national biobank which serves as a resource for any types of health 
research. In this case, participants are considered to have low control over biobanking 
due to a broad biobanking goal: the resources of this biobank can be used in a wide 
range of studies and thus the available details about future uses of these resources are 
few during recruitment; this prevents participants from controlling uses of these 
resources through their consent. According to the suggestion of this key attribute, 
biobankers should give participants more control by, inter alia, continuously informing 
them about how their samples and information are actually used. In doing so, they have 
incremental control over biobanking: as they have more information about actual uses 
of biobank resources, they better realise whether and when to withdraw their consent, 
thereby allowing them to have additional control over the uses of their samples and 
information through their right of withdrawal. As this increased control enables them 
to effectively prevent their samples and information from being used against their will, 
this increase in their control can arguably be considered to show them respect, and thus 
this control sharing can be deemed appropriate according to this key attribute. Note 
that, if blanket consent is instead adopted in this circumstance, communication should 
be more frequent, informative and/or effective, so as to befit the relatively low level 
of their control which results from this consent approach. 
Another example is a biobank where cohort participants all share the same 
genetic trait. These participants join this biobank with the aim of supporting innovative 
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treatments that can benefit their genetic community. However, as they share the same 
genetic trait, any research on the resources of this biobank may have adverse 
consequences for this cohort as a whole. In this case, control via the right of withdrawal 
might not be considered sufficient because, if such consequences arise, all the 
participants could only withdraw their consent, thereby impeding biobanking as well 
as opposing their goal. In other words, control sharing that is only based on the right 
of withdrawal might not be considered respectful towards participants. According to 
this key attribute, more control over this biobanking should be given to participants 
by, for example, adopting categorical consent rather than broad or blanket consent. For 
a small cohort, every participant might be allowed to voice his/her preferences 
regarding uses of biobank resources, and deliberative discussions might also be used 
to handle any disputes. As a result, the aforesaid mass withdrawal could be avoided, 
since participants can help decide which uses will not result in such withdrawal. In 
addition, because their interests and preferences are better valued and their goal can be 
achieved, biobankers can be considered to treat them with respect. It can therefore be 
argued from the perspective of the Model that this increase in participants’ control 
could render this control sharing relatively appropriate. 
3.4.2   Reflection on the ARR 
From a conceptual perspective, control sharing is a common characteristic 
that is normally found in partnership initiatives, especially where an imbalance in 
control between partners exists.75 Accordingly, the fourth key attribute of control 
sharing is arguably substantial here, since partnership is the underlying concept of the 
ARR and, in a biobanking context, participants conventionally have relatively less 
control over biobanking. In terms of the ARR, this key attribute arguably reflects the 
ARR’s key feature of respectfulness: allowing participants to have some control over 
biobanking can amount to treating participants with respect, regardless of whether or 
not they actually prefer or need this control. Furthermore, control sharing is intrinsic 
                                               
75 AI Hilsen, "Balancing Power - The Give and Take of Tripartism in Transition Economies" 
in HS Desivilya and M Palgi (eds), The Paradox in Partnership: The Role of Conflict in 
Partnership Building, (Dubai: Bentham Science, 2011) 24-35. 
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to the ARR’s key feature of cooperation with negotiability. Particularly, if biobankers 
work with participants and also allow them to negotiate about biobanking activities, 
some control over biobanking is inherently shared with them. Indeed, from a 
psychological perspective, control sharing might also lead to successful negotiations, 
as it can lead participants to perceive themselves to have more equal power with 
biobankers.76 It can be concluded from these explanations that this key attribute not 
only reflects the nature of partnership, but can also help develop the ARR. 
3.4.3   Interim Conclusion 
To summarise, the fourth key attribute of control sharing requires biobankers 
to take into account separately the aspect of control in biobank governance and to 
ensure that control over biobanking is shared with participants appropriately. This key 
attribute does not require any mechanisms in particular, but it does instead suggest 
ways to determine whether control sharing is appropriate. Regarding this suggestion, 
biobankers should first take into consideration all mechanisms that can give control 
over biobanking to individual participants, in order to assess the overall level of control 
that they actually have over certain biobanking. Examples of these mechanisms are the 
consent procedure, the rights of withdrawal and meaningful involvement. Then, 
biobankers should determine if control sharing that results from these mechanisms can 
be considered appropriate. This determination should be made on a case-by-case basis 
but, conceptually, control sharing is considered appropriate if it can express respectful 
gestures towards participants. If this is not the case, biobankers need to share more or 
less control over biobanking with participants, in order to achieve appropriate control 
sharing. As for justifications for this key attribute, control sharing not only amounts to 
a common attribute of partnership, but it also helps foster the ARR by reflecting the 
ARR’s key features of respectfulness and cooperation with negotiability. 
It is also worth stressing the relationship between the Model’s key attributes 
of control sharing and collaboration in order to avoid considering these two key 
attributes repetitive, since certain mechanisms in biobank governance might comply 
                                               
76 RJ Wolfe and KL McGinn, "Perceived Relative Power and its Influence on Negotiations" 
(2005) 14 Group Decision and Negotiation 3-20. 
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with both of these key attributes concurrently. Conceptually, the former emphasises 
the control over biobanking that participants have as a result of implementing 
mechanisms, while the latter revolves around input that they provide through 
mechanisms. From a practical perspective, some mechanisms embody both of these 
key attributes by giving participants control over biobanking as well as receiving their 
input and making it meaningful for biobanking. An example is involvement 
mechanisms that amount to meaningful involvement, as explained above.77 On the 
other hand, some mechanisms involve only one of these two key attributes. For 
example, the right of withdrawal gives participants control over uses of biobank 
resources, but it does not seek their input about biobanking. By contrast, to receive 
participants’ feedback about their experience of measurement sessions can be 
considered to be collaboration with participants according to the Model, but it might 
not be a control-sharing mechanism here because it might not allow participants to 
influence those sessions directly. 
Conclusion 
This thesis proposes the ARR, a participant-biobanker relationship that can 
deliver ethical and effective biobanking practices. The last chapter established that the 
ARR should be based on partnership and its conceptual framework should consist of 
five key features, namely respectfulness, cooperation with negotiability, support, 
continuity in relationship and collectiveness in goals. To explain how to foster the 
ARR in practice, this chapter proposes the Model, which has four key attributes – i.e. 
emphasis on collective goals, collaboration, reciprocation and control sharing. To 
apply the Model, biobankers are required to implement certain measures in biobank 
governance in order to incorporate these key attributes into biobanking activities. With 
the aim of facilitating practical application of the Model, this chapter also suggests 
some mechanisms that can comply with those measures in practice. 
Three points concerning the Model need to be emphasised here. First, there 
are three categories of proposals in this chapter: (i) the Model’s key attributes, (ii) the 
                                               
77 See 3.2.3 and 3.4.1 a) (Meaningful Involvement) above. 
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measures for applying those key attributes and (iii) the mechanisms suggested as 
promising ways to implement those measures. When adopting the Model, those key 
attributes and measures are important considerations, while those mechanisms are 
merely suggestions which do not need to be followed. Second, the Model has the main 
aim of suggesting ways to develop the ARR, which is expected to deliver ethical and 
effective biobanking practices, and it is intended to be used for determining the 
prospect of the ARR in certain biobanks. In this respect, any non-conformity to the 
Model can diminish such a prospect, but it does not necessarily amount to the 
unethicality or ineffectiveness of biobanking practices. Finally, some mechanisms can 
be used to apply more than one key attribute. For example, the establishment of an 
oversight body that is tasked with encouraging biobankers to pursue collective goals 
is suggested for applying the key attributes of emphasis on collective goals and 
reciprocation. Also, the mechanisms for collaborating with participants, which involve 
allowing them to provide input and ensuring the meaningfulness of their input, are 
basically for applying the key attribute of collaboration, but these mechanisms can also 
be used to apply the key attributes of reciprocation and control sharing.  
The relationship between the Model’s key attributes and the key features of 
the ARR, proposed in Chapter 2, can be concluded as follows. The key attribute of 
emphasis on collective goals emphasises the key feature of collectiveness in goals. The 
key attribute of collaboration allows participants to work with biobankers and to 
influence biobanking activities, thereby accentuating the key feature of cooperation 
with negotiability. The key attribute of reciprocation seeks to compensate for 
participants’ burdens resulting from their participation and to value their contributions, 
and thus it exhibits the key features of respectfulness and continuity in relationship. 
The key attribute of control sharing, by allowing participants to have some control 
over biobanking, reflects the key feature of respectfulness. In addition to the key 
attributes themselves, the measures proposed for applying the key attributes can per se 
exhibit some key features of the ARR. For example, the measures for applying the first 
three key attributes exhibit the key feature of support, since they involve the sharing 
of information about biobanking activities and knowledge about biobanking, which 
basically empowers participants to deal with biobanking. Moreover, the negotiation 
about tangible reciprocation in the key attribute of reciprocation reflects the key feature 
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of cooperation with negotiability. It is also notable that the key feature of 
respectfulness is echoed in every key attribute of the Model. Given these explanations, 
it can be argued that the Model can be used to foster the ARR because it can exhibit 
all key features of the ARR. 
Two points regarding this chapter should be noted here. First, the proposals 
in this chapter reflect that this thesis uses deontological ethics to ethically justify its 
proposals. Particularly, the Model aims to develop the ARR, which in turn seeks to 
render biobanking activities ethically acceptable. Thus, the measures for adopting the 
Model’s key attributes can be considered to be rules for determining if biobankers’ 
actions are ethical from the perspective of this thesis. It is therefore arguable that the 
ethicality of these proposals is based on features of actions.78 Second, as this chapter 
is mainly intended to propose the Model, it does not address many issues that might 
arise in the Model, such as the undesirability of individual feedback, the negative 
influence of financial incentives, and the acceptability of participants’ control over 
biobanking. There are also some limitations on application of the Model that should 
be noted. These issues and limitations will be addressed and highlighted, respectively, 
in the last chapter of this thesis. 
Given all the explanations in this chapter, the practical measures required for 
applying the Model can be concluded, as outlined in the following page. 
  
                                               
78 Notably, this aspect of the proposals of this thesis will be further explained in the last 
chapter of this thesis. See 6.2.1 in ch 6 below. 
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Outline of the Partnership Model 
Key Attribute 1:  Emphasis on Collective Goals 
1.1 Clarifying biobanking goals 
1.2 Reinforcing collectiveness in biobanking goals 
  1.2.1 Overseeing biobanking activities continuously 
  1.2.2  Resisting any deviations from collective goals 
Key Attribute 2:  Collaboration 
  2.1  Giving participants opportunities to provide input 
  2.2  Assuring the meaningfulness of input by preventing three possible 
   forms of tokenism: 
    a)  Insignificance of issues 
    b)  Insufficiency of capability 
    c) Disregard for participants’ input 
Key Attribute 3:  Reciprocity 
 3.1 Intangible reciprocation: Making commitments to pursue collective 
goals and to provide safeguards for participants 
    3.1.1 Encouraging the fulfilment of these two commitments  
   3.1.2 Having communication with participants about these  
     two commitments 
 3.2 Tangible Reciprocation: Offering tangible benefits to participants  
   3.2.1 Clarifying policies on tangible reciprocation 
   3.2.2 Allowing negotiation over policies on tangible reciprocation 
Key Attribute 4:  Control Sharing 
  4.1  Considering all control-sharing mechanisms 
  4.2 Sharing control over biobanking appropriately with participants  





Partnership Model and UK Biobank1 
The first three chapters have outlined the main proposals of this thesis, which 
revolve around a participant-biobanker relationship that can deal with issues and 
challenges arising in biobanking practices, aka an authentic research relationship in 
biobanking (“an ARR”). This thesis seeks to propose one approach to an ARR that is 
based on partnership (“the ARR”). Chapter 1 establishes the fundamental notion of 
the ARR by proposing its main characteristics. Then, Chapter 2 proposes its conceptual 
framework, which consists of five key features that are considered to exhibit its main 
characteristics. Ultimately, Chapter 3 proposes a partnership model for biobank 
governance that can be used to foster the ARR in practice (“the Model”). It can be 
concluded that the main proposals of this thesis involve (1) the fundamental notion of 
the ARR, (2) the conceptual framework of the ARR and (3) the Model, all of which 
concern the normative, conceptual and practical aspects of the ARR, respectively. To 
demonstrate how to put the Model into practice, this and the next chapters are to test 
it against two practical biobank initiatives, namely UK Biobank and ALSPAC, 
respectively. To facilitate understanding of the discussions in this chapter, general 
information about UK Biobank is summarised in Box 4.1 below.  
Box 4.1:   General information about UK Biobank2 
Objectives 
 UK Biobank is a long-term biorepository that contains tissue samples and 
related information from people across the UK, with the aim to create national 
                                               
1 Appendix 1 lists materials that were accessed and reviewed to set up the discussions and 
develop the arguments in this chapter. It also demonstrates how the titles of these materials 
are simplified when being used as references in the discussions and footnotes here. 
2 These explanations are based on publicly-accessible documents, such as EGC annual 
reports and the UK Biobank website. 
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health resources for scientists to conduct health-related research on particular 
diseases. 
 The purpose of UK Biobank is to provide research resources for improving 
prevention, diagnosis and treatment of a wide range of serious and  
life-threatening illnesses as well as promoting health across society for the 
public’s benefit. 
Cohort 
 The participants of UK Biobank are 500,000 British people aged between 40 
and 69 years at the time of recruitment, from across the UK. 
 Participants were recruited from 2006 to 2010 by undergoing measurements, 
providing samples (blood, urine and saliva) and information about themselves, 
and agreeing to have their health followed through their health records. 
 UK Biobank’s resources were opened up for research use in March 2012. 
Governance Structure 
 UK Biobank has four main governing bodies that facilitate, manage and conduct 
biobanking activities, i.e. the UK Biobank Board, the Steering Committee, the 
Expert Working Groups and the International Scientific Advisory Board. 
 UK Biobank has many governance documents. A key one is the Ethics and 
Governance Framework (EGF), which explains the commitments and 
standards to which UK Biobank will adhere during creation, maintenance and 
use of UK Biobank’s resources. Basically, this framework deals with UK 
Biobank’s relationships with participants, researchers and society. There are 
also other guidance documents on certain matters, such as access procedures, 
re-contacting and de-identification. 
 Reviews of access applications involve three bodies. The Principal Investigator 
(PI) and the Co-ordinating Centre determine access applications in terms of 
scientific leadership and efficiency regarding uses of UK Biobank’s resources. 
On the PI’s recommendation, the Access Sub-Committee of UK Biobank Board 
makes key decisions on access applications. 
 The Ethics and Governance Council (EGC) was established by the funders of 
UK Biobank, in 2004, to keep UK Biobank’s activities under its ethical and 
operational scrutiny. The Council is external to and independent from UK 
Biobank, and its main role is to critically monitor UK Biobank’s activities, unlike 
general ethics committees that ethically review and approve research 
proposals. As regards the remit of this body, it (1) ensures and reports publicly 
on the conformity of UK Biobank’s activities to the EGF and participants’ 
consent, (2) advises UK Biobank on revisions to the EGF and (3) advises UK 
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Biobank on the interests of participants and the public. This body is accountable 
to and, if necessary, provides information to the funders. 
Relationship with Participants 
 Data collection: At the recruitment stage, participants underwent baseline 
measurements and provided blood, urine and saliva samples for future 
analysis. They also provided information about themselves regarding their 
lifestyle and environment through questionnaires. They agreed to have their 
health followed by granting UK Biobank access to their health records in other 
databases, so that all their major health episodes and eventual death could be 
captured. Their data were additionally collected through repeated baseline 
assessments and questionnaires on exposures and outcomes that are not 
available in the records, such as cognitive function, occupational history and 
mental health outcomes. At present, UK Biobank is collecting imaging 
enhancements – i.e. pictures of brains, hearts and bones – from participants. 
 Active involvement: Participants can normally communicate with biobankers 
through either channels opened for general enquiries and feedback, or Q&A 
sessions at meetings arranged by the EGC (2005–2010) and UK Biobank (after 
2010). There were also surveys and interviews that allowed them to provide 
input on certain matters. 
 Communication:3 Other than the above involvement mechanisms, participants 
can generally receive updates and information about UK Biobank’s activities 
primarily through annual participant newsletters and the UK Biobank website. 
They can also access detailed versions of such information by accessing 
various documents provided on UK Biobank’s and the EGC’s websites, 
including EGC annual reports, reports on EGC internal meetings, reports on UK 
Biobank consultations and EGC public meetings, and many policy documents.4  
UK Biobank is chosen for testing the Model for many reasons. First, this 
biobank has distinctive biobanking characteristics with which the ARR is intended to 
                                               
3 The term ‘communication’ in this chapter refers to any mechanisms set up to transfer or 
exchange information between relevant parties, whether one way or two ways. Thus, this 
term ranges from the transfer of information through newsletters and websites, to 
information exchanged through dialogues and discussions. Involvement mechanisms can 
therefore be considered to be one approach to this communication. The difference is that 
communication focuses on the transfer of information while involvement mechanisms focus 
on the act of taking part. 
4 There might also be an Annual General Meeting, as suggested by the panel reviewing the 
EGC’s work in 2015, but it was not arranged in 2015 yet. This is further explained in the 
conclusion to this chapter, below. 
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deal, i.e. the longevity of biobanking and unexpected uses of biobank resources.5 Thus, 
it is compelling to know whether, and if so the extent to which, the Model can 
contribute towards the governance of UK Biobank. Second, the size of its cohort is so 
large that it is intriguing to see how the Model, which mainly involves collaboration 
and communication, can be applied to the governance. Third, many activities in the 
governance hold the promise of the ARR, such as series of public and participant 
meetings, critical oversight by the EGC and ongoing communication with participants. 
Thus, it is interesting to know the extent to which the governance conforms to the 
Model. For these reasons, testing the Model against governance arrangements in UK 
Biobank can show how the Model is applied to such circumstances and provide 
practical examples of biobanking activities that comply with the Model. Also, it might 
inherently suggest how to further improve a participant-biobanker relationship in UK 
Biobank. This could be considered important when considering the fact that UK 
Biobank is open not only to commercial use but also to non-UK use.6 Accordingly, it 
is reasonable to use UK Biobank as a case study to test the Model.  
This chapter consists of four sections, each of which deals with one of the 
four key attributes of the Model, i.e. emphasis on collective goals, collaboration, 
reciprocation and control sharing. The order of these sections is the same as that of the 
explanations about the practical application of those key attributes, provided in 
Chapter 3.  
Four points are noteworthy here. First, discussions in this chapter purely stem 
from documentary research that mainly examines publicly accessible sources, such as 
websites, meeting reports and annual reports,7 as opposed to personal correspondence 
and interviews. As further emphasised below, this imposes some limitations on these 
discussions.8 Second, these discussions are limited to biobanking activities carried out 
before 2016, regardless of when information about those activities became available. 
For example, the latest document used is the EGC’s Annual Review 2015, which was 
available in 2016. Third, although the EGC is part of the governance of UK Biobank, 
                                               
5 See 1.4.1 in ch 1 above.  
6 Report on 41st EGC Meeting (December 2014), at 4. 
7 The documents used as sources for the discussion in this chapter are listed in Appendix 1. 
8 See the conclusion of this chapter. 
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it is intended to be a ‘critical friend’ of UK Biobank.9 Thus, as evident below, this 
body can serve as an oversight body in the governance. Finally, the notion underlying 
these discussions is that the governance is dynamic and has a mutual learning strategy 
as its core practice. Accordingly, the arguments here basically aim to make 
constructive suggestions, rather than making ‘right or wrong’ judgements. 
Box 4.2: Change in communication strategy 
It is necessary to explain briefly the development of involvement activities in 
UK Biobank governance, particularly regarding the change in a body that is responsible 
for these activities, since many discussions here concern them. During the recruitment 
stage (2006–2010), the EGC played an important role in engaging with the public by, 
inter alia, arranging annually public meetings. After recruitment, a communication 
strategy changed: the series of EGC public meetings ceased in 201010 and UK Biobank 
started to engage with participants by establishing its own communication with 
participants, i.e. issuing annual participant newsletters (2011), launching its new 
website (2011),11 using social media as online communication channels (2014)12 and 
starting its own series of participant meetings (2014).13 The EGC continues to 
communicate with the public,14 and it has attended UK Biobank’s participant meetings.15 
Two points are notable here. First, it is unclear from accessible documents as to 
reasons behind this change. However, this change happened after the panel reviewing 
the EGC’s work in 2010 (“the 2010 Panel”) had implied in its report that a role in 
                                               
9 EGC Annual Report 2010, at 6. 
10 Report on 25th EGC Meeting (December 2010), at 2. It is said that EGC public meetings 
become occasional events, i.e. when certain issues arise. See EGC Communication Strategy 
(2011), at 3. 
11 The UK Biobank website was re-developed for facilitating communication with 
participants, including providing updates and information about biobanking activities, 
receiving general enquiries and feedback, and allowing participants to update contact details. 
See Communication Plans (2011). 
12 Thus far, Facebook and Twitter have been used as online communication. See EGC 
Annual Report 2014, at 11-12. 
13 According to the UK Biobank website, six UK Biobank participant meetings have been 
arranged in three recruitment cities, i.e. Edinburgh (November 2014 and January 2015), 
Manchester (April, May and September 2015) and Nottingham (November 2015). See also 
Report on 44th EGC Meeting (September 2015), at 6. 
14 EGC Communication Strategy (2011), at 2, 3. 
15 UK Biobank gave the EGC a standing invitation to attend any participant events. See 
Report on 43th EGC Meeting (June 2015), at 6. It also invited the EGC to speak at its 
participant events. See Report on 44th EGC Meeting (September 2015), at 6. Indeed, it is 
evident from accessible documents that the EGC did speak at those events. See EGC Annual 
Report 2015, at 1, 16. 
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engaging with the public and participants was outside the EGC’s remit and should be 
handled by UK Biobank.16 Second, the panel reviewing the EGC’s work in 2015 (“the 
2015 Panel”)17 implied the same in its report released in June 2015.18 This panel also 
suggested arranging an annual general meeting (“AGM”) for public reporting, 
discussion and future planning. However, the ways in which the EGC responded to the 
latest review in practice were unclear in 2015. 
The tentative conclusion to be drawn is that the governance of UK Biobank 
essentially conforms to the Model, and thereby it is likely that the ARR has been 
developed in UK Biobank to some extent. This conformity mainly results from the 
work of the EGC, which acts as a ‘critical friend’ of UK Biobank and a guardian of 
participants, because the Council plays an important role in helping the governance to 
has all key attributes of the Model. Moreover, since 2015, this conformity might even 
increase if certain recommendations made by the 2015 Panel are put into practice, i.e. 
arranging an AGM and developing an official mechanism for UK Biobank when 
dealing with the EGC’s advice. On the other hand, there are also some concerns raised 
by the review of the 2015 Panel, particularly regarding a recommendation to arrange 
an AGM and the understanding of the 2015 Panel that the EGC should not play a role 
in engaging with participants and the public.  
4.1   Emphasis on Collective Goals 
As explained in Chapter 3, the key attribute of emphasis on collective goals 
requires participants and biobankers to share the same biobanking goals throughout 
biobanking endeavours. To achieve this, there must be measures to (1) clarify 
biobanking goals and (2) reinforce the collectiveness in biobanking goals between 
participants and biobankers.19 Based on this premise, this section deals with the 
                                               
16 Review of the EGC 2010, at para 42; EGC Communication Strategy (2011), at 2-3. 
17 EGC Annual Report 2015, at 7. 
18 Review of the EGC 2015. Notably, the EGC seemed to be critical of this review. See 
Report on 44th EGC Meeting (September 2015), at 10. 
19 See 3.1 in ch 3 above. 
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questions of whether any mechanisms in UK Biobank governance can be used to 
implement these two measures, and if so how? As for the structure of this section, 
these two measures are dealt with separately in two different sub-sections. At first 
glance, it seems that this aspect of the governance conforms to the Model mainly 
because of consistent communication with participants in the governance and the 
establishment of the EGC, but there are some practical issues that may undermine this 
conformity. 
4.1.1   Clarification of Biobanking Goals 
The Model (Chapter 3): The measure to clarify biobanking goals generally involves the 
communicative mechanisms during recruitment that aim to make biobanking goals clear 
to participants. It is suggested conceptually that the focus of this measure should be on 
methods, as opposed to consequences, and thereby the quality of this communication is 
an important consideration. In practice, there should be evidence of biobankers’ attempts 
to facilitate participants’ understanding of biobanking goals, as opposed to evidence of 
sufficiency in such understanding. 
To find out whether UK Biobank’s goals have already been clarified, the 
recruitment documents and documents describing communication mechanisms in the 
governance of UK Biobank, were examined to determine how the goals were 
communicated to participants and whether the governance had any mechanisms in 
place for facilitating their understanding of the goals. As a result of this examination, 
it can be argued that the goals were adequately clarified since the governance had many 
communication channels that could facilitate understanding of the goals. These 
channels include providing participants with the recruitment documents20 and a leaflet 
for repeat-measurement visits, both of which clearly explain the purpose of UK 
Biobank.21 Also, there were EGC public meetings and UK Biobank participant 
                                               
20 The recruitment documents here refer to the consent form, the information leaflet and the 
further information leaflet. See Appendix 1. 
21 The recruitment documents that are accessible are dated 2010, although UK Biobank 
started recruiting participants in 2006. It is therefore questionable whether the information 




meetings, which presented information that could help participants (who attended the 
meetings) to understand the goals, such as the purpose of UK Biobank, its importance, 
potential uses and actual uses of UK Biobank’s resources (“the Resources”). Indeed, 
those meetings had Q&A sessions, which might help verify or improve understanding 
of the goals. Furthermore, there have been many published documents that explain the 
goals (e.g. EGC annual reports and the UK Biobank website), and thus participants 
could use these documents to improve their understanding of the goals.  It can therefore 
by argued from these explanations that UK Biobank’s goals were sufficiently clarified 
because participants were able to acquire an accurate understanding of the goals 
through many communication channels in the governance. 
Furthermore, some might say that, in practice, misunderstanding of UK 
Biobank’s goals is unlikely for three reasons. First, the goals are basically broad and 
generic, and thereby do not contain detailed or complicated information. Accordingly, 
participants do not require in-depth or expert knowledge to understand them. Second, 
it might be assumed from the age range of the participant cohort that participants are 
unlikely to lack intellectual competence to understand the goals. Finally, it appears 
that, in general, UK Biobank has attached importance to participants’ understanding 
about UK Biobank, making it reasonable to assume that the goals were well explained 
to participants. This is based on some documents, such as the EGF22 and the report on 
the 44th EGC’s meeting,23 which say that such understanding is one of UK Biobank’s 
concerns. Moreover, in practice, there were some activities suggesting so. One is a 
post-visit survey (during the pilot phase of recruitment) that examined participants’ 
understanding of their participation and the long-term implications thereof, including 
UK Biobank’s aim of benefiting future generations as opposed to benefitting them.24 
Another is a postal survey that was conducted to deal with participants being unaware 
of some aspects of participation after this unawareness had been recognised by the 
                                               
22 The EGF states that participants’ understanding of, inter alia, the purpose of UK Biobank 
and the expectation of commercial involvement is an important ingredient of consent to 
participation, and this understanding needs to be assured by UK Biobank. See UK Biobank 
EGF v3 (2007), at 5-6. 
23 It was said that UK Biobank was well aware of the age of cohort participants and the need 
to tailor its communication with them. See Report on 44th EGC Meeting (September 2015), 
at 6. 
24 Report of the Integrated Pilot Phase (2006), at para 4.3.3-4.3.6. 
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EGC.25 There was also an empirical study conducted after imaging-assessment visits 
to assess their understanding of the pilot imaging study, including its aims and the 
possibility of feedback.26  
Given these explanations, it can be said that the governance has various 
communication that facilitates understanding of the goals, although the goals are 
unlikely to be misunderstood. One can therefore argue that UK Biobank has made 
sufficient attempt to clarify its goals and thus this aspect of the governance conforms 
to the Model.  
There are however two notable points here. First, although the possibility of 
commercialising the Resources can be implied from the recruitment documents, it is 
not explicitly stated: the information leaflet briefly explains that the Resources may be 
used by researchers who work for commercial companies;27 the consent form merely 
suggests that the Resources may lead to the commercial development of new 
treatments.28 This possibility is instead clarified in detail on the UK Biobank website, 
particularly in the FAQs section.29 Accordingly, a question might arise as to whether 
commercial involvement in UK Biobank was adequately emphasised at recruitment, 
given the controversy over this matter30 together with UK Biobank’s attempt to attract 
the commercial sector.31 Notably, although the answer to this question seems to be 
negative according to accessible documents, it is admittedly possible that this 
involvement was already communicated verbally to participants. 
Second, it is questionable whether participants actually had sufficient 
understanding of UK Biobank’s goals. This question generally stems from many 
empirical studies conducted in a general context: these studies reveal that participants 
                                               
25 EGC Annual Review 2009, at 12. It is evident that UK Biobank also proposed arranging 
telephone interviews to address such lack of awareness, but no follow-up is found in 
accessible documents and thus it is unclear whether these interviews were actually carried 
out and, if so, how. 
26 Report on 43rd EGC Meeting (June 2015), at 4. 
27 Information Leaflet (2010), at 8; Further Information Leaflet (2009), at 8. 
28 Consent Form (2006). 
29 UK Biobank Website (accessed on 29 April 2016). 
30 See 6.4.3 a) in ch 6 below. 
31 Report on 41st EGC Meeting (December 2014), at 4. 
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usually had some misunderstandings about certain aspects of biobanking;32 some 
studies also show that participants might not read information offered to them.33 
Moreover, while the aforementioned post-visit survey indicates that participants had a 
good understanding of participation and elements of consent,34 EGC public meetings 
revealed that some participants were not fully aware of certain aspects of participation, 
such as re-contacting by UK Biobank and the linkage between the Resources and NHS 
records.35 This fact might raise some doubts as to whether some participants actually 
had sufficient understanding of UK Biobank, including its goals. However, while such 
doubts can be considered reasonable, they do not weaken the argument here, since the 
actual level of participants’ understanding is not used as a benchmark for this aspect 
of the Model. This point is raised here because it is relevant to this aspect of the Model 
and it will be cited again when discussing how participants’ input was not disregarded 
in 4.2.2 c) below. 
 
                                               
32 M Dixon-Woods et al, "Beyond “Misunderstanding”: Written Information and Decisions 
about Taking Part In a Genetic Epidemiology Study" (2007) 65 Social Science & Medicine 
11 2212-2222; G Moutel et al, "Bio-Libraries and DNA Storage: Assessment of Patient 
Perception of Information" (2001) 20 Medicine and Law 2 193-204; V Toccaceli et al, 
"Research Understanding, Attitude and Awareness towards Biobanking: A Survey among 
Italian Twin Participants to a Genetic Epidemiological Study" (2009) 10 BMC Medical 
Ethics 1 1-8. 
33 P Ducournau and R Strand, "Trust, Distrust and Co-production: The Relationship Between 
Research Biobanks and Donors" in JH Solbakk, S Holm and B Hofmann (eds), The Ethics of 
Research Biobanking, (London: Springer Science, 2009) 115-130; K Hoeyer, "‘Science Is 
Really Needed—That’s All I Know': Informed Consent and the Non-verbal Practices of 
Collecting Blood for Genetic Research in Northern Sweden" (2003) 22 New Genetics and 
Society 3 229-244; H Busby, "Blood Donation for Genetic Research: What Can We Learn 
from Donors' Narratives?" in R Tutton and O Corrigan (eds), Genetic Databases:  
Socio-ethical Issues in the Collection and Use of DNA, (London: Routledge, 2004) 39-56;  
K Hoeyer, "Ambiguous Gifts: Public Anxiety, Informed Consent and Biobanks" in R Tutton 
and O Corrigan (eds), Genetic Databases: Socio-ethical Issues in the Collection and Use of 
DNA, (London: Routledge, 2004) 97-116. 
34 Report of the Integrated Pilot Phase (2006), at para 4.3.3-4.3.6; Report on EGC Public 
Meeting 2007 (June), at 12. 
35 EGC Annual Report 2009, at 12. 
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4.1.2   Reinforcement of Collectiveness in Goals 
The Model (Chapter 3): This measure aims to encourage participants and biobankers to 
share the same biobanking goals throughout biobanking endeavours. The reinforcing 
mechanisms need to have two crucial elements: ongoing oversight of biobanking activities 
and discouragement of any deviations from collective goals. 
Based on this explanation, the governance of UK Biobank was examined to 
find any mechanisms that can be used to oversee UK Biobank’s activities continuously 
and to discourage any activities that deviate from UK Biobank’s goals. In doing so, all 
accessible documents about the governance were reviewed in order to find out (1) how 
information about UK Biobank’s activities is communicated between different 
stakeholders – i.e. participants, biobankers and the EGC – and (2) how these 
stakeholders can deal with undesirable activities, if at all. These documents include the 
EGF, EGC annual reports and reports on the EGC’s internal and public meetings. They 
also include other materials used to inform participants about UK Biobank’s activities, 
such as participant newsletters and the UK Biobank website. This examination reveals 
that the governance of UK Biobank has such mechanisms. In this sub-section, 
explanations of these mechanisms are separated into two sub-sub-sections. One deals 
with mechanisms for dealing with changes to participants’ goals, and the other deals 
with those for dealing with changes to biobankers’ goals. 
a)  Changes to Participants’ Goals 
As suggested in the Model, two mechanisms – namely communication about 
biobanking progress (“CBP”) and the right of withdrawal – should be available to 
participants to reinforce collectiveness in biobanking goals. The former enables them 
to recognise collective goals through information on biobanking activities, and the 
latter allows them, by themselves, to impede deviations of their own goals from 
collective goals.  
The governance of UK Biobank has both of these mechanisms. Particularly, 
participants have the right to withdraw their consent ‘at any time without having to 
explain why and without penalty’. The details of this right are clearly explained in the 
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EGF.36 Indeed, participants have been informed of this right through many documents, 
such as the recruitment documents and the UK Biobank website. In terms of CBP, one 
can generally say that the governance has sufficient CBP, thereby enabling participants 
to keep properly up-to-date with UK Biobank’s activities, including how the Resources 
are actually used. This might result from UK Biobank’s attempt to maintain the 
validity of participants’ broad consent by keeping participants informed about 
biobanking activities.37 Explanations of CBP can be separated into two stages of UK 
Biobank’s development, i.e. during recruitment (from 2006 to 2010) and after 
recruitment (after 2010). The reason behind this separation is the change in 
communication strategy, which is explained in Box 4.2 above. 
During recruitment, the EGC played a major role in communicating with the 
public, and so it established many publicly accessible communication channels that 
contain information about UK Biobank’s activities, and thereby participants can 
regularly keep up-to-date with UK Biobank’s progress through these channels. They 
include its series of public meetings, which were arranged annually in the recruitment 
cities. On its website, it also published its annual reports and reports on its internal 
meetings, which review and discuss UK Biobank’s activities, respectively.38 In terms 
of content, these channels provided various information about UK Biobank (such as, 
background, governance, current and planned activities, and prospective studies), 
thereby making them eligible to be CBP. Other than this regular communication, 
participants could get updates about UK Biobank’s progress by sending enquiries to 
the EGC or UK Biobank. One can therefore say that, during the recruitment stage, 
there were many CBP channels that allowed participants to follow UK Biobank’s 
progress, whether regularly or irregularly. Note that, since the Resources were not 
open to researchers at that time,39 these communication channels mainly contained 
                                               
36 UK Biobank EGF v3 (2007), at 9-10. 
37 EGC Annual Report 2010, at 13. 
38 The UK Biobank website itself might be another channel for CBP during recruitment 
(2006-2010). However, it is difficult to confirm this because its previous version, which was 
used before launching its current version in 2011, is not accessible. See EGC Annual Report 
2011, at 12. 




information about recruitment and resource management. There was no information 
about actual uses of the Resources in this respect. 
After recruitment, UK Biobank established three main communication 
channels. The first was a new (or current) UK Biobank website. As this website is 
intended to be a primary communication channel, it is remarkably informative: it 
provides not only updates on UK Biobank’s activities, such as the management and 
uses of the Resources, but also relevant information, such as knowledge about genetic 
research, prospective studies and data-collecting procedures. The second channel is 
participant newsletters, which started being issued annually in 2011. These newsletters 
contain similar information to the UK Biobank website, but with more details.40 The 
last channel is UK Biobank’s participant meetings, which present information about 
the background and progress of UK Biobank (as similarly as the EGC’s public 
meetings) with more focus on actual uses of the Resources.41 As for the EGC, its 
annual reports and reports on its internal meetings still continue to be issued on its 
website in the same way as occurred during the recruitment stage. Other than these 
regular communication channels, participants could additionally receive updates about 
UK Biobank’s activities through other occasional communication, such as 
notifications on controversial issues,42 individual responses to their enquiries,  
re-contacting43 and other mass media (i.e. television and radio broadcasts, newspapers, 
scientific journals and magazines).44 
When considering all these communication channels, it can be said that the 
governance of UK Biobank has had many channels for CBP, and thereby participants 
                                               
40 In general, participant newsletters are sent via email. If they are undelivered or participants 
do not have email addresses, they will be delivered by mail instead. See Communication 
Plans (June 2011). 
41 These meetings have been arranged in the recruitment cities since November 2014. See 
note 13 above. However, there are no formal reports on these meetings at the time of writing. 
Only transcripts, slides and video clips of presentations at these meetings are available on the 
UK Biobank website. 
42 Report on Public Consultation on Draft Access Procedures (2011), at 10. 
43 Policy on Re-contacting, at para A.3.1.1, B.1.1.1, B.2. 
44 This information was presented by Andrew Trehearne, UK Biobank’s Head of 
Communications, at the EGC’s 10-year anniversary conference in 2014 (3-5 November 
2014, London). See also Policy on Access, at para A4; EGC Annual Report 2012, at 12; 
EGC Annual Report 2013, at 11. 
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have been allowed to properly and continuously keep up-to-date with UK Biobank’s 
activities. In this respect, they are arguably capable of realising UK Biobank’s actual 
goals, which are reflected by its activities. Indeed, this capability might increase as the 
2015 Panel recommended that the EGC arranges an AGM, which has the aim of 
providing the public with updates on UK Biobank’s and the EGC’s activities.45 
Accordingly, it can be assumed that participants have capability to recognise easily 
any deviations of their own goals from UK Biobank’s goals, the latter being considered 
to be collective goals in this situation. With their right of withdrawal, they are also able 
to impede such deviations by withdrawing their consent. It is therefore arguable that 
UK Biobank participants are able to help reinforce collectiveness in biobanking 
goals, because the governance of UK Biobank has mechanisms that allow them to 
oversee UK Biobank’s activities continuously and to impede changes to their goals 
that deviate from collective goals. 
b)  Changes to Biobankers’ Goals 
The Model suggests that there should be an oversight body that is assigned to 
reinforce collectiveness in biobanking goals. This body should be capable of 
monitoring biobanking activities and resisting activities that deviate from collective 
goals. Also, this body should have mechanisms for recognising what biobanking goals 
participants actually have and informing them of its own reinforcing activities.  
In the governance of UK Biobank, the EGC can be presumed to be such a 
body since it is generally assigned to monitor UK Biobank’s activities critically and to 
encourage the conformity of those activities to the EGF and participants’ consent, as 
well as to advise UK Biobank on participants’ interests.46 To prove this presumption, 
this sub-sub-section looks into EGC’s activities, particularly its relationships with UK 
Biobank and participants, in order to find out whether or not it is suitable to be an 
oversight body that reinforces collectiveness in biobanking goals according to the 
Model. As for the structure of this sub-sub-section, the EGC’s relationships with UK 
Biobank and participants are dealt with separately. 
                                               
45 Review of the EGC 2015, at 8. 
46 See Box 4.1 above. 
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Relationship with UK Biobank 
One can say that the EGC’s relationship with UK Biobank is in accordance 
with the Model’s suggestion, since the EGC not only has sufficient access to 
information about UK Biobank’s activities but can also resist activities that deviate 
from the goals shared with participants.  
Regarding sufficient access, the EGC can access information about UK 
Biobank’s activities through its communication with UK Biobank. Particularly, it 
receives UK Biobank’s biannual reports, which summarise many UK Biobank’s 
activities, such as security of data in the Resources, responses to the enquiries and 
complaints sent to UK Biobank, and linkage between the Resources and NHS records. 
The EGC normally invites UK Biobank staff to its quarterly internal meetings, usually 
the UK Biobank PI, to report and answer questions about biobanking activities.47 
Regarding the access-review procedure, the EGC regularly (i) has full access to 
applications that are considered significant,48 and (ii) receives quarterly summary 
reports on access-review processes from UK Biobank.49 In practice, it also receives 
minutes of the meetings of UK Biobank’s Access Sub-Committee (ASC), and these 
minutes provide information about the access applications that are discussed at ASC 
meetings.50 It also had occasional communication with UK Biobank, such as informal 
meetings between the EGC Chair and UK Biobank’s CEO.51 This amount of 
communication suggests that the EGC can realise most of UK Biobank’s activities, 
and thus it arguably has sufficient access to information about those activities. 
                                               
47 EGC Annual Report 2015, at 6. 
48 When UK Biobank finds certain access applications ‘significant’, it should notify the EGC 
of such applications at the earliest opportunity and send a copy of them to the EGC along 
with its notification. Access applications are considered significant when they involve (1) 
requests for re-contact; (2) novel and/or important ethical issues; (3) novel and/or important 
governance issues; (4) making decisions that will set major precedents; or (5) some other 
matters that, in the judgment of UK Biobank, merit the EGC’s attention. See Report on 41st 
EGC Meeting (December 2014), at Annex A. It was agreed that significant access 
applications will be escalated for advice to the EGC. See Report on 44th EGC Meeting 
(September 2015), at 9. 
49 This is a new model for overseeing access procedures, and this model was adopted on 1 
January 2015. However, in 2015, it was still being piloted and thus it was not published in 
the form of a policy document yet. See EGC Annual Report 2014, at Annex A. 
50 Report on 45th EGC Meeting (December 2015), at 4. 
51 EGC Annual Report 2011, at 5; EGC Annual Report 2015, at 6. 
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As for the capability to resist any deviations from participants’ goals – which 
are deemed to be collective goals in this situation – it is important to note that the EGC 
can neither directly control nor review any UK Biobank’s activities, based on the 
notion that it generally acts as an advisor, not an arbiter.52 In the access-review 
procedure, for example, the EGC only gets involved in certain types of access 
applications and can merely give advice on them, as opposed to decisions about 
them.53 However, one may say that it could resist certain of UK Biobank’s activities 
through some latent sanctions. Particularly, the EGC can either raise any undesirable 
activities with the funders or express its disapproval of such activities publicly.54 These 
mechanisms could result in the withdrawal of funding and/or consent,55 which might 
undermine the viability of UK Biobank.56 Thus, it can use these mechanisms as latent 
sanctions to hinder any undesirable activities in the governance of UK Biobank. It is 
therefore arguable that, in practice, the EGC could resist UK Biobank’s activities 
that deviate from participants’ goals through its latent sanctions. Notably, it seems 
that possible withdrawal of funding is relatively promising because, in practice, the 
funders have regularly been involved in the EGC’s activities57 and thereby the EGC 
can conveniently raise any deviations with them. 
It can be concluded that the EGC can oversee UK Biobank’s activities and 
could resist activities that deviate from participants’ goals, aka collective goals. One 
                                               
52 UK Biobank governance is based on the idea of mutual learning: the EGC is considered as 
a ‘critical friend’ who helps reflect the whole picture of UK Biobank governance. See EGC 
Annual Report 2010, at 6. Notably, this idea is not in line with the 2003 genetics whitepaper, 
which says that the oversight body of UK Biobank ‘will have the power to veto’ the use of 
the Resources. Department of Health, Our Inheritance, Our Future: Realising the Potential 
of Genetics in the NHS, (June 2003) 94, at para 5.37. 
53 See note 48 above. 
54 UK Biobank EGF v3 (2007), at 3, 14-15. 
55 The EGF says that ‘[c]ompliance with [the EGF] will be a condition of continued funding 
of UK Biobank by the [f]unders’. See UK Biobank EGF v3 (2007), at 19. 
56 Notably, Cutter et al say that this public denouncement mechanism is deemed powerful 
from a socio-political perspective, but it may be considered lacking in power when 
specifically enforcing governance principles. See M Cutter Anthony et al, "Balancing 
Powers: Examining Models of Biobank Governance" (2004) 1 Journal of International 
Biotechnology Law 5 187-192, at 190. 
57 It is evident that the funders have regularly attended EGC internal meeting as observers 
and also worked closely with the EGC, such as reviewing the EGC’s 2015 report on 
feedback, assisting the EGC in reviewing the pilot protocol on incidental findings, advising 




can therefore argue that this aspect of UK Biobank governance conforms to the Model. 
Nevertheless, two practical issues might arise regarding this argument. First, it is 
questionable whether the EGC’s knowledge of access applications can be considered 
sufficient in practice. This is because, while the Council receives summaries vis-à-vis 
access applications from UK Biobank,58 it only has full access to access applications 
that UK Biobank considers significant and escalates to it for advice.59 In this respect, 
its ability to oversee access-review processes relies upon UK Biobank’s discretion, let 
alone the possibility of delayed escalation.60 Also, its access to the minutes of ASC 
meetings is not regular and may occur several months after these meetings take place.61 
The second issue concerns the effectiveness of the EGC’s latent sanctions. For 
withdrawal of funding, it is unclear from accessible documents how the funders decide 
on this matter, thereby raising doubts as to whether this sanction can be used to hinder 
deviations from participants’ goals. For withdrawal of consent, this sanction relies on 
participants’ activeness, which is uncertain and thus cannot be relied on. These two 
practical issues suggest that, in practice, the EGC might not be able to properly perform 
the reinforcing role required by the Model, thus undermining the validity of this 
argument. Nonetheless, discussing these issues require further in-depth information on 
actual practices, which is not accessible, and thus these issues cannot be addressed 
here. They are mentioned so as to note that they may weaken this argument. 
Relationship with Participants 
One can say that the EGC’s relationship with participants is also in line with 
what the Model suggests. The reason is that the Council has mechanisms that, in 
practice, can be used to realise participants’ biobanking goals (or any changes thereto) 
                                               
58 See EGC Annual Report 2015, at 8-9. 
59 See note 48 above. Note that, previously, the EGC could routinely check access 
applications in UK Biobank’s access database. See EGC Annual Report 2015, at 8. 
60 While it is recommended that UK Biobank notifies the EGC of significant access 
applications at the earliest opportunity, the EGC – in practice – received such notification a 
few months after significant access applications had been submitted to UK Biobank. See 
Report on 43rd EGC Meeting (June 2015), at 7-8. Indeed, according to accessible documents, 
there were some applications that the EGC considered to be significant, but they were not 
reported nor notified to it. See Report on 45rd EGC Meeting (December 2015), at 4. 
61 Report on 45th EGC Meeting (December 2015), at 4. However, it was agreed that, in the 
future, the EGC will receive these minutes as soon as possible after ASC meetings take 
place. See EGC Annual Report 2015, at 9. 
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and inform participants of its own reinforcing activities.62 Particularly, for the purpose 
of informing, it has consistently been issuing its annual reports and reports on its 
internal meetings, both of which are available on its website and explain its oversight 
activities. The content of these reports includes what UK Biobank’s activities it is 
monitoring or interested in, and how it interacts with UK Biobank or reacts to issues 
arising in the governance of UK Biobank. Until 2010, it also arranged public meetings 
in the recruitment cities, where participants could receive updates on its activities. 
Given these communicative mechanisms, one can say that participants have been able 
to know about its activities as an oversight body, including its relationship with UK 
Biobank as explained above. It is therefore arguable that the EGC has mechanisms 
that can be used to inform participants of its reinforcing activities.  
As regards mechanisms for understanding participants’ current goals, it has 
two mechanisms that might be used for this purpose, i.e. (1) establishing channels for 
individual enquiries and feedback and (2) arranging meetings that were attended by 
participants. The details of these mechanisms are explained separately, as following:  
The former refers to channels for individual participants to send their 
enquiries and feedback to the EGC and UK Biobank. It is evident that the content of 
these enquiries and feedback can reflect participants’ thoughts about biobanking goals 
and has been considered by the EGC. Particularly, for enquiries and feedback received 
by the EGC itself, although their details have barely been revealed in publicly 
accessible documents,63 it is evident that they involve participants’ opinions on uses 
of the Resources, which could imply participants’ expectations and biobanking goals, 
and these opinions were realised by the EGC.64 As for enquiries and feedback received 
by UK Biobank, they also reveal participants’ thoughts, such as concerns about 
commercialisation,65 which could suggest participants’ goals regarding commercial 
                                               
62 In general, the EGC aims to provide information for, and gather information from, its key 
audiences, including UK Biobank participants. See EGC Communication Strategy (2011), 
at 1. 
63 The EGC’s annual reports and reports on its internal meeting rarely reveal the content of 
these enquiries and complaints as well as the ways in which it dealt with them. 
64 Report on 15th EGC Meeting (June 2008), at 11; Report on 19th EGC Meeting (June 2009), 
at 14. 
65 EGC Annual Report 2009, at 12.  
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use. Despite UK Biobank handling them, the EGC can see their content through UK 
Biobank’s biannual reports on enquiries and complaints,66 which the EGC has been 
using for monitoring how UK Biobank deals with them.67 Given how participants’ 
enquiries and feedback have been dealt with by the EGC, it can therefore be argued 
that the EGC can know participants’ goals and realise any changes thereto through UK 
Biobank’s and its channels for individual enquiries and feedback, although this might 
actually not be the intended use of these channels. 
As regards meetings attended by participants, during the recruitment stage, 
the EGC itself arranged seven public meetings in the recruitment cities and these 
meetings had Q&A sessions, in which attendees could raise concerns and discuss 
issues with UK Biobank’s staff. In practice, it is also evident that some participants 
did attend these meetings68 and issues discussed included commercial use and the 
possibility of feedback. While it is unclear from accessible documents whether those 
who raised those issues are participants, these meetings might be assumed to reflect 
participants’ general expectations of biobanking, which could be interpreted as their 
biobanking goals. It is likely, therefore, that the EGC was able to realise participants’ 
current goals through Q&A sessions at its public meetings. After recruitment, UK 
Biobank has arranged its own participant meetings in the recruitment cities69 and these 
meetings had Q&A sessions too. Indeed, although these meetings were organised by 
UK Biobank, the EGC was present at these meetings.70 Thus, one might assume that 
the EGC could have some insight into participants’ biobanking goals through UK 
Biobank participant meetings as well. Given the meetings and the channels for 
enquiries and feedback organised by the EGC and UK Biobank, one might therefore 
argue that, in general, the EGC has been able to realise participants’ goals and any 
changes thereto.  
There are however three notable points with regard to this argument. First, 
although the EGC’s public meetings were attended by some participants, they were 
                                               
66 EGC Annual Report 2007, at 11. 
67 EGC Annual Report 2009, at 4; UK Biobank EGF v3 (2007), at 14-15. 
68 EGC Annual Report 2008, at 9; EGC Annual Report 2009, at 12; EGC Annual Report 
2010, at 14. 
69 See note 13 above. 
70 See note 15 above. 
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not intended to engage with participants specifically. This is echoed in reports on these 
meetings, which do not differentiate participants from other attendees. Thus, one can 
question the extent to which the EGC could actually know about participants’ goals 
through its public meetings. Second, some information is not available to confirm the 
evidence that supports this argument. Particularly, reports on participants’ input at UK 
Biobank participant meetings are not available,71 making it unclear whether the EGC 
can actually use these meetings to learn about participants’ goals. Also, it is unclear 
from accessible documents whether the EGC’s internal meetings still discuss enquiries 
and feedback handled by UK Biobank,72 thereby making it questionable whether those 
enquiries and feedback still allow the EGC to learn about participants’ current goals.  
Thus, such information is required to confirm the validity of this argument. On the last 
point, it is evident in the report reviewing the EGC’s work in 2015 that the EGC is 
perceived not to have a role in engaging with participants.73 So, it is doubtful whether, 
subsequently, there will be any changes to the governance that hinder the EGC from 
realising participants’ goals and thus undermine the validity of this argument. 
4.1.3   Interim Conclusion 
This section has argued that biobanking goals shared with participants have 
been well emphasised in the governance of UK Biobank. One reason is that biobanking 
goals were sufficiently clarified and are basically unlikely to have been misunderstood. 
Moreover, the governance has mechanisms that can reinforce the collectiveness in 
biobanking goals between UK Biobank and participants. Particularly, on the one hand, 
it has many channels for CBP and also gives participants the right of withdrawal. Thus, 
participants can maintain such collectiveness by withdrawing their consent if their own 
                                               
71 As mentioned in note 41, the UK Biobank website only provides video clips, transcripts 
and slides of presentations, not Q&A sessions, at these meetings. Also, it is unclear how UK 
Biobank dealt with the input that participants gave at these meetings. Notably, it is suggested 
at the EGC’s internal meeting that ‘there may be value in someone going through the videos 
of the participants’ events to pull out the key issues raised by participants’. See Report on 
44th EGC Meeting (September 2015), at 6. 
72 According to accessible documents, UK Biobank’s biannual reports on participants’ 
enquiries and complaints started being discussed at the EGC’s 13th meeting, and then were 
merely mentioned briefly at the EGC’s 27th meeting for the last time. See Report on 13th 
EGC Meeting (November 2007), at 8-9; Report on 27th EGC Meeting (June 2011), at 5. 
73 See Box 4.2 above. 
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goals become different from collective goals, i.e. UK Biobank’s goals that they realise 
through CBP. On the other hand, the governance has the EGC, an oversight body that 
helps to reinforce such collectiveness by monitoring UK Biobank’s activities as well 
as resisting activities that deviate from collective goals (if any) through latent sanctions 
imposed by UK Biobank’s funders or participants. There have also been mechanisms 
that enable the Council to inform participants of its oversight activities and to know 
about participants’ goals, which are considered as collective goals in this situation. For 
these reasons, it is therefore arguable that the governance embodies the Model’s key 
attribute of emphasis on collective goals. 
Nonetheless, there are five main practical issues from the perspective of the 
Model. First, one might question whether commercial involvement in UK Biobank 
was adequately emphasised at recruitment. Second, it is questionable whether the EGC 
actually has sufficient access to access applications since such access has to rely on 
UK Biobank’s discretion and notification. Third, some might question the 
effectiveness of the EGC’s latent sanctions, as they depend on uncertain factors, i.e. 
the discretion of UK Biobank’s funders and the activeness of participants. Fourth, it is 
questionable whether the EGC was able to learn about participants’ goals through its 
public meetings, since these meetings were not intended specifically to engage with 
participants. Finally, it is unclear whether or not, at present, the EGC can realise 
participants’ goals from UK Biobank participant meetings and from participants’ 
enquiries and feedback handled by UK Biobank. As these issues are related to the 
EGC’s capability to reinforce collectiveness in biobanking goals, they might affect the 
aforesaid argument about the EGC being an oversight body in the Model. It is not, 
however, feasible to address these issues here, since more information on actual 
practices regarding these issues is required. Still, it is worth pointing them out as they 
help to demonstrate how the Model is applied in practice. Other than these issues, it is 
notable that the arguments here will be used for the key attribute of reciprocation, since 
these two key attributes partly share the same practical applications. 
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4.2   Collaboration 
The key attribute of collaboration in the Model requires biobankers to 
cooperate with participants in a respectful manner by giving participants a chance to 
influence biobanking activities meaningfully. In doing so, there must be mechanisms 
that provide participants with opportunities to provide input about biobanking and 
assure the meaningfulness of their input.74 Based on this explanation, this section deals 
with the questions of (1) whether and how the governance of UK Biobank gives 
participants such opportunities and (2) whether such opportunities suffer from any 
forms of tokenism, such as the disregard of participants’ input and the insignificance 
of issues under consideration. These two main questions are dealt with separately in 
two sub-sections. To address these questions, documents illustrating any involvement 
mechanisms in the governance are reviewed. These documents include EGC annual 
reports, reports on EGC public meetings, and a report on UK Biobank’s consultation 
on access procedures. As a result of this review, it can be said that the answers to these 
questions are generally positive, as the governance has mechanisms for receiving 
participants’ input about the governance and their input has a real chance of 
influencing UK Biobank’s activities.  
Two points are noteworthy here. First, discussions in this section do not 
include involvement mechanisms arranged before the recruitment stage, i.e. public 
consultations before 2006.75 The reason is that the Model deals with a relationship 
between participants and biobankers, and thereby it is basically not applicable to 
mechanisms that do not involve actual participants. In other words, discussions here 
                                               
74 See 3.2 in ch 3 above. 
75 UK Biobank, Ethics Consultation Workshop on 25 April 2002, (September 2002) 19;  
UK Biobank, Minutes of Consultation with Industry Workshop on 4 April 2003, (2003) 9; 
People Science & Policy Ltd, UK Biobank Consultation on the Ethical and Governance 
Framework, (June 2003) 50; Opinion Leader Research, Summary of the UK Biobank 
Consultation on the Ethics & Governance Framework, (August 2003) 40. There is copious 
literature that discusses these consultations, e.g. M Levitt, "UK Biobank: a Model for Public 
Engagement?" (2005) 1 Genomics, Society and Policy 3 78-81; T Wakeford and F Hale, 
Generation Scotland: Towards Participatory Models of Consultation, (2004) 12;  
HM Wallace, "The Development of UK Biobank: Excluding Scientific Controversy from 
Ethical Debate" (2005) 15 Critical Public Health 4 323-333; A Petersen, "Securing Our 
Genetic Health: Engendering Trust in UK Biobank" (2005) 27 Sociology of Health & Illness 
2 271-292; etc. 
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revolve around input from participants, as opposed to that from the public. The second 
point concerns difference in the content of discussions between the two following  
sub-sections. Particularly, the first sub-section of this section only focuses on the 
opportunities to provide input that participants have, while the possibility of such input 
influencing UK Biobank’s activities will be discussed in the second sub-section. 
4.2.1   Opportunities to Provide Input 
In the governance of UK Biobank, when considering some policy documents, 
it seems that UK Biobank intends to give participants opportunities to provide their 
input on its governance. Particularly, the EGF says that it might establish a participant 
panel to voice participants’ general views.76 Its policy on re-contacting also says that 
it might re-contact participants for the purpose of receiving their opinions.77 From a 
practical aspect, although it is unclear from accessible documents whether the 
mechanisms suggested in these policy documents have already been put into practice, 
it appears that UK Biobank has implemented other mechanisms that allow participants 
to provide their input about its governance. Explanations of these mechanisms can be 
separated into regular and irregular mechanisms, as follows. 
For regular mechanisms, both UK Biobank and the EGC have channels for 
receiving general enquiries and feedback, as explained above.78 Indeed, UK Biobank 
also includes an escalation system in its channel for receiving general enquiries and 
feedback, thereby allowing participants to communicate directly with its senior staffs 
if necessary.79 Furthermore, both UK Biobank and the EGC have arranged participant 
and public meetings, after and during recruitment, respectively. These meetings enable 
                                               
76 UK Biobank EGF v3 (2007), at 8. 
77 Policy on Re-contacting (2013), at B.1.1.1. 
78 See 4.1.2 b) (Relationship with Participants) above. 
79 Communication Plans (2011). 
The Model (Chapter 3): Biobank governance needs to have mechanisms that allow 
participants to voice their thoughts about biobanking, so as to give them opportunities to 
provide their input on biobanking. 
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participants to provide input about UK Biobank governance by asking and discussing 
ethics and governance issues.80  
As for irregular mechanisms, UK Biobank sometimes established one-time 
communication channels to receive participants’ input on certain matters, such as a 
post-visit survey for obtaining feedback on their experience of recruitment, a postal 
survey for investigating participants’ understanding and expectations of UK 
Biobank,81 empirical research on participants’ attitudes and understanding about the 
provision of incidental findings,82 and a public consultation on access procedures, 
which participants were notified about and some of them participated in.83 Also, when 
reviewing the EGC’s work in 2015, the funders held participant focus-group sessions 
to listen to participants’ voices about the EGC.84  
Given all these regular and irregular mechanisms, one can therefore say that 
participants have thus far had many opportunities to provide their input on the 
governance of UK Biobank. It is noteworthy that there might be another mechanism 
for providing such opportunities in the future, i.e. an AGM, and this mechanism will 
be explained in the conclusion of this chapter. 
4.2.2   Meaningfulness of Input 
According to this proposal, this sub-section determines whether participants’ 
opportunities to provide their input about the governance of UK Biobank, explained 
                                               
80 See 4.1.2 b) (Relationship with Participants) above. 
81 EGC Annual Report 2009, at 12; UK Biobank Website. 
82 EGC Annual Report 2015, at 13. 
83 Report on Public Consultation on Draft Access Procedures (2011). 
84 Report on 42nd EGC Meeting (March 2015), at 3. Notably, no further detail about these 
sessions is accessible. 
The Model (Chapter 3): Biobankers are required to ensure the meaningfulness of 
participants’ input by allowing their input to have a real chance of substantially influencing 
biobanking. To fulfil this requirement, they need to address three forms of tokenism that 
might occur in a biobanking context, i.e. the insignificance of issues under consideration, 
the insufficiency of participants’ capability to provide input, and the disregard of their input. 
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above, can be considered tokenistic. In doing so, the mechanisms presented in the 
preceding sub-section are examined in order to find out whether or not they suffer from 
those three possible forms of tokenism. As for the structure of this sub-section, these 
three possible forms of tokenism are discussed separately in three different  
sub-sub-sections.  
a)  Insignificance of Issues 
The first possible form of tokenism refers to a situation where issues on which 
participants are allowed to provide input are not significant for biobanking. The Model 
does not propose any criteria for what issues are significant, but instead suggests that 
significant issues should affect the quality of a participant-biobanker relationship or 
influence the direction of biobanking activities.  
Based on this premise, the governance of UK Biobank so far seems not to 
suffer from this possible form of tokenism, since the main mechanisms for receiving 
participants’ input, i.e. channels for general enquiries and feedback and UK Biobank 
participant meetings, are not limited to any specific issues. Also, other mechanisms 
can be considered to address significant issues. In particular, regarding the surveys on 
participants’ experience of recruitment and their expectations about future 
involvement, it is unclear from accessible documents what aspects of these matters 
were considered, but these matters can generally be deemed significant since they 
probably influenced subsequent interactions between UK Biobank and participants. 
For example, these surveys might lead UK Biobank to improve its measurement 
procedures or its communication with participants. The public consultation in 2011 
was regarding access procedures, which are per se essential for biobanking. Indeed, in 
practice, responses to this consultation also covered other significant issues, such as 
data security, communication, and re-contacting.85 Given issues considered in these 
mechanisms, one can therefore argue that the governance has not suffered from this 
possible form of tokenism. 
                                               
85 Report on Public Consultation on Draft Access Procedures (2011). 
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b)  Insufficiency of Capability 
The second possible form of tokenism stems from the insufficiency of 
participants’ capability to give useful input, which renders their input neither helpful 
nor worthy of consideration. The solution to this form of tokenism is participant 
empowerment. This empowerment might be performed by way of sharing general 
knowledge about biobanking and information about certain biobanks with participants. 
By assuming that some participants prefer to be non-active and thereby do not need 
such knowledge and information, this sharing accentuates the accessibility of such 
knowledge and information, not the consequences or methods of this sharing.  
As for the governance of UK Biobank, this sub-sub-section examines the 
extent to which information about UK Biobank and general knowledge about 
biobanking have been shared with participants, and determines whether this sharing 
can be considered sufficient to empower them. It is notable that information about UK 
Biobank basically encompasses updates on UK Biobank’s activities. Accordingly, one 
of the arguments here is analogous with the argument made regarding CBP above,86 
and it can be explained again, as follows: the governance has many CBP channels that 
enable participants to keep up-to-date with UK Biobank’s activities, and thus 
participants arguably have sufficient access to information on UK Biobank’s activities.  
The same holds true for the accessibility of other information about UK 
Biobank and general knowledge about biobanking, as both UK Biobank and the EGC 
have many communication channels that allow participants to access such information 
and knowledge. Particularly, UK Biobank has its own website and has issued 
participant newsletters, both of which explain, inter alia, biobanking practices, genetic 
research, prospective studies and actual uses of the Resources.87 Its information 
leaflets, given to participants during recruitment and assessment visits, provide good 
background information about UK Biobank. It also arranged participant meetings, 
which explained recent uses of the Resources and gave participants opportunities to 
                                               
86 See 4.1.2 a) above. 
87 See 4.1.2 a) above. Notably, UK Biobank’s policy on access procedure says that, to assist 
participants in providing input, the issues relating to use of the Resources will be highlighted 
on the UK Biobank website. See Policy on Access (2011), at para A4.4. 
161 
 
glean more information directly from biobankers and researchers. For the EGC, it 
arranged its own public meetings, which presented background information about UK 
Biobank and itself, as well as relevant ethics and governance issues. It has also 
published many documents containing procedural and technical information as well as 
ethical discussions revolving around UK Biobank’s activities, such as annual reports 
and reports on its internal meetings. Given all of these communication channels, one 
can say that participants have had sufficient access to information about UK Biobank 
and knowledge about biobanking. Thus, it is arguable that the sharing of information 
and knowledge in the governance is adequate to enable participants to give useful input 
and so the governance does not suffer from this possible tokenism either. 
c)  Disregard for Input 
The last possible form of tokenism occurs when participants’ input is not 
given serious consideration by biobankers, thus preventing participants from having a 
real chance of influencing biobanking activities. To address this concern, biobank 
governance should have mechanisms that can be used to confirm that participants’ 
input is actually taken into account, regardless of whether or not such input is 
eventually put into practice.  
In the governance of UK Biobank, it can be said that participants’ input is not 
disregarded. At policy level, UK Biobank makes a commitment to take participants’ 
input on access to the Resources seriously, by saying that ‘[i]nput from the participants 
… will be taken into account’.88 This commitment has also been echoed in practice. In 
particular, it is evident from the report on a public consultation about access procedures 
that input from attendees (including participants) was taken into account by UK 
Biobank, as it was well summarised and also responded to properly by UK Biobank.89 
Also, according to the EGC’s annual report in 2010, UK Biobank dealt promptly with 
some procedural issues that participants had voiced through channels for general 
enquiries and feedback.90 Furthermore, as explained below, UK Biobank agreed to pay 
more attention to participants’ understanding of the feedback policy when it found that 
                                               
88 Policy on Access (2011), at para A3.4. 
89 Report on Public Consultation on Draft Access Procedures (2011). 
90 EGC Annual Report 2010, at 12. 
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many participants did not clearly understand a certain aspect of this policy.91 Notably, 
UK Biobank has also received participants’ input about its governance at its participant 
meetings, but it is unclear whether and how it dealt with that input since there have 
been no reports on these meetings.92 
Moreover, in practice, the EGC helps encourage UK Biobank to give 
participants’ input serious consideration. On the one hand, the Council – through 
biannual reports provided by UK Biobank – routinely monitors how UK Biobank 
handles and responds to participants’ enquiries and feedback.93 On the other hand, it 
might indirectly lead UK Biobank to take participants’ input into consideration 
through its advice. This is based on accessible information revealing that it once based 
its advice for UK Biobank on participants’ input that it had received at its public 
meeting, and UK Biobank was responsive to that advice: after participants’ feedback 
had revealed their unawareness of certain aspects of participation to the EGC, it 
informed UK Biobank of this issue and UK Biobank subsequently conducted a postal 
survey to address this issue.94 Other than this issue, UK Biobank has also evidently 
been responsive to its advice on other matters,95 such as including ethics expertise on 
the access committee96 and improving lay summaries of access applications.97 Given 
these EGC monitoring and advising activities, it can be said that the EGC can help to 
prevent participants’ input from being neglected by UK Biobank.  Indeed, the fact that 
information on these EGC’s activities is publicly accessible might spontaneously 
pressurise UK Biobank to give participants’ input serious consideration. Given all of 
                                               
91 See 4.3.2 a) below; EGC Annual Report 2015, at 13 (Box 12). 
92 See note 71 above.  
93 EGC Annual Report 2010, at 12. See also note 72 above. 
94 EGC Annual Report 2009, at 12. See also 4.1.1 (last paragraph) above. Note that this 
evidence is used to support that, in general, the EGC can help lead UK Biobank to take in 
account participants’ input. In this respect, it is per se not an example of such help because, 
in this case, participants did not aim to give input that influences biobanking activities. 
95 Indeed, this tends to be the case afterwards: the 2015 Panel suggested amending the remits 
of the EGC, whereby UK Biobank needs to give the EGC’s advice serious consideration. See 
Review of the EGC 2015, at 7. This point will be emphasised again in the conclusion of this 
chapter. 
96 EGC Annual Report 2010, at 8. 
97 EGC Annual Report 2012, at 8; EGC’s Statement on Access (2012), at 1-2. 
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these UK Biobank and EGC activities, it is arguable that the governance has so far 
not suffered from this possible form of tokenism.  
However, two issues that can undermine the strength of this argument might 
arise from some recent incidents.98 The first issue is whether the EGC is still 
monitoring how UK Biobank deals with participants’ general enquiries and feedback 
because, as explained above, its internal meetings no longer discuss UK Biobank’s 
biannual reports on those enquiries and feedback.99 The second issue concerns whether 
the Council is still able to realise participants’ input and use this input to advise UK 
Biobank. This issue stems from two incidents that raise doubts about the extent to 
which the EGC can currently know about participants’ input: first, its own public 
meetings, where participants could provide their input about UK Biobank, are no 
longer arranged;100 second, although accessible documents suggest that it has attended 
UK Biobank participant meetings,101 there has been no evidence showing what 
participants’ input at these meetings was about and the extent to which it realised or 
understood that input.102 These two issues make it questionable whether the EGC still 
helps encourage UK Biobank to take participants’ input into account. However, these 
issues cannot be addressed here since confirming and discussing them require more 
information which is not publicly available at the time of writing. These issues are 
raised to show how to apply the Model by demonstrating what actual incidents can 
decrease the conformity of the governance to the Model. 
4.2.3   Interim Conclusion 
Overall, it can be said that collaboration between UK Biobank and 
participants has been fostered within the governance of UK Biobank to some extent. 
                                               
98 The incidents from which these two issues arise are similar to those mentioned in the last 
paragraph of Sub-section 4.1.2, but they are discussed from a different perspective. 
Particularly, this sub-section concerns the EGC’s activities that can help ensure participants’ 
input being considered by UK Biobank, while Sub-section 4.1.2 discusses the EGC’s ability 
to know about participants’ thoughts about biobanking goals.  
99 See 4.1.2 (last paragraph) above. 
100 See Box 4.2 above. 
101 See note 15 above. 
102 See note 71 above. 
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The reasons are not only that UK Biobank has offered participants opportunities to 
provide their input about its governance, but also that their input has a real chance of 
influencing UK Biobank’s activities since the governance has not suffered from the 
aforementioned three possible forms of tokenism. It is therefore arguable that this 
aspect of the governance generally conforms to the Model.  
However, this argument might be weakened by some incidents that occurred 
after the change in communication strategy (explained in Box 4.2), i.e. the halt to EGC 
public meetings and the recent absence of the EGC discussing how UK Biobank deals 
with participants’ general enquiries and feedback. The reason is that these incidents 
raise the question of whether the EGC still helps encourage UK Biobank to take 
participants’ input into account. Indeed, when considering that UK Biobank has 
increasingly engaged with participants through various communication channels,103 
some might assume that collaboration in the governance has improved. While this 
assumption might be correct, no information has been made available to show how 
UK Biobank deals with participants’ input104 or confirm that it has done so properly in 
practice, making it difficult to support and accept this assumption. Thus, at present, it 
is questionable whether the quality of collaboration in the governance remains the 
same and whether this aspect of the governance still conforms to the Model as before. 
It is notable that UK Biobank governance may suffer from the issue of 
representation, where input from some participants represents that of other participants 
or a whole participant cohort. This possibility results from two measures that, 
according to some policy documents, might be implemented within the governance, 
namely the establishment of a participant panel105 and participant representation in the 
EGC.106 For the ARR, this type of representation is generally not desirable since it is 
likely to lead biobankers to disregard the interests of some participants.107 However, 
this issue is not discussed in this section because these two measures have not been 
put into practice. Particularly for the former, no participant panel has so far been 
                                               
103 See Box 4.2 above. 
104 See note 71 above. 
105 UK Biobank EGF v3 (2007), at 8. 
106 EGC’s Terms of Reference, at 2. 
107 See 6.3.1 in ch 6 below. 
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established within the governance. As for the latter, some participants were actually 
appointed as members of the EGC, but this appointment took place ‘by chance’, not 
with intent to recruit participant representatives108 – that is, those members did not play 
any role as participant representatives in the EGC in practice.109 It can therefore be 
said that the governance has, to date, not suffered from the issue of representation. 
4.3   Reciprocation 
As established in Chapter 3, the Model requires biobankers to reciprocate 
participants’ contributions to biobanking, with the aim of making participants feel 
satisfied with their participation. In practice, this reciprocation can be in either tangible 
or intangible form.110 Based on this proposal, this section addresses the questions of 
whether the governance of UK Biobank provides participants with any reciprocation, 
and if so how? In doing so, it takes into consideration documents revealing any 
commitments given and any benefits offered by UK Biobank. These documents 
include the recruitment documents, participant newsletters, EGC annual reports and 
some policy documents. As for the structure of this section, two forms of reciprocation, 
i.e. tangible and intangible reciprocation, are dealt with separately in two different   
sub-sections. At first glance, this aspect of the governance generally conforms to the 
Model, but this conformity might decrease due to some practical issues concerning the 
EGC’s activities, which make it doubtful whether the EGC can help provide these two 
forms of reciprocation in practice. 
4.3.1   Intangible Reciprocation 
The Model (Chapter 3): To provide intangible reciprocation, biobankers need to give 
commitments to pursue collective goals and to provide sufficient safeguards for them. In 
doing so, biobankers are required to implement measures to (1) encourage the fulfilment 
of these two commitments and (2) inform participants of them and their fulfilment. 
                                               
108 EGC Annual Report 2009, at 14. 
109 Report on 44th EGC Meeting (September 2015), at 12. 
110 See 3.3 in ch 3 above. 
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Based on the Model, this sub-section explains UK Biobank’s activities that 
can be considered to constitute making commitments to pursue UK Biobank’s goals 
and to provide sufficient safeguards for UK Biobank participants. In doing so, it 
outlines activities in UK Biobank governance that can be used to (1) encourage the 
pursuit of UK Biobank’s goals and the provision of participant safeguards and (2) 
notify participants of these two commitments and the fulfilment thereof. This  
sub-section is divided into two sub-sub-sections, each of which deals with one of these 
measures. It is notable that, as explained in Chapter 3,111 the mechanisms suggested 
for implementing these two measures are similar to those suggested for reinforcing 
collectiveness in biobanking goals in the first key attribute of emphasis on collective 
goals. This is because the practical application of these two key attributes similarly 
requires ongoing oversight of biobanking activities and encouragement to conduct 
certain activities properly. Thus, some arguments in the first section will be applied 
here. 
a)  Encouragement to Fulfil Commitments 
According to the Model, the mechanisms suggested for encouraging the 
fulfilment of those two commitments involve the establishment of an oversight body 
that is assigned to encourage such fulfilment and which also has communication with 
participants to elicit their thoughts about what their goals actually are and whether 
existing safeguards are sufficient.  
For UK Biobank, the EGC is arguably eligible to be this oversight body. As 
the reasons supporting this argument are similar to those supporting the argument 
regarding the EGC in the first section,112 the latter can be applied here and explained 
again, as follows. First, the EGC is able to encourage UK Biobank to pursue collective 
goals and/or provide participant safeguards, because it can monitor UK Biobank’s 
activities and influence those activities by using some latent sanctions imposed by the 
funders and participants. Second, the EGC can realise participants’ thoughts regarding 
what biobanking goals participants currently have and whether they are satisfied with 
                                               
111 See 3.3.1 a) in ch 3 above. 
112 See 4.1.2 b) above. 
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existing safeguards within the governance, through UK Biobank’s and its own 
communication. Third, in addition to the reasons given in the first section, the EGC 
consists of professionals with a wide range of expertise and thus it can be assumed to 
have adequate capability to determine the sufficiency of participant safeguards. Given 
all these reasons, it is therefore arguable that the EGC can encourage the fulfilment 
of commitments to pursue collective goals and to provide participant safeguards.  
Other than reasoning, the practical issues arising with the similar argument in 
the first section are also applicable here and can be explained again, as follows: there 
are some issues that might undermine the strength of this argument; first, one might 
have doubts about whether the EGC can effectively encourage such fulfilment in 
practice, since it is questionable whether the EGC actually has sufficient access to 
access applications and whether its latent sanctions are truly effective; second, one can 
also question its capability to realise participants’ thoughts about collective goals and 
existing safeguards, because it is unclear whether the EGC can currently do so through 
UK Biobank participant meetings and UK Biobank biannual reports on participants’ 
enquiries and complaints; also, the EGC was not expected by the 2015 Panel to play a 
role in engaging with participants; note that all these issues cannot addressed in this 
chapter since there is insufficient information available to do so.113  
It is worth mentioning the involvement of Ethox Centre, a multidisciplinary 
bioethics research centre in the University of Oxford’s Department of Public Health, 
in any ethical review. This involvement is intended to amount to approval of research 
ethics committees,114 and thereby it differs from the establishment of the EGC, which 
seek to oversee the ethicality of all biobanking activities. This involvement can help 
to fulfil a commitment to provide participant safeguards.115 However, as the Centre 
provides merely advice and support, not imposing sanctions against UK Biobank’s 
approvals for access applications, it might not be able to encourage UK Biobank to 
                                               
113 See 4.1.3 above. 
114 EGC Statement on Access (2012), at 3. 
115 The role of the Ethox Centre is different from, but complementary to, that of the EGC. 
See EGC Annual Report 2014, at 8.  
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fulfil this commitment effectively. Accordingly, it cannot be an oversight body 
according to the Model.  
b)  Communication about Commitments 
The Model suggests that there should be communication with participants to 
(i) inform them clearly about commitments to pursue collective goals and to provide 
sufficient safeguards for them and (ii) allow them to realise the fulfilment of these two 
commitments.  
UK Biobank has already informed participants about these two 
commitments through information leaflets distributed during recruitment.116 Active 
participants might also realise these commitments through attending EGC public 
meetings117 and seeing certain policy documents as well.118 Moreover, one can say that 
UK Biobank governance has many communication channels that allow participants to 
realise the fulfilment of these two commitments. This is generally supported by 
explanations of CBP in the governance, which are provided above.119 To be specific, 
UK Biobank’s communication channels (i.e. its participant meetings and participant 
newsletters) mainly provide information about potential and actual uses of the 
Resources, as well as progress and results of actual uses, thus allowing participants to 
know whether UK Biobank’s goals are being pursued. Furthermore, the EGC reports 
publicly on its oversight activities, which essentially involve promoting the ethicality 
of UK Biobank’s activities, including encouraging UK Biobank to provide sufficient 
safeguards for participants. This enables participants to realise how their interests are 
safeguarded in the governance. Given these communication channels, it can therefore 
be argued that participants can realise whether and how these two commitments 
are fulfilled by UK Biobank. 
                                               
116 UK Biobank’s purpose and its participant safeguard, i.e. the protection of participants’ 
confidentiality, are explained and assured in information leaflets provided at recruitment.  
See Information Leaflet (2010), at 2, 4, 8, 10; Further Information Leaflet (2009), at 4-8. 
117 Report on EGC Public Meeting 2005, at 1, 4-5; Report on EGC Public Meeting 2007 
(June), at 1-7; Report on EGC Public Meeting 2007 (December), at 2-13. 
118 UK Biobank EGF v3 (2007); EGC Statement on Access (2012); Policy on Access (2011). 
119 See 4.1.2 a) above. 
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The conclusion in this sub-section is that UK Biobank has provided 
participants with intangible reciprocation. One reason is that its governance has the 
EGC, which is eligible and able to encourage the fulfilment of commitments to (1) 
pursue goals agreed with participants and (2) provide sufficient safeguards for them. 
Moreover, participants have already been informed of these two commitments and are 
able to realise the fulfilment thereof through many communication channels in its 
governance. It can therefore be argued that, in general, this aspect of UK Biobank 
governance conforms to the Model.  
Two points are notable here. First, in reality, one can question the extent to 
which participants actually know about the provision of participant safeguards within 
the governance, since it is evident that some participants could not recall hearing about 
the EGC,120 which plays an important role in encouraging and reporting on such 
provision. Second, this conformity might increase by holding an AGM, which was 
proposed by the 2015 Panel. Particularly as an AGM aims to disclose publicly the 
relationship between UK Biobank and the EGC,121 it might enable participants to 
realise the EGC’s role in encouraging UK Biobank to fulfil those two commitments. 
In other words, this meeting can be another communication channel that allows 
participants to realise this fulfilment. Thus, arranging an AGM might make the 
governance conform more to the Model by facilitating intangible reciprocation. 
4.3.2   Tangible Reciprocation 
The Model (Chapter 3): Tangible reciprocation refers to offering tangible benefits to 
participants (e.g. financial benefits, individual research results and analysed health 
information) in return for their contributions to biobanking. This reciprocation is not 
necessary due to the uncertainty of its availability. Should it be provided, biobankers are 
required to (1) clarify policies on this reciprocation, and then (2) allow participants to 
negotiate on these policies. 
                                               
120 Review of the EGC 2015, at 5 (note 2). 
121 Review of the EGC 2015, at 8. 
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Within the governance of UK Biobank, participants have been provided with 
two types of tangible reciprocation. One is offers of financial benefits, i.e. travel 
expenses, which participants are allowed to claim back at a reasonable rate at the end 
of assessment visits.122 The other is individual feedback on health information, i.e. 
incidental findings resulting from imaging assessments, which is going through a pilot 
phase, as further explained in the next paragraph. To illustrate whether and how this 
aspect of the governance is in accordance with the Model, this sub-section addresses 
the questions of whether UK Biobank’s policies on tangible reciprocation have been 
sufficiently clarified and whether participants have been allowed to negotiate on these 
policies. As for the structure of this sub-section, these two questions are dealt with 
separately in two different sub-sub-sections.  
It is notable that the provision of individual feedback in the governance of 
UK Biobank is undergoing development. Particularly, UK Biobank originally adopts 
only a non-feedback policy: participants are only given reports on measurements taken 
during initial assessment visits123 together with possible warnings about abnormalities 
in these measurements; but they do not receive any information produced after these 
visits, such as laboratory analyses or individual research results.124 Recently, UK 
Biobank planned to provide participants with potentially serious incidental findings 
(“PSIFs”) stemming from imaging assessments.125 To test the feasibility of this plan, 
it piloted a new protocol, namely a limited feedback loop, whereby participants (and 
their general practitioners) are provided with PSIFs from imaging assessments, if 
any.126 With the aim of mainstreaming this protocol, it conducted social science 
research on the implications of receiving PSIFs over a certain period of time, from the 
                                               
122 Information Leaflet (2010), at 5. 
123 These measurements include blood pressure, weight, height, body mass index and lung 
function. See Report on 15th EGC Meeting (June 2008), at 9. 
124 UK Biobank EGF v3 (2007), at 6-8. 
125 Here, a potentially serious incidental finding is defined as a finding that indicates the 
possibility of a condition which, if confirmed, carries a real prospect of significantly 
threatening life span, or of having a substantial impact on major body functions or quality of 
life. See EGC Annual Report 2014, at 10; EGC Annual Report 2015, at 12 (Box 10). 
126 In practice, any potentially serious findings that are initially noticed by radiographers 
during imaging visits and subsequently verified by radiologists, will be fed back to 
participants and their general practitioner. See EGC Annual Report 2014, at 10. It seems to 
me that this pilot protocol is employed in parallel to the original non-feedback policy, in that 
the former is only applied to imaging assessments. 
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perspectives of participants, their families and health professionals involved.127 It also 
ran systematic radiology reviews in parallel with this piloting, so as to evaluate the 
new protocol by assessing the numbers of false positives and false negatives resulting 
from the use of this protocol.128 This piloting indicates that UK Biobank is going to 
provide another approach to tangible reciprocation, i.e. feedback from imaging 
assessments, in addition. To reflect the dynamics of this aspect of the governance, 
discussions in this sub-section encompass both the original policy and the pilot 
protocol. It is however worth emphasising again that discussions here are limited to 
the development of this piloting in 2015.129 
a)  Clarification of Policies 
According to the Model, to clarify policies on tangible reciprocation, 
biobankers need to have clear policies on tangible reciprocation and then notify and 
justify those policies, or any changes thereto, to participants.  
This premise suggests that this clarifying measure basically involves 
communication about policies on tangible reciprocation. Accordingly, this sub-sub-
section, by examining communicative mechanisms in the governance of UK Biobank, 
determines the extent to which UK Biobank has communicated its policies on this 
matter to participants. The two types of tangible reciprocation that it provides for 
participants are dealt with separately. Regarding the reimbursement of travel expenses, 
a policy on this reimbursement is clear and was communicated to participants during 
the recruitment stage.130 As this policy can be considered self-explanatory, it does not 
require explicit justification. It can therefore be said that this policy has been 
                                               
127 EGC Annual Report 2015, at 13-14. (See also Report on 40th EGC Meeting (September 
2014), at 6; Report on 41st EGC Meeting (December 2014), at 6; EGC Annual Report 2014, 
at 10) Notably, the results of this research are not accessible, but this sub-section does not 
require such results to determine whether this aspect of UK Biobank governance conforms to 
the Model. 
128 EGC Annual Report 2015, at 12. 
129 Notably, UK Biobank proposed continuing this pilot protocol, with the EGC’s support. 
See EGC Annual Report 2015, at 13; Report on 43rd EGC Meeting (June 2015), at 4. 
Ultimately, this proposal was endorsed by the panel that was tasked with reviewing this 
protocol. See Report on 45th EGC Meeting (December 2015), at 5. 




sufficiently clarified. Likewise, an original policy on individual feedback, i.e. the  
non-feedback policy, was adequately clarified. Particularly, this policy has been clear 
since early in the development of UK Biobank.131 It is also explicitly illustrated and 
clearly justified in the EGF, which is publicly accessible.132 Indeed, this policy was 
notified to participants during recruitment through some of the recruitment 
documents.133 Thus, it is arguable that UK Biobank’s policies on tangible 
reciprocation have been sufficiently clarified. 
As regards the pilot protocol on imaging enhancements, it would be unfair to 
make any comments on this protocol, since it was yet to be implemented properly in 
2015.134 This might justify why this protocol has not been properly communicated to 
participants: while the UK Biobank website section for participants and participant 
newsletters do explain imaging enhancements, they do not mention this protocol; only 
participants who attended UK Biobank participant meetings in Manchester could 
realise it;135 however, this protocol is explained in other publicly accessible sources, 
i.e. EGC annual reports136 and the website section for researchers. Nevertheless, it is 
worth mentioning that, while piloting this protocol, UK Biobank conducted one 
empirical study on participants who had consented and then undertook imaging 
assessments, which embodied this protocol, so as to determine their understanding of 
their consent to imaging assessments. Indeed, after the results of this study had 
revealed some misunderstandings about this protocol, UK Biobank agreed to pay more 
attention to this matter.137 This incident suggests that UK Biobank gave importance to 
participants’ understanding of this protocol by attempting to make this protocol clear 
to them. Based on this incident, it is likely that this protocol will be sufficiently 
clarified when being mainstreamed, and thereby this aspect of the governance tends to 
                                               
131 UK Biobank EGF v1 (2003), at 11-13. 
132 UK Biobank EGF v3 (2007), at 6-8. 
133 Consent Form (2006); Information Leaflet (2010), at 7. 
134 This pilot protocol was just endorsed at the end of 2015. See note 129 above. 
135 Presentations at UK Biobank’s participant meetings did explain the pilot protocol, as is 
evident from the video clips of those presentations, which are available on the UK Biobank 
website. See UK Biobank Website (accessed on 4 February 2016). 
136 EGC Annual Report 2014, at 9-10; EGC Annual Report 2015, at 11-13. 
137 UK Biobank and the EGC agreed that more work is required to enhance participants’ 
understanding of the unavailability of an opt-out option in this pilot protocol. See Report on 
43rd EGC Meeting (June 2015), at 4; EGC Annual Report 2015, at 13. 
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conform to the Model. This tendency is also increased by UK Biobank’s commitment 
to prepare notes that explain this protocol and the original non-feedback policy, 
particularly for participants.138  
b)  Negotiation over Policies 
To make policies on tangible reciprocation negotiable, the Model requires 
biobankers to give participants opportunities to influence these policies by at least 
allowing them to voice their preferences on these policies and giving their preferences 
serious consideration.  
As this requirement is fundamentally similar to the measures for applying the 
key attribute of collaboration,139 the arguments and issues articulated regarding that 
key attribute are applicable here.140 They can be described again, as follows. 
Participants have been provided with opportunities to voice their preferences about 
policies on tangible reciprocation through many meetings and the channels set up for 
general enquiries and feedback, both of which have been organised by UK Biobank 
and the EGC. Also, their preferences have a real chance of being influential because 
their input appears to be taken into account by UK Biobank, sometimes with the help 
of the EGC. One might therefore argue that, in general, UK Biobank participants 
are allowed to negotiate about policies on tangible reciprocation, although the 
governance of UK Biobank has not yet adopted any specific mechanisms for this 
negotiation. As also explained above, some issues might undermine this argument, 
since they raise the question of whether the EGC still helps to allow this negotiation 
by way of preventing participants’ preferences on this matter from being disregarded. 
Nonetheless, these issues cannot be addressed in this chapter because there is 
insufficient information to do so. 
Some might support this argument by citing introduction of the pilot protocol 
for PSIFs. Particularly, it is evident that participants have consistently voiced their 
preference for some feedback: despite being informed of the non-feedback policy 
                                               
138 EGC Annual Report 2014, at 13. 
139 See 3.3.1 b) (Negotiation over Policies) in ch 3 above. 
140 See 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 c) above. 
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during recruitment, they have kept asking for more feedback at almost all EGC public 
meetings,141 and even during the public consultation on access procedures.142 The fact 
that UK Biobank started piloting this protocol might lead some to assume that this 
piloting resulted from those voices and so UK Biobank’s policies on tangible 
reciprocation are negotiable. While this assumption is reasonable, it is unclear from 
accessible documents whether this piloting actually originated from those voices. In 
particular, it is only revealed that the EGC was the body that started discussing the 
possibility of feeding back PSIFs from imaging assessments to participants, without 
any reference to participants’ voices.143 Indeed, although UK Biobank received 
participants’ input about the impact of receiving PSIFs,144 it seems that this input was 
used for testing the feasibility of this protocol, not allowing negotiation over it. It is 
therefore difficult to confirm that this introduction actually resulted from negotiation 
between participants and UK Biobank. Accordingly, this piloting should not be used 
to prove the negotiability of policies on tangible reciprocation within the governance. 
It is also notable that, in practice, this introduction might be informed by the trend 
towards the provision of individual feedback, as further explained below.145 
4.3.3   Interim Conclusion 
It can be concluded that, based on the Model, UK Biobank has provided 
participants with both intangible and tangible reciprocation. For the former, it can be 
considered to have given them commitments to pursue the goals shared with them and 
to provide sufficient safeguards for them, because its governance has mechanisms for 
informing them about these commitments, encouraging the fulfilment of these 
commitments, and enabling them to realise this fulfilment. For tangible reciprocation, 
UK Biobank has already clarified its policies on reimbursing travelling expenses and 
                                               
141 According to my research, participants (as attendees) voiced their need for more feedback 
at five out of six EGC public meetings arranged from 2005 to 2009 (no information is 
available for the EGC’s public meeting in 2006), as well as at the UK Biobank participant 
meeting in 2014 (I attended this participant meeting). 
142 Report on Public Consultation on Draft Access Procedures (2011), at 11. 
143 Report on 14th EGC Meeting (March 2008), at 6-7. 
144 See 4.3.2 (second paragraph) above.  
145 See the conclusion of this chapter (last paragraph) below. 
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providing no individual feedback. Also, these policies seem to be negotiable when 
considering that, in general, participants are allowed to voice their preferences about 
these policies and their preferences may influence these policies. For example, when 
there are a number of participants voicing their preferences for other individual 
feedback at UK Biobank participant meetings, the EGC might – by realising these 
preferences – use them to advise UK Biobank on this matter. As UK Biobank has 
normally been responsive to the EGC’s advice, it is possible for these preferences to 
bring about any changes to UK Biobank’s policies on individual feedback. Thus, from 
a conceptual perspective, participants can be considered able to negotiate with UK 
Biobank about its policy on tangible reciprocation.  
Given these explanations, it can therefore be argued that this aspect of the 
governance of UK Biobank generally conforms to the Model. What might undermine 
this conformity are issues revolving around the EGC’s activities: there are some issues 
that can raise the question of whether, in practice, the EGC can play roles in (1) 
encouraging the fulfilment of those two commitments and (2) allowing negotiation 
over UK Biobank’s policies on tangible reciprocation. Note that these issues are 
similar to those illustrated in the key attributes of emphasis on collective goals and 
collaboration, respectively. Also, it is noteworthy that the introduction of the pilot 
protocol for PSIFs should not be used to support the negotiability of policies on 
tangible reciprocation within the governance. The reason is that it is unclear from 
accessible documents whether this introduction actually stemmed from the preferences 
for individual feedback that participants have consistently expressed at many meetings 
and the public consultation on access procedures. 
4.4    Control Sharing 
According to the Model, the key attribute of control sharing aims to develop 
the ARR by sharing control over biobanking with participants. In practice, this key 
attribute requires biobankers to ensure that this sharing is contextually appropriate. 
Notably, the term control here refers to capability that participants have to make 
decisions about their relationship with biobankers at an individual level. In this respect, 
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it might not allow them to influence the overall direction of biobanking or biobanking 
activities that cannot be personalised.146 Based on this premise, this section first 
identifies mechanisms in the governance of UK Biobank that give participants control 
over the governance at an individual level, and then determines whether the sharing of 
control within the governance can be considered appropriate. To carry out these two 
tasks, all documents that might reveal such mechanisms were reviewed. They include 
the EGF, which defines UK Biobank’s relationship with participants, and other 
documents that outline the practical aspect of this relationship and the participatory 
mechanisms in the governance, such as EGC annual reports and reports on EGC 
internal meetings. This section has two sub-sections, each of which deals with one of 
these tasks. The tentative conclusion is that the control over biobanking that individual 
participants have within the governance mainly stems from their right of withdrawal 
and the level of this control can be considered low. However, control sharing within 
the governance can be deemed appropriate due to the existence of the EGC.   
4.4.1   Control-sharing Mechanisms 
The Model (Chapter 3): Before determining the appropriateness of control sharing, 
biobankers need to take into account any mechanisms in biobank governance that might 
give participants control over biobanking at an individual level, such as the consent 
procedure, the right of withdrawal and meaningful involvement. The ways in which these 
mechanisms are implemented are also considered, since they help determine the extent 
to which these mechanisms provide individual participants with control over biobanking. 
Based on the Model, all activities in the governance of UK Biobank were 
examined to identify mechanisms that enable individual participants to influence UK 
Biobank’s activities. As a result of this examination, it can be said that individual 
participants may influence UK Biobank’s activities through two mechanisms. 
One is broad consent, whereby they can limit the use of the Resources to the purpose 
of health-related research.147 However, this mechanism gives them a low level of 
control over the governance because this purpose is quite broad, as further explained 
                                               
146 See 3.4 in ch 3 above. 
147 Consent Form (2006). 
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below. The other mechanism is the right of withdrawal, whereby individual 
participants have the options of (i) preventing UK Biobank from contacting them 
directly, (ii) forbidding such contact as well as further access to their health records in 
other databases, or (iii) forbidding such contact and access together with preventing 
researchers from using their samples and information afterwards.148 It is evident from 
accessible documents that participants have been well informed of this right, as this 
right was repeatedly communicated through, inter alia, the recruitment documents149 
and EGC public meetings.150 Also, the options and details of this right are explained 
in the EGF and on the UK Biobank website. 
As regards meaningful involvement, discussions on this involvement can be 
separated into activities that can and cannot be personalised. For the former, there 
appear to be very few biobanking activities on which participants have been allowed 
to make decisions. Thus far, they were only allowed to decide whether to join the 
piloting about feeding back any PSIFs from imaging assessments; but, in 2015, this 
piloting was not implemented fully as a routine measure for feeding PSIFs back to 
participants yet.151 Accordingly, this piloting cannot be used to discuss whether 
participants have control over the provision of this feedback within UK Biobank 
governance. As for non-personalised activities, there is no involvement mechanism in 
the governance that enables individual participants to directly influence these activities 
or the direction of UK Biobank’s activities. The most likely way for participants to do 
so is to express their thoughts about certain activities to the EGC, whose advice might 
be informed by their input and has been well responded to by UK Biobank.152 In this 
respect, those activities might be influenced by their thoughts, which are in the form 
                                               
148 UK Biobank EGF v3 (2007), at 9-10. 
149 Report of the Integrated Pilot Phase (2006), at para 4.3.4 and figure 4.4c. 
150 Report on EGC Public Meeting 2005, at 3; Report on EGC Public Meeting 2007 
(December), at 15. 
151 See 4.3.2 (second paragraph) above. 
152 There is no concrete evidence confirming that this method will work in practice. 
However, it is likely to be the case according to the evidence that the EGC once based its 
advice for UK Biobank on participants’ input that it had received at its public meeting, and 
UK Biobank was responsive to that advice. See 4.2.2 c) (third paragraph) above. Note that, 
although the Council no longer arranges its public meetings, participants still can give their 
input on this matter to it through its channels for general enquiries and feedback and, 
possibly, UK Biobank’s participant meetings, which it has routinely attended. See 4.1.2 b) 
(Relationship with Participants) above. 
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of the EGC’s advice. However, this way is far from effective in practice, especially 
when considering that participants’ thoughts probably vary widely, let alone any 
conflicts between those thoughts. It can therefore be said that individual participants 
are unlikely to be able to influence UK Biobank’s activities that cannot be personalised 
through meaningful involvement in the governance.  
It can be concluded from these explanations that individual participants’ 
control over UK Biobank governance mainly stems from their broad consent and right 
of withdrawal. It is worth noting the control that participants might have over the 
governance at a collective level. Particularly, it is evident that the issue of participant 
involvement was raised and discussed at academic conferences and EGC public 
meetings.153 Notwithstanding, participants have been neither directly involved in 
making decisions about UK Biobank’s activities nor included in any committees or 
working groups within the governance. Some participants were factually appointed as 
EGC members, who can influence UK Biobank’s activities through the EGC’s advice 
to UK Biobank; but this actually occurred by chance and those participants were not 
involved in the EGC in order to represent cohort participants.154 Furthermore, while 
the EGF suggests some mechanisms that allow participants to influence UK Biobank’s 
activities at a collective level, e.g. establishing a participant panel to voice participants’ 
general views and proposing amending the EGF,155 these mechanisms have not yet 
been put into practice. Thus, it can be said that participants do not have any control 
over the governance at a collective level. 
 
 
                                               
153 EGC Annual Report 2009, at 14. 
154 Ibid. Notably, this evidence is not used to argue for participant representation on UK 
Biobank’s management bodies or the EGC; rather, it is used to explain that participants do 
actually not have control over biobanking at a collective level through this involvement. 
155 UK Biobank EGF v3 (2007), at 8, 19. 
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4.4.2   Appropriate Control Sharing 
The Model (Chapter 3): Control over biobanking needs to be shared appropriately with 
participants. In doing so, it is suggested that, conceptually, the sharing of control should 
be able to express respectful gestures towards participants. There are neither 
mechanisms nor criteria proposed for implementing this suggestion, as this 
implementation should be contextual. 
The previous sub-section explains that UK Biobank shares control over its 
governance with individual participants through broad consent and the right of 
withdrawal. A subsequent question arises as to whether or not this sharing can be 
considered appropriate – i.e. whether it can express respectful gestures towards 
participants. As there has been no qualitative study that directly answers this question, 
this sub-section addresses the question by first determining the level of control that 
individual participants actually have over UK Biobank governance as a result of those 
two control-sharing mechanisms. It then determines whether or not this level of control 
can be considered respectful towards participants by considering circumstantial factors 
that might affect their desire to influence UK Biobank’s activities. These two steps are 
dealt with separately in two different sub-sub-sections, as follows. 
a)  Actual Level of Control 
Between broad consent and the right of withdrawal, one can say that the latter 
is a main source of individual participants’ control over UK Biobank governance. The 
reason is that, in practice, the former does not provide a high level of this control: it  
restricts uses of the Resources to the purpose of supporting research studies ‘intended 
to improve the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness, and the promotion of 
health throughout society’;156 this purpose encompasses a diverse range of studies, and 
thus this consent does not impose stringent restrictions on such uses. By contrast, the 
right of withdrawal can be considered to give individual participants a high level of 
this control from their perspective, due to CBP and the withdrawal options offered. In 
particular, UK Biobank has so many channels for CBP that they can keep up-to-date 
                                               
156 Consent Form (2006). 
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with its activities properly, as illustrated above,157 and thus they can exercise this right 
effectively since they know exactly whether and when to do so. Furthermore, this right 
not only enables them to withdraw their participation in UK Biobank, but also allows 
them to prohibit certain biobanking activities, namely direct contact with them and 
access to their health records in other databases, without leaving UK Biobank. Given 
this explanation, it can be said that the right of withdrawal in the governance can be 
considered to give participants substantial control over the governance at an individual 
level. It is therefore arguable that this right is deemed to be a mechanism that 
essentially gives individual participants control over the governance. 
b)  Circumstantial Appropriateness 
Based on accessible documents, there seems to be one important factor that 
is likely to lead participants to need control over UK Biobank governance, i.e. the 
possibility of commercial use.158 In general, commercial use of biobank resources can 
be considered controversial and, undoubtedly, many empirical studies have revealed 
widespread scepticism over such use.159 Based on this premise, one can assume that 
participants in UK Biobank may need more control over uses of the Resources. One 
reason is that, while they were informed of this possibility, they did not know how the 
Resources would actually be used during recruitment. Also, prospective aspects of 
these uses are not clearly explained in the recruitment documents: the consent form 
does not provide much detail about prospective uses of the Resources; in two 
information leaflets provided during recruitment, prospective uses of the Resources 
are only explained by citing a few illnesses that might involve using the Resources.160 
For these reasons, it is difficult to conclude that participants already had a clear 
understanding of possible commercial uses. While this amount of explanation can be 
justified by the use of broad consent in the governance, individual participants might 
need to make decisions about uses of the Resources on a case-by-case basis, especially 
                                               
157 See 4.1.2 a) above. Note that some of channels for CBP, such as EGC annual reports and 
reports on EGC internal meetings, even provide in-depth information about UK Biobank’s 
activities. 
158 See 4.1.1 (second last paragraph) above. 
159 See 6.4.3 a) in ch 6 below. 
160 Consent Form (2006); Information Leaflet (2010), at 2; Further Information Leaflet 
(2009), at 4. 
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given the aforesaid scepticism. Because the right of withdrawal in the governance – a 
main source of their control over the governance – does not enable them to do so, they 
are likely to need more control over the governance.  
Notwithstanding, this need is likely to be obviated by another circumstantial 
factor, i.e. the existence of the EGC. In particular, the EGC has properly performed its 
role in terms of critically monitoring UK Biobank’s activities and promoting the 
interests of participants by, inter alia, encouraging UK Biobank to respect their consent 
and to provide sufficient safeguards for them.161 Indeed, it is also evident that, in 
practice, the Council attempted to retain its ability to perform this role. This attempt is 
inferred from the fact that the EGC was critical of some of the 2015 Panel’s 
recommendations that could limit such an ability, e.g. reducing its membership and 
decreasing the frequency of its internal meetings.162 Thus, it is possible for participants 
to trust the Council to oversee uses of the Resources and prevent those they find 
undesirable. One might therefore say that the work of the EGC can fulfil their need for 
more control over uses of the Resources. 
To conclude this sub-sub-section, it can be assumed from these two 
circumstantial factors that, in spite of the possibility of commercial use, the existence 
of the EGC potentially makes the control sharing in the governance, which mainly 
stems from the right of withdrawal, suffice to show respect to participants. It is 
therefore arguable that, according to the Model, the sharing of control in the 
governance can be considered appropriate, thereby making this aspect of the 
governance conform to the Model.  
4.4.3   Interim Conclusion 
In UK Biobank governance, control over the governance is shared with 
individual participants mainly through the right of withdrawal. The reason is that, 
while broad consent does not provide them with much of this control, this right can be 
                                               
161 See Box 4.1, 4.1.2 b) and 4.3.1 a) above.  
162 Report on 44th EGC Meeting (September 2015), at Annex A (EGC Response to the 
Report of the Expert Review Panel).  
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considered to give them a high level of it: the governance has so many CBP channels 
that they can exercise this right effectively; also, this right allows them to prevent some 
UK Biobank’s activities, such as accessing their health records in other databases or 
using their samples and information in future research studies. Indeed, this sharing can 
arguably be considered appropriate according to the Model. Particularly, although the 
possibility of commercial use might make individual participants desire more control 
over uses of the Resources, the EGC’s oversight activities might obviate this desire. 
Accordingly, one can say that UK Biobank participants are likely to feel satisfied with 
the level of control that they have as a result of merely their right of withdrawal, 
thereby allowing control sharing in the governance of UK Biobank to be considered 
respectful towards them. It is therefore arguable that, according to the Model, this 
sharing can be deemed appropriate, and thus this aspect of the governance can be 
considered to conform to the Model.  
It is notable that, as the EGC plays an essential role in this conformity, some 
recommendations from the 2015 Panel might change this argument because they might 
change the EGC’s role within the governance. However, at the time of writing, it is 
still unclear whether and how these recommendations are to be acted on. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the governance of UK Biobank essentially 
conforms to the Model. A crucial factor contributing to this conformity is the work of 
the EGC. In general, the EGC works closely with UK Biobank to monitor UK 
Biobank’s activities critically and reflect on the acceptability of these activities from 
the perspectives of participants and the public. It also keeps participants informed 
about those activities and establishes other communication channels that allow them 
to provide their input on biobanking. In terms of the Model, the EGC helps 
considerably in making the governance conform to the Model, since it makes the 
governance embody all the key attributes of the Model, as follows. To emphasise 
collective goals, the EGC can help reinforce collectiveness in biobanking goals by 
resisting biobanking activities that deviate from the goals agreed with participants. It 
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facilitates collaboration by receiving participants’ input and helping prevent their input 
from being disregarded by UK Biobank. In terms of reciprocation, it helps encourage 
UK Biobank to fulfil commitments to pursue collective goals and to provide 
participant safeguards, and also helps render policies on tangible reciprocation 
negotiable in general. Finally, its work can be assumed to render the control sharing 
within the governance appropriate by obviating participants’ need for more control 
over the governance. One can therefore argue that the EGC plays a crucial role in 
fostering the ARR in the governance. Notwithstanding, there are a number of issues 
that might raise the question of whether the governance really conforms to the Model 
at present, as consistently noted throughout this chapter. Because to discuss these 
issues would call for more in-depth information, which is not currently accessible, they 
cannot be confirmed and addressed here. 
Possible Changes after 2015 
It is worth mentioning recommendations from the 2015 Panel here, as they 
lead to some changes that might render UK Biobank governance more conformable to 
the Model. One possible change is the way in which UK Biobank generally responds 
to the EGC’s advice: UK Biobank should seriously consider such advice and clearly 
indicate whether or not such advice is to be acted on.163 While UK Biobank has been 
responsive to the EGC’s advice in practice,164 this change could ensure and certify this 
responsiveness, thereby making the governance conform better to the Model. For 
example, this change could reinforce the Model’s key attribute of collaboration by 
preventing participants’ input, which the EGC may use to inform its advice to UK 
Biobank, from being neglected by UK Biobank. Also, as it allows the EGC to better 
encourage UK Biobank to pursue collective goals and provide participant safeguards, 
it could reinforce the Model’s key attributes of emphasis on collective goals and 
reciprocation.165 Another possible change concerns the possibility of an AGM.166 As 
this meeting has the aim of formal public reporting, discussion and future planning, it 
could be another channel for CBP, which is crucial for applying some key attributes 
                                               
163 Review of the EGC 2015, at 7 (Recommendation 6). 
164 See 4.2.2 c) (third paragraph) above. 
165 See 4.1.2 b) (Relationship with UK Biobank) and 4.3.1 a) above. 
166 Review of the EGC 2015, at 8 (Recommendation 7). 
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of the Model.167 Its aims also suggest that participants could use it as another channel 
for providing their input, and thus it could help achieve the Model’s key attributes that 
call for allowing participants’ input or learning about participants, such as the key 
attributes of collaboration, emphasis on collective goals and reciprocation.168  
However, the recommendation for an AGM ironically raises some concerns 
as well. In particular, the term ‘annual general meeting’ gives the same impression as 
general meetings that are arranged within corporate governance, and thereby raises 
many concerns. In general, this term raises a concern as to whether an AGM would 
lead many people to perceive UK Biobank to be excessively commercially orientated. 
More importantly, this term might also introduce corporate governance methods into 
the governance of UK Biobank. This is similar to Winickoff’s proposal, which argues 
for a shareholder model in UK Biobank: his proposal adopts decision-making 
procedures that are similar to those used in corporate general meetings, as the way to 
represent a participant collective in UK Biobank governance.169 As these procedures 
might in practice lead some participants to be represented by others, they potentially 
raise a concern about the issue of representation, which is not desirable for the ARR.170 
From a practical perspective, these procedures also raise concerns about whether UK 
Biobank plans to grant a participant collective control over its governance, or whether 
it intends to use an AGM merely to seek tokenistic approval of its activities. Given all 
these concerns, it is questionable as to what reasons are actually behind this 
recommendation.171 Notably this recommendation was not put into practice in 2015.172 
                                               
167 See 4.1.2 a), 4.2.2 b) and 4.3.1 b) above. 
168 See 4.1.2 b) (Relationship with Participants), 4.2.1, 4.3.1 a) and 4.3.2 b) above. 
169 DE Winickoff, "Partnership in U.K. Biobank: A Third Way for Genomic Property?" 
(2007) 35 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 3 440-456, at 449. 
170 See 6.3.1 in ch 6 below. 
171 Notably, Hunter and Laurie argue against applying Winickoff’s shareholder model to the 
context of UK Biobank elsewhere. See KG Hunter and GT Laurie, "Involving Publics in 
Biobank Governance: Moving beyond Existing Approaches" in H Widdows and C Mullen 
(eds), The Governance of Genetic Information, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009) 151-200. 
172 At the time of writing, it is evident from the UK Biobank website that the first AGM was 
arranged in London on 13 June 2016. 
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Furthermore, there are some concerns caused by the understanding of the 
2015 Panel that it is not appropriate for the EGC to engage directly with participants.173 
Particularly, this understanding raises doubts about whether, in the future, there will 
be any changes in UK Biobank governance that hinder the EGC from reaching 
participants. This hindrance could impair some of the EGC’s abilities that make the 
governance conform to the Model, e.g. the ability to realise participants’ thoughts 
about collective goals and the sufficiency of participant safeguards174 and the ability 
to receive their input about the governance and take it into UK Biobank’s 
consideration.175 These abilities might even be more limited by the recommendation 
from the 2015 Panel that the EGC should reduce its operational scale by, inter alia, 
reducing its membership and decreasing the work appointment for its secretariat.176 
Indeed, this reduction additionally raises the question of whether the EGC’s work will 
still be sufficiently effective for, as explained in the first paragraph of this conclusion, 
making the governance conform to the Model or helping develop the ARR in the 
governance. It is therefore possible that the governance will be less conformable to the 
Model after 2015.  
Given all of these possible changes and concerns, it can be said that the 
arguments in this chapter might not be applicable to the governance after 2015. Note 
that, while these changes and concerns cannot be confirmed in 2015, they are 
explained here so as to show how to apply the Model by demonstrating how the Model 
responds to the review of the 2015 Panel.  
Limitations on the Discussions 
It is important to note again that discussions in this chapter are purely based 
on information in publicly-accessible documents.177 This implies that other incidents 
                                               
173 Review of the EGC 2015, at 7; EGC Annual Report 2015, at 18 (Box 17). 
174 See 4.1.2 b) (Relationship with Participants) and 4.3.1 a) above. 
175 See 4.2.2 c) and 4.3.2 b) above. 
176 Review of the EGC 2015, at 9-10; Report on 44th EGC Meeting (September 2015), at 
Annex A. 
177 Only one non-published document is used for improving the factual accuracy of 
discussions in this chapter, namely UK Biobank Communication Plans, which Andrew 
Trehearne prepared for the EGC in 2011. Note that this document was provided by him with 
his knowledge that it would be used in this thesis 
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that are not reported in such documents are excluded from these discussions, although 
they might actually relate to or even inform these discussions. This also implies that 
these discussions stem from my own interpretations of such documents, which might 
admittedly not agree with the reality. These discussions may be deemed sanitised in 
this respect. An example is the introduction of the pilot protocol for the feedback of 
PSIFs from imaging assessments.178 In particular, while accessible documents might 
lead some to assume that this introduction is informed by the EGC and/or participants’ 
feedback,179 it is possible that this introduction might be purely or additionally 
influenced by the recent trend towards the provision of individual feedback. This trend 
is pointed out by some authors, such as Widdows180 and Wolf,181 and is also supported 
by the recent literature that seeks to pursue a feasible way to provide individual 
feedback.182 Given this example, it can be said that the arguments in this chapter might 
change if information from other sources, such as interviews with participants and UK 
Biobank staff, is available and taken into consideration as well. However, this does not 
diminish the value of this chapter since it has the primary aim of demonstrating how 
to apply the Model in practice, not to make critical arguments concerning or to conduct 
an evaluation of UK Biobank governance. 
                                               
178 See 4.3.2 (second paragraph) above. 
179 See 4.3.2 b) (last paragraph) above. 
180 H Widdows and S Cordell, "The Ethics of Biobanking: Key Issues and Controversies" 
(2011) 19 Health Care Analysis 3 207-219, at 215. 
181 SM Wolf, "Return of Individual Research Results & Incidental Findings: Facing the 
Challenges of Translational Science" (2013) 14 Annual Review of Genomics and Human 
Genetics 557-577. 
182 SM Wolf et al, "Managing Incidental Findings and Research Results in Genomic 
Research Involving Biobanks and Archived Data Sets" (2012) 14 Genetics in Medicine 4 
361-384; LM Beskow and W Burke, "Offering Individual Genetic Research Results: Context 
Matters" (2010) 2 Science Translational Medicine 38 available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3136874/ (accessed on 10 June 2016);  
I Budin-Ljøsne et al, "Feedback of Individual Genetic Results to Research Participants: Is It 
Feasible in Europe?" (2016) 14 Biopreservation and Biobanking 3 241-248. 
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Chapter 5  
Partnership Model and ALSPAC1  
The first three chapters have outlined the main proposals of this thesis, which 
concern a participant-biobanker relationship that can deal with issues and challenges 
arising in biobanking practices. This thesis considers such a relationship as an 
authentic research relationship in biobanking (“an ARR”) and it seeks to propose one 
approach to an ARR that is based on partnership (“the ARR”). These proposals 
include (i) the fundamental notion of the ARR, which is in the form of its main 
characteristics, (ii) its conceptual framework, which consists of its five key features 
that are considered to exhibit its main characteristics, and (iii) the partnership model 
for biobank governance that is used to develop it in practice (“the Model”). With the 
aim of demonstrating how to put the Model into practice, the previous chapter has 
tested it against UK Biobank. This chapter is to test it against the Avon Longitudinal 
Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC), which seems to treat participants as 
partners (similarly to UK Biobank) but has a different governance structure. To 
facilitate understanding of the discussions in this chapter, general information about 
ALSPAC is summarised in Box 5.1 below. 
Box 5.1:   General information about ALSPAC2 
Objectives 
 ALSPAC is a longitudinal research project aiming to create resources for 
health-related research that help understand the ways in which physical and 
social environments interact over time with genetic inheritance to affect health, 
behaviour and development in infancy, childhood and then into adulthood. 
                                               
1 Appendix 2 lists materials that were accessed and reviewed to set up the discussions and 
develop the arguments in this chapter. It also demonstrates how the titles of these materials 
are simplified when being used as references in the discussions and footnotes here. 
2 These explanations are based on publicly-accessible documents, such as the recruitment 
documents, annual reports and the ALSPAC website. 
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 The main goal of ALSPAC is to help discover the causes of the most important 
health and social problems facing the world today, so that those problems can 
be prevented. 
Cohort 
 More than 14,000 pregnant women with estimated delivery dates between April 
1991 and December 1992 were originally recruited.  
 These women (study mothers) and the children resulting from their 
pregnancies (study children, CO90s) have been followed up intensively for 
more than two decades, and comprehensive and detailed data have been 
collected throughout the lives of the children. 
 In the last few years, the mothers' partners (study fathers), the CO90s’ children 
(COCO90s), the CO90s’ siblings and the CO90s’ grandparents have been 
enrolled in this project to generate health information covering four generations. 
Governance Structure 
 ALSPAC is governed by multiple bodies. They include as follows:  
o ALSPAC Executive Committee 
o ALSPAC Independent Scientific Advisory Board 
o ALSPAC Steering Group 
o ALSPAC Ethics and Law Committee 
 The remits of these bodies are explained in Box 5.2. 
Relationship with Participants 
 Data collection: Data have been collected by self-administered questionnaires, 
data extraction from medical notes, linkage to routine information systems and 
measurements at the research clinics that participants have been invited to 
attend regularly. 
 Active involvement: Participants can be involved in biobanking activities 
through many mechanisms, such as being members of the Original Cohort 
Advisory Panel (OCAP)3 or the COCO90s Advisory Panel, joining online parent 
                                               
3 The OCAP is the group of study children (CO90s) that was established to help ALSPAC in 
making decisions about some issues affecting ALSPAC’s activities. This panel is 
representative of the CO90s cohort in terms of age, gender and social class. Its members 
came from selection of study children who volunteered to be part of this panel. At present, it 
is a group of 23 participants who meet six times a year and receive no payment for being part 
of it. Notably, it was first set up in 2006 as the Teenage Advisory Panel (TAP). Because of 
its members becoming adults, it had become the Young Adult Advisory Panel before it was 
renamed to the OCAP. In practice, when compared with the TAP, the OCAP is more  
self-governing and gets less support, in the form of facilitation and advice, from ALSPAC’s 
staff. See Annual Report 2009, appx 1; Annual Report 2011-12, at 1. The detail about the 
OCAP’s activities is further explained below. See 5.2.1 (Regular Mechanisms) below.  
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advisory forums, attending attrition away days and working with biobankers in 
some working groups. A Research Partners scheme was introduced to involve 
participants in designing and making decisions about respective studies. 
 Communication: Other than the aforesaid participatory mechanisms, ALSPAC 
generally communicates with participants through participant newsletters and 
online media, namely the ALSPAC website, online forums and social networks. 
Some public events were also organised to communicate with participants.4 
As for the reason for selecting ALSPAC to test the Model, it is claimed that 
ALSPAC has attempted to treat its participants ‘as partners, rather than merely 
subjects’.5 Thus, it is intriguing to know whether or not a participant-biobanker 
relationship in ALSPAC is comparable to the ARR. On the other hand, ALSPAC has 
many distinctive characteristics that make it heavily reliant upon the quality of a 
participant-biobanker relationship. For example, ALSPAC has existed for more than 
two decades, and so far it has involved four generations of certain families, thus 
highlighting the need for continuity in this relationship. Also, ALSPAC collects 
various types of information, including family histories and criminal records, and thus 
its participants are prone to risks to their privacy and confidentiality. As the Model 
aims to develop the ARR – which is intended to deal with these characteristics – testing 
it against ALSPAC could show how well the quality of a participant-biobanker 
relationship in ALSPAC has been maintained, and could suggest how to maintain the 
viability of ALSPAC.6 Accordingly, this testing could arguably not only be an example 
                                               
4 The term ‘communication’ in this chapter refers to any mechanisms set up to transfer or 
exchange information between relevant parties, whether one way or two ways. Thus, this 
term ranges from the transfer of information through newsletters and websites, to 
information exchanged through dialogues and discussions. Involvement mechanisms can 
therefore be considered to be one approach to this communication. The difference is that 
communication focuses on the transfer of information while involvement mechanisms focus 
on the act of taking part. 
5 SE Mumford, "Children of the 90s: Ethical Guidance for a Longitudinal Study" (1999) 81 
Archives of Disease in Childhood - Fetal and Neonatal Edition 2 F146-F151, at F147. 
6 As established in Chapter 1, one main characteristic of the ARR is the ability to deal with 
the distinctive characteristics of biobanking that raise issues and challenges in biobanking 
practice. See 1.4.1 in ch 1 above. 
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of how to put the Model into practice, but also demonstrate whether and how the Model 
could contribute to ALSPAC governance. 
This chapter consists of four sections, each of which deals with a key attribute 
of the Model, namely emphasis on collective goals, collaboration, reciprocation and 
control sharing. The structure within these sections is the same order as that of the 
explanations about the practical application of these key attributes in Chapter 3. 
Three points are noteworthy here. First, similarly to the previous chapter, 
discussions in this chapter are based on documentary research that examines the 
governance of ALSPAC through publicly accessible sources, such as websites, annual 
reports and newsletters, as opposed to personal correspondence and interviews. This 
suggests that the picture of the governance painted here is purely based on my own 
interpretation of these sources, which might not depict the reality of the governance. 
Second, information about many aspects of the governance is not available in those 
sources, as occasionally noted below, and information about ALSPAC’s activities 
before 2000 is barely accessible. These limitations do noticeably undermine the depth 
of many discussions and the strength of many arguments in this chapter. Indeed, they 
also render these discussions unable to reflect the real picture of the governance and a 
participant-biobanker relationship therein. Thus, from a practical perspective, they 
may detract from the usefulness of these discussions and arguments. Finally, the notion 
underlying these discussions and arguments is that the governance is dynamic and has 
a mutual learning strategy as its core practice. Thus, the arguments here are basically 
intended to make constructive suggestions, rather than ‘right or wrong’ judgements.  
As a tentative conclusion, ALSPAC governance largely conforms to the 
Model, mainly because it has many mechanisms for communicating regularly with 
participants. It also has many involvement mechanisms, which can conform well to 
the Model’s key attribute of collaboration, but it is unclear whether these mechanisms 
actually suffer from the issue of representation, which is not desirable for the ARR. 
Nonetheless, the lack of detailed information about some ALSPAC’s activities 
prevents this chapter from conducting an in-depth discussion and reaching a firm 
conclusion regarding many respects of the governance, as well as confirming the 
greater extent of this conformity. Despite this situation, this chapter is still useful for 
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this thesis. This is because the main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the ways in 
which the Model is applied in practice, as mentioned above, and this chapter can 
achieve this aim by explaining what respects of the governance are of interest for the 
Model and how they affect conformity to the Model, as well as pinpointing issues that 
might arise within the governance from the perspective of the Model. 
5.1   Emphasis on Collective Goals 
As explained in Chapter 3, the key attribute of emphasis on collective goals 
requires participants and biobankers to share the same biobanking goals throughout 
biobanking endeavours. To achieve this, there must be measures to (1) clarify 
biobanking goals and (2) reinforce the collectiveness in biobanking goals between 
participants and biobankers.7 Based on this premise, this section determines whether 
any of ALSPAC’s activities can be equated with these two measures. As for the 
structure of this section, these two measures are dealt with separately in two  
sub-sections. At first glance, the governance of ALSPAC has many mechanisms for 
communicating with participants, thereby making the governance conform to the 
Model to some extent. However, it is unclear whether, according to the Model, 
collectiveness in biobanking goals can properly be reinforced within the governance 
because the available information is not adequate to confirm that biobanking activities 
which are not in line with collective goals will be inhibited. 
5.1.1   Clarification of Biobanking Goals 
The Model (Chapter 3): The measure to clarify biobanking goals generally involves the 
communicative mechanisms during recruitment that aim to make biobanking goals clear 
to participants. It is suggested conceptually that the focus of this measure should be on 
methods, as opposed to consequences, and thereby the quality of this communication is 
an important consideration. In practice, there should be evidence of biobankers’ attempts 
to facilitate participants’ understanding of biobanking goals, as opposed to evidence of 
sufficiency in such understanding. 
                                               
7 See 3.1 in ch 3 above. 
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For ALSPAC, the measure for clarifying biobanking goals is particularly 
important because, ever since its inception, part of its participant cohort is children, 
who probably lack the capability to understand biobanking goals. Also, there are many 
studies revealing that, in general, participants usually have misunderstandings about 
some aspects of biobanking8 and some of them might not read information offered to 
them.9 To find out whether ALSPAC’s goals are clarified, documents that show how 
the goals were communicated to participants and how such communication is handled 
by ALSPAC were examined. These documents include the recruitment documents, i.e. 
the consent form and two information booklets, and other documents that explain 
ALSPAC’s communicative activities, e.g. annual reports and participant newsletters. 
After examining these documents, it can be argued that ALSPAC’s goals are 
sufficiently clarified. The reason is that, while the goals are basically broad and generic 
and thereby do not contain detailed or complicated information, there is evidence of 
ALSPAC’s attempt to facilitate participants’ understanding of the goals. This evidence 
is based on (i) communication with participants during recruitment and (ii) some 
involvement mechanisms, which can be explained separately, as follows. 
Communication at Recruitment 
During the recruitment stage, there were many documents explaining 
ALSPAC’s goals to participants. One notable example is the detailed information 
booklet, which not only explains the goals but also provides other information that 
could enhance understanding of the goals, such as examples of research studies 
completed and in progress, the uniqueness of ALSPAC and the direction of ALSPAC’s 
activities.10 Participant newsletters11 also indirectly explain the goals by illustrating 
                                               
8 See note 32 in ch 4 above. 
9 See note 33 in ch 4 above. 
10 Detailed Information Booklet (2014). Notably, the consent form does, per se, not clearly 
explain ALSPAC’s goals but, during recruitment, participants also received the detailed 
information booklet, which provides detailed information about those goals. It should also be 
noted that all these recruitment documents, on which this discussion is based, are dated 2014. 
In this respect, this discussion might not be applicable to recruitment documents that were 
previously used before that year. 
11 ALSPAC has recruited different generations at different times, and thereby previous 
newsletters might be used to inform recent recruits about its goals and direction. 
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retrospective and prospective uses of ALSPAC’s resources (“the Resources”), as well 
as explaining how certain measurements and data collections relate to those uses.  
More importantly, the ways in which information in these documents is 
illustrated can arguably facilitate participants’ understanding of the goals. Particularly, 
the language in these documents is perceptibly simple and their artwork design is clean 
and readable.12 There is even a guidelines document that was produced, by the OCAP, 
to ensure that information sent to participants is presented in a user-friendly manner 
whilst still including all relevant content.13 Also, many key issues that can promote 
such understanding are repeated, such as the aims of ALSPAC and the absence of 
commercial involvement. ALSPAC even issued participant newsletters separately for 
adult and young participants, with differences in language and content.14  
Given these explanations, one can say that ALSPAC has attempted to 
facilitate participants’ understanding of its goals by providing them with information 
that helps them understand its goals and making this information comprehensible to 
them. It is therefore arguable that ALSPAC has already clarified its goals. 
Involvement Mechanisms 
The aforesaid attempt can also be found in some mechanisms that involve 
participants in improving the communication between ALSPAC and participants. As 
an example, the OCAP collaborated with the newsletter editor in developing the 
content and design of some newsletters.15 Some study fathers were involved in 
developing a qualitative study that interviewed study fathers with the aim of, inter alia, 
                                               
12 According to accessible information, there is no Crystal Mark certifying that the language 
is ‘plain English’. This claim is based on my own perception, which stems from the 
difference between the content of participant newsletters issued before 2010 and of 
documents that were issued recently, including the recruitment documents (2014) and 
participant newsletters issued after 2010. 
13 YoungHealthParticipation, "Involving Children and Young People in Research – PRWE 
Forum" (11 December 2013) available at https://younghealthparticipation.com/page/2/ 
(accessed 20 June 2016). 
14 It should be noted that, since 2013, ALSPAC has issued one participant newsletter per 
year but each newsletter is divided into sections that provide information and updates about 
ALSPAC’s activities for different cohort groups. 
15 Annual Report 2009, at 1.  
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identifying information required to make informed decisions.16 One study father joined 
the working group for the Fathers’ study in order to advise about recruitment.17 As 
these mechanisms basically aim to increase the effectiveness of communicating 
information about ALSPAC to participants, they can be assumed to serve as an 
important indicator of the attempts to improve participants’ understanding of 
ALSPAC, including its goals. Nonetheless, it is difficult to fully accept this 
assumption, since accessible information about these mechanisms is limited. 
Particularly, there are no details about whether or not such understanding is actually 
part of what those mechanisms seek to achieve. Indeed, their actual purposes are also 
unclear from accessible sources.18 Without these details, it is questionable whether, in 
practice, these mechanisms were actually implemented for improving participants’ 
understanding of ALSPAC’s goals.  
In addition to the evidence of ALSPAC trying to facilitate participants’ 
understanding of its goals, it can also be argued that, as far as study children are 
concerned, ALSPAC has mechanisms that helped make its goals clear to them when 
seeking their (re)consent to participation in it. Particularly, it is evident that its 
governance has ongoing communication that enables study children, who were 
originally recruited on the basis of their parents’ consent, to have a better 
understanding of its goals during their childhood: as explained below, its governance 
has communication about its biobanking progress that allows participants to always 
keep up-to-date with its activities,19 and  it also provides participants with sufficient 
access to information about its background;20 information about its background and 
biobanking activities can be considered to help participants to better understand its 
goals during the course of biobanking; indeed, this ongoing communication includes 
consistently sending newsletters to all participants and, as explained above, the content 
                                               
16 Annual Report 2011-12, at 4. 
17 Annual Report 2011-12, at 4. 
18 The establishment of the OCAP was one of two key mechanisms that were introduced for 
improving the participation rate of study children. See Annual Report 2006, at 2. It might be 
assumed that this was also the case for the involvement of study fathers in ALSPAC 
governance, because the participation rates of both cohort groups were low. See Annual 
Report 2008, at 3; Annual Report 2011-12, at 3, 4. 
19 See 5.1.2 a) below. 
20 See 5.2.2 b) below. 
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of these newsletters is easily comprehensible to participants. Given this ongoing 
communication, it is reasonable to believe that, when study children became young 
adults and gave (re)consent to participation on their own behalf, ALSPAC’s goals were 
sufficiently clarified from their perspective. It is therefore arguable that ALSPAC has 
mechanisms that helped clarify its goals when it sought (re)consent to participation 
from study children.  
Given these explanations, it is therefore arguable that, in general, ALSPAC 
has sufficiently clarified its goals. This is because it is evident from communication 
at recruitment that ALSPAC has attempted to facilitate participants’ understanding of 
its goals. This attempt might also be assumed when considering certain involvement 
mechanisms within its governance, although more information is required to test this 
assumption. Also, its governance has ongoing communication that could help make its 
goals clear to study children when it sought their (re)consent to participation.  
Notably, one interview study also, at first, seems to show such attempt.21 This 
study is part of a project that has a goal to improve the general understanding of ethical 
issues in epidemiological research, namely the Ethical Protection in Epidemiological 
Genetic research.22 The aim of this study is to learn about study children’s perceptions 
of their participation in ALSPAC. During the course of this study, some of study 
children were asked about ALSPAC, including its overall purpose. So, the results of 
this study might be used to give more insights into how study children generally 
understood ALSPAC’s goals and to inform any mechanisms for improving their 
understanding of these goals. However, nothing in accessible documents indicates that 
the study results had such a use, and thus the conduct of this study cannot be used to 
support this argument. 
                                               
21 T Goodenough et al, "Ethical Protection in Research: Including Children in the Debate" in 
M Smyth and E Williamson (eds), Researchers and Their Subjects: Ethics, Power 
Knowledge and Consent, (Bristol: The Plicy Press, 2004) 55-72. 
22 Centre for Ethics in Medicine (Unversity of Bristol), "EPEG Project" (October 2000 - 
September 2003) available at http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts//Ethics/CEM/epeg.htm (accessed 
5 January 2015). 
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5.1.2   Reinforcement of Collectiveness in Goals 
The Model (Chapter 3): This measure aims to encourage participants and biobankers to 
share the same biobanking goals throughout biobanking endeavours. The reinforcing 
mechanisms need to have two crucial elements: ongoing oversight of biobanking activities 
and discouragement of any deviations from collective goals. 
In light of this explanation, the governance of ALSPAC was examined to find 
any mechanisms that might be used to implement this reinforcing measure. In doing 
so, all publicly accessible documents were reviewed in order to find out how 
information about ALSPAC’s activities has been communicated between different 
stakeholders – i.e. participants, biobankers and, if any, oversight bodies – and how 
these stakeholders can deal with undesirable activities within the governance, if at all. 
These documents include participant newsletters, annual reports and the terms of 
reference for different entities in the governance. This examination reveals that the 
governance has mechanisms for tackling the changes to participants’ goals that deviate 
from collective goals, but it is unclear whether it has measures for dealing with the 
changes to biobankers’ goals that deviate from collective goals. This can be illustrated 
separately, according to these two different changes, as follows. 
a)  Changes to Participants’ Goals  
As suggested in the Model, two mechanisms – namely communication about 
biobanking progress (“CBP”) and the right of withdrawal – should be available to 
participants to reinforce collectiveness in biobanking goals. The former enables them 
to recognise collective goals through information on biobanking activities, and the 
latter allows them, by themselves, to impede deviations of their own goals from 
collective goals.  
For ALSPAC, these two mechanisms are both available in its governance. 
Particularly, participants have the right to withdraw their consent at any time without 
giving any reason.23 Indeed, they have been well informed of this right through many 
                                               
23 Policy on Withdrawal (2011). 
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documents – such as the consent form and the information booklets – and these 
documents as well as a policy document on this matter are also available on the 
ALSPAC website.24 In terms of CBP, participants have many opportunities to keep 
themselves up-to-date with ALSPAC’s activities, including how the Resources are 
used, through many communication channels, as follows. 
Participant newsletters can be deemed to be a main channel for CBP, since 
they are sent individually to participants on a regular basis and are also downloadable 
from the ALSPAC website. In terms of content, they explain how the Resources have 
been and will be used in research studies, including what knowledge was derived and 
will be sought from such uses, how useful participants’ contributions are for research 
studies, and who use the Resources. They also illustrate other biobanking activities, 
ranging from research-related activities (e.g. progress in recruitment, research studies 
in progress, and diseases of current and future focus) to management activities (e.g. 
funding and staff recruitment). The ALSPAC website is another CBP channel. This 
website itself provides background information about ALSPAC as well as updates on 
its activities, including cohort groups, biobank management, the results of research 
studies using the Resources. There are also many documents that are available on this 
website, such as policy documents, annual reports on management activities and 
scientific publications – the latter provide details on actual uses of the Resources. In 
addition to these communication channels, there have also been many involvement 
mechanisms that have allowed participants to be updated on ALSPAC’s activities and 
related research findings. These mechanisms are in the form of online communities 
(i.e. online advisory forums and a Facebook group page) and public events (namely 
ResearchFest (2012) and the First 21 Years Conference (2012)).  
Given all these channels for CBP, it can be said that ALSPAC participants 
can monitor ALSPAC’s activities and progress continuously. Thus, they – by taking 
into account ALSPAC’s activities – are able to identify actual ALSPAC’s goals and 
any changes thereto throughout biobanking endeavours. Indeed, with their right of 
                                               
24 According to my research, it is evident that participants have been repeatedly informed 
about their right of withdrawal through the recruitment documents and many participant 
newsletters. Indeed, a policy document on this matter is publicly accessible as well. 
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withdrawal, they are also allowed to withdraw their consent at any time if they find 
any discrepancies between identified goals and their own biobanking goals. When 
considering CBP and the right of withdrawal within the governance of ALSPAC, one 
can say that participants are able to impede the changes to their own goals that deviate 
from ALSPAC’s goals, which are considered to be collective goals in this situation. It 
is therefore arguable that the governance has mechanisms that can impede any 
deviations of participants’ goals from collective goals, and thereby this aspect of the 
governance conforms to the Model. 
b)  Changes to Biobankers’ Goals 





















 ALSPAC Executive Committee (AEC): The AEC generally manages all 
biobanking activities relating to research studies, including approving requests 
to access the Resources. It also ensures that biobanking activities are in 
accordance with any regulatory and ethical requirements, as well as strategic 
plans developed by the ASG. If any issues arise, it will refer access and  
non-access related cases to the ISAB and the ASG, respectively. 
 ALSPAC Independent Scientific Advisory Board (ISAB): The ISAB is a group 
of scientists who have a role in dealing with any scientific issues, such as 
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also reviews access-related cases referred on by the AEC. With the expression 
‘independent’, its certain members will be excluded when considering issues 
that create conflicts of interests with these members. Reports on the ISAB’s 
meetings are produced for the Co-PIs, the ASG and the funders. 
 ALSPAC Steering Group (ASG): The main role of the ASG is to provide 
strategic oversight and to review all activities in the governance, including how 
participant safeguards are provided and how complaints from participants are 
handled. It also supports the Co-PI’s and the AEC’s work regarding research 
studies, and resolves non-access related issues referred on by the AEC. 
 ALSPAC Law and Ethics Committee (ALEC): The ALEC comprises clinicians, 
researchers, people with legal expertise and lay people, including participants. 
This committee has the aim of providing ethical oversight of ALSPAC as a 
whole. In practice, it plays a main role in protecting participants’ interests by, 
inter alia, dealing with any legal and ethical issues arising in the governance, 
establishing guidelines or policy on certain ethical issues and reviewing study 
proposals that require new data collection from participants.  
 Co-Principal Investigator (Co-PI): The governance has two Co-PIs of cohort 
infrastructure and scientific innovation. The former sits on both the AEC and the 
ASG, while the latter only sits on the ASG. Their work is mainly supported by 
the ASG and the ISAB through receiving reports from these two bodies. They 
are responsible to the funders. 
According to the Model, it is suggested that there should be an oversight body 
that is assigned to reinforce collectiveness in biobanking goals. This body should be 
capable of monitoring biobanking activities and resisting activities that deviate from 
collective goals. Also, this body should have mechanisms for recognising what 
biobanking goals participants actually have and informing them of its own reinforcing 
activities.  
As for ALSPAC, its governance employs a multiple-committee model, 
whereby more than one committee is assigned to govern and manage it. The remits of 
and relationships between these committees are briefly explained in Box 5.2 above. 
As regards a role in reinforcing collectiveness in goals, it should first be noted from 
the remits of these committees that, unlike the Ethics and Governance Council in UK 
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Biobank (EGC),25 these committees are fundamentally not intended to routinely 
evaluate the governance of ALSPAC in a critical fashion. Rather, they work together 
to facilitate biobanking and deal with any issues that hinder ALSPAC’s activities or 
undermine ALSPAC’s relationship with participants. Thus, it might be fair to say that 
this reinforcing task is basically outside their remit, and thus it is arguably unfair to 
judge them on this matter. Nonetheless, in the attempt to show how the Model is 
applied to the governance, this sub-sub-section mentions two mechanisms in the 
governance that might be used to fulfil such a task, as follows: 
Reference to the ISAB 
The first one concerns a mechanism that refers problematic access 
applications to the ISAB. This mechanism is triggered during a process of approving 
applications that request access to the Resources. In general, access applications are 
handled by the AEC. The conditions of approval are mostly related to scientific 
acceptability – such as scientific strength, appropriateness of methods and absence of 
repetition – but they also include whether research proposals are ‘within the scope of 
the consents obtained for the specific samples’.26 When access applications are 
considered problematic, they are referred to the ISAB for review. Such applications 
exist in three circumstances: (1) access applications might significantly deplete stocks 
of finite samples;27 (2) access applications are complex or controversial, beyond the 
AEC’s capability to adjudicate;28 or (3) the AEC’s decisions on access applications are 
contested by applicants or ‘significant third parties’.29 From the perspective of the 
Model, collectiveness in biobanking goals can be reinforced in a situation where access 
applications do not conform to participants’ consent, which can be analogous to 
collective goals, and these applications are reviewed by the ISAB because either the 
AEC decides to send them to the ISAB for review or its decisions on them are 
                                               
25 See Box 4.1 in ch 4 above. 
26 Policy on Access (2014), at 11. 
27 Policy on Access (2014), at 11. 
28 Terms of Reference - AEC (2014), at para 3.5 a); Terms of Reference - ISAB (2014), at 
para 2.1. 




contested. In this situation, the ISAB can be considered to play a role as an oversight 
body, which resists the uses of the Resources that deviate from collective goals.  
However, although this mechanism is theoretically possible according to 
accessible documents, it might not be feasible in practice for reinforcing collectiveness 
in biobanking goals for two reasons. First, an ISAB review is not routine: it requires 
either the AEC to ‘find itself unable to adjudicate’ or someone to contest its decisions 
on certain access applications, let alone what ‘significant third parties’ actually include 
in practice. This infers that access applications that do not conform to collective goals 
might not be reviewed and rejected by the ISAB. Second, the ISAB is unlikely to 
perform this reinforcing task in practice since, as assumed from its remit and 
composition, this body seems to be primarily intended to tackle scientific matters, not 
the non-conformity of access applications to participants’ consent or collective goals. 
In other words, it is likely that, in practice, only scientific-related issues are left to be 
addressed by the ISAB. Indeed, it is also unclear from accessible documents how the 
ISAB knows about participants’ actual biobanking goals since it has no regular 
communication with participants. For these reasons, it can be argued that, in practice, 
this mechanism cannot properly resist the uses of the Resources that do not conform 
to collective goals, and thereby it cannot be used as a mechanism for reinforcing 
collectiveness in biobanking goals according to the Model. 
Practical Sanctions by Funders 
The second mechanism involves financial sanctions imposed by ALSPAC’s 
funders. Unlike the first mechanism, which focuses on access applications, this 
mechanism covers biobanking activities in general. This is similar to the governance 
of UK Biobank, where the EGC can raise undesirable biobanking activities with UK 
Biobank’s funders – who are in a position to use financial sanctions against such 
activities.30 In ALSPAC, bodies involved in this mechanism are the Co-PIs of cohort 
infrastructure and of scientific innovation. One reason is that the Co-PIs have access 
to information about ALSPAC’s activities: both Co-PIs are members of the ASG, 
which oversees ALSPAC’s activities; they receive reports about ALSPAC’s activities 
                                               
30 See 4.1.2 b) (Relationship with Biobankers) in ch 4 above. 
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from the ASG and the ISAB; the Co-PI of cohort infrastructure is also a member of 
the AEC, which manages biobanking activities in general.31 Another reason is that they 
are responsible to the funders.32 Given these two reasons, one can therefore say that 
the Co-PIs are capable of monitoring ALSPAC’s activities and recognising any 
activities that deviate from the goals shared with participants. Moreover, since they are 
responsible to the funders, they might resist such activities by raising such activities 
with the funders, who might use financial sanctions to hinder or inhibit such activities. 
Accordingly, it is arguably possible for the Co-PIs to play a role in reinforcing 
collectiveness in biobanking goals in the governance. 
However, the lack of information about the Co-PIs’ remit and practices 
prevents investigating this possibility for two reasons. First and foremost, it is unclear 
whether, in practice, the Co-PIs play a role in enhancing administrative efficiency, 
scientific justifiability or ethical and social acceptability. Consequently, it is difficult 
to assert that they will always raise any deviations from participants’ goals with the 
funders. Second, based on the Model, where an oversight body should be able to realise 
what goals participants actually have, it is unclear how the Co-PIs can realise 
participants’ current goals, due to the absence of information about what data they 
regularly go through and what activities they are interested in. In practice, they might 
be able to realise such goals through, for example, public events attended by 
participants or reports that document participants’ feedback about the governance; but 
this cannot be confirmed from accessible documents. For these reasons, although the 
Co-PIs possibly recognise and resist any deviations from participants’ goals, it is 
difficult to argue that they will do so in practice. The conclusion here is that it is 
unclear whether the Co-PIs can play a role as an oversight body that reinforces 
collectiveness in biobanking goals in the governance. In this respect, more 
information about the Co-PIs’ activities is required to determine whether this aspect 
of the governance actually conforms to the Model. 
To summarise this sub-sub-section, given accessible information about the 
governance of ALSPAC, one might assume that any deviations of ALSPAC’s 
                                               
31 See Box 5.2 above. 
32 Terms of Reference - ASG (2014), at para 1.3. 
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activities from collective goals could be resisted within the governance. For one 
reason, access applications that do not conform to collective goals might be reviewed 
and rejected by the ISAB. Moreover, biobanking activities that are not in line with 
collective goals might be hindered through financial sanctions imposed by the funders, 
with whom the Co-PIs might raise such activities. However, when considering these 
two mechanisms in more detail, it is difficult to accept this assumption. Particularly, 
regarding an ISAB review, it can be suggested from accessible documents that, 
basically, this review is neither performed on a regular basis nor intended to deal with 
access applications that do not conform to collective goals. As regards financial 
sanctions, there is not sufficient information to confirm whether the Co-PIs can realise 
participants’ actual goals and whether, if they can, they will raise ALSPAC’s activities 
that do not conform to those goals with the funders. Consequently, it cannot be 
concluded that collectiveness in biobanking goals can be reinforced by these two 
mechanisms, and that this aspect of the governance conforms to the Model. 
5.1.3   Interim Conclusion 
In this section, the overall argument is that collective goals, i.e. goals that 
ALSPAC and participants originally agreed on, are to some extent emphasised in the 
governance of ALSPAC. For one reason, it is arguable that ALSPAC has sufficiently 
clarified its goals. This is supported by the communication with participants during the 
recruitment stage and some involvement mechanisms within the governance, both of 
which show that ALSPAC has attempted to facilitate participants’ understanding of its 
goals. As a result of this clarification, participants can have a clear understanding of 
its goals, and thus they are allowed to genuinely share the same goals with it. Another 
reason is that participants can properly reinforce collectiveness in biobanking goals in 
the governance: the governance provides them with the right of withdrawal and has 
many channels for CBP; consequently, they are allowed to withdraw their consent 
when their own goals deviate from collective goals, which they can realise through 
channels for CBP in the governance. For these two reasons, one can say that this aspect 
of the governance conforms quite well to the Model.  
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Nonetheless, it is unclear whether or not the governance of ALSPAC can 
emphasise collective goals by resisting any biobanking activities that deviate from 
collective goals. This is because, based on accessible information, it seems that the 
ISAB does not play a role in discouraging the uses of the Resources that do not 
conform to collective goals. Moreover, the available information is not sufficient to 
confirm that, in practice, ALSPAC’s activities that deviate from collective goals will 
be resisted or inhibited by other mechanisms within the governance, such as financial 
sanctions that the Co-PIs might request the funders to impose against these activities. 
More information is therefore required to confirm that collective goals are emphasised 
in this fashion as well. In other words, the accessible information is not sufficient to 
argue for a higher degree of conformity of the governance to the Model.  
5.2   Collaboration 
The key attribute of collaboration in the Model requires biobankers to 
cooperate with participants in a respectful manner by giving participants a chance to 
influence biobanking activities meaningfully. In doing so, there must be mechanisms 
that provide participants with opportunities to provide input about biobanking and 
assure the meaningfulness of their input.33 Based on this proposal, this section deals 
with the questions of whether and how the governance of ALSPAC provides 
participants with opportunities to provide input about the governance as well as 
whether these opportunities suffer from any possible forms of tokenism. With the aim 
of addressing these questions, documents illustrating involvement mechanisms 
implemented in the governance were reviewed, in order to find out how ALSPAC has 
allowed participants to provide input about the governance and how it deals with their 
input. It first needs to be noted that there are no documents that explicitly explain this 
aspect of the governance, and thus relevant materials – which include annual reports, 
participant newsletters and the ALSPAC website – are examined to learn about it. 
After examining these materials, it is arguable that the answers to those questions are 
positive. This is because the governance has many communicative and involvement 
                                               
33 See 3.2 in ch 3 above. 
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mechanisms that give participants those opportunities. Also, it seems that those 
opportunities have not suffered from any possible forms of tokenism, although more 
information is needed to verify this. 
5.2.1   Opportunities to Provide Input 
The Model (Chapter 3): Biobank governance needs to have mechanisms that allow 
participants to voice their thoughts about biobanking, so as to give them opportunities to 
provide their input on biobanking. 
This sub-section determines the extent to which ALSPAC gives participants 
opportunities to provide feedback or input about its governance. To do so, all 
involvement mechanisms in the governance of ALSPAC were examined in order to 
find out those that allow participants to voice their thoughts about the governance. It 
is worth emphasising that this sub-section focuses only on participants’ opportunities 
to provide input. In this respect, the possibility that their input will influence 
ALSPAC’s activities will be dealt with in the following sub-section. As a result of this 
examination, it is arguable that participants have many opportunities to provide input 
about the governance throughout the course of biobanking, because there are a number 
of involvement mechanisms within the governance that provide these opportunities. 
As the structure of this sub-section, such mechanisms can be classified into regular 
and irregular mechanisms and they can be explained separately, as follows: 
Regular Mechanisms 
For regular involvement mechanisms, advisory panels should first be 
mentioned. These panels comprise participants who volunteer to be involved in 
ALSPAC’s management. There are two panels within the governance of ALSPAC: 
the OCAP34 and the COCO90s advisory group. The former is the panel of study 
children that has helped ALSPAC in dealing with many aspects of the governance. It 
has worked collaboratively with ALSPAC and has thus far been engaged in various 
                                               
34 See note 3 above. 
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matters, ranging from recruitment and communication to research activities.35 For 
example, it helped to improve the design and content of some participant newsletters.36 
As for data collection, it was asked to give some advice on the layout and language 
used in questionnaires and other information documents,37 as well as to give advice on 
the clinic environment at focus centres so as to make those centres have a less clinical 
and more teenage-friendly feel.38 It got involved in ALSPAC’s communication with 
other participants by setting up the ALSPAC Facebook page and advising on the tone 
and content of this page.39 It has also dealt with some ethical questions,40 such as the 
disclosure of information to participants.41 The other panel is the COCO90s advisory 
group, which is comprised of the children of study children who are eligible to be the 
COCO90s cohort. Although the detail about this panel is barely revealed in accessible 
documents, it seems that this panel serves a similar purpose to the OCAP.42  
In addition to advisory panels, participants can provide input about the 
governance by being members of some working groups. One example is the ALEC, 
on which the OCAP,43 study mothers44 and study fathers45 are currently represented. 
Another is the working group for the Fathers’ study, which recruits one study father to 
give advice on recruitment and study development.46 There is also the Pre-ALEC, 
which comprises participant members of the ALEC and works as an additional forum 
for ethical review by lay members, prior to main ALEC meetings.47 Other than 
membership, participants can contribute personally towards the governance through 
                                               
35 Annual Report 2006, at 2; Annual Report 2008, at appx 1. 
36 Annual Report 2008, at 2. 
37 Annual Report 2009, at 5. 
38 Annual Report 2008, at 4. 
39 Annual Report 2009, at 5. 
40 Annual Report 2009, at 2. 
41 C Hellmich et al, "Genetics, Sleep and Memory: A Recall-By-Genotype Study of 
ZNF804A Variants and Sleep Neurophysiology" (2015) 16 BioMed Central 96 available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4619339/ (accessed on 10 July 2016), at 6. 
42 Annual Report 2011-12, at appx 5. 
43 C Overy et al, History of the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC), 
c.1980–2000, Volume 44 (London: The Trustee of the Wellcome Trust, 2012), at 93. 
44 K Birmingham and M Furmston, "Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children 
(ALSPAC): Ethical Process" in J Gunning and S Holm (eds), Ethics, Law and Society 
Volume II, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2006) 65-74, at 66. 
45 Annual Report 2011-12, at 4. 
46 Annual Report 2011-12, at 4. 
47 ALSPAC, New Data Collection Review Dates, (2016) 1. 
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other involvement activities, such as online parent advisory forums, which were 
established to engage with study parents.48 As these forums are used to discuss ideas 
with and obtain feedback from them, they are provided with opportunities to provide 
input about the governance, including research areas of interest to them.49 In addition 
to these forums, in general, individual participants can provide input about the 
governance by voicing their thoughts through channels for general enquiries and 
feedback. These channels exist in various forms, ranging from telephone and email to 
social media, such as Facebook and Twitter. The details of these channels are provided 
in participant newsletters and on the ALSPAC website. Indeed, individual participants 
can also voice their concerns or make complaints about the governance, which will be 
dealt with systemically by ALSPAC’s staff.50  
Irregular Mechanisms 
Other than regular mechanisms, participants additionally have opportunities 
to provide input about ALSPAC governance through some involvement activities 
arranged irregularly. Many of these activities were in the form of meetings with 
biobankers. An example is attrition away days, which allowed participants to voice 
their opinions on how to improve the participation rate in ALSPAC.51 Some were 
arranged as public events, such as ResearchFest in 2012, which enabled participants 
(as attendees) to provide feedback about the governance.52 Also, many mechanisms 
were occasionally implemented to receive participants’ input about the governance 
individually. For example, a ‘phone blitz’ was initiated to invite missing participants 
personally to participate again and it also asked those participants to advise on how to 
make clinic sessions attract more attendance.53 Some focus groups and interviews were 
held in father clinics to find an appropriate way to collect samples from study fathers.54 
Some participant newsletters were used to ask participants to give their ideas on certain 
                                               
48 Parents Newsletters 2011, at 2. 
49 Parents Newsletters 2011, at 2. 
50 Policy on Complaints (2014). 
51 Annual Report 2006, at 2. 
52 ALSPAC, "Researchfest 2012" (2012) available at 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/alspac/events/researchfest2012 (accessed 10 January 2015). 
53 Annual Report 2007, at 3. 
54 Annual Report 2008, at 3. 
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matters, such as outreach visits55 and questionnaires for collecting data.56 Some 
qualitative studies were also conducted to get participants’ perceptions on certain 
matters, such as study children’s perception of their participation57 and their opinions 
on some ethical issues.58 
Given all these involvement mechanisms, one can therefore say that 
ALSPAC participants have many opportunities to provide their input about the 
governance of ALSPAC on a regular basis. This is even the case for non-biobanking 
matters. For example, study parents were asked at ‘parents evening’ meetings to advise 
how ALSPAC could help their children at school.59 Study mothers were asked to get 
involved in producing a series of short books that concern what is most important to 
women and their well-being.60 Although these mechanisms are not directly related to 
the governance, they might help increase the sense of involvement and collaboration, 
and thereby may strengthen a participant-biobanker relationship within it. It is 
therefore arguable that this aspect of the governance conforms to the Model. Two 
points are noteworthy here. First, the governance also has a ‘research partners’ scheme, 
which allows participants to get involved in research studies by helping make decisions 
about research studies.61 This scheme may enable them to provide input, particularly 
regarding research studies that use the Resources. However, there are neither details 
nor updates about this scheme in accessible documents, and so this scheme is not used 
to support this argument. Second, many of involvement mechanisms in the governance 
might raise the issue of representation, which is not desirable for the ARR. This issue 
will be discussed at the end of Sub-section 5.2.2 c) below. 
                                               
55 Parents Newsletters 2008, at 3. 
56 Young Participant Newsletters 2012, at 3. 
57 T Goodenough et al, see note 21 above. 
58 E Williamson et al, "Children’s Participation in Genetic Epidemiology" in R Tutton and  
O Corrigan (eds), Genetic Databases: Socio-ethical Issues in the Collection and Use of 
DNA, (London: Routledge, 2004) 139-160. 
59 Participant Newsletters Issue 26, at 7. 
60 Family Newsletters 2015-16, at 7. 
61 Annual Report 2011-12, at 1. 
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5.2.2   Meaningfulness of Input 
The Model (Chapter 3): Biobankers are required to ensure the meaningfulness of 
participants’ input by allowing their input to have a real chance of substantially influencing 
biobanking. To fulfil this requirement, they need to address three forms of tokenism that 
might occur in a biobanking context, i.e. the insignificance of issues under consideration, 
the insufficiency of participants’ capability to provide input, and the disregard of their input. 
Based on the Model, this sub-section addresses the question of whether the 
opportunities to provide input that ALSPAC participants have can be considered 
tokenistic. In doing so, ALSPAC’s activities revolving around participants’ input, 
including the involvement mechanisms explained in the previous sub-section, were 
examined in order to find out whether or not the governance suffers from any of those 
three possible forms of tokenism. As a result of this examination, the answer to this 
question seems to be negative. To explain this answer, those three possible forms of 
tokenism are dealt with separately in three different sub-sub-sections. 
a)  Insignificance of Issues 
The first possible form of tokenism refers to a situation where issues on which 
participants are allowed to provide input are not significant for biobanking. The Model 
does not propose any criteria for what issues are significant, but instead suggests that 
significant issues should affect the quality of a participant-biobanker relationship or 
influence the direction of biobanking activities.  
Based on this premise, the governance of ALSPAC seems not to suffer from 
this possible form of tokenism, as involvement mechanisms in it generally involve 
biobanking issues that can be considered important. Particularly, many of those 
mechanisms aim to increase the participation rate, which is basically crucial for the 
success and viability of ALSPAC. The involvement of the OCAP is a good example: 
the Panel’s input can be considered to help increase the participation rate because it 
helped make participants have good experiences of ALSPAC’s activities by, inter alia, 
changing the environment of clinics, setting up the ALSPAC Facebook page and 
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improving the content of ALSPAC’s newsletters, questionnaires and website.62 The 
same can be said for the involvement of some study fathers. Particularly, one study 
father has sat on the working group for the Fathers’ study to advise on recruitment. 
Also, some study fathers took part as fathers’ ambassadors, who promote the Fathers’ 
study by being involved in a recruitment video and interviews with the media.63 
Another example is attrition away days, which sought to involve participants in finding 
out how to improve the attrition rate.64 
Participants have been allowed to get involved in other important issues too. 
For example, the OCAP engaged in discussing some ethical questions as members of 
the ALEC65 and influencing the direction of research studies by advising on new 
research topics.66 The COCO90s advisory group was involved in making decisions 
about clinic measures and the ways to contact the COCO90s cohort.67 Some study 
fathers have had opportunities to discuss ethical questions as members of the ALEC, 
and to give advice on study development as part of the working group for the Fathers’ 
study.68 Moreover, according to the aforementioned ‘research partners’ scheme, it 
might be assumed that participants are allowed to influence research studies by helping 
make decisions about prospective studies.69 Above all, communication channels that 
enable any participants to send general enquiries and feedback, as well as to make 
complaints about the governance, are not limited to any specific issues. Given all of 
these involvement mechanisms and communication channels, it can be argued that 
participants have been allowed to deal with significant issues in the governance, and 
thus the governance is not prone to the risk of this possible form of tokenism. 
                                               
62 See 5.2.1 (Regular Mechanisms) above. 
63 Annual Report 2011-12, at 4. 
64 Annual Report 2006, at 2. 
65 Annual Report 2008, at appx 1. 
66 Young Participant Newsletters 2008, at 4. 
67 Annual Report 2011-12, at appx 5. 
68 Annual Report 2011-12, at 4. 
69 Annual Report 2011-12, at 1. Note that further detail about this scheme is not accessible. 
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b)  Insufficiency of Capability 
The second possible form of tokenism stems from the insufficiency of 
participants’ capability to give useful input, which renders their input neither helpful 
nor worthy of consideration. The solution to this form of tokenism is participant 
empowerment. This empowerment might be performed by way of sharing general 
knowledge about biobanking and information about certain biobanks with participants. 
By assuming that some participants prefer to be non-active and thereby do not need 
such knowledge and information, this sharing accentuates the accessibility of such 
knowledge and information, not the consequences or methods of this sharing.  
Based this premise, this sub-sub-section addresses the question of whether 
ALSPAC sufficiently share knowledge about biobanking and information about it with 
participants. Note that, as information about ALSPAC encompasses updates on 
ALSPAC’s activities, part of the arguments here is analogous with the argument made 
regarding CBP above,70 and it can be explained again, as follows: there are many 
communication channels within ALSPAC governance that enable participants to keep 
themselves up-to-date with ALSPAC’s progress; it is therefore arguable that 
participants have sufficient access to information about ALSPAC’s activities. This 
sub-sub-section focuses on the accessibility of other information, namely background 
information about ALSPAC and general knowledge about biobanking.  
In ALSPAC governance, participants arguably have sufficient access to 
background information about ALSPAC and general knowledge about biobanking. 
This argument is supported by the same evidence as that used to support the arguments 
regarding communication about ALSPAC’s goals and activities.71 Thus, it can be 
explained again, as follows. The governance has provided participants with such 
information and knowledge. Particularly, the information about uses of the Resources, 
which facilitates understanding of ALSPAC’s goals, has been provided in the 
recruitment documents, participant newsletters and public events, as well as on the 
ALSPAC website. General knowledge about biobanking and the explanations for 
some biobanking activities (e.g. data linkage and its benefits; procedures for and 
                                               
70 See 5.1.2 a) above. 
71 See 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 a) above. 
212 
 
reasons behind collecting certain information and samples; the relations between 
participants’ contributions and medical advances etc.) have been frequently provided 
in many documents, especially participant newsletters. Participants might also have 
opportunities to learn about research procedures according to the ‘research partners’ 
scheme, whereby biobankers assist them in conducting their own research studies.72 
Given this degree of informational accessibility, one can say that information about 
ALSPAC and knowledge about biobanking have been sufficiently shared with 
participants, and thus this possible form of tokenism is arguably not an issue within 
the governance. 
c)  Disregard for Input 
The last possible form of tokenism occurs when participants’ input is not 
given serious consideration by biobankers, thus preventing participants from having a 
real chance of influencing biobanking activities. To address this concern, biobank 
governance should have mechanisms that can be used to confirm that participants’ 
input is actually taken into account, regardless of whether or not such input is 
eventually put into practice.  
For ALSPAC, it can be said from accessible information that the governance 
of ALSPAC only has such mechanisms when handling complaints from participants. 
Particularly, it is evident that the governance has a systemic procedure for dealing with 
participants’ complaints.73 Indeed, according to this procedure, these complaints will 
eventually be resolved by an external body, namely the Management Group of the 
School of Social and Community Medicine, University of Bristol. Accordingly, this 
procedure and the involvement of the Management Group can be considered to be 
mechanisms for ensuring that complaints from participants are given serious 
consideration by ALSPAC.  
As regards other involvement mechanisms in the governance, their details are 
not available enough to determine conclusively whether participants’ input provided 
via them has been given serious consideration, and whether certain ALSPAC’s 
                                               
72 See note 69 above. 
73 Policy on Complaints (2014). 
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activities were truly informed by that input. Still, it might be argued from accessible 
information that participants’ input has actually been taken into account to some 
extent, as it can be inferred from some statements that certain biobanking activities 
and some changes thereto were influenced by participants’ input. For example, it is 
explained that, after ALSPAC had realised that some participants deemed 
questionnaires too lengthy and did not prefer using a paper version of them, it promised 
to make them shorter and to provide an online version in addition, respectively.74 It is 
said that ALSPAC involved the OCAP in making suggestions about the environment 
of clinics and those suggestions were subsequently implemented.75 One report says 
that the establishment of online advisory forums for engaging with study parents 
resulted from feedback from parents’ focus groups.76 Other than these statements, 
some facts might also be used to support this argument. An example is the fact that 
participants have been repeatedly informed of their right of withdrawal:77 this 
repetition is in line with the qualitative research on study children which concluded 
that this right should be reinforced with them constantly.78 All these statements and 
facts indicate that ALSPAC has taken participants’ input into account.  
When considering this indication together with the mechanisms for handling 
participants’ complaints, it is arguable that, in practice, ALSPAC governance has 
not, so far, suffered from this possible form of tokenism.  
Despite this argument, it is notable that more information is needed to verify 
that this aspect of the governance genuinely conforms to the Model. Particularly, it is 
unclear from accessible documents how ALSPAC actually deals with participants’ 
input received via its involvement mechanisms, and the extent to which such input has 
actually influenced its activities. On the one hand, this raises the question of whether 
the governance has routine mechanisms in place for dealing with such input, thus 
raising doubts as to whether this argument will remain valid afterwards. On the other 
hand, it is questionable whether the governance has suffered from the issue of 
                                               
74 Annual Report 2011-12, at 4; Young Participant Newsletters 2012, at 3. 
75 Annual Report 2008, at 4. 
76 Annual Report 2011-12, at 1, 4. 
77 See 5.1.2 a) (second paragraph) above. 
78 T Goodenough et al, see note 21 above, at 69. 
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representation, which – as discussed in Chapter 6 – is not desirable for the ARR since 
the input of some participants is disregarded:79 most of involvement mechanisms in 
the governance only involve some participants and so these participants might be 
considered to represent other participants, thereby making the governance prone to this 
issue. Admittedly, the governance does have channels for receiving input from every 
participant and, due to the above statements and facts, it is reasonable to assume that 
ALSPAC normally takes into account input from other participants, if any. However, 
accessible information is not sufficient to confirm that this assumption is entirely 
correct. Thus, more information is required to argue strongly that the governance does 
not suffer from the issue of representation and genuinely conforms to the Model. 
5.2.3   Interim Conclusion 
Given all involvement mechanisms in the governance of ALSPAC, it can be 
said that the collaboration between participants and ALSPAC has been remarkably 
effective. One reason is that the governance has a number of involvement mechanisms, 
whether regular or irregular, which have given participants a lot of opportunities to 
provide their input about the governance. These mechanisms range from establishing 
the channels for general enquiries and feedback, which provide such opportunities for 
every participant, to establishing participant panels, such as the OCAP and the 
COCO90s advisory group, which allow some participants to collaborate closely with 
ALSPAC’s staff. More importantly, their input has had a real chance of substantially 
influencing the governance, based on the fact that the governance generally has not 
suffered from the aforesaid three possible forms of tokenism. It is therefore arguable 
that this aspect of the governance substantially conforms to the Model.80  
However, it remains to be seen whether this legacy will continue, because it 
is unclear whether the governance of ALSPAC has any mechanisms for ensuring that 
                                               
79 See 6.3.1 (Representation) in ch 6 below. 
80 This degree of collaboration might result from ALSPAC’s scientific engagement strategy, 
which was devised to ensure that all participants are engaged in biobanking. See Annual 
Report 2006, at 2. However, no further information about this strategy is available in 
accessible documents, and thus it is difficult to know the extent to which it has underlain 
involvement mechanisms in ALSPAC governance. 
215 
 
participants’ input will always be given serious consideration. Furthermore, it is 
unclear whether the governance is really free from the issue of representation, which 
is undesirable for the ARR. In this respect, more information on this matter is required 
to strengthen this argument. 
5.3   Reciprocation 
As established in Chapter 3, the Model requires biobankers to reciprocate 
participants’ contributions to biobanking, with the aim of making participants feel 
satisfied with their participation. In practice, this reciprocation can be in either tangible 
or intangible form.81 Based on this premise, this section deals with the questions of 
whether and how ALSPAC governance provides participants with reciprocation, 
whether tangible or intangible. To address these questions, documents that reveal any 
commitments given by ALSPAC and any benefits participants have received from it 
were reviewed. These documents include the recruitment documents, annual reports 
and participant newsletters. As a result of this review, it can be argued that this aspect 
of the governance chiefly conforms to the Model, but accessible information is not 
sufficient to confirm a higher degree of this conformity. To illustrate this argument, 
two forms of reciprocation, namely tangible and intangible reciprocation, are dealt 
with separately in two different sub-sections.  
5.3.1   Intangible Reciprocation 
The Model (Chapter 3): To provide intangible reciprocation, biobankers need to give 
commitments to pursue collective goals and to provide sufficient safeguards for them. In 
doing so, biobankers are required to implement measures to (1) encourage the fulfilment 
of these two commitments and (2) inform participants of them and their fulfilment. 
Based on the Model, all biobanking activities within the governance of 
ALSPAC were examined in order to address the question of what mechanisms in the 
                                               
81 See 3.3 in ch 3 above. 
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governance can be used for giving participants commitments to pursue collective goals 
and to provide safeguards for participants. To answer this question, this sub-section 
outlines the mechanisms in the governance that can be used as measures (1) to 
encourage the fulfilment of those two commitments and (2) to inform participants 
about those commitments and the fulfilment thereof. As for the structure of this  
sub-section, these two measures are dealt with separately in two different  
sub-sub-sections. It is noteworthy that, as explained in Chapter 3,82 the mechanisms 
suggested for implementing these two measures are in practice similar to those 
suggested to reinforce collectiveness in biobanking goals in the first key attribute, 
because they all involve overseeing biobanking activities continuously, encouraging 
the proper conduct of certain activities, and establishing communication with 
participants. Thus, some arguments in the first section will be referred to and applied 
to this sub-section.  
a)  Encouragement to Fulfil Commitments 
According to the Model, the mechanisms suggested for encouraging the 
fulfilment of those two commitments involve the establishment of an oversight body 
that is assigned to encourage such fulfilment and which also has communication with 
participants to elicit their thoughts about what their goals actually are and whether 
existing safeguards are sufficient.  
For ALSPAC governance, those two commitments are considered separately. 
For a commitment to pursue collective goals, because this pursuit is similar in practice 
to the reinforcement of collectiveness in biobanking goals, the arguments articulated 
above83 are applicable here and can be explained again, as follows: despite that 
accessible documents suggest that the ISAB can encourage pursing collective goals 
since it can review access applications that do not conform to collective goals, this 
review is not routine and seems to essentially involve scientific issues, not conformity 
to collective goals; the Co-PIs seem to be an oversight body that can encourage 
ALSPAC to pursue collective goals, with the help of financial sanctions imposed by 
                                               
82 See 3.3.1 a) in ch 3 above. 
83 See 5.1.2 b) above. 
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the funders; however, this role cannot be confirmed since there is not enough 
information about the Co-PIs to verify whether the Co-PIs can and do play this role in 
practice; particularly, it is unclear whether they are assigned to critically oversee or 
only facilitate ALSPAC’s activities, and whether they can realise participants’ actual 
goals. Thus, one cannot firmly say that the governance has mechanisms for 
encouraging ALSPAC to fulfil a commitment to pursue collective goals. 
Regarding a commitment to provide participant safeguards, a body that can 
encourage, or even ensure, the fulfilment of this commitment is the ALEC, for many 
reasons. First, this committee is generally responsible for safeguarding participants by, 
inter alia, reviewing some research proposals, creating protocols for certain ethical 
questions, and addressing any ethical or legal issues arising.84 In practice, these 
responsibilities cover many aspects of the governance of ALSPAC, such as the 
provision of individual feedback, hands-on measurements, access to the Resources and 
the protection for study children during interviews.85 Second, as this committee is 
attended by the Co-IP of scientific innovation and the Executive Director, it has access 
to information about ALSPAC’s activities in practice,86 thus allowing it to recognise 
any harm to participants’ interests, if any. Finally, it can elicit participants’ views about 
the sufficiency of participant safeguards indirectly via the EPEG project,87 which 
partly aims to improve understanding of participants’ views on appropriate ethical 
protection as well as to inform the work of ethics committees.88 Note that, in practice, 
it can also know about such views from its participant members; but this may raise the 
issue of representation and thus is not used as supporting evidence here. For these 
reasons, it can therefore be argued that the ALEC can be an oversight body that 
                                               
84 See Box 5.2 above; Terms of Reference - ALEC. 
85 SE Mumford, see note 5 above; K Birmingham and M Furmston, see note 44 above;  
SE Mumford, "Children of the 90s II: Challenges for the Ethics and Law Committee" (1999) 
81 Archives of Disease in Childhood - Fetal and Neonatal Edition 3 F228-F231. 
86 K Birmingham and M Furmston, ibid, at 66. 
87 Centre for Ethics in Medicine (University of Bristol), see note 22 above. 
88 T Goodenough et al, see note 21 above; E Williamson et al, see note 58 above;  
E Williamson et al, "Conducting Research with Children: the Limits of Confidentiality and 
Child Protection Protocols" (2005) 19 Children & Society 5 397-409; T Goodenough et al, 
"‘What Did You Think about That?’ Researching Children's Perceptions of Participation in a 
Longitudinal Genetic Epidemiological Study" (2003) 17 Children & Society 2 113-125. 
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supports ALSPAC in providing sufficient safeguards for participants89 and thereby the 
governance has mechanisms for encouraging the fulfilment of a commitment to 
provide safeguards for participants. 
b)  Communication about Commitments 
The Model suggests that there should be communication with participants to 
(i) inform them clearly about commitments to pursue collective goals and to provide 
sufficient safeguards for them and (ii) allow them to realise the fulfilment of these two 
commitments.  
In the governance of ALSPAC, the former type of communication can be 
found during the recruitment stage. Particularly, the recruitment documents and the 
ALSPAC website provide information that helps demonstrate how collective goals 
have been and will be pursued, such as examples of how the Resources have been and 
will be used. Also, the same materials and many participant newsletters repeatedly 
promise to protect participants’ privacy and confidentiality, and explain the ways in 
which this protection is provided and ensured.90 This is especially the case for study 
children: certain safeguards were explained to them alongside the development of their 
capability to understand ethical issues.91 Indeed, all of these materials are publicly 
accessible, since they can be downloaded from the ALSPAC website and some of 
them, i.e. participant newsletters and the recruitment documents, were even sent to 
participants individually. It can therefore be said that ALSPAC already informed 
participants about those two commitments. 
For communication about the fulfilment of those two commitments, CBP in 
the governance is remarkably effective in terms of both quantity and content, as 
                                               
89 It is evident that ALSPAC governance also has the Pre-ALEC, which is comprised of 
participant members of the ALEC and works as an additional forum for ethical review by lay 
members prior to main ALEC meetings. See ALSPAC, New Data Collection Review Dates, 
(2016) 1. However, further detail about this body is not available in accessible documents. 
90 Consent Form (2014); Detailed Information Booklet (2014); Summary Information 
Booklet (2011); Participant Newsletters Issue 25, at 2; Parents Newsletter Issue 33, at 5; 
Family Newsletters 2014-15, at 3. 
91 K Birmingham and M Furmston, see note 44 above, at 67. 
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explained above.92 More importantly, it is indeed evident that CBP allows participants 
to access information on how the Resources have actually been used93 and what 
safeguards have been provided for them.94 Thus, it is arguable that they can realise 
whether or not those two commitments have already been fulfilled. However, when 
looking more closely at communication about participant safeguards, it is questionable 
if information on this matter is sufficiently accessible. Particularly, this information 
has only been briefly explained in some participant newsletters.95 Updates on ethical 
approvals for ALSPAC’s activities have been provided but merely with small details 
about safeguards for participants.96 The activities of the ALEC, which has an important 
role in safeguarding participants, have been explained in a few journal articles, which 
might be deemed irregularly available and difficult to access for participants.97 Some 
participants are members of the ALEC but it is unclear whether information about 
participant safeguards is normally shared with other participants. Given that this 
information is used to maintain continuity in a participant-biobanker relationship,98 
one can say that it should be more accessible and more regularly available. The 
conclusion here is that ALSPAC participants can realise whether or not those two 
commitments have actually been fulfilled, but they should have more access to 
information about participant safeguards within the governance. 
It can be summarised from all analyses in this sub-section that this aspect of 
ALSPAC governance largely conforms to the Model. Particularly, participants were 
notified of commitments to pursue collective goals and to provide safeguards for them. 
They can also check the fulfilment of these two commitments through CBP in the 
                                               
92 See 5.1.2 a) and 5.2.2 b) above. 
93 Actual uses of the Resources, as well as interesting research findings resulting from those 
uses, are normally summarised in participant newsletters. Also, scientific publications about 
research studies using the Resources are listed in annual reports and downloadable from the 
ALSPAC website. 
94 After examining many participant newsletters, as listed in Appendix 2, safeguards for 
ALSPAC participants are explicitly explained in one newsletter. See Family Newsletters 
2014-15, at 3. Other newsletters only briefly mention them. See Participant Newsletters Issue 
25, at 2; Parents Newsletter Issue 33, at 5. 
95 See note 94 above. 
96 Annual Report 2006, at 1; Annual Report 2008, at 1, 2; Annual Report 2011-12, at 3, 5. 
97 SE Mumford, see note 5 above; SE Mumford, see note 85 above; K Birmingham and  
M Furmston, see note 44 above. 
98 See 3.3.2 in ch 3 above. 
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governance. Moreover, the governance has a mechanism in place for encouraging the 
fulfilment of a commitment to provide participant safeguards, i.e. ethical oversight by 
the ALEC. Nonetheless, it cannot be confirmed from accessible information that the 
governance also has a mechanism for encouraging the fulfilment of a commitment to 
pursue collective goals. The subtle, albeit useful, suggestion here is that information 
about participant safeguards or information about the ALEC’s activities should be 
more accessible and regularly communicated to participants, so as to enable them to 
conveniently and continuously realise that their interests are considered important and 
are properly safeguarded by ALSPAC. 
5.3.2   Tangible Reciprocation 
The Model (Chapter 3): Tangible reciprocation refers to offering tangible benefits to 
participants (e.g. financial benefits, individual research results and analysed health 
information) in return for their contributions to biobanking. This reciprocation is not 
necessary due to the uncertainty of its availability. Should it be provided, biobankers are 
required to (1) clarify policies on this reciprocation, and then (2) allow participants to 
negotiate on these policies.   
In ALSPAC, two types of tangible reciprocation have been provided for 
participants. One is offers of financial benefits, such as money vouchers, free meals, 
gifts for study children, opportunities to win monthly prizes, and compensation for 
travelling and accommodation expenses. These benefits have usually been offered to 
certain participant groups for their attendance at data-collecting sessions. The other 
one is the provision of health information, which includes biophysical measurements, 
questionnaire results and results of tests on samples or genetic materials (excluding 
measurements taken in the presence of participants). This information shall, as a 
general rule, not be disclosed to participants, but there are exceptions to this rule, as 
explained below. To determine whether tangible reciprocation in the governance of 
ALSPAC is in accordance with the Model, all of ALSPAC’s activities were examined 
in order to address the questions of whether ALSPAC’s policies on tangible 
reciprocation have been clarified and whether participants are allowed to negotiate 
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about these policies. As for the structure of this sub-section, these two questions are 
dealt with separately in two different sub-sub-sections. 
a)  Clarification of Policies 
According to the Model, to clarify policies on tangible reciprocation, 
biobankers need to have clear policies on tangible reciprocation and then notify and 
justify those policies, or any changes thereto, to participants. As this clarifying 
measure involves communication about policies on this matter, this  
sub-sub-section – by examining all communication mechanisms in ALSPAC 
governance – determines the extent to which ALSPAC participants have been 
informed of these policies. The two aforementioned types of tangible reciprocation are 
dealt with separately, as follows.  
Regarding financial benefits, incentive schemes were initiated in the 
governance in order to make ALSPAC more interesting to participants by offering 
them financial benefits. These schemes have been clearly communicated to them 
through some participant newsletters.99 Although there are neither explanations nor 
justifications for these schemes, they can be considered clear to participants because 
their nature is understandable: they aim to render data-collecting sessions appealing to 
participants. It is therefore arguable that incentive schemes in ALSPAC governance 
have been sufficiently clarified. Note that these schemes might raise the issue of (albeit 
subtle) coercion, as further discussed below. 
As for the provision of health information, the governance can be deemed to 
have a clear policy on this matter: in general, health information is not disclosed to 
participants; this disclosure is, however, possible only in exceptional circumstances 
and it requires both consent from participants and approval from the ALEC; in the 
absence of such consent, this disclosure might be possible if problems identified are 
so severe that the argument for disclosing them can outweigh other considerations.100 
As a real-life example of this provision, after participating in ALSPAC, one participant 
                                               
99 Young Participant Newsletters 2008, at 3; Parents Newsletters Issue 33, at 1; Young 
Participant Newsletters 2009, at 6; Family Newsletters 2015-16 at 4. 
100 Policy on Feedback (2011). 
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whose spine was suffering from scoliosis was referred by ALSPAC to her doctor, and 
eventually recovered after undergoing an operation on her spine.101 Indeed, this policy 
is clearly explained and justified in a policy document, which is available on the 
ALSPAC website. This website also provides more explanations about this policy, 
such as when to apply this policy and when health information can be disclosed.102 
Indeed, according to this policy document, the notion that participation in ALSPAC is 
not for health checks is claimed to have been explicitly stated and frequently repeated 
to participants.103  
Based on all of these discussions, one can say that the governance has clear 
policies on tangible reciprocation and these policies were clearly justified and 
notified to participants. It is therefore arguable that this aspect of the governance is 
in accordance with the Model.  
b)  Negotiation over Policies 
To make policies on tangible reciprocation negotiable, the Model requires 
biobankers to give participants opportunities to influence these policies by at least 
allowing them to voice their preferences on these policies and giving their preferences 
serious consideration.  
As this requirement is fundamentally similar to the measures for applying the 
key attribute of collaboration, the arguments articulated above104 are applicable here 
and can be described again, as follows: ALSPAC participants have many opportunities 
to voice their preferences about policies on tangible reciprocation through many 
involvement mechanisms in the governance of ALSPAC; also, their preferences 
possibly influence such policies, since it is evident that their input on other matters has 
so far been taken into consideration by ALSPAC. Thus, it is arguable that, in general, 
they are able to negotiate about policies on tangible reciprocation. But still, one 
                                               
101 Young Participant Newsletters 2009, at 4. 
102 On 23 June 2016, this information was already removed from the ALSPAC website. 
103 Policy on Feedback (2011), at 1. Notably, my research on accessible documents suggests 
that this notion was rarely communicated to participants: it is only briefly mentioned in the 
detailed information booklet. See Detailed Information Booklet (2014), at 14. However, it is 
possible that, in practice, participants were frequently informed about this notion verbally.  
104 See 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 c) above. 
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can raise the question of whether this argument is entirely valid. This is because it is 
unclear whether the governance has any mechanisms for ensuring that participants’ 
preferences on this matter will be taken into account. Nor do accessible materials 
indicate clearly that those preferences have been and will be influential in the 
governance. For example, one source says that the OCAP helped develop incentive 
schemes, but it does not reveal the extent of the OCAP’s influence on these schemes,105 
making it questionable whether these schemes were actually informed by the OCAP’s 
input. Accordingly, more information is required to strengthen this argument.  
Incentives or Undue Influence? 
As financial benefits were offered to ALSPAC participants in return for their 
involvement in ALSPAC’s activities, an issue might arise as to financial involvement 
in their decisions to participate. That is, it is questionable whether the influence of 
those offers was so substantial as to impair their capability to make decisions on 
participation. Again, accessible information is not sufficient to address this question. 
Particularly, there have not been any empirical studies on this matter. The fact that the 
OCAP engaged in developing ALSPAC’s incentive schemes does not indicate that 
such influence has been at an acceptable level. Moreover, the fact that the benefits 
offered have progressively increased106 might imply a low level of such influence, but 
it was also possible that this increase resulted from other factors, such as more funding 
being available and better financial management.107 It is therefore difficult to answer 
this question here, due to limited information. More information is required to give an 
answer, such as the involvement of the ALEC in this matter and empirical evidence on 
participants’ attitudes towards those offers. Note that, from a conceptual perspective, 
                                               
105 L Greenwood, "ALSPAC - Lynne Molloy" (30 June 2009) available at 
http://centreforpublicengagement.blogspot.co.uk/2009/06/alspac-lynne-molloy.html 
(accessed 13 January 2016). 
106 Monetary benefits offered to study children have constantly increased, from £10 in 2008, 
£20 plus a free lunch in 2009 and £30 plus travel and accommodation costs in 2015. See 
Young Participant Newsletters 2008, at 3; Young Participant Newsletters 2009, at 6; Family 
Newsletters 2015-16 at 4. 
107 No further information on this matter is available: the newsletters issued in 2010, which 
might reveal the results of ALSPAC’s incentive schemes, are not available on the ALSPAC 




financial incentives might undermine the ARR: these incentives can hinder the ARR’s 
key feature of collectiveness in goals by enticing participants to pursue financial 
benefits instead of medical advances as biobankers do, as well as that of respectfulness 
by exposing participants to undue influence. The issue of financial incentives will be 
explained and discussed further in the last chapter of this thesis.108 
5.3.3   Interim Conclusion 
To summarise, it is arguable that reciprocation in the governance of ALSPAC 
does essentially conform to the Model. For tangible reciprocation, policies on this 
reciprocation were sufficiently clarified, and the governance has mechanisms that 
allow participants to negotiate about these policies. As for intangible reciprocation, 
participants have been informed of commitments to (1) pursue collective goals and (2) 
provide safeguards for them, and they can realise the fulfilment of these commitments 
essentially through CBP in the governance. However, based on accessible documents, 
the governance only has a mechanism for encouraging the fulfilment of the latter 
commitment.  
Two points can be noted from this argument. First, as it seems that 
information on the fulfilment of the latter commitment has not been made sufficiently 
available to participants, it is suggested that such information should be more 
accessible and regularly communicated to them. Second, accessible information is not 
adequate to confirm a higher degree of the conformity of ALSPAC governance to the 
Model. Particularly, for intangible reciprocation, it is unclear whether the governance 
has a mechanism for encouraging the fulfilment of the former commitment. As regards 
tangible reciprocation, it is questionable whether policies on tangible reciprocation are 
genuinely negotiable, and whether the financial benefits offered to participants under 
ALPSAC’s incentive schemes actually reduced or improved the quality of a 
participant-biobanker relationship in the governance.  
                                               
108 See 6.6.4 in ch 6 below. 
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5.4   Control Sharing 
According to the Model, the key attribute of control sharing aims to develop 
the ARR by sharing control over biobanking with participants. In practice, this key 
attribute requires biobankers to ensure that this sharing is contextually appropriate. 
Notably, the term control here refers to capability that participants have to make 
decisions about their relationship with biobankers at an individual level. In this respect, 
it might not allow them to influence the overall direction of biobanking or biobanking 
activities that cannot be personalised.109 Based on this premise, this section first 
identifies mechanisms in ALSPAC governance that give participants control over the 
governance at an individual level, and then determines whether the sharing of control 
in the governance can be considered appropriate. To carry out these two tasks, all 
publicly accessible documents that might reveal such mechanisms were studied. These 
documents primarily include annual reports, which illustrate overall biobanking 
activities and management in the governance, and secondarily other communication 
documents, such as the recruitment documents and participant newsletters. As a 
tentative conclusion, the governance has many control-sharing mechanisms, and 
control sharing in it can be considered appropriate. 
5.4.1   Control-sharing Mechanisms 
The Model (Chapter 3): Before determining the appropriateness of control sharing, 
biobankers need to take into account any mechanisms in biobank governance that might 
give participants control over biobanking at an individual level, such as the consent 
procedure, the right of withdrawal and meaningful involvement. The ways in which these 
mechanisms are implemented are also considered, since they help determine the extent 
to which these mechanisms provide individual participants with control over biobanking. 
Based on the Model, the governance of ALSPAC was examined in order to 
find out mechanisms that enable individual participants to have control over the 
governance at an individual level. It is notable that the extent to which these 
                                               
109 See 3.4 in ch 3 above. 
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mechanisms give individual participants control over the governance will be discussed 
in the next sub-section.  
As a result of this examination, it can be said that individual participants in 
the governance of ALSPAC are allowed to have such control through three 
mechanisms. The first mechanism is broad consent, which allows them to restrict the 
uses of their samples and information to ‘research on the causes of the world’s most 
important health and social problems’.110 As further explained below, this mechanism 
does not give participants much control since this restriction is arguably not 
significant. The second one is the right of withdrawal. According to this right, 
participants are provided with eight options to control different biobanking activities 
at an individual level, such as sending participants invitations to attend clinic sessions, 
linking their information in the Resources with their records in other databases and 
using their samples and information for research purposes.111 The last one is consent 
to the feeding back of health information. As explained above, the health information 
of individual participants might be disclosed to them in some circumstances and this 
disclosure normally requires their consent.112 It can therefore be said that they are 
allowed to control this disclosure personally. Note that, as explained above, some 
involvement mechanisms in the governance also seem to give individual participants 
some control over the governance in practice, since their input has evidently influenced 
ALSPAC’s activities (e.g. the development of online advisory forums and the changes 
to preparation of questionnaires), but there is not sufficient information to confirm that 
this is routinely the case.113 
It is worth noting that ALSPAC governance also has many mechanisms that 
give individual participants control over the governance at a collective level. These 
mechanisms formally involve some participants in the governance to work with 
biobankers and influence ALSPAC’s activities. An obvious example is the OCAP. 
This panel has been engaged in many aspects of the governance, ranging from 
communication with participants to discussions of certain ethical issues. It is also 
                                               
110 Summary Information Booklet (2011), at 1. 
111 Policy on Withdrawal (2011). 
112 See 5.3.2 a) above. 
113 See 5.2.2 c) (last paragraph) above. 
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evident that this panel has influenced many biobanking activities, such as producing 
participant newsletters, preparing questionnaires and advising on the clinic 
environment at focus centres.114 Other than the OCAP, some participants have been 
appointed to working groups or committees in the governance, thereby allowing them 
to influence ALSPAC’s activities. For example, one study father was recruited to a 
working group for the Fathers’ study to advise on recruitment and study development; 
study fathers have sat on the ALEC to inform discussions therein.115 Furthermore, 
there is also the ‘research partners’ scheme, whereby participants can get involved in 
designing and making decisions about research studies.116 According to accessible 
information, this scheme seems to allow participants to influence uses of the Resources 
by helping shape the direction of research activities. However, as the Model focuses 
on a participant-biobanker relationship at a micro level,117 these mechanisms are not 
discussed and used to support the arguments in this section.  
5.4.2   Appropriate Control Sharing 
The Model (Chapter 3): Control over biobanking needs to be shared appropriately with 
participants. In doing so, it is suggested that, conceptually, the sharing of control should 
be able to express respectful gestures towards participants. There are neither 
mechanisms nor criteria proposed for implementing this suggestion, as this 
implementation should be contextual. 
The previous sub-section explains that participants can have control over the 
governance of ALSPAC at an individual level through their broad consent, their right 
of withdrawal and their consent to the feeding back of health information. A question 
arises as to whether or not control sharing in the governance is appropriate – i.e. 
whether it can accord participants respect. As there has been no qualitative study that 
directly answers this question, this sub-section addresses this question by first 
determining the level of control that individual participants actually have as a result of 
                                               
114 See 5.2.1 (Regular Mechanisms) above. 
115 Annual Report 2011-12, at 4. 
116 See note 69 above. 
117 See 1.3.2 in ch 1 above and 6.3.1 in ch 6 below. 
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those three control-sharing mechanisms. It then determines whether or not such a level 
of control can be considered respectful towards participants by considering 
circumstantial factors that might affect their desire to influence ALSPAC’s activities. 
These two steps are dealt with separately in two different sub-sub-sections, as follows. 
a)  Actual Level of Control 
Among those three control-sharing mechanisms in ALSPAC governance, it 
can be said that the right of withdrawal is a main source of the control that participants 
have over the governance at an individual level, since the other two do not grant them 
much of such control. Particularly, the control resulting from consent to the feeding 
back of health information is limited only to this aspect of the governance and, indeed, 
subject to the availability of feedback. Broad consent does not provide a high level of 
such control: it merely restricts uses of the Resources to supporting ‘research on the 
causes of the world’s most important health and social problems’;118 this purpose 
encompasses a diverse range of studies, even including non-health-related research, 
and thus this consent imposes very little limitation on those uses in practice.  
On the other hand, the right of withdrawal can be considered to provide a high 
level of such control. One reason is that, as explained above, participants have well 
been informed of this right and can also exercise it effectively due to CBP in the 
governance, which allows them to constantly keep up-to-date with ALSPAC’s 
activities.119 That is, they can know exactly how the Resources are used as well as 
whether and when they should exercise this right. Also, this right enables them to have 
control over their participation, as well as other biobanking activities relating to them 
individually, such as communicating with them, accessing their records in other 
databases and using their samples and information.120 Given this explanation, it can be 
said that the right of withdrawal in the governance can be considered to give 
participants a high level of control over the governance at an individual level. It can 
                                               
118 Summary Information Booklet (2011), at 1. 
119 See 5.1.2 a) above. 
120 Policy on Withdrawal (2011). 
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therefore be argued that, from the perspective of the Model, the right of withdrawal 
is deemed a main control-sharing mechanism for ALSPAC participants. 
b)  Circumstantial Appropriateness 
A subsequent question arises as to whether control sharing that mainly results 
from the right of withdrawal can be considered appropriate within the governance of 
ALSPAC. According to my research, accessible documents do not reveal any 
empirical studies that might be used to address this question directly.  
Still, one can argue that the answer to this question may be positive. The 
reason is that this control sharing can be considered to show individual participants 
respect as it seems to give them more control over the governance than their need. 
Particularly, in the context of ALSPAC, there are a number of factors that can be 
assumed to reduce their need for such control. One is that ALSPAC does not involve 
the commercialisation of their samples or information. Another factor is that it is not 
organised and funded by industrial or commercial entities:121 based on many empirical 
studies, this factor could lead participants to have high trust in ALSPAC,122 and thus 
they are unlikely to require much control over its activities.123 Third, it has the ALEC, 
which is tasked with overseeing and maintaining the ethical acceptability of its 
activities. Finally, its governance has many involvement mechanisms that allow some 
                                               
121 ALSPAC is operated by University of Bristol, and its core funders are this university, UK 
Medical Research Council and the Wellcome Trust. See ALSPAC, "About" available at 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/alspac/about/ (accessed 13 January 2016). 
122 Many empirical studies reveal high trust in non-industrial related entities in a research 
context. See T Caulfield et al, "Biobanking, Consent, and Control: A Survey of Albertans on 
Key Research Ethics Issues" (2012) 10 Biopreservation and Biobanking 5 433-438;  
Z Master et al, "Cancer Patient Perceptions on the Ethical and Legal Issues Related to 
Biobanking" (2013) 6 1 available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1755-8794-6-8 (accessed on 
13 January 2016); Wellcome Trust, Wellcome Trust Monitor Wave 2: Tracking Public Views 
onScience, Biomedical Research and Science Education, (May 2013) 143; CR Critchley and 
D Nicol, "Understanding the Impact of Commercialization on Public Support for Scientific 
Research: Is It about the Funding Source or the Organization Conducting the Research?" 
(2011) 20 Public Understanding of Science 3 347-366. 
123 The relationship between a high level of trust and the reduced need for control over 
biobanking is acknowledged in extensive literature. See T Caulfield et al, "A Review of the 
Key Issues Associated with the Commercialization of Biobanks" (2014) 1 Journal of Law 
and the Biosciences 1 94-110; KB Brothers et al, "Two Large-Scale Surveys on Community 
Attitudes toward an Opt-Out Biobank" (2011) 155 American Journal of Medical Genetics 
Part A 12 2982-2990.  
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participants to monitor as well as influence its activities. It can be assumed from all 
these factors that participants’ need for control over the governance is low, and thus it 
is probable that they feel satisfied with the level of control they have mainly from the 
right of withdrawal in the governance. It is therefore arguable that the sharing of 
control within the governance can be considered respectful towards participants 
and thus this sharing can be deemed appropriate according to the Model. 
5.4.3   Interim Conclusion 
To summarise, the level of control that individual participants actually have 
over the governance of ALSPAC is mainly based on their right to withdrawal. This is 
because, given CBP and withdrawal options they have in the governance, this right 
can be considered to give them a high level of control over the governance at an 
individual level, while broad consent and consent to the feeding back of health 
information do not provide much of such control in practice. Also, according to the 
Model, the extent of this control sharing can arguably be considered appropriate in the 
context of ALSPAC. The reason is that participants can be assumed to need a low level 
of such control due to many circumstantial factors within the governance, namely the 
absence of commercial involvement in the governance (both in terms of the direction 
of biobanking and the bodies that fund and organise ALSPAC), the ethical oversight 
of the ALEC and involvement mechanisms in the governance. Thus, one can say that 
ALSPAC participants are likely to feel satisfied with the level of control that they have 
over the governance as a result of their right of withdrawal, thus allowing the current 
control sharing within the governance to be considered respectful towards them. It is 
therefore arguable that control sharing in the governance can be deemed appropriate 





This chapter has argued that the governance of ALSPAC chiefly conforms to 
the Model, mainly because the governance has many mechanisms for communicating 
with participants. Particularly, the governance has established various communication 
channels for interacting with participants, such as participant newsletters and the 
ALSPAC website. In terms of content, these channels provide participants with 
various types of information – ranging from notifications, justifications and summaries 
of certain biobanking activities, to instructions on how to attend or participate in some 
activities, such as measurements and data collections. It can therefore be argued that 
participants are allowed to access both prospective and retrospective information about 
ALSPAC’s activities, understand them, and know how to deal with them. The only 
suggestion on this point is that information about participant safeguards or the ALEC’s 
activities should be made more accessible and regularly communicated to 
participants.124 From the perspective of the Model, this communication helps 
considerably to make the governance conform to all the key attributes of the Model. 
First, it helps emphasise collective goals by making ALSPAC’s goals clear to 
participants and allowing them to verify that they still share the same goals with 
ALSPAC. Second, it facilitates collaboration by allowing participants to provide input 
about the governance as well as providing them with the information and knowledge 
that can render their input meaningful. Third, it provides them with reciprocation by 
allowing clarification of and negotiation over policies on tangible reciprocation as well 
as enabling them to realise that collective goals are being pursued and safeguards for 
them are provided. Finally, it gives participants control over the governance at an 
individual level by assisting them in exercising their right of withdrawal. 
It is worth noting that ALSPAC governance also has many involvement 
mechanisms that formally recruit some participants to work with ALSPAC and to 
influence its activities. These mechanisms significantly help foster collaboration 
between participants and ALSPAC: they allow participants to provide input about the 
governance; also, much of that input has evidently influenced ALSPAC’s activities in 
                                               
124 See 5.3.1 b) (third paragraph) above. 
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practice, although it is unclear from accessible information as to the details of how 
such input was actually dealt with. A notable one is the involvement of the OCAP, 
which has helped ALSPAC address many issues and influenced many ALSPAC’s 
activities. Indeed, the fact that this panel has existed for a decade reflects not only the 
success of this mechanism but also ongoing collaboration in the governance. Other 
examples of these mechanisms are the recruitment of some participants to the ALEC 
and the working group for the Fathers’ study. In practice, these mechanisms can 
generally be considered to improve a participant-biobanker relationship as well as 
facilitate ALSPAC’s activities. For the Model, they basically strengthen to its key 
attribute of collaboration. However, they might also raise the issue of representation, 
which is not desirable. While this issue seems to be unlikely here, there is not enough 
information to either rule it out or confirm it. It is also notable that, according to the 
Model, these mechanisms are not deemed to be control-sharing mechanisms. This is 
because they give participants control over the governance at a collective level, while 
the Model focuses on the individual level of a participant-biobanker relationship. 
Based on all of these explanations, it can therefore be argued that ALSPAC 
governance largely conforms to the Model, and thus the ARR is likely to have been 
developed in it. This might justify the longevity of ALSPAC. Notwithstanding, the 
lack of detailed information about many ALSPAC’s activities hinders this chapter 
from discussing many aspects of the governance. This hindrance not only undermines 
the robustness and accuracy of many discussions and arguments here, but also prevents 
this chapter from confirming a higher degree of such conformity, as consistently noted 
throughout this chapter. As a notable example, information about the Co-PIs is not 
sufficient to confirm whether they can play a role in encouraging ALSPAC to pursue 
collective goals, thereby making this chapter unable to confirm whether this aspect of 
the governance conforms to the Model’s key attributes of emphasis on collective goals 
and reciprocation. Other aspects of the governance that suffer from such lack include 
the progress on the ‘research partners’ scheme, the effects of financial incentives on 
participants’ decisions to participate, and the ways in which ALSPAC deals with 
participants’ input. More information is therefore required to increase the depth and 
accuracy of the discussions in this chapter. This also implies that this chapter’s picture 
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of ALSPAC governance and a participant-biobanker relationship in it might not agree 
with the reality.  
Despite the lack of detailed information about many ALSPAC’s activities, 
this chapter is still useful for this thesis. The reason is that it can achieve the main aim 
of illustrating how the Model is applied in practice by showing what aspects of the 
governance are of interest to the Model and what biobanking activities contribute to 
the conformity of the governance to the Model, as well as pinpointing issues that might 








Extent of Contribution 
The contribution of this thesis concerns an authentic research relationship in 
biobanking (“an ARR”), a participant-biobanker relationship that can deal with issues 
and challenges in biobanking practice. Based on the notion that there may be many 
types of participant-biobanker relationship that can be deemed an ARR, this thesis 
proposes one approach to an ARR that looks like a partnership relationship (“the 
ARR”). The proposals relating to the ARR (“the Proposals”) have been illustrated in 
the first three chapters of this thesis. In short, Chapter 1 established the fundamental 
notion of the ARR by proposing its main characteristics. Next, Chapter 2 proposed a 
conceptual framework for the ARR, which is based on partnership and consists of five 
key features that are considered to exhibit the main characteristics of the ARR. Then, 
Chapter 3 proposed a partnership model for biobank governance that is used to foster 
the ARR in practice (“the Model”). A diagram illustrating the overall picture of the 
Proposals is provided in Box 6.1 below. Ultimately, to demonstrate how the Model is 
applied in practice, Chapters 4 and 5 tested the Model against biobank initiatives, 
namely UK Biobank and ALSPAC, respectively.  
This chapter draws together all aspects of the contribution and outlines how 
they add up to – and go beyond – existing knowledge in the area of biobanking, so as 
to highlight their originality. It is also intended to clarify the Proposals by explaining 
what types of literature they contribute towards and the extent to which they are 
applicable, as well as how they handle some issues that commonly arise in biobanking. 
In so doing, this chapter has four sections. The first section summarises the 
contribution of this thesis, which essentially involves the Proposals and the lessons 
learnt from testing the Model against practical biobanking initiatives. The next one 
pinpoints the scholarly value of the Proposals by reflecting on their academic 
grounding, i.e. what type of literature they relate to. The third section outlines some 
limitations of the Proposals when putting them into practice. The last section, from the 
perspective of the Proposals, discusses some issues that usually arise in a biobanking 
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context but which are not sufficiently addressed in previous chapters, with the aim to 
further clarify the Proposals by illustrating how they handle these issues.  
 6.1   Summary of the Contribution  
Overall, the contribution of this thesis focuses on a participant-biobanker 
relationship that can help encourage effective and ethically robust biobanking 
practices. The reasons behind this focus can be concluded as follows. While 
biobanking has many distinctive characteristics that are beneficial to research conduct, 
these characteristics raise many issues and challenges, such as the ineffectiveness of 
conventional safeguards, the risk of unauthorised identification and the increased need 
for commercial involvement. These issues and challenges could render biobanking less 
appealing to participants, thereby inherently undermining biobanking itself. Also, they 
are so complicated that the implementation of one-off mechanisms or engagement 
measures may not be able to provide appropriate solutions, thus calling for a relatively 
holistic solution to those issues and challenges. A focus on a participant-biobanker 
relationship, which involves an element of continuity and many aspects of interaction, 
might therefore offer a systemic and coherent solution to those issues and challenges.  
In addition, it can be said from the above explanation that, to encourage biobanking, 
this relationship needs to be able to deal with the practical and ethical issues and 
challenges arising from the distinctive characteristics of biobanking. On the other 
hand, it is also required to attract participants, who are considered to be crucial 
contributors to biobanking. Accordingly, this thesis first establishes that, in general, 
this relationship should be able to enhance the ethical acceptability of biobanking to 
participants as well as the effectiveness of it in scientific and human health terms.  
This premise leads to the principal research question of this thesis: What form 
of research relationship is appropriate for ethical and effective biobanking practices? 
To address this top-level question, three sub-questions were dealt with. The first one 
concerns normative justification for the ARR: Why is the ARR desirable for 
biobanking? With the aim of establishing a conceptual framework for the ARR, the 
second sub-question is: What should the ARR look like from a conceptual perspective? 
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From a practical perspective, the last sub-question concerns how the ARR can be 
developed in biobanking practice. The answers to these three sub-questions are called 
the Proposals. They cover the normative, conceptual and practical aspects of the ARR, 
which were explained in Chapters 1, 2 and 3, respectively. To determine the 
practicality of the Proposals, they were also tested against biobank initiatives, namely 
UK Biobank and ALSPAC, in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. Given this explanation, 
it can be said that the Proposals and lessons learnt from this testing are considered as 
the main contribution of this thesis.  
To summarise this main contribution, it is briefly outlined in two  
sub-sections: one deals with the Proposals, and the other explains the results and some 













Box 6.1:   The proposals of the thesis 
 
Fundamental Notion: 2 main characteristics of the ARR 
• Ability to deal with the distinctive characteristics of biobanking 
• Ability to strike a balance between participants’ and biobanks’ interests 
Normative Aspect 
Conceptual Framework:  
5 key features of the ARR 
• Respectfulness 
• Cooperation with Negotiability 
• Support 
• Continuity in Relationship 
• Collectiveness in Goals 
Conceptual Aspect 
Partnership Model:  
4 key attributes of the Model 
• Emphasis on Collective Goals 
• Collaboration 
• Reciprocation 





6.1.1   Proposals of the Thesis 
As explained above, the Proposals involve the normative, conceptual and 
practical aspects of the ARR. To give the overall picture of the Proposals, the diagram 
thereof is provided in Box 6.1 above. In this sub-section, the Proposals are explained 
in three sub-sub-sections, according to the aspects of the Proposals. In particular, the 
first sub-sub-section explains the fundamental notion of the ARR, which consists of 
two main characteristics of the ARR. The second sub-sub-section deals with the 
conceptual aspect of the ARR by explaining its conceptual framework, which 
comprises five key features of the ARR. The last sub-sub-section explains the Model, 
which has four key attributes and can be used to develop the ARR in practice. 
a)  Fundamental Notion of the ARR 
The fundamental notion of the ARR is dealt with in the first chapter of this 
thesis. It amounts to the main criteria that are used in Chapter 2 to determine the 
underlying concept of the ARR and develop a conceptual framework for it. This notion 
stems from an attempt to address two major challenges created by the background 
problems of this thesis. One major challenge is that the distinctive characteristics of 
biobanking are beneficial to research conduct, but they can raise many issues and 
challenges in biobanking practice. For the other one, there are two values that need to 
be promoted in biobanking, i.e. the ethical acceptability of biobanking to participants 
and the effectiveness of biobanking. Given these two major challenges, this thesis 
argues that the ARR should have two main characteristics, each of which can respond 
to one of these two major challenges. The first is the ability to deal with the distinctive 
characteristics of biobanking that can raise issues and challenges in biobanking 
practice, such as the longevity of biobanking and multiple and unexpected uses of 
biobank resources. The second is the ability to strike a balance between participants’ 
and biobanks’ interests. This ability is based on the idea that the ethical acceptability 
of biobanking to participants and the effectiveness of biobanking can be equated with 
participants’ and biobanks’ interests, respectively. Indeed, these two interests might 
conflict with each other, but they are both crucial for biobanking. To encourage 
biobanking, these two interests should therefore be balanced with each other.  
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Given this explanation, it can be said that these two main characteristics can 
address those two major challenges and thus they can deliver ethical and effective 
biobanking practices. This thesis therefore argues that they should be considered to be 
the fundamental notion of the ARR. Indeed, they can also be used to address the first 
sub-question of this thesis, which concerns normative justification for the ARR. In 
particular, the reason why the ARR is desirable for biobanking is that, according to its 
main characteristics, it is intended to address the distinctive characteristics of 
biobanking that make biobanking unappealing to participants. Also, it requires 
participants’ interests to be balanced with those of biobanks, and thereby it is likely to 
be able to enhance the ethical acceptability of biobanking to participants as well as the 
effectiveness of biobanking in an appropriate fashion. In other words, the ARR is 
designed to solve the background problems of this thesis and to create a situation where 
the attractiveness of biobanking to participants is in harmony with the benefits of 
biobanking to health-related research. Based on these explanations, it is therefore 
arguable that the ARR is desirable for biobanking. 
b)  Conceptual Framework of the ARR 
The conceptual framework of the ARR is proposed in Chapter 2, with the aim 
of answering the second sub-question of this thesis – concerning the conceptual aspect 
of the ARR. This chapter performs two tasks. The first is to locate the social-science 
conceptual basis that is foundational to the ARR by seeking the underlying concept of 
the ARR. In so doing, it first establishes that such a concept needs to be applicable to 
biobank governance and able to exhibit the two main characteristics of the ARR. Then, 
it takes into consideration the concepts of solidarity and partnership. As a reason, these 
two concepts are applicable to and promising for biobanking: they both involve a 
strong relationship between individuals and a disposition towards collective interests 
or goals. Indeed, they have been used in extensive literature that seeks to pursue ethical 
biobanking practices. To study them, this chapter reviews the literature explaining 
them and proposes their working notions for this thesis. After studying these two 
concepts, it argues that solidarity cannot underlie the ARR. The reason is that solidarity 
cannot be prescribed and it does not sufficiently recognise individuals’ interests, 
thereby making this concept incapable of being applied to biobank governance and 
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exhibiting one main characteristic of the ARR, respectively. As partnership does not 
suffer from these issues, Chapter 2 argues that partnership should be the concept 
underlying the ARR, while solidarity should only be an aspirational concept. This 
argument suggests that the ARR should look like a partnership relationship.  
The second task is to use partnership as a basis for outlining a conceptual 
framework for the ARR. To do this task, it is proposed that this framework should 
have five key features, namely: (a) respectfulness, (b) cooperation with negotiability, 
(c) support, (d) continuity in relationship and (e) collectiveness in goals. These key 
features can be explained in terms of a participant-biobanker relationship, as follows: 
from a cognitive perspective, biobankers are required to respect participants as 
partners; in practice, they need to carry out activities that express respectful gestures 
towards participants, including collaboration and support; they are required to 
maintain their relationship with participants; they also need to share the same 
biobanking goals as participants. Given this explanation, it can be said that these key 
features echo partnership attributes and, as an added bonus, potentially encourage 
solidarity. More importantly, they can exhibit the two main characteristics of the ARR. 
In short, the key feature of continuity in relationship can deal with the longevity of 
biobanking and unexpected uses of biobank resources, and the other key features can 
strike a balance between participants’ and biobanks’ interests. Thus, these key features 
are considered as the conceptual framework of the ARR, and they are used in Chapter 
3 to inform a partnership model proposed for developing the ARR in practice. 
c)  Partnership Model for Fostering the ARR 
With the aim of addressing the last sub-question of this thesis – concerning a 
practical aspect of the ARR – Chapter 3 proposes the Model, a partnership model for 
biobank governance that can be used to develop the ARR in practice. The Model 
consists of four key attributes. They require implementing certain measures and can 
reflect the aforesaid key features of the ARR, as follows. (1) The key attribute of 
emphasis on collective goals asks biobankers to clarify biobanking goals and establish 
mechanisms for encouraging them and participants to share the same biobanking goals. 
This exhibits the ARR’s key feature of collectiveness in goals. (2) The key attribute of 
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collaboration requires biobankers to give participants opportunities of providing input 
on biobank governance and ensure the meaningfulness of that input, thereby reflecting 
the ARR’s key features of respectfulness and cooperation with negotiability. (3) The 
key attribute of reciprocation calls for reciprocating participants’ contributions, 
whether in intangible or tangible form, so as to exhibit the ARR’s key features of 
respectfulness and continuity in relationship. (4) The key attribute of control sharing 
calls for appropriate sharing of control over biobanking with individual participants. 
This sharing can reflect the ARR’s key feature of respectfulness. Indeed, as most of 
these key attributes involve providing participants with information about biobanking 
activities and knowledge about biobanking, they are considered to be empowerment, 
thereby echoing the ARR’s key feature of support. The above explanation suggests 
that the Model can be used to develop the ARR, since all its key attributes and the 
measures it requires can reflect all the key features of the ARR.  
Three points are noteworthy here. First, the Model also suggests some 
mechanisms for implementing those measures, such as the establishment of an 
oversight body and communication about biobanking progress (“CBP”). However, 
these mechanisms are merely suggestions and thus they are not necessary for applying 
the Model. Second, the Model is not intended to add a more top-down superstructure 
of detailed rules to follow or mandatory requirements for biobankers to satisfy. Nor 
does it say that any biobank governance that does not conform to the Model is always 
wrong, unethical or prone to undermine a participant-biobanker relationship. Rather, 
the Model suggests how to develop the ARR, which is considered desirable for 
biobanking. Thus, it can be considered to be ethical guidelines for making biobanking 
attractive to participants and, so, probably more viable. It can also be seen as a form 
of ‘maturity model’, whereby biobankers can test their full preparedness on the road 
to fostering genuine and authentic relationships with their participants. Finally, there 
are no criteria for when the ARR exists in biobank governance. The Model provides 
good reasons to believe that the ARR is more likely if the measures it requires are 
adopted. In this respect, the more certain biobank governance conforms to the Model, 
the more likely the ARR is developed in that governance. 
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6.1.2   Examples of Application 
With the main aim to demonstrate how the Model is applied in practice, this 
thesis eventually tests the Model against actual biobank initiatives, i.e. UK Biobank 
and ALSPAC, in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. As the research into the governance 
of these two biobanks is based on publicly-accessible documents, there are some 
limitations on the accessibility of information regarding their biobanking activities. 
This implies that the picture of research relationships in their governance as well as 
details about their activities are purely based on my interpretation of such documents, 
and thereby might not be factually accurate. Even so, some lessons can be learnt from 
this testing: as UK Biobank and ALSPAC have different characteristics and their 
governance arrangements largely conform to the Model, this testing can help illustrate 
what aspects of biobank governance are really important for fostering the ARR in 
practice. This sub-section therefore deals with these lessons by, first, illustrating the 
similarities and differences between these two biobank initiatives from the perspective 
of the Model; and then, based on these similarities and differences, it concludes 
mechanisms that are crucial for developing the ARR in practice. 
a)  UK Biobank vs ALSPAC  
This thesis has argued that the governance of these two biobanks mainly 
conforms to the Model and thus the ARR is likely to have been developed in them. 
The reason behind this conformity is that both biobanks have effective communication 
with participants.1 In particular, they both give their participants ongoing access to 
updates about their biobanking activities, including management and uses of their 
resources, through many communication channels, such as participant newsletters and 
websites. As a result, participants in both biobanks can properly use their rights of 
withdrawal to control how their samples and information are used and to reinforce 
                                               
1 The term ‘communication’ in this chapter refers to any mechanisms set up to transfer or 
exchange information between relevant parties, whether one way or two ways. Thus, this 
term ranges from the transfer of information through newsletters and websites, to 
information exchanged through dialogues and discussions. Involvement mechanisms can 
therefore be considered to be one approach to this communication. The difference is that 
communication focuses on the transfer of information while involvement mechanisms focus 
on the act of taking part. 
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collectiveness in biobanking goals. They can also check whether their goals and 
interests are respected. Moreover, both biobanks have communication channels that 
enable participants to provide input about their governance, such as meetings and 
channels for general enquiries and feedback. Indeed, they also share basic information 
about themselves and general knowledge about biobanking with participants, thereby 
empowering participants to engage in biobanking and provide useful input. Thus, it is 
possible for their participants to collaborate and negotiate with them effectively. To 
this extent, this is considered as a range of ways in which there is similarity between 
these two biobanks. Note that, as those communication channels are in line with many 
measures proposed in the Model, they arguably play an essential role in making the 
governance of these two biobanks conform to the Model, as emphasised below. 
In contrast, there is one major difference between the governance of these two 
biobanks, i.e. the existence of an oversight body that is assigned to encourage the 
conformity of biobanking activities to participants’ goals, according to the Model’s 
key attributes of emphasis on collective goals and reciprocation. Particularly, UK 
Biobank has the Ethics and Governance Council (“EGC”), which consistently 
monitors its activities – including the uses and management of its resources – in order 
to encourage the conformity of its activities to participants’ consent. Also, the EGC 
might resist certain biobanking activities through some latent sanctions imposed by 
UK Biobank’s funders and participants. The EGC is therefore capable of performing 
such an encouraging task. By contrast, it is unclear whether ALSPAC has an oversight 
body that is assigned to handle this encouraging task: the ALSPAC Law and Ethics 
Committee does not routinely oversee its activities to monitor the conformity of its 
activities to participants’ goals; although its co-principal investigators are eligible to 
perform routine oversight as well as such an encouraging task, it is doubtful from 
accessible documents whether they actually do so in practice. Given this difference, 
one can therefore argue that UK Biobank governance better reflects those two key 
attributes of the Model, thereby making it, overall, more conformable to the Model 
when compared with ALSPAC governance. 
In terms of involvement mechanisms, UK Biobank governance has several 
public and participant meetings and one public consultation on its access procedures. 
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It also has channels for general enquiries and feedback, whereby participants can 
provide their input about it. In ALSPAC governance, similar channels are available 
and, in addition, participants can engage in some working groups and committees or 
even become members of participant advisory groups. When compared with UK 
Biobank, ALSPAC is considered to give its participants more chances of influencing 
its activities because their input is more likely to be taken into consideration.  As a 
result, its governance has better collaboration between participants and biobankers, 
and thus its governance conforms better to the Model’s key attribute of collaboration. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that such engagement makes its governance prone to 
the issue of representation, which is undesirable for the ARR:2 all participants might 
be represented by those appointed to those groups and committees, and thereby input 
from those who are not appointed, if any, might be disregarded. While this issue might 
not and is unlikely to arise in practice, it is difficult either to rule out or to confirm this 
issue because information about how participants’ input has actually been dealt with 
in ALSPAC governance is not accessible. By contrast, UK Biobank governance does 
not have such engagement, but it is evident that this governance has mechanisms for 
preventing participants’ input from being disregarded by UK Biobank.  
b)  Crucial Mechanisms  
Given the similarities and differences between the governance of UK Biobank 
and ALSPAC, it can be concluded that there are two key mechanisms that are crucial 
for adopting the Model: (1) communication with participants and (2) the establishment 
of an oversight body that is assigned to monitor biobanking activities and is able to 
influence biobanking activities. By the term ‘crucial’, these mechanisms play a 
substantial role in making certain biobank governance conform to the Model. The 
reason is that they help exhibit many key attributes of the Model, and thereby they 
create the likely possibility of the ARR being developed. It is worth emphasising that, 
as this sub-section concerns lessons learnt from testing the Model against UK Biobank 
and ALSPAC, these mechanisms basically result from comparing the governance of 
these two biobanks from the perspective of the Model. In this respect, they are actually 
                                               
2 See 6.3.1 (Representation) below. 
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not important part of the Proposals, which were already summarised in the previous 
sub-section. That is, they are considered to be merely suggestions about how to adopt 
the Model in biobanking practice, as opposed to requirements that need to be satisfied 
in order to comply with the Model.3 Thus, it can be said that, although certain biobank 
governance does not have these mechanisms, it still can conform to the Model if it has 
other mechanisms that can implement the measures required by the Model.4 As for the 
structure of this sub-sub-section, it deals with these two crucial mechanisms separately 
by first explaining reasons why they are deemed crucial and then outlining 
characteristics that they should have according to the Model. 
Communication with Participants 
First and foremost is communication with participants, which refers to the 
transfer of information from and to participants. According to the Proposals, this 
communication should serve as mechanisms for informing participants of updates on 
biobanking activities, sharing general knowledge about biobanking with them, and 
receiving their input about biobank governance. In this respect, it enables participants 
to understand biobanking and activities, update them on biobanking progress, and 
receives input from them. In terms of the Model’s key attributes, this communication 
helps emphasise collective goals by clarifying biobanking goals and encouraging 
participants and biobankers to share the same goals. It can facilitate collaboration in 
biobanking by receiving input on biobank governance from participants and 
empowering them to provide useful input. It can also facilitate exercising the right of 
withdrawal, which is a control-sharing mechanism according to the Model. Moreover, 
it can be used for reciprocating their contributions: it allows them to know that 
collective goals are being pursued and their interests are safeguarded; it enables them 
to negotiate about policies on tangible reciprocation, where it is provided. Notably, in 
                                               
3 To make certain biobank governance conform to the Model, biobankers are required to 
implement the measures that are proposed for applying the key attributes of the Model. This 
implementation is not necessarily similar to mechanisms that the Model suggests for 
implementing those measures. 
4 For example, even though it is impractical for certain biobank governance to establish the 
aforesaid oversight body, it is still possible for that governance to comply with the Model if 
some parties in that governance, such as biobankers and participants, are tasked with the 
same role as this body. 
246 
 
practice, it can address the issue regarding an asymmetry of information, which usually 
arises during negotiation processes: as the Model requires biobankers to clarify those 
policies as well as deal with the insufficiency of participants' capability to provide 
input about biobanking, biobankers need to adequately provide participants with the 
information that is useful for this negotiation. 
This explanation suggests that this communication helps biobank governance 
to comply with all the key attributes of the Model. Furthermore, it can be said that this 
communication helps exhibit all the key features of the ARR: it empowers participants 
to deal with many aspects of biobank governance, and thereby it well echoes the 
ARR’s key feature of support; the fact that it can be used to apply all the key attributes 
of the Model indicates that it can reflect the other key features of the ARR. One can 
therefore say that this communication is crucial for the development of the ARR. Thus, 
in practice, biobankers should attach importance to this communication when they 
adopt the Model. In this respect, any biobank governance that has regular and effective 
communication with participants is likely to conform well to the Model. 
The characteristics of this communication can be concluded as follows. As 
this communication is used to enable participants to understand certain aspects of 
biobanking and realise certain biobanking activities, its content generally includes 
background information about biobanks in which they participate, updates about the 
activities of these biobanks, and general knowledge about biobanking. Also, its content 
should be understandable to participants. This is especially the case for information 
about biobanking goals, which should be sufficiently clear and should emphasise any 
commercial involvement in biobanking.5 Its methods are not specific to any form or 
medium, but it should be effective and accessible to all cohort participants. Indeed, 
communication about biobank activities should have an element of continuity, thereby 
reflecting the ARR’s key feature of continuity in relationship. In practice, this allows 
anticipating any changes to the direction of biobanking and, as revealed by some 
empirical studies, the possibility that participants disregard some information during 
                                               
5 See 3.1.1 a) in ch 3. 
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recruitment.6 Other than these characteristics, this communication should be open and 
honest in order to reinforce the ARR’s key feature of respectfulness, as well as 
avoiding causing any scandals. 
Note that this communication is in line with extensive academic literature: 
many authors support communication with participants by citing its benefits, such as 
trust,7 transparency,8 reflexivity and adaptability;9 some consider it to be a mechanism 
for developing a partnership relationship with participants;10 interestingly, some 
authors say that, due to the identifiability of information in biobanking practice, 
biobankers have a moral obligation to notify participants of how their information will 
be used.11 This communication is also supported by many empirical studies revealing 
the preference for being informed about biobanking activities,12 even over the need for 
consent.13 It is noteworthy that, to comply with certain key attributes of the Model, 
                                               
6 P Ducournau and R Strand, "Trust, Distrust and Co-production: The Relationship Between 
Research Biobanks and Donors" in JH Solbakk, S Holm and B Hofmann (eds), The Ethics of 
Research Biobanking, (London: Springer Science, 2009) 115-130; K Hoeyer, "‘Science Is 
Really Needed—That’s All I Know': Informed Consent and the Non-verbal Practices of 
Collecting Blood for Genetic Research in Northern Sweden" (2003) 22 New Genetics and 
Society 3 229-244; H Busby, "Blood Donation for Genetic Research: What Can We Learn 
from Donors' Narratives?" in R Tutton and O Corrigan (eds), Genetic Databases:  
Socio-ethical Issues in the Collection and Use of DNA, (London: Routledge, 2004) 39-56. 
7 H Machado and S Silva, "Public Participation in Genetic Databases: Crossing the 
Boundaries between Biobanks and Forensic DNA Databases through the Principle of 
Solidarity" (2015) 41 Journal of Medical Ethics 10 820-824, at 822.  
8 LM Beskow and E Dean, "Informed Consent for Biorepositories: Assessing Prospective 
Participants' Understanding and Opinions" (2008) 17 Cancer Epidemiol Biomarkers Prev 6 
1440-1451. 
9 KC O’Doherty et al, "From Consent to Institutions: Designing Adaptive Governance for 
Genomic Biobanks" (2011) 73 Social Science & Medicine 3 367-374, at 372; G Laurie, 
"Reflexive Governance in Biobanking: on the Value of Policy Led Approaches and the Need 
to Recognise the Limits of Law" (2011) 130 Human Genetics 3 347-356. 
10 AV Campbell, "The Ethical Challenges of Genetic Databases: Safeguarding Altruism and 
Trust" (2007) 18 King's Law Journal 2 227-245; J Kaye et al, "From Patients to Partners: 
Participant-Centric Initiatives in Biomedical Research" (2012) 13 Nature Reviews: Genetics 
5 371-376; K Saha and JB Hurlbut, "Research Ethics: Treat Donors as Partners in Biobank 
Research" (2011) 478 Nature 7369 312-313. 
11 J Kaye, "Abandoning Informed Consent the Case of Genetic Research in Population 
Collections" in R Tutton and O Corrigan (eds), Genetic Databases: Socio-ethical Issues in 
the Collection and Use of DNA, (London: Routledge, 2004) 117-138, at 130-131. 
12 C Grady et al, "Broad Consent for Research with Biological Samples: Workshop 
Conclusions" (2015) 15 The American Journal of Bioethics 9 34-42. 
13 E Vermeulen et al, "Obtaining ‘Fresh’ Consent for Genetic Research with Biological 
Samples Archived 10 Years Ago" (2009) 45 European Journal of Cancer 7 1168-1174;  
E Vermeulen et al, "A Trial of Consent Procedures for Future Research with Clinically 
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additional mechanisms need to be implemented together with this communication. For 
example, to collaborate with participants, biobank governance is required to have both 
communication channels for receiving their input and mechanisms for dealing with 
their input properly. To emphasise collective goals, biobank governance should have 
communication that keeps participants up-to-date with biobanking progress, aka CBP, 
and it should also allow them to have the right to withdraw their consent.  
Establishment of an Oversight Body 
The second mechanism is the establishment of an oversight body that is 
assigned to monitor and can influence biobanking activities. This body needs to be 
capable of (1) accessing information about biobanking activities so as to determine 
biobankers’ actual goals and the sufficiency of existing participant safeguards, and (2) 
influencing biobanking activities in order to either resist activities that do not conform 
to collective goals or lead biobankers to provide participant with sufficient safeguards, 
if necessary. According to the Model, this body plays a role in reinforcing the 
collectiveness in biobanking goals between participants and biobankers, thereby 
reflecting the Model’s key attribute of emphasis on collective goals. It also takes a role 
in encouraging biobankers to pursue collective goals and to provide sufficient 
safeguards for participants. This encouraging role is deemed to be a way to provide 
participants with intangible reciprocation and thus it can fulfil the Model’s key 
attribute of reciprocation. Based on this explanation, the establishment of this 
oversight body can be considered crucial for the Model because it helps exhibit two 
key attributes of the Model, i.e. emphasis on collective goals and reciprocation.  
It is noteworthy that, as suggested above, the establishment of this oversight 
body is not necessary to make biobank governance conform to the Model. Thus, 
biobank governance still can conform to the Model provided that it has other 
mechanisms that can perform those roles instead of this body. In this respect, the 
function that this mechanism serves is important, not the form it takes. Nonetheless, it 
                                               
Derived Biological Samples" (2009) 101 British Journal of Cancer 9 1505-1512;  
E Vermeulen et al, "Opt-Out Plus, the Patients’ Choice: Preferences of Cancer Patients 
Concerning Information and Consent Regimen for Future Research with Biological Samples 
Archived in the Context of Treatment" (2009) 62 Journal of Clinical Pathology 3 275-278. 
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can be said that, in practice, this mechanism is more feasible than assigning those roles 
to participants. One reason is that participants might not be sufficiently active and/or 
capable of overseeing biobanking activities. Moreover, they are unlikely to be able to 
influence biobanking activities or to encourage biobankers to pursue collective goals 
and provide sufficient safeguards by themselves. Accordingly, in practice, it might be 
more workable to comply with those two key attributes of the Model by establishing 
this body to play those roles, rather than giving those roles to participants. 
As regards the characteristics of this oversight body, no precise composition 
is required by the Model, but there are some notable points in this regard. First, as 
implied from its roles explained above, it needs to have sufficient knowledge in the 
areas of research and biobanking, and thereby it should have professionals in these 
areas as its members. Second, the inclusion of participants and/or external persons in 
it is neither necessary nor prohibited. Notably, such inclusion is preferable in terms of 
openness, accountability and collaboration, but the inclusion of participants might 
inflict the issue of representation, as discussed below.14 Third, it is possible that some 
members of this body are biobankers. Indeed, such membership can be advantageous 
in practice, in that this body can conveniently oversee biobanking activities by simply 
receiving information thereon from member biobankers. However, it is also possible 
that this membership allows biobankers to influence or even interfere with this body’s 
activities, thereby hindering this body from properly performing its role. Accordingly, 
if biobankers are recruited to it, there should be mechanisms for precluding them from 
causing such hindrance. Finally, this body is not necessarily external to or independent 
of biobanks because the effectiveness in performing the aforesaid roles is an important 
consideration. It is therefore possible that biobankers, like principal investigators, will 
play a role as this body. In this case, it should be evident that they effectively monitor 
biobanking activities, reliably resist activities that do not conform to collective goals 
and can encourage providing sufficient safeguards for participants. 
                                               
14 See 6.3.1 (Representation) below. 
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6.1.3   Interim Conclusion 
To summarise this section, the contribution of this thesis revolves around the 
ARR. The first chapter establishes that an authentic relationship in biobanking should 
enhance both the ethical acceptability and effectiveness of biobanking, and thereby the 
ARR should be able to handle practical and ethical issues resulting from the distinctive 
characteristics of biobanking and also to strike a balance between participants’ and 
biobanks’ interests. Based on this premise, Chapter 2 explains why the ARR should 
be based on partnership, and uses this concept to develop the conceptual framework 
of the ARR by proposing the key features thereof. Then, Chapter 3 proposes the 
Model, a partnership model for biobank governance that biobankers can use to foster 
the ARR in practice. The Model has four key attributes, namely emphasis on collective 
goals, collaboration, reciprocation and control sharing. Eventually, to show how the 
Model is applied in practice, Chapters 4 and 5 test the Model against two biobanks, 
i.e. UK Biobank and ALSPAC, respectively. This testing inherently shows how 
biobank governance can conform to the Model in practice, and it leads to the 
conclusion that there are two crucial mechanisms that significantly promote this 
conformity. One is communication with participants, which can exhibit every key 
attribute of the Model, and the other is the establishment of an oversight body that is 
able to monitor and influence biobanking activities.  
To demonstrate how the practical aspect of the Proposals correspond to the 
normative aspect thereof, the relation between the Model and the fundamental notion 
of the ARR, established in Chapter 1, can be summed up, as follows. The Model can 
be used to make a participant-biobanker relationship exhibit the main characteristics 
of the ARR because it can respond to issues and challenges in biobanking practice, as 
well as can balance participants’ and biobanks’ interests. Particularly, it fundamentally 
involves ongoing communication with participants, which can deal with multiple and 
unexpected uses of biobank resources given that broad consent is a mainstream 
approach to consent in biobanking practice. The need for reciprocation can help 
maintain a participant-biobanker relationship, thereby addressing the longevity of 
biobanking. Also, in general, other unprecedented challenges could be solved through 
collaboration between biobankers and participants. Furthermore, the Model promotes 
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both biobanks’ and participants’ interests by emphasising collective goals and 
allowing participants to be involved in biobank governance or influence biobanking 
activities, respectively. Thus, it can be used to strike a balance between these two 
interests. Based on this explanation, it can therefore be argued that the Model can 
develop a participant-biobanker relationship that can enhance both the ethical 
acceptability of biobanking to participants and the effectiveness of biobanking. 
All aspects of the contribution here have already answered the main research 
question as well as all three sub-questions of this thesis. Particularly, for the top-level 
question, the ARR proposed in this thesis is one approach to a research relationship 
that can deliver ethical and effective biobanking practices. For the three sub-questions, 
they are addressed, as follows. The ARR is desirable for biobanking, because it is 
designed to encourage biobanking by dealing with the practical and ethical issues and 
challenges stemming from the distinctive characteristics of biobanking and by striking 
a balance between participants’ and biobanks’ interests, both of which are considered 
important for the viability of biobanking. From a conceptual perspective, the ARR 
should look like a partnership relationship, and thereby it should have five key 
features, i.e. respectfulness, cooperation with negotiability, support, continuity in 
relationship and collectiveness in goals. To develop the ARR in practice, biobankers 
can apply the Model to biobank governance. This model has four key attributes, 
namely emphasis on collective goals, collaboration, reciprocation and control sharing. 
In the following sections, the contribution of this thesis is further emphasised and 
clarified by pinpointing its academic grounding and limitations as well as its capability 
to deal with issues that commonly arise in biobanking practice. 
6.2   Academic Grounding of the Proposals 
It can be concluded from the previous section that this thesis attempts to make 
a contribution towards the notion of an ARR, which is assumed to be a participant-
biobanker relationship that can promote the ethical acceptability and effectiveness of 
biobanking. In short, it first proposes the main characteristics of the ARR as a 
fundamental notion thereof. Next, it argues that the ARR should be based on 
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partnership, and then translates partnership attributes into five key features of the ARR, 
which are taken together as the conceptual framework of the ARR. Finally, it uses this 
framework to develop the Model, which can be used to develop the ARR in biobanking 
practice. Given this explanation, we might usefully ask what types of literature the 
Proposals can contribute towards. As the ARR is intended to be a desirable relationship 
or to deliver appropriate actions between parties in the context of biobanking, two 
main academic disciplines can be put on the table: ethics and law. Accordingly, this 
section deals with this question by determining whether or not the Proposals can be 
used as ethical and legal frameworks for biobank governance. 
6.2.1   Ethicality 
Chapter 1 has briefly explained about the ethicality of the Proposals and 
concluded that the Proposals contain an element of ethicality and they use 
deontological ethics and virtue ethics as their approaches to ethical reasoning.15 This 
sub-section engages with this aspect of the Proposals again in order to provide more 
insight into it and further clarify it by, inter alia, showing how it is reflected in certain 
part of the Proposals.16 Thus, this sub-section is to discuss again the question of which 
moral theories underlie methods that this thesis uses for ethically justifying the 
Proposals.  
As there are three main moral theories of modern philosophy in the field of 
bioethics – namely consequentialism, deontological ethics and virtue ethics17 – this 
discussion is separated into three sub-sub-sections, each of which deal with one of 
these main moral theories. It is worth emphasising that this sub-section aims to explain 
the ways in which the content of the Proposals is ethically justified in order to facilitate 
understanding of the Proposals. It focuses on the methodology of ethical reasoning in 
                                               
15 See 1.3.3 in ch 1 above. See also 2.3 (last paragraph) in ch 2 and Conclusion in ch 3 
above.  
16 In Chapter 1, the explanation about this aspect of the Proposals is mainly based on the 
research questions of the thesis. 
17 M Talbot, Bioethics: An Introduction, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
Other moral theories are explained in detail elsewhere. See JF Childress, "Methods in 
Bioethics" in B Steinbock (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 15-45;  
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this respect. For the content of justification, the Proposals have already been justified 
normatively through the explanation about the fundamental notion of the ARR.18 
Consequentialism 
Consequentialism involves using the results of past actions to determine 
moral acceptability thereof. From a prospective perspective, actions are morally 
acceptable if they can yield maximally good consequences and minimally bad ones. 
Utilitarianism is an exemplar of this theory that considers the happiness of the greatest 
number as a morally desirable consequence.19 
This moral theory is the first to be ruled out since the Model generally requires 
implementing certain measures, not targeting certain consequences. This is evident in 
many of its requirements. For example, its key attribute of emphasis on collective goals 
calls for clarifying biobanking goals, not participants’ clear understandings of 
biobanking goals.20 Also, the key attribute of control sharing does not specify the level 
of control over biobanking that needs to be shared with participants; rather, it requires 
biobankers to share control over biobanking with participants in a contextually 
appropriate fashion. Indeed, although the Proposals aim to foster the ARR, they require 
neither the existence nor evidence of the ARR. The main characteristics and key 
features of the ARR are merely used as theoretical bases for proposing its conceptual 
framework and a model for fostering it, respectively. In this respect, they are merely 
guidelines for how biobankers should behave towards participants in order to foster 
the ARR, not criteria for determining the existence of the ARR nor results that 
biobankers need to achieve. It can therefore be said that the ethicality of the Proposals 
is not based on certain results and thus the Proposals do arguably not use 
consequentialism as their approach to ethical reasoning. 
                                               
18 See 1.4 in ch 1 or 6.1.1 a) above. 
19 Consequentialism can be classified into direct and indirect consequentialism, where moral 
decisions about certain actions are based on the outcomes of those actions and other facts, 
such as rules or motives underlying them, respectively. See E Carlson, Consequentialism 
Reconsidered, (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, 1995), at 5. To avoid 
confusion, the term ‘consequentialism’ in this sub-section only refers to the former. 




Deontological ethics bases the rightness of certain actions on duties or rules. 
That is, the right actions are actions that conform to moral rules. Thus, this moral 
theory accentuates the features of certain actions when making moral decisions about 
them. It is agreed that there are a number of moral rules for determining the moral 
acceptability of certain actions, but explanations of such rules vary according to 
different deontologists.21  
Regarding the question of whether or not this ruled-based theory is the 
approach to ethical justification adopted by the Proposals, it can be said that the answer 
to this question is positive. Particularly, as suggested above, the Model essentially 
involves measures that biobankers need to implement in biobank governance, and 
these measures aim to develop the ARR, which in turn seeks to encourage biobanking 
by enhancing the ethical acceptability (as well as effectiveness) of biobanking. In this 
sense, it can be said that those measures could be considered as rules for biobankers 
who need to make their biobanking activities ethical. That is, biobankers’ actions that 
conform to the Model can be considered ethical in a biobanking context. Accordingly, 
the Model might be considered to provide criteria or rules for determining whether or 
not biobanking activities or biobankers’ actions can be considered ethical. It can 
therefore be argued that the Proposals embrace deontological ethics as an approach to 
their ethical reasoning.  
Virtue Ethics 
According to virtue ethics, morality is based on the character traits of actors. 
This moral theory basically deals with the question of what type of persons we should 
                                               
21 For example, according to Kant, moral rules need to pass the categorical imperative test, 
where rules under consideration need to be universally applicable without exception, and 
moral rules essentially involve forbidding one to treat others as mere means. Scanlon uses 
the question of whether or not persons can reasonably reject certain rules as a way to test if 
those rules can be a basis for morality. By contrast, Ross does not call for any tests for 
determining moral rules. See I Kant, Ethical Philosophy: Grounding for the Metaphysics of 
Morals, (Cambridge: Hackett Publicshing, 1994), Translation by James W. Ellington;  
TM Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1998), at 153; D McNaughton and P Rawling, "Deontology" in D Copp (ed) The Oxford 
Handbook of Ethical Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 424-458, at 432-433. 
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become.22 It focuses on making judgements about persons by considering their overall 
moral worth.23 It does not take into consideration only ones’ actions but also their 
virtues, which involve the reasons and emotions required for living in a way that is 
consistent with their moral commitments.24 Notably, virtue is also described as a 
disposition to act in a certain way.25  
For the Proposals, one can say that they essentially adopt this moral theory as 
their approach to ethical reasoning, since the ethicality of the Proposals relates to the 
character trait of virtuous biobankers. Particularly, the Proposals fundamentally stem 
from the premise that the ARR is considered to be an appropriate participant-biobanker 
relationship in general26 and partnership can be used to underlie its conceptual 
framework.27 Since, in practice, the ARR involves biobankers’ interactions with 
participants, this premise intrinsically suggests that biobankers should have attitudes 
and behave towards participants in the same ways that partners do towards each other. 
Partnership can therefore be considered to underpin the preferred characters that 
biobankers should have when governing their biobanks. Based on this explanation, it 
can be said that the Proposals perceive partnership as a virtue that biobankers are 
required to have in order to develop the ARR. That is, according to the Proposals, this 
concept can define the virtuous character of biobankers. As a result, biobankers who 
are disposed to treat participants as partners can be considered as having a virtuous 
trait. It can therefore be argued from these explanations that the Proposals also adopt 
virtue ethics as their way to justify their contents ethically.  
It can be argued from these discussions that the ethical reasoning of the 
Proposals resembles a mixture of virtue ethics and deontological ethics. In 
particular, the conceptual framework of the ARR and the Model, both of which 
                                               
22 JF Childress, see note 17 above. 
23 P Montague, "Virtue Ethics: A Qualified Success Story" in D Statman (ed) Virtue Ethics: 
A Critical Reader, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997) 194-204, at 194-196. 
24 AV Campbell, "The Virtues (and Vices) of the Four Principles" (2003) 29 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 5 292-296. 
25 M Talbot, see note 17 above, at 34-35. However, Statman explains that this explanation is 
the way in which deontologists define the word ‘virtue’. See D Statman, "Introduction to 
Virtue Ethics" in D Statman (ed) Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1997) 1-41, at 9. 
26 See 1.2 in ch 1 above. 
27 See 2.3 in ch 2 above. 
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fundamentally stem from partnership attributes, suggest that biobankers should treat 
participants as partners in order to enhance the ethical acceptability of biobanking, and 
thereby partnership is considered to be a character trait that is virtuous for biobankers 
here. Also, as the Model comprises measures that biobankers can use to develop the 
ARR in practice, it suggests the features of activities that biobankers should conduct 
for enhancing the ethical acceptability of biobanking, and so it can be considered to 
formulate rules for biobankers’ ethical actions. Accordingly, the Proposals can be 
considered to suggest both the virtue that biobankers should possess and the rules to 
which biobankers’ actions should conform. Based on these explanations, it can be 
concluded that the Proposals can be deemed to be an ethical framework for biobank 
governance, and they use the moral theories of deontological virtues and virtue ethics 
as methods for ethical justification.  
Two points should be noted from this conclusion. First, as the Proposals have 
ethical grounds and provide an ethical framework for dealing with practical issues and 
challenges in biobanking, they can be categorised in the area of applied ethics.28 
Second, for Statman, this ethical reasoning is called the reductionist radical 
approach to virtue ethics, where judgements of rightness are reducible to those of 
character and thus judgements of character are considered prior to those of action.29 
Particularly, the Model is considered ethical fundamentally because it can exhibit the 
key features of the ARR: the measures it requires, which involve biobankers doing 
something, are designed to incorporate the key features of the ARR, which are based 
on partnership, into a participant-biobanker relationship; also, as explained above, 
partnership is considered to be the character trait of biobankers that is deemed virtuous 
here; one can therefore say that the Model is desirable since it can introduce a 
partnership relationship into biobank governance. This can be explained by some of 
the measures required in it which, by themselves, are not always preferable and are 
even prone to criticism. As an example, sharing control over biobanking with 
                                               
28 E Winkler, "Applied Ethics: Overview" in R Chadwick, D Callahan and P Singer (eds), 
Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1998) 191-196. 
29 D Statman, see note 25 above, at 8-9. Note that this literature usefully explains how the 
relationship between deontological ethics and virtue ethics is perceived diversely by different 
authors. See also P Montague, see note 23 above. 
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participants is disapproved of by some authors,30 but it is deemed acceptable since it 
is used to show that participants are respected as partners in biobank governance. Thus, 
this sharing is considered an acceptable action in this thesis because it can reflect a 
partnership attribute of respectfulness.31 On the other hand, it can also be said that, 
although the measures required by the Model might be preferable in biobanking 
practice, they – according to the Proposals – are per se not considered ethically 
justifiable unless they can manifest a partnership relationship between participants and 
biobankers. In this respect, they are not intended to be a source of ethicality. This is 
why the explanation of the Model, in Chapter 3, constantly shows how they can reflect 
the key features of the ARR. Given all these explanations, one can therefore say that 
the ethicality of the Model basically stems from judgements of character traits, not 
those of action, and thereby the Proposals perceive trait appraisals to be prior to act 
appraisals. From a philosophical perspective, it can also be said that the Model is 
ethically explicable in terms of its capability to reflect partnership, a virtuous trait of 
biobankers. Notably, the fact that the Proposals consider virtue ethics to be prior to 
deontological ethics is additionally echoed in their focus on relationship, as opposed 
to certain measures or mechanisms – that is, they are based on the notion that 
developing certain measures is unlikely to provide a solution to the issues and 
challenges existing in biobanking practice, and so they instead focus on proposing a 
form of a participant-biobanker relationship, which goes beyond actions or duties. 
6.2.2   Legality 
The question arises as to whether law plays a role in the Proposals. To address 
this question, this sub-section considers the nature and content of the Model, and then 
determines whether it is suitable to use legal mechanisms to put the Model into 
practice. Before addressing this question, some points should be noted here. First, the 
discussion in this sub-section concentrates on the Model, since it deals with the 
question regarding the practical aspect of the Proposals. In this respect, it does not 
involve the fundamental notion and conceptual framework of the ARR. Second, this 
                                               
30 See 6.4.1 below. 
31 See 3.4.2 in ch 3 above. 
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sub-section only has the aim of clarifying the contribution of this thesis. In this respect, 
it does not involve a discussion about whether the Model theoretically deserves legal 
protection, since this discussion involves lengthy scrutiny in the area of legal  
theory – which is outside the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is worth briefly 
mentioning that, in terms of regulatory rationales, it is justifiable for the Model to be 
used as legal regulation, because the ARR, which the Model aims to develop, seeks to 
promote the interests of individuals (participants) and collectives (biobanking) and 
both of these interests can be rationales for regulation.32 It can therefore be said that it 
is possible to use the Model as a basis for legal mechanisms.  
Third, an issue on the role of law in governing biobanks has been raised in 
the context of the UK. This is because there are as yet no legal mechanisms for directly 
governing biobanks in the UK, unlike some jurisdictions such as Estonia and Sweden, 
and this has provoked criticism about the effectiveness of governance mechanisms in 
this area.33 The discussion in this sub-section, however, does not engage with such an 
issue since it only concerns application of the Model, not the governance of all 
biobanks in the UK. Finally, the discussion here involves any legal mechanisms that 
might be used to enforce the Model. In this respect, it is not limited to legal partnership, 
which basically refers to business associations established for generating profits.34 It 
is, however, arguable that legal partnership is not applicable here. My research 
suggests that there are two main reasons behind this argument. One is that, while both 
the Model and legal partnership similarly involve cooperation and collectiveness in 
goals, the themes of their goals are different: partnership in the Model mainly involves 
medical advances, although commercialisation might also be embraced to some extent, 
but legal partnership fundamentally aims to deliver profit; that is, the former primarily 
concerns collective health benefits, but the latter is basically based on the commercial 
                                               
32 Individuals’ rights and social solidarity can be rationales for regulation. See T Prosser, 
"Regulation and Social Solidarity" (2006) 33 Journal of Law & Society 3 364-387;  
R Baldwin et al, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice, 2nd ed (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), at 22-23. 
33 M Cutter Anthony et al, "Balancing Powers: Examining Models of Biobank Governance" 
(2004) 1 Journal of International Biotechnology Law 5 187-192, at 189-190; SMC Gibbons, 
"Are UK Genetic Databases Governed Adequately? A Comparative Legal Analysis" (2007) 
27 Legal Studies 2 312-342.  
34 Partnership Act 1890, s 1(1). 
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interests of certain individuals. Moreover, the content of the former chiefly involves 
positive interactions and dispositions towards other partners (i.e. participants), but that 
of the latter is essentially about responsibilities and liabilities among partners, as well 
as protection against fraudulent actions between them. 
Regarding a legal role for the Model, this thesis does not recommend directly 
translating the Model into legal provisions, mainly because the Model is only intended 
to offer guidelines for biobankers who want to foster the ARR in their biobanking. 
This reason is echoed in the content of the Model. Particularly, first, biobanking 
activities that do not conform to the Model are not always considered unethical, let 
alone illegal. Indeed, as explained above, some measures proposed in the Model are 
prone to criticism. It can therefore be said that the Model is not seen to set minimal 
standards for biobanking practices, and thereby it might not be suitable to enforce it 
legally. Second, its content is broad, with the aim to make it flexible and generally 
applicable. Thus, one can ask whether or not its content is clear and specific enough 
for such translation. That is, such translation might result in practical problems with 
regard to, inter alia, enforcement and interpretation of translated provisions. An 
example is the requirement for appropriate sharing of control: as the Model does not 
provide details about when control sharing is considered appropriate,35 one might 
question what criteria a court will use to determine the appropriateness of this sharing 
and how a court legally enforces this requirement in different circumstances.  
Other than the content of the Model, this recommendation can also be 
justified from a practical perspective. In particular, some biobanks have practical 
limitations that prevent their governance from complying with the Model. An example 
of these limitations is limited resources, from which small-scale biobanks usually 
suffer. This limitation can hinder some biobanks from establishing, inter alia, ongoing 
communication with participants or a body that can oversee and influence biobanking 
activities in their governance, both of which are deemed crucial to application of the 
Model.36 In the light of this limitation, such translation might undermine the sanctity 
of law by making translated provisions unable to be applied to some biobanks in 
                                               
35 See 3.4.1 b) in ch 3 above. 
36 See 6.1.2 b) above. 
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practice. Given all these reasons, it can therefore be argued that legal mechanisms are 
not preferable for directly reinforcing the whole of the Model.  
However, this argument does not mean that legal mechanisms are neither 
possible nor acceptable for applying the Model at all. Rather, the Model might be 
used to inform legal provisions about biobanking. As an example in the context of the 
UK, the Health Research Authority might adopt the Model’s measures for 
collaboration and reciprocation, which mainly aim to promote participants’ interests, 
for underlying its guidance on how biobankers should manage and conduct biobanking 
activities, which is published under the Care Act 2014.37 Alternatively, the Model 
might be wholly translated into legal provisions which can only be applied in certain 
circumstances. Indeed, some measures proposed in the Model can benefit from the 
enforceability of legal mechanisms. One example is the measure for reinforcing 
collectiveness in biobanking goals within the Model’s key attribute of emphasis on 
collective goals: this measure requires resisting biobanking activities that do not 
conform to collective goals, if any;38 the ability to resist such non-conformity can be 
consolidated by legal mechanisms, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of this 
measure. It can therefore be said that, by being facilitative as well as prescriptive and 
sanction-driven, law could be beneficial to application of the Model by playing a 
supportive role.  
Despite the aforesaid possibility and benefit, it needs to be emphasised again 
that the Model is not designed to rely on legal mechanisms, as already explained above, 
and thus to enforce the whole of the Model by law is not suggested here. 
6.3   Limitations of the Proposals 
As outlined in the first chapter of this thesis, the discussion in this thesis 
focuses on a relationship between participants and biobankers at a micro level, by 
                                               
37 Care Act 2014, s 111(6), (7). 
38 For this aspect of the Model, the effectiveness of mechanisms for resisting this  
non-conformity is an important consideration. See 3.1.1 b) (Changes to Biobankers’ Goals) 
in ch 3 above. 
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dealing with both the micro- and meso-levels of a management approach to biobank 
governance.39 This scope can be explained separately into two aspects. On the one 
hand, the expression ‘micro level’ means that this thesis focuses on biobankers’ 
relationships with individual participants, not with participant collectives. On the other 
hand, this scope suggests that the parties in biobanking, other than participants and 
biobankers, are not involved in the contribution of this thesis. These two aspects 
impose some limitations when putting the Proposals into practice.  
To clarify the contribution of this thesis, these limitations are explained in this 
section. The explanations of these limitations can be separated into two sub-sections, 
each of which deals with one of those two aspects: one deals with the fact that the ARR 
involves the micro level of a participant-biobanker relationship, and the other describes 
the roles of other parties, i.e. communities and members of the public, in the Proposals. 
6.3.1   Micro Level of Relationship 
As explained in Chapter 1, the contribution of this thesis focuses on the micro 
level of a participants-biobanker relationship because the interests of every participant 
are an important consideration.40 This focus is echoed in many measures proposed in 
the Model. For example, the Model’s key attribute of collaboration calls for giving all 
participants opportunities to provide input,41 not appointing some participants to 
provide input on behalf of others or a whole participant cohort. The Model’s key 
attribute of control sharing requires giving participants control over biobanking at an 
individual level, and so it mainly deals with control-sharing mechanisms that allow 
individual participants to make decisions about biobanking, such as the consent 
procedure and the right of withdrawal.42 Thus, one can say that the Model is basically 
directed at biobankers’ interactions with each participant individually, as opposed to 
participant collectives. As, according to the Model, individual participants engage in 
biobanking separately, it is difficult in practice for them to influence biobanking 
                                               
39 See 1.3 (last paragraph) in ch 1 above. 
40 See 1.3.2 in ch 1 above. 
41 See 3.2.1 a) in ch 3 above. 
42 See 3.4.1 a) in ch 3 above. 
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activities, particularly activities that cannot be personalised. It can therefore be said 
that their ability to initiate any changes in the direction of biobanking is very limited 
in practice. Only exceptional cases involving a mass withdrawal, which normally 
results from some scandals,43 and categorical/tiered consent can be imagined to make 
such changes possible. Accordingly, one limitation of the Model is that participants 
do not have much control over the direction of biobanking as a whole. 
Representation 
Moreover, the focus on a micro-level of participant-biobanker relationship 
can be related to the issue of representation, where certain participants represent the 
interests of other participants. This issue is highlighted and criticised by some 
authors,44 while others seem not to consider it problematic.45 As the ARR is based on 
the notion that the interests of every participant are important, it can be argued that, 
basically, the Proposals do not consider this issue desirable. The reason is that, when 
suffering from this issue, the interests of some participants are disregarded and such 
disregard undermines the ARR. 
From a procedural perspective, mechanisms that suffer from this issue are 
involvement mechanisms where some participants are appointed to voice their 
thoughts on behalf of others or a whole participant cohort.46 Thus, these mechanisms 
do per se not accord with the Proposals. However, they do not always undermine the 
conformity of biobank governance to the Proposals: as long as biobankers allow all 
participants to provide input and give that input serious consideration, the Proposals 
are complied with, regardless of whether these mechanisms are adopted in biobank 
governance or not. Notably, in practice, this scenario needs strong evidence of such 
consideration for confirming that the input of non-appointed participants is not 
                                               
43 H Widdows, The Connected Self: The Ethics and Governance of the Genetic Individual, 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), at 140. 
44 KG Hunter and GT Laurie, "Involving Publics in Biobank Governance: Moving beyond 
Existing Approaches" in H Widdows and C Mullen (eds), The Governance of Genetic 
Information, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 151-200. See also  
DE Winickoff, "Partnership in U.K. Biobank: A Third Way for Genomic Property?" (2007) 
35 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 3 440-456. 
45 J Kaye, see note 11 above, at 133; KC O’Doherty et al, see note 9 above, at 371. 
46 See 6.1.2 a) (last paragraph) above. 
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disregarded.47 This implies that these mechanisms will undermine such conformity if 
it is evident that biobankers do not allow non-appointed participants to provide input, 
or that they only take into account the input of appointed participants.  
In reality, however, it can also be said that the issue of representation is in 
practice inevitable, even after applying the Model, since participants are not always 
active.48 In particular, the Model’s key attribute of collaboration merely requires 
biobankers to give all participants opportunities to provide input, not to receive input 
from all of them. Thus, it is possible that, despite giving such opportunities, biobankers 
can only receive and take into account input from participants who actively engage in 
biobanking, thereby inherently causing that input to represent the voices and attitudes 
of non-active participants. That is, although biobank governance complies with the 
Model, which attempts to address the issue of representation, it might still suffer from 
this issue. It can therefore be said that this issue might be unavoidable when putting 
the Model into practice. Since the Model does not have measures for dealing with this 
scenario, one might consider this form of representation to be another limitation 
on the contribution of this thesis.  
Given the explanations about the issue of representation, it can be concluded, 
as follows: The Proposals do not conceptually advocate any representation for 
participants in biobank governance, because it is likely to undermine the ARR. 
Involvement mechanisms where some participants are appointed to voice their 
thoughts on behalf of others do per se raise the issue of representation, but these 
mechanisms do not necessarily undermine the conformity of biobank governance to 
the Proposals. In practice, because participants are not always active, this issue 
inevitably arises even when adopting the Proposals, making this scenario become 
another limitation on the contribution of this thesis. Note that this issue may arise 
                                               
47 As an example, ALSPAC adopts these involvement mechanisms, but there is not enough 
evidence for completely ruling out the issue of representation within its governance. See 
5.2.2 c) (last paragraph) in ch 5 above. 
48 This non-activeness can be inferred from some empirical studies revealing that people 
relatively prefer broad consent partly because this consent approach imposes less burdens on 
them. See CM Simon et al, "Active Choice but Not Too Active: Public Perspectives on 
Biobank Consent Models" (2011) 13 Genetic Medicine 9 821-831, at 826. 
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within the governance of ALSPAC due to many involvement mechanisms in the 
governance that only involve some participants.49 
6.3.2   Communities and the Public 
As suggested above, the Proposals are merely applied to participants and 
biobankers. The reason behind this was already explained in the first chapter: the 
Proposals stem from an attempt to enhance the ethical acceptability and effectiveness 
of biobanking by promoting and balancing the interests of participants and biobanks.50 
This implies that the Proposals fundamentally exclude communities and members of 
the public, parties who might be positively and/or negatively affected by biobanking, 
although it is acknowledged that there is extensive literature arguing for involving 
these two parties in biobanking.51 Accordingly, basically, these parties do not have any 
roles in the measures or mechanisms proposed in the Model. The Model is not applied 
to them in this respect.  
As a result of this exclusion, the Proposals are widely applicable since they 
can be applied to both private and public biobanks – the former of which do normally 
not call for public involvement in biobank governance. On the other hand, this 
exclusion arguably places another limitation on the application of the Proposals. 
Particularly, the Model might per se not be able to properly handle some issues 
that require either communities or members of the public to deal with, such as the 
maintenance of public trust, improvement in the accountability to the public, the 
involvement of communities’ interests, social/community priorities and, as explained 
further below, commercial involvement.52 
This is, however, saying neither that the Proposals inhibit members of the 
public and communities from being involved in biobanking at all, nor that such 
involvement undermines conformity to the Proposals. Rather, it is merely emphasised 
                                               
49 See note 47 above. 
50 See 1.2 (first paragraph) and 1.4.2 in ch 1 above. 
51 KC O’Doherty et al, see note 9 above, at 371-372; J Kaye, see note 11 above, at 132-133; 
AV Campbell, see note 10 above, at 244; D Chalmers, "Genetic Research and Biobanks" in  
J Dillner (ed) Methods in Biobanking, (London: Humana Press, 2011) 1-38, at 4-6. 
52 See also 6.4.3 (last paragraph) below. 
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that the Proposals do not directly deal with the roles of these parties in biobank 
governance. Indeed, such involvement may even enhance conformity to the Proposals. 
For example, since participants and these parties may share the same interests (e.g. 
genetic information privacy), such involvement might help promote participants’ 
interests by allowing members of the public or communities to help improve the 
safeguards for participants, thereby complying with the Model’s key attribute of 
reciprocation and enforcing the ARR’s key features of respectfulness and continuity 
in relationship. Moreover, such involvement might also help improve recruitment 
procedures, thus promoting biobanks’ interests by increasing participation. Other than 
benefits to the Proposals, such involvement is also arguably beneficial to biobanking 
in general by, inter alia, addressing the aforesaid issues and avoiding criticism of 
participants representing communities and the public.  
It can therefore be concluded from this sub-section that, although the 
Proposals exclude communities and members of the public, they do not prohibit the 
involvement of these two parties. Indeed, this involvement might even help foster the 
ARR by promoting participants’ and/or biobanks’ interests. 
To summarise this section, given that the contribution of this thesis basically 
deals with a research relationship between biobankers and individual participants, this 
section has pinpointed three limitations on the application of the Proposals. First, while 
participants have control over biobanking at an individual level, they do not have much 
control over the direction of biobanking activities. Second, the Proposals cannot 
address the issue of representation that results from non-active participants being 
represented by active ones. Finally, the Proposals themselves do not involve members 
of the public and communities, and so they might not properly address issues that 
should be settled by these two parties. Some points are noteworthy here. First, as 
explained in the following section, there are other issues with which the Proposals do 
not deal, i.e. participants’ competence in making decisions to engage in biobanking 
and property rights over tissue samples. The second point concerns a situation where 
input from certain participants conflicts with input from other participants or parties. 
This situation is likely to occur when adopting the Proposals, since the Model requires 
giving all participants opportunities to provide input about biobanking. To foster the 
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ARR in this situation, the Model requires biobankers to show participants whose input 
is not acted on that their input is taken into consideration by, inter alia, providing them 
with justifications for putting their input aside.53  
6.4   The Proposals and Some Biobanking Issues 
In a biobanking context, there are some controversial issues that have been 
usually discussed in extensive literature on biobanking and which might either 
undermine the ARR or conflict with the Proposals. Indeed, while these issues have 
occasionally been mentioned in previous chapters, they have not been dealt with yet. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to discuss these issues in this section in order to address 
them properly. This discussion serves not only to further clarify the Proposals by 
demonstrating their true extent and capability for securing the ARR despite the 
existence of those issues, but also to explain how their application can move beyond 
UK Biobank and ALSPAC towards other biobanking contexts. Indeed, as this 
discussion engages with extensive literature on biobanking, it inherently delineates 
how the Proposals contribute towards existing knowledge in this area. There are five 
issues that are to be addressed in this section:  
(i) participants’ control; 
(ii) individual feedback; 
(iii) commercial involvement; 
(iv) financial incentives; 
(v) property rights. 
These issues will be dealt with separately in five different sub-sections. For 
the general structure, each sub-section first pinpoints the nature and content of these 
issues by taking into consideration academic discussions about them, and then explains 
how the Proposals are related to or respond to them. Note that this section focuses on 
explaining how these issues can be handled from the perspective of the Proposals. In 
                                               
53 See 3.2.1 b) (Disregard for Participants’ Input) in ch 3 above. 
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this respect, it is not intended to provide in-depth discussions or arguments directly 
concerning these issues. 
6.4.1   Participants’ Control 
The issue of sharing control over biobanking with participants has been 
discussed in extensive literature in the area of biobanking. As some argue against this 
sharing, a question arises as to why they disagree with the Proposals, which allow this 
sharing.54 To address this question, literature that makes arguments on this matter was 
reviewed and the reasons behind those arguments were also examined. My review 
suggests that there seems to be two authors whose arguments clearly provide the 
reasons for supporting and opposing this sharing, namely Kaye and Campbell, 
respectively. In this sub-section, their arguments are explained and then the reasons 
behind their arguments are compared with those provided in this aspect of the 
Proposals, with the aim of finding justification for the similarities or differences 
between these three arguments. 
a)  Three Arguments 
To recall this aspect of the Proposals, the Model requires biobankers to share 
control over biobanking appropriately with individual participants, not participants as 
a collective. From a conceptual perspective, this requirement enforces the ARR’s key 
feature of respectfulness, which allows participants’ interests to be balanced with those 
of biobanks. In practice, this sharing is mainly performed through control-sharing 
mechanisms that allow participants to make decisions about biobanking at an 
individual level, such as the consent procedure, the right of withdrawal and meaningful 
involvement in making decisions about biobanking activities that can be personalised. 
The level of control is determined by the consent approaches employed, the amount of 
information about biobanking activities provided for participants, and the extent to 
which participants are allowed to make decisions, respectively. It is also notable that 
the Model mainly involves communication with participants that allows biobankers to 
                                               
54 See 3.4 in ch 3 above. 
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share information about biobanking activities and knowledge about biobanking with 
participants, as well as to receive input about biobank governance from them.55 
For the other two arguments, Kaye’s argument supports participants’ ongoing 
control over uses of biobank resources, aka a dynamic consent model. She first 
establishes that, due to the risk of identifiability in population collections, participants 
have a moral right to control the uses of their information and this right increases over 
time.56 Thus, she argues for broad consent at recruitment, re-consenting every five 
years and the right of withdrawal. Participants can also opt out of any secondary uses. 
To legitimise this opt-out, biobankers need to provide them with ongoing updates 
about biobanking activities and allow participant representation on committees that are 
assigned to oversee biobanking activities and approve access to biobank resources.57 
Campbell’s argument opposes sharing control over biobanking with participants. He 
argues for safeguarding participants’ altruism and trust in the context of population 
genetic databases, since he considers these values to be a primary motivation for 
participating in these databases when no financial incentives are involved.58 As regards 
the sharing of control in biobanking, Campbell counters Kaye’s argument for this 
sharing by citing a donation or ‘gift’, which reflects a willingness to surrender control, 
and the aim of biobanks to benefit the health of the collective, as opposed to participant 
individuals. Instead, he suggests, inter alia, establishing ongoing communication with 
participants in order to build a partnership by keeping them aware of biobanking 
progress and receiving input from them.59 
b)  Comparison between Three Arguments 
By comparing Kaye’s and Campbell’s arguments with the Proposals, one 
similarity is that all three arguments advocate communication with participants that 
enables them to be kept updated on biobanking progress and to provide input about 
biobanking.60 They are, however, different in terms of participants’ control over 
                                               
55 See 6.1.2 b) (Communication with Participants) above. 
56 J Kaye, see note 11 above, at 130-131. 
57 Ibid, at 131-133. 
58 AV Campbell, see note 10 above, at 240-241. 
59 Ibid, at 241-242. 
60 See 6.1.2 b) (Communication with Participants) above. 
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biobanking: Campbell explicitly argues against the provision of this control; but Kaye 
and the Proposals embrace it, although the Proposals do not specifically argue for 
dynamic consent. This difference might be justified by the basic notions behind these 
three arguments. Particularly, Campbell’s argument mainly stems from participants’ 
altruistic giving and benefits for the collective, while Kaye and the Proposals tend to 
accentuate participants’ interests.  
Based on this analysis, it might therefore be said that the answer to the 
question of whether to give participants control over biobanking depends on what is 
considered paramount. The answer seems to be positive for those who incline towards 
the protection of participants’ interests, but negative for those who perceive the 
interests of the collective or biobanks to be overriding. Regarding the Proposals, 
because the ARR is based on the notion that the interests of participants need to be 
balanced with those of biobanks,61 the Model calls for sharing control over biobanking 
with participants (at an individual level). It is, however, worth emphasising that, with 
the expression ‘paramount’, none of these arguments neglects other interests: other 
aspects of Campbell’s and Kaye’s arguments also promote participants’ and biobanks’ 
interests, respectively; the Proposals seek to strike a balance between participants’ and 
biobanks’ interests. In this respect, this analysis merely highlights that these arguments 
might attach more importance to certain interests over the others. 
Two points should be noted here. First, this difference is in line with the 
general trend in desire for control over biobanking that has been reflected in many 
empirical studies, especially studies on participants’ preferences vis-à-vis consent 
approaches. Particularly, participants normally need to have some degree of control 
over biobanking activities.62 One reason why they decline to have this control, or too 
much of it, is that it could be counterproductive for biobanking by, inter alia, imposing 
financial and logistic burdens on biobankers as well as hindering biobanking and 
research from having sufficient cohorts.63 Note that there are also other circumstantial 
                                               
61 See 1.4.2 in ch 1 above. 
62 AL McGuire et al, "DNA Data Sharing: Research Participants' Perspectives" (2008) 10 
Genetics in Medicine 1 46-53; J Murphy et al, "Public Perspectives on Informed Consent for 
Biobanking" (2009) 99 American Journal of Public Health 12 2128-2134. 
63 CM Simon et al, see note 48 above.  
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factors that might affect participants’ desire for this control, such as their trust in a 
research institution,64 the complexity of information they need to deal with, and their 
feelings of being unqualified to have this control.65 On the second point, Winickoff 
also implicitly makes an argument for participants’ control over biobanking: he 
suggests using a shareholder model used in corporate governance for involving 
participants in UK Biobank governance; this suggestion indirectly gives control over 
biobanking to the participant collective in UK Biobank.66 Nonetheless, this argument 
is not discussed above because it involves participants’ control at a collective level, 
not an individual level. Indeed, it also raises the issue of representation, which has 
already been discussed in 6.3.1 above. 
6.4.2   Individual Feedback 
The second issue relates to the provision of individual feedback in a 
biobanking context. The term ‘individual feedback’ here refers to any information 
about individual participants resulting from their participation in biobanking, i.e. 
individual research results, incidental findings and analysed health information. For 
the Proposals, this provision is one way to reciprocate participants’ contributions 
according to the Model, and it can reflect the ARR’s key features of continuity in 
relationship and respectfulness. However, there is vast literature that argues against it, 
as illustrated below. The question therefore arises as to whether this provision is really 
desirable in a biobanking context. To address this question, this sub-section first briefly 
reviews the literature on this matter so as to explore the controversy surrounding this 
provision, and then justify this aspect of the Proposals by explaining how the Proposals 
deal with this controversy. It is noteworthy that different types of individual feedback 
have different content. In the academic literature, some authors well appreciate this 
difference,67 while many do not clearly do so. In practice, this difference might not be 
                                               
64 KB Brothers et al, "Two Large-Scale Surveys on Community Attitudes toward an Opt-Out 
Biobank" (2011) 155 American Journal of Medical Genetics Part A 12 2982-2990. 
65 AL McGuire et al, see note 62; CM Simon et al, see note 48 above. 
66 DE Winickoff, see note 44 above, at 449. 
67 SM Wolf et al, "Managing Incidental Findings and Research Results in Genomic Research 
Involving Biobanks and Archived Data Sets" (2012) 14 Genetics in Medicine 4 361-384. 
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distinct in some circumstances, such as genomic research.68 However, the discussion 
in this sub-section does not distinguish different types of individual feedback. This is 
because they all are used to serve the same function, i.e. reciprocation, in the Model 
and they can similarly affect participants in both positive and negative ways. This 
difference is therefore considered insignificant here.  
a)  Extensive Controversy 
The provision of individual feedback is one of the most controversial issues 
in biobanking. Various perspectives have been taken into consideration and many 
compelling reasons have been set out by both proponents and opponents of this 
provision to argue for and against it, respectively. 
For proponents, as concluded by Haga and Beskow, three principles – namely 
respect for participants, beneficence and reciprocity – are commonly used to argue for 
this provision,69 especially the first one. Some even use this first principle to override 
any costs and burdens resulting from this provision.70 Similarly to the Proposals, some 
deem the provision of individual research results to be a reflection of partnership, since 
participants are treated respectfully as partners in biobanking – not simply a means to 
an end.71 Indeed, in the context of UK Biobank, Johnston and Kaye consider this 
provision to be a legal duty, which might inflict a negligence liability.72 From a 
practical perspective, Fernandez et al use the potential benefits of individual feedback, 
                                               
68 LM Beskow and W Burke, "Offering Individual Genetic Research Results: Context 
Matters" (2010) 2 Science Translational Medicine 38 available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3136874/ (accessed on 10 June 2016);  
MK Cho, "Understanding Incidental Findings in the Context of Genetics and Genomics" 
(2008) 36 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 2 280-285. 
69 SB Haga and LM Beskow, "Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of Biobanks for 
Genetics Research" in DC Rao and CC Gu (eds), Advances in Genetics, Academic Press, 
2008) 505-544, at 528-529. 
70 DI Shalowitz and FG Miller, "Disclosing Individual Results of Clinical Research: 
Implications of Respect for Participants" (2005) 294 JAMA 6 737-740; CV Fernandez and  
C Weijer, "Obligations in Offering to Disclose Genetic Research Results" (2006) 6 The 
American Journal of Bioethics 6 44-46. 
71 CV Fernandez et al, "The Return of Research Results to Participants: Pilot Questionnaire 
of Adolescents and Parents of Children with Cancer" (2007) 48 Pediatric Blood & Cancer 4 
441-446. 
72 C Johnston and J Kaye, "Does the UK Biobank Have a Legal Obligation to Feedback 
Individual Findings to Participants?" (2004) 12 Medical Law Review 3 239-267. 
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i.e. the possibility of improving participants’ quality of life and preventing harms, to 
defend this position. This provision is also claimed to benefit health-related research 
itself by underlining its importance,73 recruiting participants and retaining support for 
it.74 This position is also supported by many empirical studies revealing that the 
provision of individual feedback is desirable75 even though the content of such 
feedback is likely to be negative.76 
On the other hand, many reasons have been used to counter the aforesaid 
position. Ossorio refutes the argument that the provision of individual feedback is a 
way to respect participants by citing alternative measures for expressing such respect, 
the possibility of participants having little interest in this feedback, and an untenable 
burden on research infrastructure.77 Therapeutic misconceptions and possible harm to 
participants,78 as well as the right not to know,79 are frequently used to reject this 
provision. Some even consider this provision to be an undue inducement for 
participants.80 As discussed in 6.4.4 below, this provision can raise the issue of 
                                               
73 CV Fernandez et al, "Considerations and Costs of Disclosing Study Findings to Research 
Participants" (2004) 170 Canadian Medical Association Journal 9 1417-1419. 
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financial incentives. From a practical perspective, McHale argues that this provision 
can place participants and researchers at risk of stigmatisation and litigation, 
respectively.81 Many practical limitations and challenges have also been highlighted, 
such as the validity of individual feedback,82 the design of research and biobanks, the 
characteristics of participants, and intensive consumption of resources that are created 
by relocating, re-contacting participants and validating individual feedback.83 
b)  The Proposals’ Approach 
After considering the arguments from both sides, it is arguably difficult to 
conclude a position that is, in general, most desirable for both participants and 
biobanking: in the academic literature, the arguments presented to support either of 
these positions are compelling but can still be countered in some ways; the results of 
empirical studies incline towards the provision of individual feedback, but they are not 
unanimous. Thus, it is not pragmatic for the Proposals to strongly advocate either 
position for many reasons. First, the ARR aims to strike a balance between 
participants’ and biobanks’ interests, and it is unclear which position can be considered 
to definitely promote each of these interests. Second, participants’ individual 
preferences need to be honoured and satisfied, due to the ARR’s key features of 
respectfulness and continuity in relationship. Indeed, the Proposals are based on the 
notion that the interests of every participant are important.84 This implies that the 
results of those empirical studies should not be generalised; otherwise, the interests of 
some participants would inherently be disregarded. Finally, some biobanks have a 
limited capability of providing individual feedback, due to some contextual factors 
such as types of biobank resources and the availability of management resources. It 
                                               
81 JV McHale, see note 79 above, at 91. 
82 JF Merz et al, see note 78 above, at 255; JN Hirschhorn et al, "A Comprehensive Review 
of Genetic Association Studies" (2002) 4 Genetics in Medicine 2 45-61. 
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can therefore be argued that the question of whether to provide participants with 
individual feedback should be decided on a case-by-case basis.85  
This argument justifies why the Model does not necessitate the provision of 
individual feedback. Particularly, the Model’s key attribute of reciprocation neither 
requires nor recommends this provision. Rather, it asks biobankers to, first, clarify 
policies on this matter so as to enable participants to realise the actual extent of 
biobanks’ capability to provide individual feedback and other factors that potentially 
affect their preferences regarding this provision, including the possible content and 
implications of individual feedback; then, the Model requires biobankers to allow 
participants to negotiate about these policies through, inter alia, the collaborative 
measures proposed in the key attribute of collaboration.86 Given this explanation, it 
can be concluded that the Proposals deal with the controversy over the provision of 
individual feedback by using (i) mutual learning, which allows participants’ and 
biobanks’ interests in certain circumstances to be put on the table and taken into 
consideration, and (ii) negotiation, which can be assumed to be the most promising 
way to balance these two interests in a contextually appropriate fashion. One can 
therefore say that, despite the storm of controversy over the provision of individual 
feedback, it is still possible for the Proposals to use this provision to develop the ARR, 
which seeks to strike a balance between participants’ and biobanks’ interests. 
6.4.3   Commercial Involvement 
The meaning of commercial involvement in biobanking might range from the 
possibility of biobank resources being accessed by for-profit entities, to biobanks being 
established and organised by these entities. Particularly, the low end of this spectrum 
refers to a situation where for-profit entities are not involved in biobank governance 
but might access biobank resources. At the other end, these entities establish, organise 
and fund biobanks, and thus they are influential in biobank governance. One example 
                                               
85 This is supported by Hoeyer, who argues for acknowledging the diversity of participants’ 
perceptions and expectations about the provision of research results. See K Hoeyer, "Donors 
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on this spectrum is a situation where for-profit entities do not directly run biobanks but 
they are funders who can influence biobanking activities through their funding. Based 
on this meaning, the questions in this sub-section are whether commercial involvement 
hinders the Proposals’ ability to develop the ARR and, if so, how the Proposals tackle 
this hindrance. These questions are dealt with in two sub-sub-sections. The first one 
briefly reviews the literature on commercial involvement in biobanking and explains 
how this involvement might undermine the ARR. The second sub-sub-section then 
demonstrates how the Proposals handle this involvement. Note that, despite the 
aforesaid gradations of this involvement, the discussion in this sub-section does not 
distinguish them because, as suggested below, they all undermine the ARR in the same 
way. 
a)  Issues Arising 
In general, it has been said that the involvement of the private sector is 
necessary for medical advances.87 However, because this involvement usually relates 
to the commercialisation of biobanking, it has attracted many criticisms in the 
academic arena. These criticisms encompass various issues, such as exploitation,88 the 
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commodification of biomaterials,89 patenting,90 the unfair distribution of benefits,91 
and distrust among participants and the public.92 This involvement was even partly 
responsible for the well-known scandal of Icelandic biobank project.93 This creates a 
dilemma lying in a biobanking context. This dilemma is evident in many empirical 
studies that reveal ambivalent attitudes towards commercial involvement in 
biobanking:94 some people deem this involvement acceptable or inevitable, in spite of 
some concerns; but others oppose it or even express distrust in it.95 Furthermore, it can 
be suggested from these studies that, in practice, there are many circumstantial factors 
affecting participants’ attitudes towards this involvement, such as the degree of this 
involvement, participants’ characteristics and their experiences. One can therefore 
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argue that it is difficult to provide a definite answer to the question of whether 
commercial involvement in biobanking should be accepted or refused, and thus it 
seems sensible to leave this question to be decided by participants in certain biobanks. 
In terms of the Proposals, it is possible for commercial involvement in 
biobanking to undermine the ARR. On the one hand, this involvement might entice or 
lead biobankers to incline towards the commercialisation of biobanking, thereby 
making profitability become more central to biobankers’ actual goals beyond what 
were originally agreed with participants. On the other hand, in practice, participants 
might not be sufficiently or clearly informed about this involvement when being 
recruited. These two scenarios might hinder development of the ARR by weakening 
two key features of it. One is collectiveness in goals: an inclination towards the 
commercialisation of biobanking causes biobankers’ actual goals to deviate from 
participants’ goals, and thereby collectiveness in biobanking goals is no more; the 
insufficiency of information about this involvement might lead participants to mistake 
biobankers’ goals, and thus there are no collective goals to begin with. Another ARR’s 
key feature that might be weakened is respectfulness. In particular, informing 
participants insufficiently about this involvement might be considered to express 
disrespect, or even make dishonest gestures, towards them. One can therefore argue 
that commercial involvement in biobanking might hinder development of the ARR. 
Notably, given the nature of this hindrance explained above, it can be said that this 
hindrance is possible no matter what the degree of this involvement is. 
b)  Solution in the Model 
The explanation above suggests that there are two measures for dealing with 
the possible hindrance to development of the ARR. The first measure is effective 
communication that informs prospective participants of any commercial involvement, 
especially when recruiting them, thus allowing them to realise and understand this 
involvement properly and to decide whether to accept it as part of their biobanking 
goals. As a result of using this measure, their decisions to participate can amount to 
acceptance of this involvement, and thereby all participants and biobankers can be 
assumed to share the same goals, which contain certain degrees of this involvement. 
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This also intrinsically establishes open and honest communication with participants. 
One can therefore say that this measure can exhibit the ARR’s key features of 
collectiveness in goals and respectfulness. For the Proposals, this measure is similarly 
required in the Model’s key attribute of emphasis on collective goals: during 
recruitment, this key attribute requires biobankers to clarify biobanking goals as well 
as inform prospective participants of commercial involvement, if any.96 Indeed, after 
recruitment, it also requires establishing CBP, which enables participants to realise 
and monitor this involvement through updates on biobanking activities. Given these 
requirements, it can be said that the Model has measures for allowing both prospective 
and actual participants to know about commercial involvement in biobanking.  
The second measure is to prevent biobanking activities, which assumedly 
reflect biobankers’ actual goals, from being excessively commercially-oriented 
beyond participants’ expectations. In practice, this measure involves a mechanism for 
resisting or impeding biobanking activities that incline towards profitability beyond 
the extent that was originally agreed with or is acceptable to participants. As a result 
of this measure, it can be perceived that biobankers’ goals are not excessively 
influenced by commercial involvement and are the same as participants’ goals 
throughout biobanking endeavours. For the Proposals, this measure is in line with the 
measure for reinforcing collectiveness in biobanking goals, required by the Model’s 
key attribute of emphasis on collective goals. In short, this reinforcement measure 
requires encouraging the conformity of biobanking activities to collective goals, i.e. 
the goals shared with participants, by implementing mechanisms that can be used to 
consistently monitor biobanking activities and resist biobanking activities that deviate 
from collective goals.97 From a conceptual perspective, this measure helps maintain 
and reinforce the ARR’s key feature of collectiveness in goals. One can therefore say 
that the Model has a measure for hindering biobankers’ goals from being changed by 
commercial involvement.  
Given the explanations in these last two paragraphs, it can be concluded that 
the Proposals have measures for preventing the development of the ARR from being 
                                               
96 See 3.1.1 a) in ch 3 above. 
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hindered by commercial involvement in biobanking. Indeed, it can be inferred from 
those explanations that, to maintain a participant-biobanker relationship, commercial 
involvement in biobanking should not be unlimited; rather, it should be in a respectful 
way as partners treat each other, by informing participants clearly and regularly of it, 
and should conform to the stated objects and purposes of certain biobanks. 
It is worth mentioning some measures in the Model that could also be used to 
deal with commercial involvement in biobanking because they can respond to the 
literature on this matter. Particularly, one empirical study reveals that, provided that 
commercialisation is involved, participants tend to have a preference for more control 
over the uses of their samples and information.98 In the Model, this preference can be 
satisfied by its key attribute of control sharing, which calls for appropriate sharing of 
control over biobanking with participants.99 Indeed, its key attribute of collaboration 
also requires biobankers to allow participants to provide input about biobank 
governance and give their input serious consideration,100 thereby allowing them to 
express such a preference and leading biobankers to respond to their preference. In 
addition to a preference for control, reciprocation is also suggested when biobanking 
involves commercialisation.101 This suggestion might be followed by the Model’s key 
attribute of reciprocation, which requires biobankers to reciprocate participants’ 
contributions. Indeed, this key attribute also requires biobankers to allow participants 
to negotiate about policies on tangible reciprocation, and thereby participants can 
express their thoughts on this matter. It can therefore be said from this explanation that 
the Proposals can deal properly with commercial involvement in biobanking. 
As the conclusion of this sub-section, commercial involvement in biobanking 
might hinder development of the ARR, which the Proposals are intended to foster, by 
undermining the collectiveness in biobanking goals between participants and 
biobankers as well as by making disrespectful gestures towards participants. However, 
the Proposals can arguably deal with this hindrance and even respond to some 
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preferences that participants might have as a result of commercial involvement, 
through some measures proposed in the Model. Thus, this involvement is arguably not 
problematic for the Proposals – that is, it is unlikely to hamper the Proposals’ ability 
to develop the ARR. Notably, as some authors suggest that members of the public 
should also be involved in dealing with commercial involvement in biobanking,102 the 
fact that the Proposals do not cover a role for the public in biobanking103 might limit 
their capability to tackle this involvement. As a result of this limitation, the ways in 
which the Proposals handle this involvement might not be in accordance with the 
public interests, thereby indirectly undermining the viability of the biobanks that rely 
on public support. Because the Proposals do not prohibit members of the public from 
being involved in biobanking, the suggestion here is that biobankers should engage 
members of the public in dealing with commercial involvement in biobanking. 
6.4.4   Financial Incentives 
In a biobanking context, financial incentives generally refer to benefits that 
have a financial value, including monetary offers, analysed health information, and the 
provision of individual feedback. In practice, these incentives have usually been used 
to encourage participants to participate or engage in biobanking activities, especially 
measurement and data-collecting sessions. As a real-world example, ALSPAC has 
offered monetary benefits to participants in return for their visits at its assessment 
centres, as mentioned in Chapter 5.104 According to the Proposals, these incentives are 
conceptually considered to be an instrument for valuing participants’ contributions and 
compensating them for the burdens imposed upon them by their participation, thereby 
promoting the ARR’s key features of continuity in relationship and respectfulness.105 
For the Model, it is possible for biobankers to offer participants financial incentives 
since it is one way to reciprocate participants’ contributions with tangible benefits, as 
explained in the Model’s key attribute of reciprocation.106 A question, however, arises 
                                               
102 KC O’Doherty et al, see note 9 above. 
103 See 6.3.2 above. 
104 See 5.3.2 in ch 5 above. 
105 See 3.3.2 in ch 3 above. 
106 See 3.3.1 b) in ch 3 above. 
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as to whether these incentives hinder development of the ARR and, if so, how the 
Proposals handle this hindrance. These two questions are dealt with separately in two 
sub-sub-sections, as follows. 
a)  Possible Hindrance 
Although the Proposals use financial incentives to develop the ARR, it is 
ironically arguable that these incentives might hinder this development. This is 
particularly the case when their value is additional to necessary expenses incurred by 
participation in biobanking, because they can be perceived as profit resulting from 
participation. On the one hand, these incentives might entice participants to base their 
decisions to participate primarily on financial benefits. While this form of enticement 
is acceptable to some, it is not always so according to the Proposals since these 
incentives might inhibit the ARR’s key feature of collectiveness in goals: they make 
profitability become influential in participants’ goals rather than medical advances, 
thereby preventing participants from sharing the same goals with biobankers. On the 
other hand, in some circumstances, these incentives may also expose participants to 
undue influence, which is likely to impair their capability to make rational decisions, 
according to many authors.107 In terms of the ARR, this potential can detract from the 
ARR’s key feature of respectfulness by disrespecting participants or their autonomy.  
Given these implications, a question arises as to whether or not financial 
incentives can actually help foster to the ARR. It is even questionable whether the 
provision of these incentives can amount to reciprocation or not, considering that this 
provision might hinder or prevent participants from properly assessing the risks and 
benefits of their participation or safeguarding their interests. For Titmuss, in his now 
classic research, the answer to this question seems to be negative, as he argues for 
                                               
107 R Macklin, "'Due' and 'Undue' Inducements: On Paying Money to Research Subjects" 
(1981) 3 IRB: Ethics & Human Research 5 1-6; D Evancs and M Evans, A Decent Proposal: 
Ethical Review of Clinical Research, (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), at 84-85;  
P McNeill, "Paying People to Participate in Research: Why not?" (1997) 11 Bioethics 5  
390-396; RE Ashcroft, "Money, Consent, and Exploitation in Research" (2001) 1 The 
American Journal of Bioethics 2 62-63; T Phillips, "Exploitation in Payments to Research 
Subjects" (2011) 25 Bioethics 4 209-219. 
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voluntary blood donation and explains that an incentive scheme for blood giving can 
erode social bonds and a sense of community.108 
b)  Solution in the Model 
The Model does not propose any measures for dealing directly with the 
aforesaid implications, since it does not require biobankers to determine participants’ 
actual motivation or to investigate their capacity for making rational decisions. To 
reinforce collectiveness in biobanking goals from the perspective of participants, the 
Model’s key attribute of emphasis on collective goals merely calls for providing them 
with the right of withdrawal and CBP, both of which enable them to reinforce such 
collectiveness by withdrawing their consent when they feel that they no longer share 
the same biobanking goals with biobankers.109 This reinforcement mechanism is, 
however, unlikely to be effective in addressing those implications since it relies upon 
participants’ cognition, which might be impaired as a result of those implications.  
Even so, the Proposals still allow biobankers to offer financial incentives to 
participants because this offer does not always have those implications. This is 
supported by many authors who – despite acknowledging the possibility of undue 
influence, exploitation or coercion – argue for paying research participants.110 It can 
therefore be concluded from these discussions that the Proposals do not strictly 
prohibit offers of financial incentives, but these offers need to be made cautiously so 
as not to hinder development of the ARR. For example, before making any offers of 
financial incentives, biobankers might take into account circumstantial factors that 
possibly influence participants’ cognition, such as the characteristics of participants, 
the purpose of those offers and the value of those incentives. Note that this aspect of 
                                               
108 RM Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy, (London: LSE, 
1997). 
109 See 3.1.1 b) (Changes to Participants’ Goals) in ch 3 above. 
110 N Dickert and C Grady, "What's the Price of a Research Subject? Approaches to Payment 
for Research Participation" (1999) 341 New England Journal of Medicine 3 198-203;  
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the Model might be considered another limitation of the Proposals – that is, the Model 
is unable to deal properly with a situation where participants’ decisions to participate 
are adversely influenced by financial incentives. 
6.4.5   Property Rights  
Property rights refer to claims or entitlements that the law allows ones to have 
to, or over, certain property. These rights can be broadly categorised – in terms of the 
nature of property – into rights over intangible property, such as intellectual property, 
and tangible property, e.g. goods, chattels and real estate. In terms of biobanking – or 
the use of human tissues in particular – the former particularly concern patents, i.e. the 
rights over inventions, which exclusively enable inventors to legally commercialise 
their inventions and forbid others from doing so, in exchange for publicly disclosing 
details of their inventions. In this respect, human tissues do not themselves establish 
patents, unless they are part of inventions that meet the legal requirements of 
patentability (e.g. novelty, inventiveness and industrial applicability)111 and are 
patented, such as patented cell lines from human tissues. By contrast, the latter refer 
to rights over human tissues as physical matter. In general, owners of certain tangible 
property normally have the rights to, inter alia, possess, use, transfer and destroy their 
property.112 This is, however, not the case for human tissues in their natural state since, 
as explained below, the recognition of property rights over human tissues is limited. 
Based on these explanations, questions arise as to the extent to which property rights 
affect application of the Proposals, and how the Proposals deal with property rights 
that might arise in a biobanking context. This sub-section addresses these two 
questions by discussing them separately according to the nature of property. 
                                               
111 Nuffield, Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues, (April 1995) 153, at para 11.2-11.9. 
112 These various types of rights are all together called ‘the bundle of rights.’ As listed by 
Honoré, this bundle of rights comprises eleven standard incidents of ownership, including 
the right to manage, the right to income and the incident of transmissibility. See AM Honoré, 
"Ownership" in AG Guest (ed) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: A Collaborative Work, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1961) 107-147. 
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a)  Patenting 
For intangible property, there are two main issues that might arise from 
patenting in biobanking.113 First, patenting inherently relates to the commercialisation 
of biobanking. Thus, the ways in which this aspect of patenting undermines the ARR 
and is handled by the Proposals are the same as those already illustrated in 6.4.3 above. 
The second issue concerns the possibility that participants might benefit financially 
from patents. In general, researchers normally hold patents in a biobanking context as 
they are, factually, inventors – i.e. they use biobank resources to invent something. It 
is, however, legally possible to reach an agreement that allows participants to benefit 
from, or even hold, patents. Regardless of possible controversy over such an 
agreement,114 the Proposals neither require nor prohibit this form of agreement. 
Indeed, this can be considered as one way to tangibly reciprocate participants’ 
contributions, although this form of reciprocation is not necessary according to the 
Model.115 Nonetheless, as this agreement basically provides participants with financial 
incentives to participate in biobanking, the ways in which the Proposals respond to this 
issue are similar to those explained in Sub-section 6.4.4. Given these explanations, it 
can therefore be said that the implications of patenting for development of the ARR 
have already been illustrated in previous sub-sections. 
b)  Rights over Human Tissues 
As regards tangible property, the recognition of property rights over human 
tissues from the living has been the subject of ongoing debate, due to the notion that a 
human body cannot be an object of rights.116 While such recognition was traditionally 
inadmissible, this has been changing in recent years and in a number of key respects: 
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for example, the courts recently started recognising some aspects of property rights 
over human tissues. A notable example is the Yearworth case, where the court held 
that persons who had provided sperm for a reproductive purpose had ownership over 
those sperm since, legally, they had absolute control over those sperm, at least for the 
purposes of a successful negligence action.117 This ruling was later followed by the 
Canadian Court of Appeal in the Lam case, which identically involved damage to 
human sperm deposited for a reproductive purpose.118 In a research context, the US 
court in Missouri held that researchers had ownership over tissue samples donated for 
research, since this ownership had been transferred from participants to them through 
an inter vivo gift.119  
However, despite these court decisions, it remains unanswered as to whether, 
in general, persons have property rights over tissues excised from them, as well as the 
extent to which such rights are legally recognised. More importantly, it is also 
questionable whether or not the answers to these questions and the aforementioned 
court decisions will be applied to the context of research biobanking. It can therefore 
be said that, at present, it is unclear as to who has property rights over tissues that 
participants provide for biobankers when participating in biobanking, and the extent 
to which such rights are legally recognised. Undoubtedly, there are many controversies 
over this matter in the academic arena, including the area of biobanking.120 
As regards the relation between the recognition of property rights and the 
Proposals, it can be said that these two matters have different aims. In particular, the 
former has the aims of resolving conflicts between two parties and providing certain 
parties with remedies and protection. In contrast, the aims of the Proposals are to 
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prevent conflicts between participants and biobankers and to encourage biobanking, 
by suggesting how to develop a relationship that is desirable for both of them. Thus, 
one can say that they focus on different aspects of a participant-biobanker relationship, 
and thereby the recognition of property rights does not affect how the Proposals work 
in terms of developing the ARR. For example, according to the conceptual framework 
of the ARR, the ARR is based on, inter alia, respectfulness, collectiveness of goals and 
collaboration,121 all of which can prevail regardless of the extent to which property 
rights over participants’ samples are recognised and who holds such rights. From a 
practical perspective, the Model requires reinforcing collectiveness in biobanking 
goals by resisting biobanking activities that deviate from collective goals,122 and thus 
any misuses of biobank resources can be hindered or even inhibited, no matter whether 
participants have property rights over biobank resources or not. It can therefore be 
argued that these two matters are basically not related to each other. One might also 
say that the Proposals do not deal with this recognition, nor are they affected by it. 
Conclusion 
To conclude the contribution of this thesis, this thesis’ original contribution 
concerns one approach to an ARR, a participant-biobanker relationship that can deliver 
ethical and effective biobanking practices. This thesis first establishes that, as a 
fundamental notion, the ARR proposed should be able to deal with the distinctive 
characteristics of biobanking and to strike a balance between participants’ and 
biobanks’ interests. Based on this premise, it then argues that, conceptually, the ARR 
should look like a partnership relationship, and thus it should have five key features  
– i.e. respectfulness, cooperation with negotiability, support, continuity in relationship 
and collectiveness in goals – as its conceptual framework. To suggest how to foster it 
in practice, this thesis proposes the Model, the model for biobank governance that can 
incorporate those key features into biobanking activities. The Model comprises four 
key attributes, namely emphasis on collective goals, collaboration, reciprocation and 
                                               
121 See 2.3 in ch 2 above. 
122 See 3.1.1 b) (Changes to Biobankers’ Goals) in ch 3 above. 
287 
 
control sharing. To show how to apply the Model, it is tested against the governance 
of UK Biobank and ALSPAC. The results of this testing suggest that mechanisms that 
are crucial for fostering the ARR in practice are ongoing communication with 
participants and the establishment of an oversight body that can encourage the pursuit 
of collective goals and the provision of participant safeguards. It is worth emphasising 
again that these two mechanisms are merely suggestions resulting from this testing, 
not requirements that need to be satisfied in order to comply with the Model. 
In this chapter, the nature and full extent of this contribution are emphasised 
and clarified. In so doing, this chapter explains the academic grounding of the 
Proposals: it first delineates the ethicality of the Proposals (further from Chapter 1) by 
explaining that the Proposals adopt deontological ethics and virtue ethics, not 
consequentialism, as their approaches to ethical reasoning and this adoption can be 
called the reductionist radical approach to virtue ethics; it then deals with the legality 
of the Proposals by arguing that it is not suitable to use the Model directly as a legal 
framework for biobank governance due to the nature and content of the Model, 
although it is possible to do so in certain limited circumstances or to use the Model to 
inform legal mechanisms. Moreover, this chapter pinpoints the limitations on the 
application of the Proposals, namely the inability to (i) give participants control over 
the direction of biobanking activities, (ii) prevent non-active participants from being 
represented by active ones and (iii) address issues that should be settled by the public 
and communities. Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates how the Proposals respond to 
some controversial issues that usually arise in a biobanking context, i.e. participants’ 
control, individual feedback, commercial involvement, financial incentives and 
property rights. 
Some key points about the contribution of this thesis should be noted here. 
First, from a philosophical perspective, this thesis provides an ethical framework for 
biobank governance that perceives partnership as a virtuous trait for biobankers and 
provides rules for acquiring this trait through biobanking practices. Second, the ARR 
is essentially fostered through communication between biobankers and participants. 
This communication is intended to inform participants about biobanks in which they 
participate, to provide them with general knowledge about biobanking, and to receive 
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their input about biobanking. In practice, it helps them to deal with and negotiate about 
biobanking activities as well as to cooperate with biobankers properly. Third, the 
Proposals do not advocate participants’ full control over biobanking activities. Rather, 
they call for sharing control over biobanking with participants at an individual level 
and the extent of this sharing should be contextual. Fourth, for the Proposals, it is 
generally acceptable to provide participants with individual feedback and/or financial 
incentives, because this provision is considered to help maintain a research relationship 
with them by reciprocating their contributions towards biobanking. Fifth, commercial 
involvement in biobanking is unlikely to undermine development of the ARR as long 
as biobanking activities are managed in line with the Proposals properly. Finally, while 
the ARR cannot hope to meet all expectations, it can nevertheless help participants and 
biobankers to work towards a common understanding of what is at stake and to support 
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Materials Used for Analysing UK Biobank Governance 
This appendix lists materials that were accessed and reviewed to set up the 
discussions and develop the arguments in this thesis, especially Chapter 4, in addition 
to those listed in Bibliography. It also demonstrates how the titles of those materials 
are simplified, as appearing in bold, when being used as references in the discussions 
and footnotes in Chapter 4. It is notable that this simplification has the aim of avoiding 
confusion arising from the use of common referencing styles. 
The EGC’s Materials 
 EGC Annual Reports 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Annual Report  
2004-2005, (2006) 21. (“EGC Annual Report 2004-5”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Annual Review 2006, 
(2006) 13. (“EGC Annual Report 2006”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Annual Review 2007, 
(2008) 17. (“EGC Annual Report 2007”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Annual Review 2008, 
(2009) 17. (“EGC Annual Report 2008”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Annual Review 2009, 
(2010) 21. (“EGC Annual Report 2009”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Annual Review 2010, 
(2011) 20. (“EGC Annual Report 2010”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Annual Review 2011, 
(2012) 16. (“EGC Annual Report 2011”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Annual Review 2012, 
(2013) 20. (“EGC Annual Report 2012”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Annual Review 2013, 
(2014) 17. (“EGC Annual Report 2013”) 
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o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Annual Review 2014, 
(2015) 25. (“EGC Annual Report 2014”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Annual Review 2015, 
(2016) 24. (“EGC Annual Report 2015”) 
 Policy Documents 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Communications 
Strategy, (14 February 2011) 5. (“EGC Communication Strategy”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Statement on Access, 
(January 2012) 5. (“EGC Statement on Access”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Terms of Reference and 
Modus Operandi, 4. (“EGC Terms of Reference”) 
 Reports on EGC Meetings 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on the EGC 13th 
Meeting, (1 November 2007) 16. (“Report on 13th EGC Meeting”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on the EGC 14th 
Meeting, (17 March 2008) 12. (“Report on 14th EGC Meeting”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on the EGC 15th 
Meeting, (9 June 2008) 13. (“Report on 15th EGC Meeting”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on the EGC 16th 
Meeting, (15 September 2008) 15. (“Report on 16th EGC Meeting”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on the EGC 19th 
Meeting, (8 June 2009) 18. (“Report on 19th EGC Meeting”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on the EGC 20th 
Meeting, (7 September 2009) 16. (“Report on 20th EGC Meeting”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on the EGC 25th 
Meeting, (6 December 2010) 10. (“Report on 25th EGC Meeting”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on the EGC 26th 
Meeting, (14 March 2011) 11. (“Report on 26th EGC Meeting”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on the EGC 27th 
Meeting, (6 June 2011) 9. (“Report on 27th EGC Meeting”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on the EGC 28th 
Meeting, (26 September 2011) 10. (“Report on 28th EGC Meeting”) 
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o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on the EGC 29th 
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o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on the EGC 42nd 
Meeting, (9 March 2015) 8. (“Report on 42nd EGC Meeting”) 
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o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on the EGC 44th 
Meeting, (8 September 2015) 13. (“Report on 44th EGC Meeting”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on the EGC 45th 
Meeting, (7 December 2015) 8. (“Report on 45th EGC Meeting”) 
 Reports on EGC Public Meeting 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on Public 
Meeting, (2005) 6. (“Report on EGC Public Meeting 2005”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on Public 
Meeting, (June 2007) 12.  (“Report on EGC Public Meeting 2007 
(June)”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on Public 
Meeting, (December 2007) 16. (“Report on EGC Public Meeting 
2007 (December)”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on Public 
Meeting, (2008) 6. (“Report on EGC Public Meeting 2008”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on Public 
Meeting, (2009) 6. (“Report on EGC Public Meeting 2009”) 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Report on Public 
Meeting, (2010) 12. (“Report on EGC Public Meeting 2010”) 
 Other Materials 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, available at 




o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Feedback of Health 
Related Findings: Foreground Principles and Background 
Perspectives, (June 2015) 41. 
o UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, Workshop Report: 
Involving Publics in Biobank Research and Governance, (8 December 
2009) 24. (“Report on EGC Workshop on Public Involvement”) 
UK Biobank’s Materials 
 Ethics and Governance Framework 
o UK Biobank, UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework 
Version 1.0 (for Comment), (September 2003) 34.  
(“UK Biobank EGF v1”) 
o UK Biobank, UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework 
Version 3.0, (October 2007) 20. (“UK Biobank EGF v3”) 
 Policy Documents 
o Trehearne, A, UK Biobank Communication Plans, (June 2011) 4. 
(“Communication Plans”) 
o UK Biobank, Re-contact Procedure, (16 April 2013) 12.  
(“Policy on Re-contacting”) 
o UK Biobank, UK Biobank Access Procedures v1.0, (November 2011) 
36. (“Policy on Access”) 
 Recruitment Documents 
o UK Biobank, Consent Form, (24 November 2006) 1.  
(“Consent Form”) 
o UK Biobank, Further Information Leaflet, (2009) 11.  
(“Further Information Leaflet”) 
o UK Biobank, Information Leaflet, (2010) 11.  
(“Information Leaflet”) 
 Other Materials 
o UK Biobank, available at http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/ (accessed on 10 
July 2016). (“UK Biobank Website”) 
o UK Biobank, Information Leaflet for Repeat Assessment Visit, (2012) 
9. (“Information Leaflet for Repeat Assessment Visit”) 
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o UK Biobank, Report of the Integrated Pilot Phase, (14 November 
2006) 175. (“Report of the Integrated Pilot Phase”) 
o UK Biobank Coordinating Centre, Public Consultation on Draft Access 
Procedures: Summary of Responses and Modifications, (21 September 
2011) 11. (“Report on Public Consultation on Draft Access 
Procedures”) 
Others’ Materials 
 House of Commons (Science and Technology Committee), Third Report on 
the Work of the Medical Research Council, (2003) 35. 
 Review of the EGC: 
o Medical Research Council and Wellcome Trust, Review of the UK 
Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, (July 2010) 13.  
(“Review of the EGC 2010”) 
o Medical Research Council and Wellcome Trust, Review of the UK 
Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, (June 2015) 16.  









Materials Used for Analysing ALSPAC Governance 
This appendix lists materials that were accessed and reviewed to set up the 
discussions and develop the arguments in this thesis, especially Chapter 5, in addition 
to those listed in Bibliography. It also demonstrates how the titles of those materials 
are simplified, as appearing in bold, when being used as references in the discussions 
and footnotes in Chapter 5. It is notable that this simplification has the aim of avoiding 
confusion arising from the use of common referencing styles.  
 Annual Reports (ascending by time) 
o ALSPAC, Report on ALSPAC Milestones 1st Jan 2006 - Oct 2006, 
(2007) 19. (“Annual Report 2006”) 
o ALSPAC, Report on ALSPAC Milestones Year 2 1st Jan 2007 - Dec 
2007, (March 2008) 14. (“Annual Report 2007”) 
o ALSPAC, Report on ALSPAC Milestones Jan - Dec 2008, (March 
2009) 20. (“Annual Report 2008”) 
o ALSPAC, Report on Annual Milestones January - December 2009, 
(February 2010) 18. (“Annual Report 2009”) 
o ALSPAC, Strategic Award Milestones Year 1: April 2011 to March 
2012, (2012) 6; ALSPAC, Strategic Award Milestones Year 1, 
Appendix 5: Yr1 Milestones for ALSPAC G2 (COCO90s) Study,  
(11 May 2012) 4. (“Annual Report 2011-12”) 
 Participant Newsletters (ascending by time) 
o Newsletters for all participants 
 ALSPAC, Participant Newsletter Issue 25, (200?) 8. 
(“Participant Newsletters Issue 25”) 
 ALSPAC, Participant Newsletter Issue 26, (2003) 8. 
(“Participant Newsletters Issue 26”) 
 ALSPAC, Participant Newsletter Issue 27, (2004) 8. 
(“Participant Newsletters Issue 27”) 
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o Parents Newsletters 
 ALSPAC, Parents Newsletter Issue 33, (August 2008) 8. 
(“Parents Newsletters Issue 33”) 
 ALSPAC, Parents Newsletter Issue 34, (2010) 8.  
(“Parents Newsletters Issue 34”) 
 ALSPAC, Parents Newsletters, (September 2011) 6. 
(“Parents Newsletters 2011”) 
o Young Participant Newsletters 
 ALSPAC, Young Participant Newsletter, (April 2008) 3. 
(“Young Participant Newsletters 2008”) 
 ALSPAC, Young Participant Newsletter, (November 2009) 6. 
(“Young Participant Newsletters 2009”) 
 ALSPAC, Young Participant Newsletter, (March 2012) 4. 
(“Young Participant Newsletters 2012”) 
o Family Newsletters 
 ALSPAC, Family Newsletter, (July 2013) 8. 
(“Family Newsletters 2013”) 
 ALSPAC, Family Newsletter 2014-2015, (July 2014) 8. 
(“Family Newsletters 2014-15”) 
 ALSPAC, Family Newsletter 2015-2016, (2015) 8. 
(“Family Newsletters 2015-16”) 
 Policy Documents 
o ALSPAC Ethic & Law Committee, Policy regarding Disclosure of 
Biomedical Information to Participants, (March 2011) 2. 
(“Policy on Feedback”) 
o ALSPAC, Access Policy v.5.40, (December 2014) 24.  
(“Policy on Access”) 
o ALSPAC, Complaints Policy v3, (June 2014) 4.  
(“Policy on Complaints”) 
o ALSPAC, Withdrawal of Consent Policy, (February 2011) 5. 
(“Policy on Withdrawal”) 
 Recruitment Documents 
o ALSPAC, Consent Form, (14 March 2014) 2. (“Consent Form”) 
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o ALSPAC, Summary Booklet, (2011) 4.  
(“Summary Information Booklet”) 
o ALSPAC, The Detail: Detailed Booklet v.7, (14 March 2014) 36. 
(“Detailed Information Booklet”) 
 Terms of Reference 
o ALSPAC, Executive Committee: Terms of Reference, (November 
2014) 4. (“Terms of Reference - AEC”) 
o ALSPAC, ALSPAC Steering Group: Terms of Reference, (April 2014) 
4. (“Terms of Reference - ASG”) 
o ALSPAC, Independent Scientific Advisory Board: Terms of 
Reference, (June 2014) 2. (“Terms of Reference - ISAB”) 
o ALSPAC, ALSPAC Ethics & Law Committee (ALEC): Terms of 
Reference, (December 2014) 14. (“Terms of Reference - ALEC”) 
 Other Materials 
o ALSPAC, ALSPAC Progress Report 2006‐2010, (2011) 69. 
o ALSPAC, New Data Collection Review Dates, (2016) 1. 
o ALSPAC, "The Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children 
(ALSPAC) Access Policy" (October 2012) available at (accessed 12 
January 2016). 
o ALSPAC, Twenty One Years: Our Journey, (2012) 96. 
o Centre for Ethics in Medicine (University of Bristol), "EPEG Project" 
(October 2000 - September 2003) available at http://www.bris.ac.uk/ 
Depts//Ethics/CEM/epeg.htm (accessed 5 January 2015). 
o Greenwood, L, "ALSPAC - Lynne Molloy" (30 June 2009) available 
at http://centreforpublicengagement.blogspot.co.uk/2009/06/ 
alspac-lynne-molloy.html (accessed 13 January 2016). 
o University of Bristol, "Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and 
Children" available at http://www.bristol.ac.uk/alspac/ (accessed on 
10 July 2016). (“ALSPAC Website”) 
o Young Health Participation, "Involving Children and Young People in 
Research - PRWE Forum" (11 December 2013) available at 
https://younghealthparticipation.com/page/2/ (accessed 20 June 2016). 
